THE

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AND AFTER

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Founded by JAMES KNOWLES.

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No. DCCCXXV—July 1937

PICTURES ARE NOT ONLY ART

By S. Kennedy North

As long ago as 1853 a Select Committee was set up to consider, amongst other things, by 'what mode the collective Monuments of Antiquity and Fine Art possessed by the Nation may be most securely preserved,' etc. An exhaustive Report of nearly 1000 folio pages was published by this Committee, and provides the most amusing, and in many ways astonishing, reading for anyone interested in this subject. The picture-cleaning at the National Gallery in the autumn of 1846 had attracted some notice and was condemned in a letter to the Earl of Ellesmere. Sir C. Eastlake, the then Director of the Gallery, said that in his opinion the results of these operations had been entirely satisfactory. In 1937 the same subject stifles under a thick blanket of similar complacency. When the evidence of the picture restorers and cleaners is examined it will be found that there is very little departure from the practices employed so widely upon the nation's pictures in those days and those prevailing now

The great Michael Faraday gave evidence before this Committee with charming simplicity and clear insight. In one of his answers he said:

> I only do those things [*i.e.*, experiments upon pictures] as a matter of goodwill towards the Government; I could not devote my time to it professionally, but I have not the smallest doubt that a person of competent chemical knowledge, and a little acquainted with the practice of painting in ancient and modern times, might be valuably employed in ascertaining such points; *and I wonder that it should be left, as it were, to accident when accurate knowledge upon the subject might be so easily acquired.*

On the assumption that art has a cultural value, nations have erected an elaborate system for the enjoyment of it. If that assumption is true, then works of art are worth preserving. On May 27 last the following letter from the pen of the present writer appeared in *The Times*:

> The precarious state of several pictures in the Tate Gallery is a subject of grave concern to many people. Among the most beloved are three Turners, 'Port Ruysdael,' 'Pilate washing his hands,' and 'Bay of Baiae,' each in urgent need of attention (not cleaning) if they are to survive. These pictures are worth from £10,000 to £15,000 each.
>
> Knowing the devotion of the Trustees and officials to the charges under their care, it occurred to me that the underlying reason for so deplorable a state of things must be outside their control.
>
> And surely enough, it is to be found on page 44 of the Civil Estimates for the year ending 1938, where the allowance to the Tate Gallery for 'Framing, cleaning pictures, travelling, etc.,' is stated to be £400.

A fortnight later *The Times* published a leading article entitled 'A Case for Inquiry.' Herein were developed two points:

(1) 'That for the particular need now brought to the public notice the Tate Gallery has, in effect, no provision whatever.' It is not an art matter, but a civic one.

(2) That some of the pictures in the Tate Gallery 'are in a dangerous state of decay.' Again not a matter of art, but one of science.

'*Soigné*' best describes that air of well-being and polish holding the admiration of all visitors to our great national

collections. Buildings of imposing construction, the National Gallery, the Tate Gallery and the National Portrait Gallery, have been magnificently added to through the splendid generosity of private individuals in recent years, so much so that the Treasury—in the long run, the authority responsible for their maintenance—must sometimes pause to wonder whether the large upkeep charges involved by these additions are justified by the turnstile returns; and whether it is not wise to discourage any further such munificence in future. In the case of the addition to the Tate Gallery opened by the King on June 29, new vast halls are built 50 feet high, as yet sparsely populated with disproportionate sculptured figures. More than £150,000 have been given for the purpose of new building in the last few years, to say nothing of lavish amounts subscribed for new works of art. So that on the one hand we have substantial pompous buildings containing many works of art in ill-health, and on the other large sums spent in acquisitions which could be better spent on the conservation of those already acquired.

The upkeep of the Galleries is a charge upon the community, while the conservation of the works of art within them would be a perpetually growing asset increasing as time goes on in monetary value. Since nothing is done for the permanent conservation of pictures, and therefore their decay and loss of value inevitable, new acquisitions can only be regarded in the light of replacements.[1]

The Financial Secretary to the Treasury said in the House of Commons on June 3: 'Repair and restoration have been undertaken in the past in the ordinary course, and the Trustees would no doubt approach the Treasury if they considered further steps necessary.' Since the Trustees, up to the time of writing, have not approached the Treasury, one of the purposes of this article is to show that it is time 'they considered further steps necessary.' The Trustees of these Galleries, all men of affairs, number amongst them several politicians of high office. It can only be deduced that they are either unaware of the absurdly small sum they have for the

[1] This may be desirable, but let us remember that the technique and materials used in French and English painting of the nineteenth century cannot survive without conservation, and this means that the world of culture and thought expressed by it is in trust with us for future generations.

upkeep of the pictures at the National Gallery and the Tate Gallery—£1600 in the first case and £400 in the second—or they are ignorant of the dire necessity of some of the nation's property for which they assume responsibility. If public opinion is not aroused in this matter, then surely it is the business of the Trustees to inform it. In matters of art ours is a sadly uncultured nation; but the Suddeley Committee, in its work of lengthening the opening hours of our Galleries and Museums, and the National Art Collections Fund, in exciting public subscription for acquisitions of works of art, are doing invaluable service to the community. It does seem, however, that in the matter of preservation of works of art there is in this country a nucleus of anxious informed public opinion that is now ready for a lead from competent authority. Where is that competent authority to be found? On the Boards of Trustees of the three great London Galleries there is not one man whose peculiar study and knowledge is that of the '*materia*' of pictures.[2] True, there are several painters on the Board of Trustees of the Tate Gallery; but, while they are distinguished internationally for their brilliant attainments, their province is not the understanding of the physical qualities of the science of picture-making, so that it is unreasonable to expect exertion in this matter from them.

Among the directors and officers of these Galleries the same condition prevails. They do their job with great patience and devotion. Some of them have 'flair' and understanding of the æsthetics of painting. Some have many learned books and treatises to their credit; some of them paint in the little spare time they enjoy from their duties. But none of them has the knowledge which is also found to be deficient among the Trustees. Nor is it to be expected. Their education lies along the well-trodden paths of art history, the collection of chronological facts, the niceties of authenticity and taste. They have not the time—no man has in the span of life—to add to their own valuable specific knowledge the highly technical, peculiar 'what-is-what' of the physics of picture-making. The acquisition of it is a long experimental process with all the heresies of revolutionary ideas, practical

[2] Had there been, two recent acquisitions would never have been sanctioned by him—not that their authenticity or importance is questionable, but they are pictures in a state of ill-health, and the nation should no longer acquire such works while it has no hospital for their treatment

failures and courage where effort is forward in its direction rather than backward, requiring a rare mixture of sensibility balanced on the razor edge between science and art. It was Leonardo da Vinci who said: 'Those who work without the help of science are like sailors in a ship without helm or compass who never know for certain where they are going. True, there is an admirable beginning in the appointment of a scientific adviser to the National Gallery. But there is all the difference in the world between the theory and practice of the laboratory and those of the workshop. So that it is not his province to translate the data-book of the laboratory into the routine of the studio.

And that is the difficulty. There is, at the moment, no training in what questions to ask. It is left to the private investigators, whose work lies outside the Galleries, backed by the confidence and money of a few individuals, who have learned in the harsh experience as pioneers their way about the labyrinthine paths of this vast subject.[3]

So that neither the Trustees nor the officers of the Galleries know what questions to ask concerning the state of health of pictures and can only discern that which is always apparent to any intelligent layman. A part of the Financial Secretary's answer in the House of Commons stated: 'Pictures in the Tate Gallery are periodically inspected by experts with a view to ascertaining what steps are desirable for their preservation.' What experts? And what is meant by 'preservation'?

The 'experts' are the restorers and cleaners employed by the Galleries. Now here it is necessary to be as clear as possible on a highly technical subject. The picture-restorers of England are among the most skilful in the world. Many of their names are household words in the world of art. Some of them have astonishing skill. They have served the galleries and private collectors faithfully for over a century, keeping, in the main, closely to an empirical, rule-of-thumb

[3] One instance of many will suffice. The altogether complicated and involved problem of the nature of the breakdown between paint film and canvas resolved itself at one time during the investigation into fundamental questions relative to canvas, flax, the plant itself, ultimately leading to the experimental work carried on by the Linen Industry Research Association and the flax grown at Sandringham under the ægis of the late King George V. See my letter to *The Times*, January 1, 1937, 'Flax in Picture Canvases'—S. K. N.

tradition, largely secret in practice, which has proved pleasing to their clients by the clean freshness they impart to the pictures that come under their care. A few of them lay claim to using scientific methods. To these men the gallery officials apply for opinions as to the physical condition of their pictures. The Financial Secretary to the Treasury is ill-informed when he uses the word 'preservation.' Many extremely important instances in recent years could be cited where the expressed opinion of a competent picture-restorer has proved to be hopelessly wrong on the question of 'preservation,' in which some of the most valuable pictures in the world have been conserved, in spite of the expressed opinion that they must be left to decay. There is no disparagement here of a profession full of sincere, competent men. It is a statement of fact that outside their work lies a whole world of thought and practice entirely foreign to them. Indeed, it is possible to give innumerable instances where numerous pictures of international importance is such that they are suffering to-day more from the disabilities brought about by the work of the restorers of the past than from their inherent qualities due to their painters.[4] And yet it cannot be too emphatically stated that the restorer's work is necessary and useful, and that there is more than enough for him to do. But it is not 'preservation,' and has nothing whatever to do with it.

The word 'preserved' would have had a very different meaning to-day had the advice given by Michael Faraday, alluded to on p. 2, been acted upon. Fortunately, nothing in this world is permanently either good or bad; and, but for cost, there is no reason why existing methods should lag so appallingly far behind those dictated by the common-sense of research. For since Faraday's time an enormous amount of research has been done having a direct bearing upon this subject, and there is a further huge amount of it having an indirect, yet no less important, relation to it. The point most difficult for the layman to understand is that the physical make-up of a picture is absolutely distinct from anything to do with its emotional appeal, design, or pictorial qualities.

[4] Turner has suffered more in this respect than any other modern painter. And over and over again it is stated, without any authority whatever, that he was a bad craftsman and used indifferent materials in his work This is always used as an argument for the difficulty of 'restoring' his work and a reason for leaving it alone to decay; and yet there are notable instances of his work having been sensibly conserved.

The film of the most delicate oil painting is in essentials the same as the paint on the outside of the house or the doors of the room in which it hangs. The canvas on which it is painted is similar to that of the sheets on the bed. The wood sometimes used as the base to support the paint film of a picture has the same physical qualities as the chairs and tables. But, of course, the combinations of all these essentials in an almost infinite variety of technique coming down through the centuries make the picture a thing of great complexity.

Most of the results of scientific inquiry are published in the bulletins and transactions of learned societies and the industrial associations, which are promoted by individuals interested in various relative trades, Government research stations, and bodies attached to universities. The industrial research stations devote their energies to the betterment of everyday commodities. Their libraries possess a wealth of material relevant to the proper conservation of works of art, as yet uncatalogued and unannotated. To arrange all this requires patience, knowledge of where the material is to be found, to say nothing of the recognition of its application when it is seen.

The Paint Research Station at Teddington possesses records [5] of the most valuable research in every phase into the properties of pigments, vehicles, oils and varnishes, some of the discoveries being of first-rate importance to the understanding of picture problems.[6]

[5] Unfortunately, the information contained herein is confidential and only available to members, yet it is to be stated that both Mr Geoffrey Mander, M P, one time chairman, and Dr L A Jordan, the director, were more than sympathetic to the late Mr Roger Fry and myself in our efforts to form a liaison between the association and the National Gallery Dr Morrell, with Mander Brothers, and Dr. Laurie, with Messrs Madderton, must be cited as having done work of great value—the first on varnishes and the second on pigments

[6] To give only one important instance In 1929, under the direction of Dr Jordan, Dr G F New prosecuted an exhaustive inquiry into the nature of ' bloom ' on varnish films Now this ' bloom ' is a common disease in pictures and one of the chief reasons for ' cleaning ' them The inquiry revealed surprising new facts about varnish disease which only an amateur gallery director could ignore. They give an understanding of a hitherto abstruse and unknown subject Yet the old rule-of-thumb application of varnish, with all its imperfections and ultimate detriment to the paint film of the picture, is still practised in our Galleries In the light of present-day knowledge of the subject, this one example alone is an indictment of the unenlightened practice still obtaining in the workshop of the nation's pictures And when, as in the recent violent emotional controversy in the Press on the cleaning of ' Philip IV ,' by Velasques (a perfectly legitimate and necessary performance), the Director of the National Gallery and the restorer suffered much ill-informed abuse, chiefly from the artists in the community, the real reasons for a sound criticism of what was then done never once found themselves in print--for the simple reason that none of the critics knew them

The Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, in answer to an inquiry from the National Gallery in 1929, investigated the influence of variations of atmospheric humidity on works of art.[7]

It is an odious comparison that the cigarettes made to burn by the million are the subject of intense and prolonged research, the air conditioning of the factories and warehouses a matter of the nicest adjustment; biscuits, chocolates, textiles —a hundred things—are manufactured and stored in atmosphere adjusted to these commodities; while the atmosphere of our Galleries, in which is housed untold wealth, is left uncontrolled except in the meanest manner. And this in spite of the practical application of such control carried out at Hampton Court Palace in 1934. Under Mr. W. Ormsby Gore, as First Commissioner of Works, Mr. Macintyre, the senior engineer, designed and evolved a system of air conditioning at the Orangery for the housing of the Mantegna Cartoons. This achieved unassumingly, under great difficulties imposed by the building and the paintings, a result incomparable anywhere in the world, and established once and for all the importance of this subject to the accomplishment of the desired end.[8]

The Government Laboratory, the Linen Industry Research Association, the National Physical Laboratory, His Majesty's Office of Works, the Building Research Station, the British Museum Laboratory [9]—all these centres have within

[7] The notes on this work are published by the Courtauld Institute. Lord Parmoor in *The Times* of July 10, 1931, moved by criticism by Dr. Laurie in the same journal on July 9, offered the hospitality of the offices of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research 'for any discussion of a project for combining scientific knowledge, technical craftsmanship and æsthetic experience.' The Director of the National Gallery on July 10 in *The Times* said his Trustees 'were convinced of the urgent need . . ., they welcome Lord Parmoor's letter and look forward with satisfaction to a clear co-operation and co-ordination between the staffs of museums and galleries and the scientific research centres.' Little, however, has been done. In this letter he referred to the 'careful records kept by H.M. Office of Works of temperature and humidity changes in various galleries and museums, among them the National Gallery, to ascertain their variations and to suggest the best kind of control.' Again little has been done.

[8] See 'Air Conditioning in the Lower Orangery,' by J. Macintyre, *Burlington Magazine*, March 1934.

[9] Dr. Alexander Scott, an adventurous pioneer, started this laboratory to investigate problems arising out of the care of museum exhibits. While pictures have not been its first concern, it has nevertheless, through Dr. Plenderleith, contributed something to isolated questions. But its value lies behind the type of inquiring mind of its founder—cautious, conservative, yet no new idea too fantastic for pursuit. Botany (in which Nature is in her most fantastic mood) is one of his studies. He is a great source of help, serenely patient and inspiring.

them men who have made valuable contributions in one way or another to the subject under review. True, they have been approached with isolated problems. But there is no co-ordination of effort, and there is no application in terms of workshop practice. Life is too short for anyone to acquire within himself all the highly specialised knowledge in microscopy, chemistry, physics and mechanics, but it is not too short for a beginning to be made in the practical application of the bearing these sciences have upon our pictures.

On the Continent and in America, naturally, this subject is a matter of inquiry. In 1930 the International Museums Office Conference (League of Nations) was held in Rome. From all over the world delegates met to discuss problems arising out of modern conditions of museums.[10] But we have in our own country a wealth of material, with men competent beyond any others in the world, so that, as *The Times* says, 'there is no excuse for supposing that money granted for the scientific care of works of art would be thrown away on fanciful or futile experiment.'

To the public who own the nation's pictures, to Government officials, Gallery Trustees and Directors, and restorers who are its servants, this entreaty is made, because it is nothing more than ignorance—the easiest thing in the world to remove—that prevents this vital question from being tackled in the strong light of the common-sense of science. Prejudice is only half entrenched, and more than enough work has now been done to overthrow it. It is for public opinion to understand what it should demand, and all else will follow. If only £1600 per annum for the National Gallery and £400 per annum for the Tate Gallery are available for 'preservation,' then it would be wise to cut down further expenditure on new purchases and devote the money to the conservation of those works already acquired: less spectacular, perhaps, but in the long run of greater æsthetic importance and pecuniary advantage.

On the boards of the three great London Galleries should sit men whose study and knowledge give them understanding of the '*materia*' of pictures. A department should be set up

[10] The majority of the papers read at this Conference were published subsequently from 1931 in *Mouseion*, Revue Internationale de Muséographie (Paris, Office International des Musées).

forthwith under Government auspices to collect, correlate, catalogue and annotate the available information on the subject of science in relation to the conservation of pictures and their housing, and Lord Parmoor's suggestion for a co-ordination of useful centres carried out. The Government should set up and equip adequate workshops and studios in connexion with the nation's pictures and their care, dovetailing the conduct of them with the scientific advice obtainable from those co-ordinated centres. A Government inquiry should be made into the important financial aspects of the national collections, worth large sums of money, freeing them from the obscurity and insecurity from which they now suffer, to see if it is not possible to regulate this glaring example of bad economy.

S. KENNEDY NORTH.

THE FUTURE OF LABOUR

By John Scanlon

In any discussion on the future of Labour two outstanding facts ought to be considered. The first is that the more useful and necessary the labour of a workman is, the less we pay him in wages. The second fact is that, both on its industrial and political sides, the Labour movement has completely lost sight of the first fact. Had Labour consistently remembered that the reason for its origin and growth was the need to emancipate Carlyle's toil-worn craftsman, there would be no need to-day to consider Labour's future: it would be so assured that discussion would be unnecessary. All such discussions, unfortunately, centre round the Labour Party, whereas Labour's advance could certainly go on even without the Labour Party, and may now quite conceivably be held up because of it. Those who tell us to wait for a political majority never seem to consider whether a political majority is possible, now or ever. The prediction is made from scores of platforms each week-end that the majority will come, and now officially another programme is drafted telling us what they will do in the first five years of power. It is because large numbers of trade union members and Socialists, seeing no hope of a majority, but believing Labour must secure a better share of the wealth produced, are now trying to think of other methods. They believe that Labour has no political power without a majority, and that those who each week-end say that a majority is possible are either deluding themselves or the workers.

I am one of that number, and in the course of this article I will seek to show that the majority is not possible on several grounds:

(1) That the experts make no real appeal either to the intelligent worker or to the thoughtful middle class.

(2) That, so long as electoral arrangements remain on the

existing constituency basis, there are not enough proletarian seats to secure a majority.

(3) Because of changing industrial conditions, the purely proletarian workers, on whom the majority depends, are growing less, whilst the number of distributors is increasing.

Now, I have no objection to the expert as such; my objection is that he is not fulfilling his function. To be of service to the worker he should not be in the forefront of the battle as a leader. He should be in the factory supplying the munitions. He has no passion for humanity, except as something to be docketed and tabulated. Social justice means little or nothing to the expert. This, I believe, is the great tragedy of Labour. We have discarded the evangelical zeal for social justice, for a series of experts' documents which mean nothing, either to the head or the heart, of Britain's workers. The reason for this is a mistaken notion that people who demand social justice for the workers are likely to drive away the middle-class vote, whereas careful and dull experts will attract them. There is little evidence to justify this assumption.

Whatever else elections prove, they certainly show that just as the class war *theory* has practically disappeared from Britain, it emerges as a *fact* during election times. With few exceptions constituencies vote according to class. Were it not that the working class is less class-conscious than the well-to-do, there would be no exceptions at all. In any parliamentary election the working class must be in an overwhelming majority for Labour to win. With only a reasonable margin the Conservative will win by a moderately sized majority. Where the well-to-do are in a majority the Conservative majority invariably exceeds the Labour vote. No juggling with different types of candidates will alter that fact. Chelsea preferred Sir Samuel Hoare to Bertrand Russell, and the University of London decisively rejected Mr. H. G. Wells for Sir Ernest Graham-Little. There was clearly no question here of education or intellectual ability. The deciding factor in these as in other results was the party label. The same is true of overwhelmingly working-class constituencies. In these constituencies Marxian economics are scarcely men-

tioned. Any Conservative or Liberal who has fought will tell you that the one effective slogan is, 'Workers, vote for your own class!'

A scrutiny of recent London County Council election results shows that, with the exception of Fulham, every one of those seats had been won at parliamentary elections years before; some of the 'victories,' indeed, had been won for Parliament as far back as 1922. None of them was won because Mr. Morrison's ability and respectability had persuaded class electors to vote Labour. They were won, as in previous years, because the working class were in a majority. Paddington, Chelsea, Hampstead and the like, were, and will remain, unimpressed by Mr. Morrison's ability. The middle class are more likely to respond to an idealistic appeal than to an attempt to prove that the Labour Party is more competent than the Conservative Party. Far more middle-class and well-to-do people joined the Labour Party, thanks to Keir Hardie's evangelical zeal, than are now joining through the 'cleverness' of Mr. Morrison; when Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and Mr. Philip Snowden were fighting a lone fight against the war and for peace by negotiation they secured much middle-class support.

If Labour is to get a majority, it must therefore come in some other way than in a mere appeal to cleverness. Were I a well-to-do person, and given a choice between two parties who were equally committed to maintaining the existing system, I would at once choose the party which, from practical experience, knew something about the system. The exaltation of the expert at the expense of the man of vision has produced no good results; it has done infinite damage to the working class as a whole. It is the latest and worst form of class snobbery and has poisoned the entire Labour movement. Men with a good knowledge of text-books and none of practical life have asserted themselves in the Labour movement, thanks to the easy air of assurance which most one-subject men possess, and to the genuine reverence for experts possessed by working-class leaders. This still persists, in spite of the evidence that in the few years of government enjoyed by the Labour Party the two men who will always stand out as having achieved something are John Wheatley (miner) and Arthur Henderson (ironfounder).

The first succeeded in evolving some form of order out of the housing chaos; the second, in addition to his work for peace, succeeded in organising the finest political machine in the country. Both knew how to make the best use of an incomparable Civil Service. Outside politics to-day, industry after industry is being run by men who worked with their hands and their heads. The man who supervised the building of the *Queen Mary* was at one time a working fitter. Yet every expert is still absolutely convinced that if a man has ever dug coal, worked a loom, or grown food he must of necessity be a bit stupid and quite unfit for government. When two recent bye-elections running simultaneously—Preston and Greenock—had to choose candidates, the first name on the list in each case was a barrister. Each was chosen though the House is already overrun with lawyers willing to serve on either side, and each was chosen though of all the brilliant barristers who joined up when Labour seemed the coming party not one remains. A later recruit to the party, Sir Stafford Cripps, has actually been asked to leave. The Preston result should have been a lesson, because it was revealed that in attempting to capture the middle class there we had actually lost the working class. A seat that had been won in 1906 could not be retained in 1937. Turn where we will, there is not the remotest evidence that this passion for experts has been justified by results. Indeed, in time we will find that we have paid a heavy price for our amateur experts, and nowhere have we paid more dearly than in foreign policy.

I have, of course, no class objections to the well-to-do joining the Labour Party. I have watched them come and go. During my period of active service in the Labour movement I discerned two types of recruit—those who came to serve and those who saw in Labour a possible outlet for the ability which they obviously felt they had. This first type is usually of the gentle sort whose speeches breathe a spirit of idealism. The second is hard, pushing and clever. Amongst the first type those who come to mind readily are men like Lord Ponsonby, Lord Arnold, Lord Sanderson, Charles Roden Buxton, Dr. Salter, Dr. Somerville Hastings, and, of course, many others. Even in certain Labour circles, where only the disillusioned meet and lament, no one has

ever been heard to accuse any of the above-mentioned men of place-hunting; and, these days in the Labour movement, that, in itself, is a tribute.

It is the widely-held view that the possession of ideals necessarily stamps a man or woman as being a bit stupid; yet had we followed the advice of our idealists, the party would have been spared many a humiliation. Had we listened to Hardie and Wheatley, there would have been no rush to office in a minority Government, and therefore no humiliating explanations to voters that we had been unable to carry out a single item of our programme because we were in a minority. Had we listened to George Lansbury and Lord Ponsonby, it would have saved us the ridicule of Conservatives when, in the 1935 election, we were denouncing armaments and advocating sanctions on Italy at the same time.

It was Mr. Wheatley, the idealist, who carried through the housing scheme, before which all the clever minds had broken down. Wheatley's ideals, too, were not merely those of seeing the workers get three square meals a day and a shelter at night. He visualised a society in which the producer would reckon up his own produce, and, when that was done, would then determine how many experts and economists he would be able to keep. Mr. Wheatley was, of course, unpopular and quite unfitted to be in Labour's second Government.

Even on more immediately practical issues the idealists come out best. Dr. Salter has actually carried out more schemes of municipalisation than Mr. Herbert Morrison. He did not bother unduly about building bridges, but he provided good bread at cost price from a municipal bakery in Bermondsey. Yet neither George Lansbury, John Wheatley, nor Dr. Salter would find a place in a Labour Cabinet to-day. The Labour Party are convinced that the middle class are to be won in this way, and that this way lies the hope of a majority. They have been trying hard in the best way they know since Mr. Cook shocked them in 1926. The results are there for all to see: a falling vote without, and feuds and factions within. Why this slavish adulation of the middle class has grown and spread in the Labour movement is a mystery. It is rife even amongst working men, who are just as well endowed with brains, and have actually more practical knowledge of things, than the middle-class men.

But there it is. In Glasgow, where a virile movement did exist, and where intellectuals by the score played a part, the feeling was undoubtedly there. In arranging our meetings we invariably had a clamour for speakers from London. A Glasgow intellectual, it was always felt, was a nice fellow, but, as he never asserted himself, never pushed himself forward as a leader, he appeared to lack all the qualities which somehow were possessed by the intellectual from London. I remember John Wheatley, in exasperation, once asking at a party meeting what any of these fellows could tell us that we did not know ourselves. And there was no answer. We knew our poverty, he said, better than they did, and, knowing what was wrong, we had thought out how to put things right. Later that evening he warned some of us privately that this adulation of the alleged experts might become a serious menace to working-class advancement. He saw the danger of the whole philosophy of the working-class movement being changed from its full-blooded revolt against poverty into just the anæmic policy-making we find to-day. Yet his memory is respected by real experts as a politician with ideals and with the ability to put them into practice.

The latest five-year programme is the fulfilment of John Wheatley's doleful prophecy. Here is a document from a Socialist Party designed to offer sops to every faction in the nation. Their attitude to the working class is shown in their promise to give the most useful man in the country, the agricultural labourer, a living wage, and they of course, and not the labourer, will define what is a living wage. Their attitude to Socialism is to be seen in the proposal to set up an Investment Board to finance private enterprise. In their own impetuous way they propose to do all these things in the first five years. This, I feel, was a wise promise. If they proceed with that programme, they are not likely to be called on for a second five years. They propose to nationalise all the industries which can scarcely pay their way, and all the profitable ones are to be left where they are. That, briefly, is the programme on which they hope to rouse both the middle and the working classes in home affairs.

In foreign affairs the situation is, if anything, worse. In the days before our foreign policy was drafted by experts we at least knew where we were. Keir Hardie and the others

enunciated the simple, elementary truth that the working class of all countries had no quarrel. They believed that all modern wars arose almost entirely from the need of Capitalist expansion. They never accepted the view that one or two nations were endowed with all the virtues and some others with all the original sin. They held that, whilst rival Capitalist groups fought and scrambled for spheres of influence, wars and threats of wars were inevitable. Nobody needed to draft a policy for that, of course—it was just, so we thought, ordinary common sense; and nothing that has happened since has given us reason to change our views. There was the workmen's International, where a minority, it is true, from all countries held a similar view. The International broke down, but the fact that our new foreign policy has practically wiped out the International is no argument against at least having the International as a living force.

There is, however, no mystery as to why the Labour movement ever allied itself to that boneless wonder the League of Nations. Wisely or unwisely, the working class has never thought a drafted complicated programme was essential to life and happiness. We had been brought up on the doctrine that Capitalism was the enemy. We had been told that nobody but those who had signed Labour's political charter were to be trusted ever to do the fair thing by us. Accordingly, when the League of Nations was formed, we felt that whilst it might do no good, it would probably do no harm. When we saw bright young Labour experts get jobs in it, and Labour leaders' sons get jobs in the League of Nations Union, we felt that it had a function. But the same difficulty arose here as in home affairs: we had to have a programme; and the more difficult to understand, the better such programmes always are. Mr. H. G. Wells was almost alone in pointing out the danger of leaving a group at Geneva to arrange peace for the workers instead of the workers arranging it for themselves, but few of us listened to him. The League advocates told us we could not trust any Capitalist Parliament in Britain to pursue peace, but could safely trust fifty-two Capitalist nations to do so. Had it remained in this nebulous state the League could have gone on for years doing no harm, but when young men are itching to draft a programme things are not so easy. And so out of a blue sky,

with nobody at all threatening war or even thinking of it, the experts began to define ways of naming the aggressor. Lenin, a wiser man than Mr. Phillip Baker, said that when two Capitalist nations decided on war, nobody could tell which was the aggressor. Mr. Baker and the League, however, knew better, and an indifferent Labour Party, rather than argue, said in effect, 'All right, let's name the aggressor.' The next step was to devise means of punishing the aggressor, despite Lenin's warning. The new phrase 'collective security' came along; people rolled it round their tongues in obvious enjoyment. When 'peace is indivisible' followed, their happiness was nearly complete; and when the shibboleth of 'sanctions' took shape, Utopia seemed near.

At the Brighton Conference in 1935 people who could not lisp the word 'sanctions' were no longer wanted in the party. That grand old figure George Lansbury, the fine, sincere Ponsonbys and Arnolds, whose Socialism was never in doubt, became suspect. The experts had won again. They went to an election in 1935, swearing to be as faithful to collective security and sanctions as ever the Liberals and Conservatives could be. Many of them, including the experts, not having quite shaken off their past, spent one half of the evening imposing sanctions and the other half denouncing the Conservatives for providing the armaments with which to impose them. And they still wonder why the people do not respond! These, too, are the people who talk of getting a majority by capturing the middle class; whereas middle-class papers like the *Daily Express*, which took them seriously ten years ago, now only laugh. The working class, with less to laugh about on this as on most things, is only bored when it is not angry. All this description of how the Labour Party proposed to abolish war without touching any of its causes may read like a travesty of the situation. But it is true. There is not one in ten thousand of the working class who believes in 'sanctions,' or has ever given ten minutes to thinking of what they would involve.

We have paid a heavy price for our experts on foreign affairs. In 1923 Mr. Webb was thundering maledictions against the French. He said:

. . . At the root of all our present troubles is the state of warlike tension from one end of Europe to the other, which is plainly the out-

come of the unsatisfactory treaties by which the war was ended. The historian of the future cannot fail to record that Paris in 1919 was a factory of international inefficiency on a quite calamitous scale. . . . What the Labour Party stands for is a policy of mutual service, as contrasted with a policy of the deliberate pursuit of profit for self—it matters not whether the self to be profited be the individual at the expense of other individuals, or the nation at the expense of other nations

LABOUR'S FOREIGN POLICY

. . . Such a foreign policy would promptly assert for that leading position in the concert of Europe which the present Government has abandoned. It would tell France plainly that we will go no step further with her in what seems to us a fatal policy of aggression, arising, as it seems, from what the psycho-analysts would call a 'fear-complex' unworthy of a great nation It would accept with cordiality the willingness of the German people, provided the claims to extravagant war indemnities are withdrawn, to make good, up to the limit of economic capacity, the material damage inflicted on the mines and buildings of France and Belgium, and to compensate the civilian victims of bomb or torpedo. . . .

Since then we have swung completely round to hating Germany, and for no real reason except that the German people by their votes chose a form of government which differs fundamentally from ours. I know, of course, that 'the conscience of the nations' was roused because of the ruthless purge of 1934. I know, too, that our conscience bore with equanimity an earlier purge, which only affected some obscure Communists, just as it managed to bear with the roar of Dollfuss's heavy guns shelling the working-class tenements in Vienna. Indeed, he soon became a hero. Knowing this, we sometimes wonder whether the public conscience is not just a class conscience.

Had Labour's experts even the remotest contact with the heads and hearts of the British people, they would know that we hate neither Germans, French, Russians, nor Italians. Most of us are not even remotely interested. Our chief interest is in work and wages which will drive the spectre of poverty from our homes and will provide us with a modicum of security and a little leisure to pursue our own way, whether it be in cultivating the higher things of life, or cheering our own team on the football field on Saturday. Yet, in and out of Parliament, practically the whole party talks and acts as though the one thought which animates the British workers

is to find some way of humiliating Hitler and Mussolini. We felt the same about Japan a few years back, and about Russia and Horthy before that and Pilsudski a little earlier. Perhaps it will be someone else soon.

Several thousand workmen are on strike in Glasgow as I write. They are highly skilled workmen whose services are absolutely essential for the defence of Britain. Their wages are £3 13*s*. per week. These men have had no wages and no relief of any kind for three weeks. That has created not one flicker of interest in the Labour Party. At the moment they are demanding three or four times the engineers' pay for attending Parliament six months in the year. They are quite convinced that life in London is impossible under £12 per week, and they expect engineers to go on loyally voting Labour when they see the spectacle of their chosen representatives demanding £12 a week for themselves, and not one word of help or encouragement for the workmen asking £3 17*s*., quite apart from the apprentices who are getting 7*s*. to 15*s*. a week. My newspapers this week assure me that Parliament has not seen such feeling and excitement for some years. Labour, I am told, is on its hind legs—fighting manfully at last. But the fight has nothing to do with the condition of Britain. General Franco has blockaded Bilbao and British Labour is demanding freedom for the British shipping industry. A fortnight previously they had been denouncing it because it was taking a subsidy, and four months earlier they had voted against the Navy Estimates.

I read the debate, and it never seemed to occur to any of the Labour experts that British villages in the distressed areas had been blockaded for ten years, with the result that health was lowered and the physical well-being of the majority permanently impaired. Labour showed little indignation over that blockade. There was a short and quite pleasant discussion in the House, but none of that righteous indignation shown over the hard lot of British ships anxious to get to Bilbao. They made trouble over the Distressed Areas Bill; but it was simulated anger, with a touch of self-advertisement, and aroused no interest in the daily papers. Keir Hardie, John Wheatley, Arthur Cook, and even Philip Snowden in his younger days, would have made Britain ring with the shame of those hungry children oases of poverty in a wealthy

land. But these men were not experts. They felt about things. In 1936 the experts sent more experts to study the problem which had been there for all to see for over ten years, two years of which Labour was in office. Nobody laughed when the leader of the experts, Dr. Dalton, went to study conditions in Bishop Auckland, a constituency he had represented for over ten years. The experts informed Britain and the world that one of the sure ways of getting food to the distressed areas was to build more munition factories.

Looking back over the years since the war, which marks the arrival of the expert epidemic, there have never been two years when we were not being asked to take up one hobby or another. Guild Socialism, Capital Levies, Surtax, League of Nations, Collective Security, Sanctions have all been run to death. There is nothing too difficult or complicated for our experts; indeed, the more difficult and complicated, the better. The one thing they will not face at all is the simple fact that there is plenty of wealth in Britain, that it is produced by the workers, and that the workers do not get it.

The last ten years have taught us that since the experts took charge Labour's political advance has stopped. There is nothing to justify the continued prophecies of a majority based on purely working-class voting strength. On a political programme of one single item, 'social justice,' there might be some hope of a united vote; but there never was a purely political question, now or at any time, which has not succeeded in splitting the workers' ranks.

The prophecies that Labour will secure a majority are not new. They were being made freely in 1923; but there was some excuse for optimism, as we were an army then, and not six different rabbles. It was in 1923 that Mr. Sidney Webb produced a majority by sheer arithmetic. He said:

> . . . Those who are curious in statistics may be interested to compute that a continuation of the rising curve of Labour votes from the 62,698 of 1900, through the 323,195 of 1906 and the 505,590 of January 1910, the 2,500,000 of 1918 and the 4,000,000 of 1922, would produce a clear majority of the total votes cast in Great Britain somewhere about 1926. . . .

Those who relied on arithmetic alone to secure a majority had overlooked one important factor. The reasoning was comparable to that of a farmer who calculated his acreage of

cropping land by saying he had got crops from 200 acres in two years, and therefore was bound to get crops from 1000 in ten years. The practical farmer would know that crops only come from soil which will yield crops, and that when he had reached his margin of cultivable land his annual return would diminish or cease. Mr. Webb overlooked that the margin of soil which yields to Labour cultivation is strictly limited. It is composed entirely of the constituencies where the working class is in a very large majority, and no amount of fertiliser, either of League of Nations variety or any other variety, has been able to secure Labour a majority in any constituency where the majority of electors earn over £250 a year. And so one wonders whether the men who keep dangling the carrot have ever taken the trouble to examine whether there are enough of such constituencies in Britain to go round. Even at the £250 minimum, of course Labour might win, but an examination of the constituencies separately reveals that Labour draws its electoral strength almost entirely from those districts where men are engaged in one mass industry. Outside London it depends almost entirely on the heavy industries. It is true that at some time or other Labour has actually held 311 seats, although never all at the same time. Based on this figure a narrow majority is possible, but many of these seats were won on conditions which will never return again. Six of them were won, not on Labour principles or policy, but simply on the fact that the man who won the seat for Labour was something of a local squire. When they died or gave up, the seat reverted to type. Examples of this are Boston-with-Holland, Anglesey, Maldon, and North Norfolk. There were many seats won on three-cornered contests which will never be won again.

The grouping of the parties which followed the 1931 *débâcle* ended all that. Well-to-do Liberals, who saw their fifty-year feud with Conservatives on Free Trade wiped out as though it never had been, naturally felt their property was safer with a National Government than a Labour one. There were seats won in 1923 and 1929 in straight fights where the electors decided to 'give Labour a chance,' and we did not get anywhere near even in the normal election of 1935. We swept Birmingham in a wave of enthusiasm in 1929, and were hopelessly beaten in 1931.

To secure a bare majority 308 seats must be won; but there are 321 seats which all the evidence shows we cannot win, and there are at least another fifty which the evidence shows we cannot win short of a miracle.[1]

On a superficial study Labour ought to win a majority. The wage-earning classes—that is, those earning under £250 per year—are in a majority. Labour's strength, however, as I have said, has not come from the whole working class, but from sections. Examine the election results, and it will be seen that its mass strength is only polled where there are either large masses of workers living together, or where there is identity of industrial interests. All the mining areas have gone Labour, although not living in large communities, because of an identity of interest in their daily toil. Places like Glasgow, Manchester, and East London have gone Labour because they are single communities and frequently have identity of industrial interests.

The main source of strength has come almost entirely from the necessary workers in our basic industries—mining, engineering, wool, cotton, iron and steel—and, although scattered, from the railways because of identity of interest in the job. This identity is now being reflected in the omnibus transport service, where large groups of men meet and, from

[1] We are no nearer to winning the following seats than in 1923

Bedford	3	Leicester	5
Berks	3	Lincoln	8
Bucks	3	London	27
Cambridge	2	Middlesex	10
Chester	8	Norfolk	5
Cornwall	5	Northampton	2
Cumberland	2	Northumberland	3
Derby	3	Notts	3
Devon	10	Oxford	3
Dorset	4	Salop	3
Durham	1	Somerset	6
Essex	8	Stafford	3
Gloucester	7	Suffolk	6
Hants (seats won here in 1929 seem gone for ever)	12	Surrey	12
		Sussex	9
Hereford	2	Warwick	12
Hertford	5	Westmorland	1
Huntingdon	1	Worcester	5
Isle of Ely	1	Yorkshire	21
Isle of Wight	1		
North of Ireland	13	Wales	10
Kent .	13	Scotland	23
Lancashire	20	Universities	11

the feeling of security in numbers, can argue and talk and act freely. But whilst there are 12,000,000 insured persons in Britain, there are over 18,000,000 people gainfully employed in Britain. In order to get a majority in Parliament it will be seen that a large majority of the insured workers is essential at the polls. Even at that you might fail to secure a majority of the seats. It is useless getting heavy majorities in the seats in the coalfields, or in Glasgow, for instance. A majority of 1 in a constituency returns a member just as surely as a majority of 20,000.

There is, of course, no evidence that we will ever get a majority of the insured workers. Trade union strength is roughly 4,000,000, and that includes a large number of people who will never vote Labour, and, like Labour itself, the strength of trade unionism is drawn also from the few basic industries. The newer luxury trades and the purely distributive trades are not good soil for trade unionism or Labour politics, and these are growing whilst the workers in the basic trades are declining rapidly.[2] It will be seen that there are nearly as many people employed in the catering industry as in building ships. From the point of view of Labour votes it is generally agreed that the lighter trades are not nearly so good as the basic industries. On the face of it, these figures might be construed as an argument for a separate policy designed to suit the middle classes. Nothing in Labour's past history justifies that argument. The middle class and well-to-do who come to the party, we assume, want nothing for themselves. The one reason, we take it, for their joining is that they believe in social justice for the workers to-day. If

[2] Figures in the Ministry of Labour *Gazette* for November 1936 show the extent of this decline.

	July 1923	July 1936
Coal mining . .	1,243,580	895,980
Mining and quarrying (not separately specified)	26,300	11,920
General engineering, iron and steel founding	666,950	559,720
Cotton .	567,650	36,420
Shipbuilding	269,970	161,850

There are many others, of course, and roughly 600,000 is given as the figure in the contracted industries. In the distributive trades the numbers have increased from 1,253,980 to 2,048,410. Entertainments and sports have increased from 60,050 to 131,700. Hotels, restaurants, etc., from 258,960 to 435,290.

they do not join for those reasons, then the working-class movement is better without them.

Now, if my figures and arguments are sound, the prospect of a majority looks pretty dismal, and if the sole function of the Labour movement was to remove a few selected men from the struggle for existence there would be little hope for the workers. But returning men to Parliament was never an end in itself—it was a means to an end, the end being the economic emancipation of the workers, or at least the removal of the constant dread of poverty.

Looking back over our industrial history, political action has contributed little or nothing in that direction. True, Parliament granted old-age pensions, widows' pensions, unemployment and health insurance, and granted Trade Boards in the sweated industries. But not one of those things was granted by Parliament because of Labour pressure inside the House of Commons. They were granted because of Labour pressure outside. They were part of the price the worker was able to extract because two rival parties were competing for something the worker had the power to sell to either—his vote. Granted all the humanitarian motives which animated M.P.'s, the fact remains that until the workers began to strike and vote in a class-conscious way none of these things was granted. Now they are granted, it may be that we have secured all the social reforms which formed the old parliamentary programme as distinct from the purely Socialist one. This, in its turn, may explain why Parliament has not passed one single far-reaching measure of social reform since before the war.

In saying this, I am thinking of measures designed to give the worker a greater share of the wealth he produces. Unless Parliament can do that, and unless a Labour Government can force that, it has failed completely. The party was formed on the sole assumption that it would and could raise the living standards of the poor. That, in turn, assumed that the wealth necessary was there to achieve the rise. It assumed, too, that the worker did not get his share because those who controlled his means of life took too much. I know Labour leaders have told us from time to time that if we produced more we would get more. Events have proved they were wrong. The question the worker should now face is this:

If he wants his standard of life raised, can Parliament do it? The people who determine the standard of life to-day are not M.P.'s; the people who determine workers' wages and how much they can buy with their wages are the employers. All that is decided, not by the worker's political strength, but by his industrial strength. The Labour Government itself decided this issue in 1930 during the negotiations in the mining industry. In a letter written to the Miners' Federation, Mr. William Graham, on behalf of the Cabinet, stated that questions of wages and working hours were best left for settlement between the workers' and employers' representatives. We can hardly expect a Conservative Government to improve on that, and if Parliament has neither the will nor the desire to interfere in the one thing that determines our standard of life, the time has come to consider whether the tremendous energy and enthusiasm we have displayed for political action should not now be diverted into other channels.

In an uncertain world several things are fairly certain, so far as the worker is concerned. One is that until every person earning wages is united on politics, Labour cannot attain a majority in Parliament. Another is that there is not the remotest hope of the wage-earner ever being united in politics. He is already split into several fighting factions inside the Labour Party itself. There are three brands of Lefts, there are Centres, and there are those who swear by the official Right elements. Examine the political programmes, and you will find there is little to quarrel about; but it just seems that the workers are destined to split and quarrel the moment political issues are discussed. And outside the Labour Party is that large section—many of them the best workers and fighters in the trade union movement—who quite sincerely believe that a Conservative or Liberal Government is better than a Labour one.

The one thing on which the worker remains in solid entity is the industrial struggle for a higher standard of life. Once a dispute looms large on the horizon, nobody asks whether a man is Right or Left in politics, Catholic or Protestant in religion. They are all just workers. Quite frequently, in my own experience, the best fighters for workshop justice were solid Tories. In many trade unions

to-day the unpaid, drudging secretarial work is carried on by solid Tories. Work of that sort, you will understand, makes little appeal to the man with revolutionary instincts; he prefers the soap-box to the desk. Perhaps the one class of artisans most ready and willing to fight for justice in the workshop are the boilermakers, yet in politics they are notoriously Conservative. An injustice in the workshop is an injustice to all, but more boilermakers are to be found on Conservative platforms at election time than from any other trade in Britain.

None of us has forgotten the General Strike of 1926, when practically every workman in Britain who was called on to strike obeyed the summons. These men, mark you, did not strike in the hope of personal material gain. They were workers called on to strike on behalf of other workers —the miners. Whether the strike was a good or a bad thing is beside the point for the moment. The one thing it did reveal was the fact that this fine body of British workmen, which will literally rush to each other's throats on political questions which do not affect their homes, are a solid, united body on purely industrial issues.

Another thing that is certain in this uncertain world is the glaring fact that to-day the workers of Britain are not sharing in the increased wealth of Britain. Whilst rationalisation, new inventions, and speeding-up have sent production per unit up at a rapid rate, the real wage rate of the worker has risen but little. During the years 1934, 1935, and 1936 wages of some 5,000,000 persons have risen by amounts officially estimated at £91,500, £189,700, and £492,000 per week for the respective years. The cumulative increase is over £750,000 a week, or nearly £40,000,000 a year. Four million workers received no appreciable increase of their share of increased productivity, as the cost of living index varied but little. Making every allowance for unrecorded increases, wages have not risen more than £50,000,000. In the same years the actual income, as stated by the Inland Revenue Commissioners, of 8,000,000 income-tax payers was £2,505,000,000, £2,615,000,000, and £2,740,000,000 respectively. As 4,750,000 were exempt altogether by the operation of allowances, the successive increases of £110,000,000 and £235,000,000 were in theory divided between 3,250,000

income-tax payers, but, in practice, between a much smaller number. The cumulative increase of £335,000,000 in the income of this favoured section during the last ten years must be contrasted with the cumulative increase over the same period in wages of £35,500,000. Yet there is no doubt at all that this productivity has increased. Whilst no complete statistics are available, an illuminating Report has been issued by the Stationery Office this year. It shows a large number of industries in which production has gone up while the number of workers has actually decreased.

In others, while there is no reduction in the total numbers employed, production has risen considerably in proportion. As a workman, then, my position is clear. I knew in my youth that the workers did not secure a fair share of the wealth produced. In every street in every town in Britain I know there are decent souls, God-fearing men and women, whose life is one perpetual fight against poverty. Like myself, thousands of these people were convinced that the one way to free themselves from poverty was by working in and through a political party. We freely conceded that that party could not free us from poverty until it had a majority. To-day we know that, in spite of our power to produce wealth, poverty is still rampant in Britain, and to-day we are reluctantly compelled to face the fact that the majority necessary to free us from poverty is out of the question. The sooner the workers face up to that issue, the better for themselves and the nation. If we do not, we are doomed to three weeks' excitement every five years, and a heartbreak when the figures are announced.

Were I a trade union leader, I would face the issue boldly. I would not ask the workers to abandon political action, because a Parliament of some sort is essential for Britain. But I would try to think honestly of what the worker has got from politics and what he can hope to get. He was brought into politics to secure a higher standard of life out of Britain's wealth. I would honestly face up to the fact that, without a majority, he cannot get that. I would recognise freely that Parliament, even with a majority, does not interfere in the relationships between employer and worker. The worker has got nothing from Parliament in that direction, and will get nothing. The thing he has got from his political activities

is something that political concessions can never give. He has acquired a dignity and pride which was sadly lacking in the earlier days of machine production. In thirty years he has jumped forward a hundred. Anyone who knew the west of Scotland thirty years ago and knows it to-day will understand what I mean. Gone is the spectacle of drunken debauchery from the streets. Not for nothing has Keir Hardie thundered forth that they should drink less and think more. In spite of the intellectual novelists and sentimental playwrights, the vast majority of the working class to-day are decent, sober citizens. In the slough of despond, with no relief, or hope of relief, from the week of hard, physical toil, Saturday night was heaven, even if the alcohol or tired or badly nourished bodies made Sunday hell. Given courageous leadership, a new Britain can be fashioned from this new workman. In a sporadic and unorganised way he is demanding his share of Britain's wealth to-day, and he is not even troubling to ask Parliament to do anything.

The next step forward for the working class is in the industrial field. Its leaders should now boldly tell the ruling class of Britain that, unless they are prepared to share the wealth of Britain, there will be none to share. Every agreement made on any other basis for the regulation of wages should be scrapped. If the ruling class still prefer to make forty-three new millionaires per year whilst children are hungry, I should tell them that that must end. They should be told that until it is ended they will never know when the workers will be working and when they will be idle. There would be no further negotiations necessary to enforce a wage reduction. There should cease to be groups of workers engaged in competing industries where a gain to one is a hurt to another. They should not be citizens of Britain only once in five years, or when there is a war on.

Why should railwaymen, whose work is essential to all the nation, be told that their industry can only pay £2 per week. Even Mr. Selfridge does not base wages in the glove department on the output of the glove department: they are based on the output of the store. If Britain wants railwaymen, she can afford to pay for them. The wealth is here now, and I would not worry unduly when told that but for our overseas investments, the wealth would not be here. The answer

to that is, if the workers had not produced the wealth there would have been nothing to invest overseas. To get it now is merely an over-due payment, even if we are doubtful of the advantage of owning jute mills in Bombay to compete with the jute workers in Dundee, or employing peons in the Argentine to undersell the British farmer.

The organisation to enforce a demand for a share of Britain's wealth exists now. The one natural organisation of the workers of Britain is the trades council, the one place where men direct from the workshop can meet to exchange ideas with the representatives from other workshops. They know life as it is better than all the experts. These councils could be strengthened to include representatives from every section of the community engaged in the necessary productive and distributing work of the nation. Here is the next line of Labour's advance. Keir Hardie spent a lifetime urging these decent men to stand on their hind legs. The experts for ten years have been trying to push them off again. In one breath they say we can be trusted to choose representatives to run the British Empire, but not to choose a committee to help run a British workshop.

Recent industrial disputes have shown that the worker himself is looking to industrial action for improvement in his condition. Engineers, transport workers, miners and railwaymen have all been involved in negotiations some of which led to strike action. True, little or nothing has so far been gained in these disputes, either by negotiation or by strike action. The one real gain is the unmistakable evidence that, whilst working-class leaders advise waiting for a political majority, the workman himself wants his improvement now.

London omnibusmen had apparently taken their leaders too literally. During the last few years all official Labour has decided that the forty-hour week is an essential both from the point of view of productive capacity and of physical health. The London omnibusmen, with more modesty, asked for a forty-three-hour week, and it must be confessed that there was little official backing for the request either in or out of Parliament by the Labour leaders. As I write, railwaymen are still negotiating for wage cuts imposed in 1932 and have been refused. Another demand in the year 1937 is that the minimum wage for men doing useful work

should be raised from 40*s.* to 50*s.* per week. Engineers on strike in Glasgow were ordered back to work by the union, and then, after staying out for three weeks without strike benefit, were officially recognised by the union. The mining dispute has been settled by a compromise which Mr. Robert Smillie certainly never would have sanctioned.

All this sudden revolt on the part of the workers has revealed the weaknesses of the existing trade union machine. It is not so much that the machine is rusty from disuse; rather is it that the conflict of thought inside the trade union movement itself has left some doubts in the minds of the leaders as to what is the function of the trade union movement and of the Trade Union Congress. The General Council of the Trade Union Congress itself is almost powerless to do anything, as it can only intervene in an industrial dispute when asked to do so by a trade union. To-day, it must be confessed, the General Council is more an expression of political ideas than a machine to co-ordinate industrial activity.

The conversion was not the work of a day. Even before the war Mr. MacDonald and Mr. Snowden deprecated all industrial action as likely to interfere with political progress. The failure of the General Strike was the last argument of the political leaders. In later years all Trade Union Congresses have been devoted almost entirely to discussions on international or home politics. In 1934, it is true, the then President, Mr. A. Conley (Tailors' and Garment Workers' Union), in his presidential address tried to keep Congress to its original purpose. He said:

> . . . The presentation and prosecution of wage claims for shorter working hours, and other measures of general industrial application, have been left to individual unions to press forward in limited application to their own industries or trades. Is it not wise and timely to consider the simultaneous presentation to employers in all industries of a carefully planned programme of wage increases and a standard of working hours which each union or group of unions, with the assistance and guidance of the General Council, can make a matter of negotiation in the trades with which they are concerned? . . .

But nothing has been heard of Mr. Conley's proposal since, nor of another proposal the same year that a special levy be paid into a pool for just such emergencies in the unions as have arisen now. The proposal was lost sight of by the

Congress of 1935 in the urgent need to deal with Abyssinia, and Spain was the absorbing topic of the Congress of 1936.

Amongst the leaders themselves there is the growing knowledge that no single union can hope to fight successfully once organised capital has decided to fight. The theory of starving the employer into subjection finds few supporters outside the Communist Party. Unfortunately, the theory which has taken its place is the equally fallacious one propounded by Mr. J. H. Thomas—that the workers can get all they want by 'a correct use of the ballot-box.' The workers will be hard to persuade now, however, that the 'correct use' is in voting Labour. The one new thought which has emerged has come from Mr. Ernest Bevin, when he talked of the trade unions being an integral part of the State. Mr. Bevin did not define on what basis they were to exist, nor did he define what was to be the status of the worker in the State. He did not tell us if he is to share in the nation's wealth, or if he is still to be on the fodder basis when employed, and on the Means Test when unemployed. Mr. Bevin's thought, however, may be a starting-point for the next advance. Most workers would prefer to feel they were part of their country rather than hired immigrants liable to be sacked at any moment. Few of them strike for the sake of striking; they only strike, like the City, when they feel they have a grievance. If they are to be a real part of the State, and not merely profit-makers for somebody else, there will be few to complain of that. If, having become a part of the State, they are still denied their share of the State's wealth, they may use their power, not as a single unit, but as citizens. That, indeed, is the next line of advance. An intelligent working class will simply refuse to live in poverty whilst wealth and luxury are flaunted in their faces.

The year 1937 is one of hope. All the signs of revolt are healthy signs. Perhaps most hopeful of all is the fact that professional expert Labour candidates are receiving fewer votes than did working-men candidates in the same divisions in 1929. Perhaps the workers have reached the conclusion that more real brain power is required to design and build a *Queen Mary* than to draft a political programme.

JOHN SCANLON.

THE FUTURE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT ON TYNESIDE AND ELSEWHERE

By Henry A. Mess

A Royal Commission has been sitting and has recently reported on the local government of the dozen or so towns which lie along the tidal waters of the River Tyne. The recommendations which it has made are of importance, in the first place, locally; they may affect directly the future welfare of some 900,000 persons in those towns and of another 300,000 persons in the hinterland of Northumberland; and they are also of importance nationally, because they propose innovations in the structure of local government which, if adopted on Tyneside, would certainly become a precedent and model for action in other parts of the country.

I.

Before considering the recommendations of the Royal Commission, it is necessary to examine the state of affairs which occasioned the setting up of it. The situation on the Tyne is one which is repeated in essentials in several other parts of the country. A number of towns, at one time small and distinct, have grown large and contiguous. When the first census of England and Wales was taken in 1801 there were five of these towns along the Tyne with populations ranging from the 15,000 of Newcastle to the 4000 of Tynemouth. There were also a number of villages, the largest being Wallsend and Jarrow with about 1000 inhabitants each. There were various other villages and hamlets, and there was some very pleasant country between them. During 140 years there has been a great expansion of population, the villages grew into small towns, the small towns grew into large towns, the countryside was swallowed up. To-day, as a sketch map included in the Commission's Report indicates very clearly,

there is a continuum of houses stretching along both banks of the river. Newcastle and Wallsend, Wallsend and North Shields, Gateshead and Felling, Hebburn and Jarrow, lie cheek by jowl. The visitor to the district, who is taken round by car, finds it impossible to tell where one town ends and another town begins. From an aeroplane there is the appearance of a single great city, straddling the River Tyne.

Nor are the towns merely adjacent; they are interwoven. Quick transport has effected that. The Homes and Work-places tables of the census of 1921 are our chief evidence and best statistical measure of this. From every Tyneside town somewhere between 10 and 60 per cent. of its working population went to some other town to work, and in every Tyneside town somewhere between 9 and 50 per cent. of those working had come in from outside. And this great daily migration was mainly from one Tyneside town to another Tyneside town, so that whilst no single Tyneside town was self-contained, the whole group of Tyneside towns was nearly so. Naturally, the daily movement of population has been less during the acute industrial depression.

The interpenetration of these neighbouring towns has been one effect of quick transport. Another effect has been an increase of segregation of the social classes. Formerly, each town was a complete community; men of all social classes lived there. In one of these Tyneside towns they were still talking about 'the squire' when first I became acquainted with it some dozen years ago. It is probable that some of the old people still talk about 'the squire'; but the man who is ground landlord of practically the whole of the town lives far away in rural Northumberland, and the manor-house is in use as a hospital. In most of the other industrial towns there will still be seen the former homes of the gentry, now turned to use as a public library or a maternity home. Few in the higher ranks of industry, few professional men, live in such towns as Wallsend, Felling, Hebburn, Jarrow. These towns are virtually one-class towns—working-class towns. At the census of 1921 there was in Hebburn, a town of 24,000 persons, no one returning himself as dentist, solicitor, barrister, journalist, architect, or social welfare worker.

The results of this desertion of the small industrial towns are seen in poverty of personnel for local government and

for voluntary social service, and also in low rateable value and high rates. They are towns with heavy burdens and small resources. The rateable value per head of population in Felling is £3 6*s*. 4*d*.; whereas in Gosforth, which is mostly a comfortable suburb, it is £9 2*s*. 8*d*.

During the last dozen or so years a great deal of attention has been paid to the condition of the Tyneside towns, partly, but not entirely, because of the deep depression of industry, and a number of fairly elaborate reports [1] have appeared. In the last of them Captain Euan Wallace, repeating an opinion which had previously received a good deal of expression, stated: 'That there is at any rate a strong *primâ facie* case for some measure of unification of the local authorities on the Tyneside appears to be undeniable; and it is equally clear that the prospects of voluntary amalgamation are so remote as to be outside the realm of practical politics.' This was the genesis of the Royal Commission on Local Government in the Tyneside Area, which was appointed in May 1935, and sat under the chairmanship first of Sir Sidney Rowlatt, but for the greater part of its time under that of Sir Angus Newton.

II.

The terms of reference of the Commissioners were 'to examine the system of local government in the areas of local government north and south of the River Tyne; . . . to consider what changes, if any, should be made in the existing arrangements with a view to securing greater economy and efficiency, and to make recommendations.'

On Tyneside, as elsewhere, amalgamations of local authorities and alterations of boundaries have taken place fairly frequently. Two outlying districts, formerly governed by their own urban district councils, have been amalgamated with Newcastle within the last fifty years; and similarly Wallsend has absorbed what was formerly the separate local government area of Willington Quay; Gateshead and South Shields have both extended their boundaries. But these have been minor alterations, incommensurate with the great

[1] *Industrial Tyneside*, by H. A. Mess (Benn, 1928), *Industrial Survey of the North-East Coast* (H.M. Stationery Office, 1931), *Second Industrial Survey of the North-East Coast* (P. S. King, 1935), *Report on Conditions in Tyneside and County Durham*, by Captain Euan Wallace, M.P. (H.M. Stationery Office, 1934).

social changes which have taken place. The position, as it exists to-day, is well set out in paragraph 128 of the Royal Commission's Report:

> The position on Tyneside at the present time is somewhat unique. In an area not much larger than the City of Birmingham there are no less than sixteen local authorities responsible for the administration of all or some of the local government services. As a result of this it is found that there are six different authorities responsible for services such as public assistance, police, higher education, care of persons suffering from mental diseases, tuberculosis and venereal diseases, and the maintenance, repair and improvement of classified roads, ten different authorities are responsible for elementary education; nine of the sixteen authorities maintain fire brigades, and there are eleven separate hospitals throughout the area for the treatment of persons suffering from infectious diseases, while eight hospitals exist to deal with smallpox cases.

It may be useful to add that of the sixteen local authorities mentioned, two are county councils, Northumberland and Durham; four are county borough councils, Newcastle, Gateshead, South Shields, Tynemouth; two are municipal borough councils, Wallsend and Jarrow; and eight are urban district councils, Newburn, Gosforth, Whitley and Monkseaton, Ryton, Blaydon, Whickham, Felling, Hebburn.

A reduction in the number of local authorities along the river had often been recommended in articles and discussions; and the proposition of a single county borough to cover the whole of the towns mentioned had more than once been placed before the public. The arguments by which it had been supported fall mainly into five categories.

First of all, there is the argument that this conurbation is already in point of fact a single city. The houses are continuous, the visitor from a distance perceives it as one city, the population moves about freely for purposes of employment, of recreation, of shopping, and to a smaller extent for educational purposes. If the towns are integrated socially and industrially, there is a *primâ facie* case for unitary government.

Secondly, there is the argument that many of its problems can best be handled—some of its problems can only be handled—by treating the district as a unity. There is, for

instance, the question of the pollution of the river. All the towns adjacent to the Tyne discharge untreated sewage into it, and the water is admittedly filthy. One indication of this is the mortality of the salmon (the Tyne is a salmon river) and the fact that the fish may not infrequently be seen in an asphyxiated condition on the surface of the river. No single local authority is likely to take action so long as it is uncertain whether its neighbours may not continue to pollute the river as they do at present.

Of matters which might be better handled by a single authority, the provision of fever hospitals is perhaps the best example. At present there are no fewer than eleven separate hospitals for infectious diseases (in addition to eight smallpox hospitals), and most of these are small and not very well equipped. A similar argument applies, though not so strongly, to such matters as fire brigades and police forces.

The third argument is the handicap of unduly small administrative areas. In small areas it is impossible to arrange for the specialisations on which efficiency so largely depends. The clerk to the council may, for instance, have to act as director of education; the health department cannot have specialised medical officers and inspectors of nuisances. Special classes, such as those for stammerers or for myopes, are hard or impossible to arrange. Purchases have to be made in small quantities and expensively. Small areas find it hard to attract or to retain the services of officials of great ability; their officials tend to be either young men on their way to the service of some larger authority or else men who have failed to obtain promotion.

Fourthly, there is the argument as to the uneven distribution of resources and of burdens. This has been touched upon above, and it has been indicated that it is not merely a matter of finance, but also of personnel; in some of these smaller one-class towns there is a conspicuous lack of men with business or professional experience, and local government suffers from their absence.

The last argument is that the commercial and industrial importance of the Tyneside group of towns is obscured by its division into what are nominally a number of different towns; and that the trade of the area might improve if it were known to the world as a single great city. It is not an

argument to which I should myself attach a high importance; the other reasons for unification are much stronger; but I do not doubt that the present division of the area between a number of local authorities is a nuisance and a handicap to firms operating within it. It is to be noted with regret that scarcely any evidence was tendered to the Royal Commission by representatives of commerce or industry as such.

It is also to be regretted that so little evidence was tendered expressing personal and non-official points of view. The bulk of evidence was that of local authorities; and it was almost inevitable that councillors and officials should look at the questions raised from sectional points of view and influenced by vested interests. As was to be expected, the majority of the witnesses were opposed to unification. Gateshead Borough Council was the one large authority which was wholeheartedly and without qualification in favour of unification. Newcastle was prepared to accept it, provided that no extra burden was thrown upon its ratepayers. The other local authorities were in more or less violent opposition. It is noteworthy, however, that few of them expressed satisfaction with the present state of affairs. Northumberland County Council, for instance, would like to deprive Tynemouth of its county borough status, and also wished to deprive Wallsend of its powers as a Part III. education authority.[2] Durham County Council expressed itself more cautiously, but wished the Royal Commission to consider possibilities of improving the arrangements with regard to police, fire brigades, education, maternity and child welfare. The County Borough of Tynemouth desired to amalgamate with its neighbour the Urban District of Whitley and Monkseaton, a desire not reciprocated, apparently. Newburn Urban District Council wished to see educational administration unified over the whole geographical county of Northumberland. And so on.

The Report of the Royal Commission is comparatively brief and very readable. It is, indeed, too brief; the conclusions arrived at are stated dogmatically and with insufficient indication of the process of reasoning by which they were reached. This is the more regrettable as it has been decided

[2] A Part III. authority is one which administers elementary education only, but not secondary or other higher education.

not to print the evidence, a dubious economy, since it contained a detailed statement and analysis of the public services of a great urban area such as is nowhere else obtainable.

On the main question whether the Tyneside towns had in point of fact become a single urban area, the answer given by the Commissioners is an emphatic affirmative. It has often been debated whether the River Tyne unites or divides, whether it should be regarded as natural boundary or ' spinal cord.' The Commissioners ' have unhesitatingly come to the conclusion that the River Tyne is not now a suitable frontier between administrative areas.' They rejected, however, the solution of a county borough for the whole group of towns; and for this rejection they give two reasons. First of all, that under modern conditions many public services could be administered best over a still larger area. Secondly, that the creation of such a county borough would cripple the Northumberland County Council, which would lose a quarter of its population and over a third of its rateable value. Durham County Council would also lose population, but not in the same proportion; nor would the areas transferred have such high rateable values.

For these two reasons the majority of the Commissioners —four out of five—make a proposal of a very startling nature. They recommend the creation of two new local authorities— new in kind as well as in existence. The first of these would be a Northumberland Regional Council operating over the whole of the present geographical county of Northumberland and also over the Tyneside towns on the south bank, which would be detached from the geographical county of Durham. This body would administer a number of the principal services. The second body to be created would be a Municipal Borough of Newcastle, which would include not only the present Newcastle but also the other Tyneside towns under review; and this would administer the residue of the services in its area. These proposals are sweeping; it is not surprising that Tynesiders were staggered by them. They are of very great interest to all students of local government. They attempt to reconcile the conflicting interests of the great towns and of the counties; and in doing so, they propose the creation of two new forms of local government, each without close parallel in England to-day—a regional county council

with considerably greater powers than those of any existing county council, and a municipal borough with about 900,000 inhabitants but with considerably less powers than those of any existing municipal borough.

To the proposed Northumberland Regional Council the Commissioners would entrust all public health services, all education services, all police services, all fire brigade services, all highway services. And they decided, apparently with more hesitation, to recommend the administration of public assistance by the same body. All the services rendered are at present rendered over considerable parts of Northumberland by the Northumberland County Council, operating from the county hall, which is actually situated at Newcastle; and there seems to be no doubt that from the point of view of Northumberland, as distinct from Tyneside, the proposals are feasible and have much to commend them. They represent a great simplification of machinery and a desirable increase of areas of administration.

But when we come to consider the proposal from the point of view of the Tyneside towns, and especially when we come to consider the second local authority contemplated, there is a great deal to give us pause. The Tyneside towns are to be governed, if the majority recommendations should be accepted, by two bodies—the regional county council and the new kind of municipal borough. Now, the first objection, which Mr. Charles Roberts makes very strongly in his Minority Report, is that this huge municipal borough, which is to have city status and other ancient dignities which Newcastle at present enjoys, is to have less power than an ordinary urban district council. 'It would retain only one important function of local government, the provision of housing and of town planning; otherwise, in spite of the exceptional area which it embraces, it would have little under its own control but the small change of local government.' Mr. Roberts underestimates, I think, the importance of the functions which the new body would have to perform, but his criticism has much force.

A second objection to the majority proposal—and it seems to me a much more serious one—is that dual control would be established over a large part of the Tyneside area where there is at present unitary control. At present each of

the four county boroughs—Newcastle, Gateshead, South Shields, Tynemouth—is entirely master in its own house, exercising all the functions of local government. Under the new scheme the functions of local government would be divided in them between the new regional council and the new municipal borough council. Two-thirds of the Tyneside population, to benefit which was the *raison d'être* of the setting up of the Royal Commission, would pass from unitary control to dual control. Dual control is so great an evil that very great countervailing advantages would be necessary to make one accept it for areas where it does not at present obtain. It is not necessary to elaborate the drawbacks of dual control —they are well known: at best an absence of complete unity of purpose and co-operation, at worst friction, petty jealousy, sacrifice of public welfare to parochial prides and small vested interests. A considerable part of the case for change is precisely to eliminate these.

I have heard it suggested that the danger of friction between the two new bodies would be small, because the same body of electors would in point of fact elect the one, the municipal borough council, and preponderate in the electorate of the other, the regional council. But to suppose that this is any guarantee of common purpose and willingness to co-operate is naive. It is quite possible for two authorities, elected by much the same set of people, to develop antagonisms, to be jealous and obstructive. The ratepayers of Tynemouth had the unpleasant experience not so many years ago of contributing to the expenses of both parties to a law-suit —the Tynemouth Borough Council and the Tynemouth Board of Guardians.

I suggest, therefore, that the proposal of the majority, as it stands at present, is dangerous and retrogressive so far as the greater part of Tyneside is concerned. If measures could be devised for securing unity of purpose between the two new authorities—if, for instance the municipal borough could be definitely subordinated to the regional council— that would be another matter. But that, again, would establish a precedent in local government and one of a nature which was rejected by the Royal Commission on Local Government of a few years ago.

Mr. Charles Roberts in his Minority Report recognises

that the Tyneside towns form a conurbation, and that there are too many and too small units of local government. But he objects to the amalgamation of Tyneside with Northumberland on the ground that rural Northumberland, with its agricultural interests, would be swamped by an overweight of industrialism. The consideration weighs heavily with him, as it did with the Majority Commissioners, that any action taken with regard to the Tyneside must be considered in its bearing upon the county councils. This point is of great importance; indeed, its full recognition is that which gives special interest to the work of this Royal Commission and makes its findings of national as well as local importance. Ever since 1888 there have been bitter complaints from the county councils whenever a creation or an extension of a county borough has been proposed. The county councils say that their areas and resources are being whittled away continually, and that they are in danger of being left with areas too small and too poor to be administered effectively. Even if the area which they lose is a poor one, whose rates do not pay for the services which it receives, the county councils consider that they suffer, because they cannot contract their overhead expenses in proportion to the contractions of area and income. Moreover, there is a great disturbance of carefully planned administration. It is, of course, also a fact that a local authority is much like a nation in feeling loss of prestige if its area is diminished.

Mr. Roberts' proposal is in the nature of a compromise. He would form the western Tyneside towns—Newcastle, Gateshead, Wallsend, Jarrow, Gosforth, Newburn, Hebburn, Felling—into a single county borough, leaving the two county boroughs of Tynemouth and South Shields, and the urban district of Whitley and Monkseaton, to be governed as at present. Mr. Roberts claims for his scheme that it would be a considerable measure of unification, which is certainly true; and that whilst it would take away territory from Northumberland County Council (and from Durham County Council) it would not be to the extent of crippling it. It does also avoid the difficulty of extending the area of dual control.

Mr. Roberts' proposal has obvious merits, and it would probably be comparatively easy to implement. But it has the great drawback, it seems to me, of being a half-measure

and of not facing the whole of the facts. The arguments by which he supports this measure of unification are equally valid for the rest of the area. The problems of the Tyne will remain unsolved if there are still three county boroughs on its banks, nor is there any case for leaving out Whitley and Monkseaton, which is purely suburban to the Tyneside towns, and especially to Newcastle. There would still be five or six local authorities operating in what Mr. Roberts, like his colleagues, recognises as a single conurbation. He states as one of the main defects of the present local government that 'there is no body that can speak and act for Tyneside as a whole.' There would still be no such body. And since the needs of the area call for such a body, the position created, if Mr. Roberts' proposals were implemented, would be one of unstable equilibrium. There would certainly be an agitation for further amalgamations, which perhaps would take place in twenty years' time. But, having regard to the expense and disturbance which rearrangements of local government areas and authorities inevitably entail, is it worth while making two jobs of something which must be done within the next few decades?

I return to the proposal brought before the Royal Commission by several witnesses, including myself, of a single county borough for the whole group of Tyneside towns. The Royal Commission admits (para. 197) that such a scheme 'has patent attractions if it is regarded purely from the point of view of the populous districts of Tyneside.' It rejects it on the ground of the injury which would be done to the Northumberland County Council. 'It is not too much to say that Northumberland would be largely crippled by the formation of a county borough on Tyneside' (para. 199).

Would Northumberland be crippled? It would certainly suffer a serious loss. But it would still be a county with a population of nearly 300,000 and with a rateable value of over £1,350,000, or about £4 11*s.* per head. It would be by no means the smallest or poorest of English counties. In many respects it would be comparable with Cumberland. It should not be impossible for such a county to carry on, and to carry on very efficiently. But if it should find it very difficult to do so, why not amalgamate Northumberland and Durham under a single county council? No part of county

Durham is more than forty miles from Newcastle, parts of Northumberland are more remote from Newcastle than any part of Durham would be. The whole area could be administered very conveniently. The one difficulty in the way of such a solution is not physical but sentimental—the difficulty of getting local opinion to accept it. But it is probably an insuperable difficulty at the moment.

To draw to a conclusion, the Royal Commission has endorsed emphatically the arguments of those who maintained that the Tyneside towns were now so interwoven that they should be considered a single urban area. Three possible courses of action are before the public and the Government, none of them without its difficulties. There is, first of all, the majority recommendation of the creation of a Northumberland regional council and of a municipal borough of Newcastle. This has the merits of (*a*) unifying the Tyneside towns; (*b*) establishing many services over a still wider area; (*c*) avoiding injury to Northumberland. It has the defect of creating a large municipality with singularly small powers; and the graver defect of dividing control where formerly control was unified. The latter defect seems to me of paramount importance. If it could be overcome, I should support heartily the creation of the regional council. If it cannot be overcome, it outweighs, in my opinion, all advantages.

The minority recommendation of Mr. Roberts has the merit of being comparatively easily realisable. But it does not offer a final solution of the problem set, and it could only be regarded as interim action.

There remains the original proposal of a unification of the Tyneside towns into a single county borough. I do not feel that the objections to it are at all insuperable; and, unless the majority scheme can be amended in the direction indicated above, it seems to me that the creation of a single county borough is the best course of action. But it should be realised that this would leave unsolved the problem, which is nationwide, of adjusting the claims and aspirations of the counties with those of the growing towns.

The Royal Commission has in any case done a great educative work. It has attempted a solution: I do not think it has found it.

HENRY A. MESS.

FRENCH CONSERVATIVE OPINION AND ENGLAND[1]

By HENRY LÉMERY
(Sénateur de la Martinique, Ancien Garde des Sceaux)

IT has become almost a commonplace to say that close understanding between England and France is the best guarantee of the peace of Europe. It is not enough, however, merely to state this as an axiom: it must be insisted on tirelessly if it is to remain true; its application must be general and its consequences realised not only in foreign policy but in the whole fabric of domestic policy in both countries, considered together as a factor of vital importance to civilisation and the future of humanity. The *rôle* of these two countries is in fact less important by virtue of their military, economic, and financial power than by the value of the example they set to the peoples of the world. Their recognition of this will be stronger, clearer and more effective, if it is not confined to their own frontiers, but perfected in a mutual comprehension which will reveal the full significance of their solidarity, and the responsibilities for action which it involves.

There is no one who does not pay tribute to the historic achievements of the English Conservative Party, which has embodied, and sustained with admirable continuity, the dominant qualities of a vigorous and realist people, a people which holds experience to be the source of all wisdom and all progress, both in the development of society and the advancement of knowledge. The Conservative theory of government has its root in this simple and powerful notion—that what has long endured has thus demonstrated its fitness, and that the changes necessitated by altered customs and conditions should be regarded, not as the negation of

[1] Translated by Alex Glendinning

an honourable past, but as a means of harmonising what is permanent and fundamental in life with what is new in environment.

Since the British people love justice and liberty, it is their traditionalists who have built up the democratic institutions of which they are justly proud, and which the world admires as a model of order, political maturity and balance, designed to ensure both individual and social welfare. France has reached a similar position by apparently different methods. With her taste for abstract ideas and intellectual audacity she more readily perceives, in any reform, the part played by innovation rather than the underlying persistence of former conditions. But it will be clear to anyone who studies her long history that improvisations and revolutions have played a smaller part there than the steady growth of a serious and thoughtful public spirit, prompt in conception but prudent in action. There also exists in France a body of Conservative opinion very similar to that which has exercised such a beneficent influence on the destiny of England. It, too, derives its traditionalist principles from national sentiment; it is likewise liberal and does not fear progress, though it is careful to ensure that what goes by the name of progress is in fact progressive. But this French Conservative opinion is not organised; it has not given birth to a strong and stable party. It remains latent and scattered in the mass of the population, strongest in that select group which holds itself aloof, perhaps unduly, from public affairs, the better to devote itself to the vital task of promoting economic activity. Yet it is this opinion which restores the balance whenever the pendulum of affairs threatens to deviate too far from the normal. It has always succeeded in the past, and there is no reason to suppose that it will fail now; on the contrary, there are many indications that its regulatory action has already begun.

I am writing here for the English reader who, with his traditional respect for the character of other peoples, is too prone to believe that what is true in his own country may be untrue elsewhere, and that there exists in France a kind of intemperance of opinion which runs easily to extreme solutions. This belief is the result of a superficial knowledge of our public life, and of too much attention to the rivalry of

parties, whose links with the nation are much less powerful and deep-rooted than in England. Thus arises a false interpretation of events, and ephemeral movements are given an importance they do not possess. The Popular Front, for example, is regarded as a fact that must be accepted—as the manifestation of a new and irresistible spirit in the mass of the French people. In reality it is the result, on the one hand, of a redistribution of votes due almost entirely to the hardships caused by the crisis, and of little real importance; and, on the other, of the tactical errors of parliamentarians and militant radicals. These elements of chance have been exploited to the full by those who stood to benefit by them; but it is a grave illusion to imagine that the fundamental disposition of the nation has thereby been altered. The British Conservatives now in office are wrong in supposing, and in acting on the supposition, that there are no French Conservatives, or that they are a negligible quantity. In so doing, they wound their best friends and most reliable supporters in France, and help to aggravate a state of affairs at which they have small cause for rejoicing.

It would be an even worse mistake to suppose that there are, in effect, only two tendencies in France to-day: that of the Government parties who, because they call themselves democratic, strike the English as being more closely related to them than the others, and who seek to convey this impression; and that of the parties on the Right who are generally accused of Fascism by their adversaries, and who, in spite of their denials, are suspected, in liberal circles abroad, of meditating the overthrow of the parliamentary system. Such a picture of things is inexact. There are in France no partisans of any dictatorship, unless it be that of 'the proletariat' demanded by the Marxists in power to-day. The vast majority of the French people remain firmly attached to the Republic, which has functioned for sixty-six years without serious trouble and, at times, in very difficult circumstances. Those whom I call the French Conservatives fear only one thing—that the Republic in name may become a dictatorship in effect, through a class policy in which law will be no longer respected by all nor maintained for all equally.

These supporters of order, these sincere liberals, are, as I

have already said, those with whom the English Conservatives have most natural affinities, and with whom it would be easiest for them to collaborate. They have a genuine friendship for the British nation, founded on their vivid and cherished memories of the war. They know how great was the peril in 1914; they know what British aid meant, and how it weighed the balance of destiny. They also love England because she is the stronghold of liberalism, the model of countries capable of governing themselves. Between them and their English friends no misunderstanding is to be feared, no serious divergence of views on any question. They are profoundly attached to peace. France, like England, now no longer looks towards Europe, but towards her colonial empire, the constitution of which has cost her blood and money, and in which are centred from now on all her future ambitions. She occupies herself with the affairs of the old continent only to ensure that no spark is struck which might set the world ablaze. To accuse her of planning a military hegemony is as unjust as to call her supporters of order Fascists.

Towards Germany, England has tried to be as tolerant as possible. The French nationalists have no bias against Germany. They find it difficult to see in what way her rearmament has served the welfare of the world, or even her own welfare; but they feel that it is too late for recriminations. They ask only that the Reich should cease to represent for them that permanent menace which long and cruel experience has taught them to fear.

As regards the lesser Powers who claim their right to an independent life and to the development of their own culture, moderate French opinion does not differ from English Conservative opinion. While aware of its duties of assistance and protection, it has no wish to see them materialise as a source of conflicts, which it strives to avoid and to forestall. It counsels moderation, and the co-operation which it envisages seeks above all to exclude any military eventuality.

The question of Italy is more delicate. Yet the Conservatives in England were not unanimous about sanctions; many thought like the French nationalists. I remember a meeting in Paris where, speaking after Lord Phillimore, I found myself in close agreement with him in deploring what

we considered an impolitic and, moreover, ineffective gesture. Mr. Baldwin's Government, momentarily carried away by unruly public opinion, has since tried to end the tension between London and Rome. They have not completely succeeded, and, for the French nationalists, that is a subject of grave concern. They bear in mind however that, though she has not, like them, powerful historical, geographical, ethnical and cultural affinities with Italy, England has long held friendship with Italy to be an essential factor in her foreign policy. And they look forward to the re-establishment between the three occidental Powers of an *entente* which both logic and sentiment render desirable.

But there is a question about which the French nationalists and the leaders of the Popular Front are in lively disagreement—that of relations with Bolshevist Russia. The nationalists have an insurmountable aversion to the Franco-Soviet Pact and its consequences in domestic policy. It seems to them that this treaty amounts to moral fraud, for the geographical situation of the two countries does not permit the mutual assistance promised. Russia, having no common frontier with Germany, cannot come to the assistance of France in the event of German aggression; but should any conflict arise between Germany and the Soviets, no matter where or how little dangerous to Russia, France would have to bear the full brunt of it and run all the risks. It only remains to add that France will never provoke the Reich, while Moscow, with its mania for disturbing the life of other countries with propaganda, is liable to cause a grave incident at any moment. French nationalists are profoundly anxious at the progress which this propaganda makes in their country, thanks to the *rapprochement* between Paris and Moscow, thanks also to the preponderance of the Communist Party in the Popular Front, which is admittedly an invention of the Comintern. What is British Conservative opinion on these two subjects? It is very likely much closer to that of the French nationalists than of the parties on the extreme Left.

On the occasion of the German gesture of March 7, 1936, which destroyed the Locarno Pact, it was plain that England disapproved of the Franco-Soviet Pact, as having constituted some measure of provocation; and it seems clear that she is becoming alarmed lest the contagion of the

growing disorder in France should spread to her own territory. No doubt her public spirit will countenance nothing that seems like an attack on the principle which is traditionally dear to her—the right of people to govern themselves as they think fit; but in the modern world, and above all between two countries who are such close neighbours materially and spiritually as England and France, it is impossible that the domestic policy of the one should not react upon that of the other. It is for this reason that I believe it vitally necessary to the peace and well-being of the two nations, and of the whole world, that there should be frequent exchanges of views and a close solidarity of action between those elements in both countries which stand for order. It is the function of this *entente* to exert a beneficent influence on the evolution of international events. In the conflict between the totalitarian ideologies of Marxism and anti-Marxism, a conflict which grows daily more acute, the two occidental democracies represent that power of wisdom which must uphold the work of centuries, and direct the destiny of the world on the path towards the light, towards liberty, towards the good life.

The following remark, ascribed to a close friend of Mr. Neville Chamberlain, is reassuring: 'I do not know what his Government will be exactly, but I do know what it will not be—a Government of the Popular Front.' The nationalists of France rejoice in this assurance. They believe that if this sound policy prevails in England, it will prevail also in France.

HENRY LÉMERY.

SOME IMPRESSIONS IN ITALY

By Peter Hutton

'Duce–Duce–Duce.' This is probably the first thing the visitor will see as he enters Italy, the words plastered in letters 2 or 3 feet high on the wall of some garden or house, or perhaps on a railway embankment. Next come texts from the great man's speeches, painted for permanence on the walls of houses everywhere—heavy black letters on a white ground. '*Noi sogniamo l'Italia Romana—Mussolini.*' ('We dream of Roman Italy.') '*Tireremo diritto—Mussolini.*' ('We will hold on our course.') '*Chi non è pronto a morire per la sua fede non è degno di professarla—Mussolini.*' ('Who is not ready to die for his faith is not worthy to profess it.') '*Con Ginevra, senza Ginevra, contro Ginevra—a noi!*' ('With Geneva, without Geneva, against Geneva—to us!') From the Alps to Sicily similar quotations are posted in every town and village and along every road and railway line. As he passes the frontier into Fascist Imperial Italy the visitor can feel that for a thousand miles ahead of him no other voice than this can be heard. No newspaper can be sold, no book published, no wireless programme broadcast, no public speech made which does not echo those stentorian tones.

Can any other voice than this be heard in the land of Garibaldi? Is there such a thing as public opinion? And if so, what is it? What do the Italians really think about the League, about their new empire, about the Italo-German Axis, about war with England, about democracy? How strong is the Fascist *régime*? What will happen when Mussolini dies? These are questions which are instantly prompted in the mind of any observant tourist, questions which are to a great extent provoked by the apparently absolute domination of the Government propaganda and the apparently unquestioned devotion of the Italian people to the Fascist *régime*. After four months spent motoring about nearly every part of

Italy as far south as Rome—touring, sight-seeing, reading the papers, talking to Italians and foreigners, to Fascists and anti-Fascists, officials, doctors, priests, monks, friars, guides, peasants, beggars, shopkeepers and ordinary human beings of unknown occupation—it is easy to gather together a set of facts about Italy and Italian life of which one was unaware in England. It is harder to sum them up and arrive at a definite conclusion. Let us begin by stating the facts.

The first fact to grasp is that officially there is no other opinion in Italy on any subject whatever than that poured out unceasingly by Mussolini, the Fascist organisations, the radio, the Press and patriotic citizens who are trying to impress the Government with their unswerving loyalty and orthodoxy. The second fact, a psychological corollary of the first, is that there is in Italy a widely spread opinion almost exactly the contrary of the official one. This can in no sense be called 'public' opinion; it is private, very private indeed. Publication of anything approaching such sentiments means 'the islands' for at least two years, if not worse. I met a man in a small city in Italy who had just come back from one of those notorious penal settlements. He had been sent there because, drinking coffee with his friends in the piazza on the night that the news of the assassination of Dollfuss came through, he said that the 'vest-pocket' Chancellor had got his deserts.

There are thousands of so-called Communists in Italy. They are really only Anarchists or simply strong anti-Fascists, but this is because it is practically impossible for them to obtain any Communist literature from which to learn the theories and methods of Marx and Lenin. As things stand they will never make a successful Communist revolution by themselves, because, as Lenin himself taught, although it is only necessary that a small proportion of the population should be Communist to ensure success, it is absolutely necessary that those few should be perfectly instructed in the theory of the revolution. Most Italian Communists are upstanding members of the Fascist Party proving to the Government that, publicly at least, they have forsaken their old ways. Nevertheless, they and their friends are irrepressible and put the fear of God into the *régime*. About forty people were arrested recently in a little hill town in Umbria where I was staying because the red flag with the hammer and sickle

thereon was found flying one morning from one of the municipal flagstaffs. Twenty or thirty people were arrested in a popular Riviera tourist resort at the beginning of this year because they were said to be printing and distributing Communist literature. Rumour has it—but this I cannot personally vouch for—that there was an almost general mutiny of the population against the *régime* a month or two ago at Terni, an industrial town north of Rome, as a result of which a very large number of people were arrested. Local mutinies, isolated acts of rebellion, happen every other day, and the prisons are full.

But further examples of this kind, of which the visitor will only hear from friends of the victims and will naturally never on any account see mentioned in the papers, are perhaps unnecessary. How often in the past few months have I been led out of possible earshot by some friar or doctor, and once by the *podestà* and doctor of a small village, and been asked what was really happening in the outside world. In some ways this is the most pathetic part of the whole business. The Italians are far too intelligent and individualistic in character not to know that they are being deceived, or at least to suspect it. But, humanly speaking, the only unbiassed foreign news which can get into the country is on the radio, and that is useless to those who cannot understand English or French. A wireless set can also be a dangerous instrument to possess. Not long ago a party of young Blackshirts went round a number of the small cafés and *trattorie* in Florence, all of which had wireless sets (as I believe they are obliged to have by law now in Italy so that they may all be centres of propaganda), and asked the proprietors to get them the news from Barcelona. Those who were foolish enough to comply with this request or showed any knowledge of how to get the station had their shops and everything in them smashed to pieces. Of course, a little news leaks through into Italy by means of foreign newspapers and tourists, but this reaches only a very few. I shall not soon forget taking a parcel of books to be bound at a little shop in a back street of a certain Italian city. It happened that I had wrapped the books up in a week-old copy of *The Times*. My bookbinder saw this and, unwrapping the parcel, set the books aside and began avidly to search the paper. Finding an article on

'Spain,' he at once asked me to tell him what it said. Only when someone else entered the shop did he turn his attention to my books.

But continually when the unsuspecting visitor finds himself alone with an Italian will he be confronted with such eager questions as: 'What is really happening in Spain?' 'Why did you not stop us going to Abyssinia; you only had to block the Canal? Why did you not stop us? So many of us hoped you would.' If the visitor is sufficiently sure of his questioner to know that he is not simply an *agent provocateur* and makes any serious attempt at a reply, he will inevitably be confronted by the astounding ignorance induced by nearly fifteen years of terribly efficient propaganda. The Italians do not really known what is going on outside their own country—and, for the matter of that, little enough about what is going on inside it. They are taught to believe by their Press and radio that the only successful and happy countries in the world are those with Fascist or near-Fascist Governments, that democracy is out of date and that everyone in England and France is miserable, that the British Empire is falling to pieces, and that democracy inevitably leads to Socialism and Communism. Every Italian newspaper is nothing more than an organ of propaganda. A railway disaster in England or France is given columns of space; a similar event in Germany or Japan is not even mentioned. A sporting, scientific or literary triumph in Germany or Japan is given practically a page to itself; a similar item of news from France or England is passed over in complete silence. Columns and columns of the Italian newspapers have been devoted this spring to such subjects as the trouble in India and Waziristan, the unscrupulous cruelty of the Colonial Government in British Somaliland, the falling birth rate in England, the declining population in France and the miseries of the working classes in both countries. Everything possible is done to show non-Fascist countries in the worst possible light, especially from the point of view of the ordinary man in the street, who does not care one way or the other about politics, but who simply wants to earn his living in peace. The effect has been to make even seriously discontented Italians say: 'Well, it is true that we in Italy are suffering misery, but at any rate we are better off under Mussolini than they are anywhere else

in the world.' Were it not for this feeling, which, as a result of the undisputed propaganda, is universally accepted as true throughout the country, the anti-Fascists, Socialists, Communists and Anarchists, who must already be a formidable minority, might become the majority. Thus it may really be said that this intensive propaganda is Fascism's strongest weapon, and that without it the *régime* would swiftly be overthrown. For even now Fascism in Italy is not secure, and uses propaganda not merely for its foreign political ends but as an essential means of protection against the people it governs—a people famous down the ages for its love of liberty, individuality and independence of thought, and still, in spite of all that Fascism can do, the same.

Fear, just as much as propaganda, is a vital weapon of Fascism. It is a common saying in Italy that where three are gathered together the conversation will be all of the greatness of Mussolini and Fascism, but that when two of the three are alone together the subject will be discussed from a very different point of view. No one can trust anyone else; anyone may be an *agent provocateur*; and the Latin vices of calumny and envy flourish in the fruitful ground provided for them by Fascist systems of espionage. It may also be taken as true that the cellars of a German 'Brown House' are no worse than the '*sotto-suolo*' of an Italian '*Casa del Fascio*.'

It is as well to point out here that both the intensive propaganda, which is the most striking of all the facts about Italy to-day, and the continuous fear which hangs over everyone (the fear of delation to the *Casa del Fascio*), will have effects which will not necessarily cease with the present *régime*. After fifteen years of ever more intensive propaganda, and after being increasingly cut off from all unbiassed foreign news and opinion, until to-day the Italian Press and radio are the laughing-stock of that part of the world which is still more or less sane, the huge majority of the Italian people are in complete ignorance of the real state of affairs outside the country. Their artificially induced and unbalanced prejudices are entirely out of touch with reality, their whole perspective is warped, their sense of proportion has been thrown completely out of gear. Even a strong anti-Fascist is bound to feel the effects of being cut off from all contact with reality and of

the continuous bombardment of an efficient and ceaseless propaganda. It is upon this kind of soil that anything coming after Fascism will have to be founded.

Apart from those secret firebrands who are Communists or Anarchists, there is a great mass of less violent discontent in Italy to-day. This mass, which in any case is probably more important than the other groups and certainly outweighs them in numbers, is made up chiefly of the upper working classes and shopkeepers. Their cause of discontent does not necessarily go back to pre-Fascist days: that is to say, they are not merely discontented to-day because they may have been Liberals or Socialists before; they are discontented as a direct result of the actions of the Fascist Government. The *impero* (empire) is not nearly so popular in Italy as the Fascist Press would have everyone believe. Taxes are appallingly high, and everyone realises that the reason is chiefly the foundation of the empire coupled with Fascism's necessity of keeping the sword rattling. Whenever there is a public holiday in honour of some victory or massacre—which there seems to be about every other week during the spring—the crowds who are ordered to line the route of the inevitable procession have to watch the Blackshirt militia, whose pay they provide, march by. They realise the folly of it and hate parting with their money. But they have to cheer just the same. I say 'are ordered to line the route' with intention. On such festal occasions everyone receives a ticket ordering his presence at such and such a place to cheer whoever or whatever may be passing. The tickets are of various colours; red is reserved for special occasions when no excuse for absence will be accepted. In May, when the 'King-Emperor' came to Florence in connexion with the *Maggio Musicale* and the Giotto centenary celebrations, all the peasants for many miles around received the red tickets. Some of them were working after midnight as a result to make up for their lost day. For other reasons, also, these extraordinarily numerous public holidays are unpopular. The ordinary, and especially the old-fashioned, Italian of the working class is probably saner and more instinctively cultured than men of the corresponding class in any other country in the world. He does not approve of all these idle days. He objects to seeing the young men being trained in such foolish and lazy ways. The shop-

keepers do not like it either, since it interferes with their trade.

But undoubtedly the chief cause of discontent is the heavy taxation. In illustration of this, there is a story current all over Italy about a peasant who had four cows. The Communists came to him and said: 'We shall take away all your cows from you.' The Socialists came and said: 'We will be quite fair. We will take two of your cows and the other two you may keep.' Finally, the Fascists came and said: 'We will take nothing from you. Keep your cows; go on and prosper. Only, we will come every day and milk them for you.' Stories like this seem to show that the genius of the Italian people and their innate and ancient scepticism have managed to withstand, at least to a certain extent, even the terrific siege of recent years.

To turn now to foreign affairs: just as there is an undercurrent of suspicion and distrust of all the other Government propaganda, so the new friendship between Germany and Italy does not, among Italians privately, meet with the same unqualified approval which the newspapers express. The Italo-German Axis is not very popular. Apart from any merely political differences, there is, and always has been, a strong characteristic antipathy between the Italians and the Germans, particularly on the Italian side.

Government propaganda pours contempt of England and France into the ears of the Italian people. The really telling result of this campaign has been—I repeat it for emphasis—that the Italians sincerely believe that however badly off they themselves may be, at least the democratically governed nations are more miserable still. Many Italians with whom I have spoken were astonished when they heard that I had motored to Italy through France. Was not the unrest in France very bad? They could not believe that, outwardly at least, the French appeared not unhappy and that the towns and villages through which I had passed were not filled with hordes of strikers and Communists in arms. It is perhaps not generally recognised in England that however bad the Italian Press campaign against Great Britain may have been, that against France and the Popular Front Government has been very nearly as virulent.

For England has been reserved a more theoretical con-

tempt, ranging from our 'old-fashioned' form of government, which is claimed to be leading us straight to Communism, to our agricultural difficulties, the decay of our countryside, the barbaric cruelties of our colonial methods, the misery of the distressed areas and the unemployed, and, finally, our obvious decadence as exposed in the falling birth rate, due to birth control practices and racial deterioration.

In Italy they believe that it will take England five years to prepare for a European war, whereas they believe themselves to be at the peak of production. They believe, therefore, that the next five years are theirs. England is pictured as a kind of gorged pirate who must be forced to give up some of his ill-gotten hoard to more deserving, more vigorous, younger nations. I remember well one Italian saying to me: 'But why does not England give Malta to Italy?' Myself: 'But Malta is not Italian; that is an illusion. It is Maltese.' The Italian: 'I know. But why does not England do it as a friendly gesture to Italy. Only a gesture of friendship is needed. You have insulted us, and done all you can against us. Why do you not make us a friendly gesture, and then there would be no question of war?' Any attempt to point out to him that, apart from any ethics involved, such an act would simply strengthen Italy's already powerful and evidently threatening hand in the Mediterranean proved useless. Naturally, bearing well in mind the picture of England as the glutted and vicious pirate king now past his prime and only fit for the lethal chamber, there is much sympathy in Italy for Germany's demand for the return of colonies.

Mussolini, as may be seen from the walls of houses all over Italy, has committed himself to the ideal of '*una sempre più grande Italia*' ('an ever greater Italy'). It is only natural that the first point of attack should be the Mediterranean, the sea in which Italy remains virtually a prisoner. The Italian Government believes that it can, when necessary, completely block the Mediterranean. Pantelleria stands half way between Sicily and Tunis, commanding the narrow strait through which all traffic has to pass. It is fortified, and a six-mile limit has been claimed for it as regards foreign ships, while foreign aeroplanes are forbidden to fly over it, for it can be used as a base for aeroplanes, seaplanes and submarines, if not

for a fleet. Important as a base for blocking the free passage of the Mediterranean to British ships bound to Egypt and the East, it is equally important as a base of attack against the great French North African ports, and especially Tunis, and therefore as a threat to France's most vital communications, for it is from her African possessions that France hopes to get some of her most vigorous man-power and most important supplies in the event of being involved in another war. No mistake must be made about the attitude of Fascism to France; it is not against England alone that Italy has turned her face.

Apart from whatever plans Mussolini may be hatching for the future, and apart from any opportunism he may have practised in the past, there is one cause of this Italian friendship with Germany and Japan and enmity with England and France which we in England are far too inclined to overlook. It is a fact that, according to the different theories of both Fascism and Communism, 'he who is not with me is against me.' Just as the Communists believe that the English system of government is only a kind of hidden Fascism, and that, driven too far, the *bourgeoisie* would cast away its mask of democracy and turn out to be full-blooded Fascists, so the Fascists believe that democracy inevitably tends to Socialism and Communism unless that democracy is overthrown by a Fascist revolution. It would hardly be too much to say that, in the eyes of a Fascist, even more than in those of a Communist, the world is already divided into two opposing systems. Italy has written down France as almost as Communist as is Russia. England, if she does not espouse Fascism, will suffer the same fate. This purely theoretical point of view has a bearing which is often underestimated on the actions of the Italian Government. This may sound fantastic to the English reader, but it must not be forgotten that Mussolini's followers are not men of his calibre, that many of them are convinced theoretical Fascists, and that for propaganda to be effective it must retain a modicum of theoretical consistency.

This brings me to the question of the Spanish Civil War. Italy is deeply involved in Spain as much because she does not want to see another Communist Power in Europe as because she wants to have another Fascist ally in the rear of Com-

munist France. She is involved in Spain quite as much for these purposes as for any material and strategic reasons, such as the virtual control of Spanish territory. Of course, recruiting for Spain in Italy has been a more or less open affair throughout the whole unhappy business. Many of those who were sent to Spain believed until their arrival in that country that they were *en route* for Abyssinia. Others, again, have enlisted for Spain voluntarily since the pay is good and includes a good present to the volunteer's family. There is no question of the matter being secret. Non-intervention is looked upon as a great joke, since everyone knows that the reason that it takes at least six months to obtain delivery of a new Italian car, and about a year to obtain delivery of a lorry (even if they can be obtained then), is because all the Italian factories are working overtime on material for use in Spain. As a result of this, second-hand cars are being sold in Italy at almost the price they cost when new, and I have heard of one or two cases where a second-hand car in good condition fetched more than was originally paid for it. But Italy is short of other materials besides motor cars and lorries. Petrol is so expensive and taxes are so high that few cars are seen on the Italian roads, and those are of a low horse-power consuming little petrol. There is such a shortage of iron that no building except under a Government contract can be begun or completed. Many are the half-finished buildings which have stood for months with no progress being made towards their completion for lack of material.

While the subject of the Spanish War divides private opinion in Italy, much as it does in England, according to political or religious belief, everyone is firmly convinced both privately and publicly that Mussolini will never withdraw from Spain until Franco has won the day. The suggestion that both Franco and Mussolini might, after all, be beaten is regarded as inconceivable, and everyone seems to think that more and more Italian men and material will be poured into Spain until the Spanish Government is finally defeated. Naturally the Italians have no idea whatever that their forces have shown up far from well in the Spanish struggle, but believe that any rumours to this effect have been deliberately started by an envious and hypocritical Great Britain pretending to stand aside from the civil war, but in reality intriguing

with Russia and Protestants throughout the world for the downfall of Fascism and the Catholic religion.

Some account must here be given of the political position and sentiments of the Vatican and the progress of religious life in general under the *régime*. People in England were shocked at the inaction of the Pope at the time of the Abyssinian War, while English Catholic writers and periodicals have been notable for their support of Fascism in Italy and of Fascist ideals in general. Catholicism has, of course, no more in common with Fascism than it has with Communism, and those Catholics in England who have given such unthinking support to Fascism, and in the process have made it a present of so much valuable propaganda, would be horrified if they could live in Italy for a few months and see what is really happening to Italian religious life. The international character of Catholicism is being taken away from it in Italy, and, like every other Fascist action, the aim is to make it purely national. Mussolini, as a nationalist, could not quarrel with the religion which is the most Italian thing in Italy. He was bound, however, to quarrel with its supra-national character. Hitler, the German nationalist, was bound for the same reasons to quarrel violently with Catholicism, especially as it is a not particularly German organisation. Every religious festival in Italy is made into an occasion for political and patriotic demonstrations. Nearly all religious processions are accompanied by detachments of Blackshirts or Balilla. At a great procession in Florence not long ago the Blessed Sacrament was carried through the streets preceded by a large detachment of men with fixed bayonets. Naturally religion provides Fascism with some of its very best opportunities for sugaring the pill of propaganda. This is more especially so since most parish priests in Italy are favourable to Fascism since they are paid by the State. The regular clergy are less favourable since they are only taxed by it.

Good practising Catholics, men who are more Catholics than they are anything else, are not, like their English co-religionists, enthusiastic Fascists. On the contrary, they see the great danger to the Church and the manner in which Fascism uses religion for its own purposes. Their one cry in favour of Fascism, however—a cry which will carry much weight with all Catholics—is that Fascism has saved them

from Communism. It is this overwhelming and almost unreasoning terror of Communism which governs Vatican policy. The past history of the present Pope, who has personally seen more than a little of its horrors, must not be forgotten. I was, however, convinced by what I heard in Rome that, in spite of this fact, the Vatican had not by any means committed itself to a *régime* in which it is impossible to believe there can be any real stability—a *régime*, moreover, which practises the ideals of Hegelian totalitarianism. It had certainly not ventured to commit itself after the truly Athanasian manner of the English Catholic Press. The policy of the Vatican as regards Fascism is, in fact, an opportunist one. The men who guide Papal policy are of an older tradition than the officials of any other Government in Europe. To show the divergence of opinion between the Vatican and Fascism it is worth pointing out that no word of the struggle between Hitler and the Church in Germany has been allowed to leak into the Italian Press. The Pope's recent encyclical to the German bishops only appeared in full in the *Osservatore Romano*, the Vatican paper, and was gravely travestied in the secular Italian Press, for Fascists in Italy realised that this encyclical was addressed as much to them as to their German brethren.

To close on a happier note: during the whole of my stay in Italy I have never received, nor heard of any other English man or woman receiving, a hard word or a bitter look, let alone an insult, and this in spite of all the propaganda and artificial hate manufactured by the vast machine to which I have referred so often in this article. England has, humanly speaking, only one enemy in Italy; unfortunately, he is the only Italian whose voice, radiated in a thousand forms and disguises, is allowed to be heard.

PETER HUTTON.

ITALIAN EAST AFRICA—II

By MAJOR E. W. POLSON NEWMAN

IN any new colonial enterprise a special interest is always attached to the position of individuals, European and native, during the initial stages; and this is specially the case in the first large-scale effort of a Fascist Government. As religion, justice and education affect the individual in a more personal way than most other factors in human society, I propose to add to what has already been said on these subjects before going on to enlarge on the more collective aspects of colonial development in Italian East Africa. While in the matter of education the Italians have to introduce what was in former times practically non-existent, in justice they have to make careful reforms, so as to rectify evils with the least possible disturbance of a system which has been traditional through the centuries. In religion, on the other hand, they have to deal with one of the most ancient and corrupt forms of Christianity, and with important Moslem communities in different parts of the country. There is also the question for the Vatican, in co-operation with the Italian Government, of providing for the religious needs of an ever-increasing Italian population.

Visits to various religious centres in Ethiopia convince me that the Italians have already established most friendly and sympathetic relations with the hierarchy of the Ethiopian Church. On visiting the ancient church of Axum, long regarded as a shrine of special sanctity, accompanied by the Italian resident, it was obvious that every effort was made to facilitate all religious observances according to tradition, and to respect customs and ideas peculiar to the people of the country. Good personal relations between the Italian officials and the priests were also noticable at the church of Adowa and at the monastery of St. Stephanos, picturesquely situated on an island of Lake Haik, near Dessié. Indeed, the Church con-

tinues to carry out its religious functions exactly as before, and receives gifts and other help from the Italian Government. The Abuna receives an allowance, and many Ethiopian churches are undergoing complete overhaul and repair at Italian expense. St. George's Cathedral at Addis Abeba is one of those at present being reconstructed. Such primitive education as the children used to receive at the hands of the priests is not interfered with, as it is expected to die a natural death with the extension throughout the country of a modern educational system. One of the chief problems, however, is to find some means of reducing the number of priests. It is hoped that the progress of education will necessitate a higher standard in the priesthood, and thereby eliminate a considerable proportion of the lower grades. Towards the Moslem hierarchy the Italian attitude is similar, and it has long been the practice in other Moslem possessions to make gifts to and take an interest in the maintenance and improvement of mosques. In December last year the Moslems of Gore petitioned the Viceroy for a mosque, and the request was readily granted. The Moslem hierarchy receive every respect, and there is no interference with their traditional system of religious and domestic administration for their own community. They are treated on a basis of complete equality with the Christians. After a visit of inspection to Harar and other districts, the Viceroy made a speech in which he declared that absolute freedom of religion was guaranteed to all Moslems, not only in Harar, but throughout the whole Empire. The principle followed by the Italians is that in all regions the religion of the majority takes precedence, but religious liberty is complete. In Sidamo, the country of Jiam-jiam, and other pagan localities, Italian missionaries and Ethiopian priests will have facilities to preach Christianity, but elsewhere proselytising will not be encouraged. Indeed, in the State of Harar the Viceroy has advised Ethiopian priests of Amharic race to abandon a fruitless task. These priests originally came to this Moslem region as representatives of Amharic domination, now at an end, and they are strongly advised to return to their country of origin. The question of meeting the religious needs of the Italian population is chiefly a question for the Vatican; and all that can be said at present is that a new diocese is likely to be formed in Italian East Africa with a

bishop, or possibly a cardinal, in Addis Abeba. Meanwhile, small Catholic churches, built of stone, are beginning to appear on prominent positions throughout the country, but most of the services are still conducted in tents or in the open air.

Having in a previous article given a brief outline of the principles on which the Italians are building up a new judicial system, it is now necessary to show in more detail the new procedure for dealing with civil and criminal cases. Under the rule of the ex-Negus there was no written legal code, and the administration of justice was based on ancient custom and precedent rather than on juridical principles. In a legal dispute between two Ethiopians it was the custom to call in a conciliator, who might be merely a passer-by in the street. If it was impossible to settle the matter in this way, reference was made to the *danya*, or village headman, and from him it could go on to the *womba*, and thence to the *ras* or *dejiak*. If necessary, the case could be referred to a representative of the Negus, and finally to the Negus himself. As this procedure involved continual payments and endless delays, the pockets or lives of the disputants frequently gave out before settlements were reached. While it is true that in more recent times a legal code was drawn up, this was never put into operation. It was, however, on the criminal side that really barbaric practices were evident. Crimes such as murder or robbery were regarded as personal rather then public offences, and punishment lay with the individual or relatives of the person wronged instead of with the State. The law was one of retribution or payment of blood money. During the reign of the ex-Negus, Jesus Afework instituted a system of execution cells where the relatives of a victim despatched the murderer. This superseded the old custom of putting the murderer to death by slow degrees. Although the barbarous aspects of the old *régime* have been abolished, civil cases between natives are still dealt with by their own tribunals. In the case of Christians, civil cases go first to the *danya*, then to the *womba*; for Moslems, first to the *cadi* and secondly to a council of *Ulema* (formerly the Moslems had no court of second instance, and cases went from the *cadi* to the Christian *ras* or *dejiak*); for pagans, there is the village headman, with appeal to a council of notables. From these native tribunals

appeal may be made to the Italian commissioner or resident. In any cases, however, where Europeans are involved, reference must be made to an Italian tribunal presided over by an Italian judge or magistrate. Cases may then, if necessary, be referred to the Court of Appeal in Addis Abeba. On the criminal side the Italian Penal Code has been introduced. Native cases are now judged by the Italian civil authority of the locality in which they occur—*i.e.*, the commissioner or resident. Serious crimes, however, such as murder or robbery with violence, go to the assize courts which are held in the State capitals, but these courts may move to the scene of the crime if considered desirable. In criminal cases appeal may only be made on grounds of procedure, and such appeals are dealt with by the Court of Cassation in Rome. Native appeals can be carried through the various stages up to the King-Emperor. Although this judicial system already operates throughout the country, there are still localities, recently occupied, where some of the regular courts have not yet been set up.

Education is making progress, and there are all grades of Italian schools, except the university. The system of education for Italians is divided into grades as in Italy, and the youth organisation has its corresponding branches in East Africa. Whenever a demand arises for a school, educational facilities are at once provided even though the conditions may at first be primitive. In any of the larger towns one may see the children leaving school with their books and satchels at midday, as in Europe. Although, of course, the question of a university is not yet under consideration, the fact that it has already entered the minds of the Italians is an indication of the lines on which this country is expected to develop. The organisation of native schools is similar to the Italian system, but as yet only elementary schools for boys and girls have been opened, with Amharic and Arabic sections. While in some cases old buildings are in temporary use, new schools are beginning to make their appearance; and where it is not possible yet to provide buildings, classes are conducted in tents and huts. It is also interesting to note that arrangements are being made to provide a Moslem college at Harar, and it is possible that later on similar institutions will be opened in other States where there is sufficient demand. The impression

created in visiting native schools is that the Ethiopian children are intelligent up to about twelve years, after which there is a tendency for them to become dull. They show proficiency in drawing and writing, and the smaller ones in particular learn Italian quickly. The children are neatly clothed in khaki shirts and shorts, and cleanliness is encouraged by the presentation of blue bows. The instruction is of a sound, practical kind, and discipline is inculcated from the earliest stages. Medical attention is given at these schools: the pupils are taught to wash their own clothes; while the girls are taught sewing and other practical accomplishments. Drill and physical training also form important parts of the school curriculum, and the results are excellent. A visit to a native school in Asmara created a most favourable impression. The pupils, among whom was the son of Ras Seyum, did work remarkable for their age, and the neatness of their exercise-books was very creditable. In this school, as in many others, there was a special advanced class for boys of good character who wished to qualify for clerkships in the Government service and similar employment elsewhere. When I visited a school at Dessié, housed in the former headquarters of the Negus, the boys were doing physical training under a lieutenant of Alpini. Considering the short time they had received this form of instruction, and the age of some of the boys, the performance was surprising. This school was provided with a good swimming-bath, and each boy received a loaf of bread before going home in the evening. Naturally, the teaching and outdoor exercises at all native schools are on Fascist lines, and loyalty to the King-Emperor and the Duce takes a prominent part in the school life.

In a country where disease has hitherto been widespread, where lepers sold food in the market-place, efforts to preserve public health have to be comprehensive. While the steps taken to prevent disease must necessarily be slow, those already taken are as advanced as could be expected, but the plans for the future are most complete. Amongst the temporary arrangements made for dealing with illness in Addis Abeba has been the reconstruction and enlargement of the Italian Hospital for Europeans. This hospital was destroyed at the time of the Negus's flight, but has now been reorganised so as to deal with all branches of medicine and surgery. The

former Menelik Hospital for natives has been reorganised under the name of the Duke of the Abruzzi Hospital; the American Hospital, which has done excellent work for many years, continues to render up-to-date service to the native population. In addition to the hospitals there has also been started a general clinic, with specialists in internal complaints, eye diseases, tuberculosis, and venereal disease, as well as a gynæcologist, a children's specialist, and a dentist. Five smaller clinics are distributed throughout the capital. There is also a maternity home for natives, and midwifery and ambulance services. In other centres the military hospitals are at present used also for civilian cases, and there are small clinics all over the country. This does not take into account the hospitals which already exist in the former colonies of Eritrea and Somaliland. Special provision is made for the Italian road-workers, who have their own doctors and clinics, and hospitals are now being built at such labour depôts as Quoram. The plans which the Italians have in view include the setting up of a large general hospital in each capital. Each hospital will be constructed on the Addis Abeba plan and will be built in many sections, providing accommodation both for Europeans and natives. It is also intended to build smaller hospitals in all the more important centres—*i.e.*, where there is a commissioner; while minor towns and villages will each have a clinic. The Italian programme aims at providing three hospital beds to every thousand people. Leprosy is among the more serious diseases prevalent in Ethiopia, and special measures are being taken for the segregation and treatment of lepers. In Eritrea and Somaliland this work has been undertaken by the Knights of the Sovereign Order of Malta, who have established small and isolated villages for lepers. Elsewhere the work of the Sudan Leper Mission has been taken over by Italian missionaries of the Consolata religious order.

For the prevention of disease the attention of the medical authorities is at present mainly concentrated on malaria, smallpox, venereal disease, and the more elementary sanitary services. For malaria prophylaxis three institutes have been set up (one in Eritrea, one in Somaliland, and one at Addis Abeba). Meanwhile, a noisy vaccination campaign is being conducted by means of loud-speakers at eight different points in Addis Abeba. From clusters of megaphones, mounted on

poles, the natives are exhorted in Amharic and Arabic to 'Remember to go and be vaccinated.' That the words of advice are gradually having their effect is shown by the steady increase of the vaccination figures. This system will shortly be extended to all the State capitals. But perhaps the most formidable task of the Department of Public Health is the attempt to stamp out venereal disease among a population in which it has become deeply rooted. The first disagreeable fact to be faced is the presence in Addis Abeba alone of about 4000 prostitutes, mostly diseased. As, however, the ex-Negus levied a tax on prostitutes and employed female tax-collectors for this purpose, it has been possible to trace most of them. Although the Italians have the advantage of not having to pull to pieces a previous sanitary system, the introduction of modern drainage and other sanitary measures must take time. Yet among the measures already introduced are a disinfection service in all towns; the provision of slaughter-houses, in which all animals for food must be killed under official supervision; and the establishment in all State capitals of institutes for hygienic and bacteriological research. As a result of these and other measures there is already a marked improvement in the sanitary conditions which prevailed when I last visited the country two years ago.

Although the Italians have no present intention of giving any form of self-government to the native population, nor of allowing their participation in the government of the country, they give each race or tribe probably more liberty in managing their own affairs than is usual in colonial territories. For example, the Gallas, who were previously subordinate to Amharic chiefs, are now under the control of their own Galla chiefs; and these local chiefs are recognised, considered and respected by the Italian authorities. During my visit to Dembidollo, in western Ethiopia, the Galla chief Johannes was sent to Italy by air for rheumatic treatment at Acqui. The local chiefs are also consulted by Italian commissioners and residents on matters concerning their own people, but it is a rigid rule that no notables of alien race can be approached in this way. As Amhara supremacy no longer exists, every effort is being made to encourage ex-officials of Amharic race who still live in non-Amharic regions to return to their places of origin. If difficulty is experienced in selling pro-

perty, the Government is prepared to buy, while those without means receive assistance. There are also many cases where the Amharas seek Italian protection from the vengeance of those whom they have mistreated in the past. It is particularly interesting to note the reactions of the previously subordinate races to their sudden liberation from centuries of servitude. In western Ethiopia, where the Italians occupied the country by aeroplane, the Gallas are convinced that freedom descended to them from heaven; and this they express in the songs which they sing at their 'fantasias.' On the other hand, the Maos of the Anfilo forest were convinced that liberty meant a general holiday for the rest of their lives, with all their needs provided free of cost. Indeed, it was not until the Italians approached their chief with firmness that they could be prevailed upon to resume work; indolence is prevalent throughout Ethiopia, and is particularly characteristic of the western part of the country, where the climate is warm, wet and enervating. The abolition of the old system of taxation has relieved the people of a heavy burden. Formerly the demand of the Negus for so many mule-loads of any commodity meant an initial levy of about ten times that amount, in order to cover the demands of the various chiefs through whose territories the convoy passed. The immediate result, however, of the suspension of taxation has been the limitation by the natives of their production to their own necessities of life. It has not yet dawned upon them that surplus production can now be sold and their conditions of life improved.

The attitude of the Italian officials towards the native population must seem strange at first to any British observer without previous experience of the Italian colonial system. There appears to be a mixture of extreme severity on the one side with excessive leniency on the other. As long as all goes well, the Italians treat the natives much more as equals than is our custom, and seem at times to indulge in a certain familiarity which is unknown in our dealings with native races. I have even come across cases where Italian officials tended to spoil Ethiopian servants by excessive praise and pampering. I have never seen Italians curse or bully natives; they neither shout at nor try to browbeat them. Their attitude is rather one of dignified politeness and humanity except where firmness

is needed, which takes the form of one short, sharp reproof. When, however, there is serious trouble with natives, the Italians believe that severity is in the end the wisest and most humane policy. They hold that trouble must be stamped out immediately by the most severe measures, as an example to others and to ensure peace for the future. It is a matter of opinion whether this policy, or that of great moderation now practised in British possessions and mandates, is likely to produce the best results. Although the native population is now offered for the first time such education as will fit them for ordinary occupations within their own sphere, there is no intention of Europeanising or over-educating these people. The Italians have learnt from the experience of other colonial Powers that such a policy usually ends in trouble; and they are determined that if it comes in East Africa it shall not come from this direction. But a great interest is taken in native traditions and customs, and administrative officials are already finding how much their influence is increased even by a small knowledge of native languages. The Italians make no pretence that their primary object in East Africa is a benevolent mission of civilisation; but while the improvement of conditions and development of the country is intended first of all for the benefit of Italy, there is obviously a strong desire that the natives should be happy and contented.

In a previous article mention was made in general terms of the conditions at present prevailing for Europeans; and it was shown that the high cost of living and shortages were among their chief difficulties. In order to give some indication of the cost of the staple foods, the following figures are given: flour costs 1.35 lire per kilo; first-quality bread, 1.80 lire per kilo; sugar, 3 lire per kilo; cheese, 20 lire per kilo; ham, 25 lire per kilo; sausages, 13 to 15 lire per kilo. All these commodities are imported from Italy and are among the staple foods of the Italians; no import duty is paid on them; prices are regulated by a committee, and these are gradually falling as the transport services improve. Local products, on the other hand, are proportionately cheaper, although they are of inferior quality except in a few localities. Beef costs from 3 to 5 lire a kilo; veal, 3.50 to 4.50 lire per kilo; lamb, 8 lire per kilo (mutton is uneatable); poultry, 12 lire per kilo; eggs, 6 lire a dozen. Owing to their scarcity, poultry

and eggs have increased considerably in price. There is also a shortage of wheat, owing to the abolition of taxes previously levied in kind and the effect which this has had on production. *Consequently there is a large importation of flour from Italy.*

Among the shortages noticeable in Addis Abeba are water and electricity. While there seems to be an adequate supply of water in the Entoto Hills, use still has to be made of the old supply system formerly belonging to Ras Desta, which is quite inadequate to meet present needs. For electricity most of the town still relies on an antiquated system of the ex-Negus driven by an engine in the Old Ghebi. Until this is replaced by a more modern lighting system the times when light is available will continue to be spasmodic. I shall, however, have something to say on the Italian plans for the supply of electricity throughout the country in the course of the next article. As far as the needs of the European population are concerned, everything depends on the transport services from Massawa and the Jibuti railway. Owing to the incomplete state of the roads and the very limited capacity of the railway, there is great congestion at the port of Jibuti; and consequently large stocks are often held up for weeks, or even months, awaiting transport. As a result of this the shops of Addis Abeba display an assortment of goods curiously out of proportion to the probable needs of their customers. Steps are, however, now being taken by the military authorities to clear the accumulations at Jibuti before the rains, while shipping to this port will in future be regulated according to the capacity of the transport services.

As is to be expected, there is also a great shortage of housing accommodation. In the larger towns such hotels as exist are overcrowded, and all spare rooms are let by Europeans to Italian officials, elsewhere it is necessary to live in tents unless huts or former mission-houses happen to be available. But there are also many centres in western Ethiopia where roads have not yet been built and which depend entirely on supplies by air. As many of these districts have prolonged rainy seasons, during which it is often impossible for aeroplanes to land, the conditions of life are similar to those of war-time. Although in normal conditions supplies can be obtained from the Sudan, little benefit can be derived from this source until the Nile steamers can reach Gambela about

the middle of June. In such cases the commissioner or resident and other permanent officials have made themselves homes and gardens, and have taken steps to ensure as much comfort as possible; but the army officers, although mentally making the best of conditions, do not seem able to 'dig themselves in' comfortably, and thereby suffer what would seem to us unnecessary discomfort. The employment of native servants is general, and their efficiency varies considerably according to their race. The natives are also employed extensively as assistants in Italian shops; but there is a general tendency to overpay a native population which has for the most part been unaccustomed to any pay at all.

In present circumstances the lack of anything approaching adequate hotel accommodation reduces foreign visitors to a minimum, but steps are already being taken to provide good hotels in the principal centres and small guest-houses elsewhere. The Imperial Hotel in Addis Abeba is being enlarged, and a new hotel will be built at Asmara and Massawa. But the accommodation now being provided for visitors is only the beginning of an elaborate plan to cater for tourists and those who choose to combine business with pleasure. It is intended to create tourist resorts at such healthy places as Keren (in northern Eritrea), Gondar and Lake Tana, which should prove attractive to visitors from the Sudan. At Gondar it is proposed to make use of the Portuguese castles for hotel purposes, and to create at the northern end of Lake Tana a pleasure resort within about an hour's motor run from Gondar when the road is finished. Although at present all game is strictly preserved, it is intended to institute game laws and make big-game hunting possible as soon as the country is sufficiently developed and the sport can be properly controlled. Game such as elephant, hippopotamus, lion, leopard, panther, buffalo, boar, and buck of many kinds are plentiful; and their temporary preservation from indiscriminate shooting should hold out good prospects for licensed hunters later on.

Although European newspapers reach Italian East Africa quickly by air, the supply is naturally very limited, and other means are needed for the dissemination of news. In the larger towns a local Press has been started to supplement that of the former colonies. In Asmara the *Corriere Eritreo* is published in Italian and Arabic; in Addis Abeba the *Corriere dell' Impero*

appears in Italian, Amharic and Arabic; and the same language principle applies elsewhere. In addition to this, news is broadcast in Addis Abeba from the groups of loud-speakers to which I have already referred, and this service will shortly be extended to all towns of any importance. All news services, however, are under Government control, and there is a censorship for outgoing news. As there are at present no foreign correspondents in the country, the only channels of unofficial news are through the casual contributions of European residents, whose activities are practically confined to Addis Abeba and Asmara, and through European agents at Jibuti. The former channel is naturally cramped; the latter is used by anti-Italian elements in Europe. Most of the damaging reports on conditions in Italian East Africa, emanating from Paris, can be traced to European agents at Jibuti. Much of this propaganda has been accepted as fact by the London Press. The absence of foreign correspondents is possibly due to the impression that their presence would be rendered useless by restrictions. The Italians refuse to welcome journalists coming from Europe with instructions from their editors to paint everything they see or hear in the darkest colours, but those who wish to report the truth can be assured of a free hand.

I have already referred in general terms to the two different types of colonisation which are contemplated in Italian East Africa, *i.e.*:

(1) General settlement for mixed farming; and (2) Industrial colonisation. Although the old native system of agriculture was most primitive, the people recognised three distinct zones in Ethiopia and regulated accordingly such cultivation as they attempted These zones were as follows:—

(*a*) The lower plateau between sea level and about 3000 feet. Here the temperature is high and the rainfall low, while the country consists of steppes, marshes and jungle. The vegetation is tropical, umbrella trees are abundant, and the soil is sandy and poor. The regions coming within this area are Somaliland, the country of the Danakil, and the Sudanese low plateau.

(*b*) The regions between the high mountains and low plateaux —*i.e.*, from 3000 feet to 7500 feet. Here the temperature is moderate and the rainfall high. The country consists of fertile valleys, rolling plains and hills, interspersed with forest and jungle. The natural vegetation is sub-tropical. Fig trees, cactus, coffee,

etc., grow wild, while many varieties of European fruits, flowers and vegetables increase rapidly once they are introduced The soil is rich and firm. This zone comprises the State of Harar and most of the western and south-western areas

(*c*) The mountainous regions over 7500 feet, with low temperatures and frequent night frosts. Although the rainfall is high, it is less than that of the temperate zone. Prairie grass and woods are characteristic of the vegetation, and the soil is firm but stony This zone comprises the higher parts of Amhara, Shoa, Wollo Galla, etc

The parts of the country best suited for general settlement by Italian families are to be found mainly in the temperate zone, with one or two favourable localities in the mountain regions. Although plans for colonisation are still under consideration in Rome, it is possible to give a rough indication of the regions in which settlement is likely to be undertaken in the near future. There are, for example, such places in the eastern part of Amhara as the Cobbo plain, Waldia, the plain of Uccialli, and the country south of Dessié, all on the main road from north to south. Later on, as communications are completed, the Wogerat, north of Gondar, and the Lake Tana district are likely to be considered. Settlement will probably soon take place in the State of Harar, where the exchange of property is simplified by Islamic law. The best region, however, for settlement is to be found in the State of Galla Sidamo, where the soil is of exceptional quality and the climate most suitable for Europeans Many landscapes strongly recall the English countryside, and all indications point to a land of flourishing farms and plentiful produce. Such districts as Gimma, Kaffa, Lekemti, Wollega and Saio will be settled as soon as communications permit, but in some cases there are as yet no roads at all, and roads to other districts will not be finished before the rains begin. In the district of Addis Abeba, however, as well as in the State of Harar, a beginning has already been made with small settlements of ex-service men, and this plan will be extended to Italian families after the forthcoming rains. Each family will receive a piece of land and a sum of money with which to build his house and equip the farm. At Oletta, near Addis Abeba, the plan is to arrange for triangular holdings, so that the houses built at the apex of each triangle will form a central village. Each farmer will have the status of a proprietor and

will employ native labour, as it has been decided that there is to be no Italian paid labour on agricultural settlements. Fifty families will be brought out immediately after the rains, and the number will be increased to a hundred as soon as possible. At the moment vegetables are being grown as giving the quickest results, but wheat will soon form an important product. For the first year it is intended to direct and supervise the settlers, and experiments are now being carried out with the cross-breeding of sheep and cattle. In Eritrea and Somaliland, on the other hand, colonisation will take the form of industrial concessions for large-scale production of standard commodities, and this will be carried out in two ways—(1) by direct employment of native labour, and (2) by the supervision of native cultivators. Eritrea is for the most part unsuitable for Italian settlement, as large areas belong to natives who cannot be dispossessed.

As far as colonisation is concerned, it is important to realise that the present stage is essentially one of preparation, and visible results are no indication of the possibilities of the country or the capacity of the Italians to make use of it. As time passes, however, settlements will gradually grow up along the lines of communication. Although no great influx of Italian settlers can be expected this year or next, there is good reason to believe that within a decade the country will absorb about a million people of Italian nationality. Further information regarding the resources of the country, agricultural and otherwise, will form part of the next and concluding article.

E. W. POLSON NEWMAN.

Saio, Western Ethiopia, May 1937.

MITTELEUROPA

By C. F. Melville

The struggle on the Danube and in the Balkans between German expansion and the opposing forces of Danubian co-operation is now entering upon a decisive phase. This is clearly indicated both by the moves towards a *rapprochement* between Austria and Hungary on the one hand and the Little Entente States on the other, and the German counter-move in the form of Baron von Neurath's recent visits to Belgrade, Budapest and Sofia. Yet another indication is afforded by the conversations which took place in London at the time of the Coronation between the British Foreign Secretary and the heads of the various Danubian and Balkan delegations. In the course of those conversations, although the British were not able to entertain any positive commitments, Mr. Eden was nevertheless able to give assurances that Britain would not give up her interest in Central Europe. More especially Britain's blessing was given to the plan of M. Hodja, the Czechoslovak Premier, for economic co-operation and political understanding in the Danubian region; and British encouragement was accorded to the idea of making a beginning with improved Austro-Czech-Hungarian relations, in which connexion British diplomacy had been active, especially in Budapest, for some time past. Finally, indications were given that in the forthcoming new negotiations for a Western Pact Britain would convey to Berlin and Rome that her interest in Central Europe was an important element in her foreign policy. All this, of course, was in line with what Mr. Eden later told the Dominion Premiers at the Imperial Conference: that Britain has definite commitments in the West and an 'interest' (without commitments) in the Centre. Hence Baron von Neurath's mission to counter the Danubian co-operative move initiated by Prague,

by a reassertion of Germany's interest in Jugoslavia, Hungary and Bulgaria.

In this connexion it is necessary to bear in mind the Rome–Berlin Axis. For the capitals visited by the German Foreign Minister were those which enjoyed either new or old friendships with Italy. Baron von Neurath sought not only to strengthen German friendship with Jugoslavia, Hungary and Bulgaria individually, but also to bring Jugoslavia and Hungary into closer relations with each other, and by these means to link these Powers closely with the Rome–Berlin Axis. Bulgaria, of course, already had her pact with Jugoslavia, and enjoyed also good relations both with Germany and Italy. The aim clearly was to offset by these means the setting up of a Vienna–Budapest–Prague triangle which might in time develop into a wider Danubian understanding.

This leads me to a consideration of the attitudes of the various Central and South-Eastern European States concerned. In the first place, there is Austria, the pivot upon which the problem mainly turns. For the triumph of Germany's policy on the Danube and in the Balkans would inevitably lead to the eventual incorporation, in one form or another, of Austria in the Third Reich, whereas the success of the opposed policy of Danubian co-operation would mean the preservation of Austria as an independent part of a Danubian grouping.

During recent months the machinery of the Austro-German accord of July 11, 1936, has been creaking audibly. Nazi enthusiasm having outrun the more cautious methods of Herr von Papen, the German Ambassador at Vienna, and the real father of the July Agreement, it has for some time been apparent to the Austrian Chancellor, Herr von Schuschnigg, that any hopes of a real Austro-German compromise are doomed to disappointment. Discouraged by Germany's attitude, and disappointed by Italy's waning interest in Austria's cause, Herr von Schuschnigg began to look further afield for friends. Hopes raised by British rearmament, and the renaissance of Anglo-French co-operation, caused him to look towards the Western democracies, by way of Prague. The idea of the Vienna–Prague–Budapest triangle, which, as I have said, was to receive British encouragement, began to take shape. The time seemed

propitious for fostering this idea, because not only were relations between Vienna and Prague distinctly encouraging, thanks mainly to the good personal relations between Herr von Schuschnigg and M. Hodja, but also the d'Aranyi Administration, which had assumed power in Hungary after the death of General Gombocs, was more disposed than its predecessor to consider improved relations with Czechoslovakia. At the same time, the personal influence of M. Hodja on Czechoslovak foreign policy resulted in an increased disposition on the part of the republic to arrive at an accommodation with Hungary. Austro-Hungarian relations had, of course, been cordial for some time past.

It seems, however, that Herr von Schuschnigg had not reckoned sufficiently with the Rome–Berlin Axis. At Venice, where he met the Duce, he discovered that the Rome–Berlin Axis obstructed the path from Vienna to Prague. It was made clear to him that Signor Mussolini was so preoccupied with Africa, the Mediterranean and Spain, for which he needed Germany's friendship, that he was not prepared unduly to jeopardise that friendship for the sake of Austria. Hence, for the first time since the inception of the Rome Protocols, no formal assurance of Italy's defence of Austrian independence was forthcoming, and, even more disconcerting, the Austrian Chancellor was told plainly that any close Austro-Czechoslovak understanding would receive the Italian no less than the German veto. It became clear that Austrian 'independence' was approved in Rome so long as Austria made no attempt to act independently. It also became clear that if Austria had to capitulate to Germany, the assistance of Signor Mussolini as 'honest broker' in the bringing about of this capitulation would be the final irony. Especially was there bitter feeling in Vienna when Signor Gayda, the Duce's 'mouthpiece' on the *Giornale d'Italia*, said that Austria should include one or more Nazis in her Government. The fact that the Duce did not take responsibility for this article only partially assuaged the feelings of the Austrian Government.

Then came the London conversations, and the subsequent Neurath mission to South-Eastern Europe, which I have already explained. The position now is that Herr von Schuschnigg is continuing his policy of understanding with

Czechoslovakia, but is obliged to refrain from a formal agreement with that country. Internally the Chancellor also has difficulties which arise directly from the same causes as the external ones. He refuses to entertain any idea of admitting Nazis into his Cabinet. As he declared in a recent statement in Parliament, the Austro-German Agreement of July contained no secret obligations or understandings, and therefore there is no question of being obliged to co-opt Nazis into the Government. All of which shows that, in spite of the difficulties, both external and internal, the Chancellor continues with high courage, and not a little skill, to maintain his fight for Austrian independence. And, all things considered, he is doing so with singular success. Nevertheless, it would be idle to close one's eyes to the extent of the difficulties which confront him.

For some months past there has been a resumption of Nazi propaganda in Austria. Nazi organisations, which, as such, had long been banned, have begun to re-form in various guises. They seized their opportunity when Baron Neustädter-Sturmer, as Public Security Minister, permitted the organisation of the camouflaged Nazi organisation known as the '*Deutscher Volksbund*.' He was subsequently dismissed. But the harm was already done.

The actual number of fully-fledged Nazis is probably now, as before, only about 30 per cent. But there has been an increase, both within and without the governmental organisation, the *Vaterlandische* Front, of quasi-Nazis known as 'pronounced nationals.' Prominently amongst these is General Glaise-Horstenau, the Minister of the Interior. Standing half-way between him and the Chancellor is the Foreign Minister, Herr Guido Schmidt. At the same time there has recently been an increase in illegal Nazi activity. Another portent is the split of the Nazis into two main sections, the moderates and the radicals. The former are specifically Austrian, and their leader, Captain Leopold, is hardly less an object of hatred on the part of the Radicals, who are in direct touch with Berlin and Munich, than is the Chancellor himself. In the event of a Nazi revolution it would not be long before the moderates were swept away by the radicals, with results which would probably turn Austria into another Spain, and with attendant international

complications. Things have not yet reached, and may perhaps never reach, this stage, for Herr von Schuschnigg may succeed in staying the course. I have mentioned these darker possibilities only to show that those who criticise the Chancellor would do well to reflect upon his difficulties.

Dominating the Austrian question is, of course, the fact of the Rome–Berlin Axis. Italy needs Germany's protection of her back in Europe in order that Italian aspirations in the Mediterranean and in Spain may be worked for in comparative safety. Furthermore, so long as the antagonism between London and Rome remains at its present intensity, the Rome–Berlin Axis is likely to mean more and more to Italy. Germany's friendship is, of course, costing Italy a high price. A year ago I wrote in these pages that Italy's African responsibilities, following the Abyssinian War, would inevitably result in a weakening of Italy's position on the Danube and a corresponding strengthening of Germany's position in those parts. The Austro-German Agreement of July last year was a case in point. Since then there has been added the Spanish commitment, and this has accelerated the pace of Italy's surrender to Germany in Middle Europe. As things stand, there is more or less a division of spheres of interest—Germany on the Danube, Italy in the Mediterranean and Spain. For Germany now is less extensively involved than Italy in Spain. Germany refrains from an actual military alliance with Italy, for reasons best known to the German General Staff. But there exists a real enough political collaboration in which Italy is the junior partner.

It is probably an uneasy partnership, requiring continual readjustment, for it is between two Powers whose fundamental interests are opposed but who, for reasons of expediency, are obliged to co-ordinate their temporary aims. For the Italians the ' Axis ' has the additional advantage of nuisance value *vis-à-vis* the British. But these considerations do not detract from the potency of the partnership in such matters as obstructing the efforts of the Danubian States to come together. Austria is maintained in a precarious independence, mainly because it is one of the expedients of the Italo-German partnership that while Italy will not now too strongly oppose the Germanisation of Austria, Germany

likewise will not try too rapidly or too forcibly to bring about that Germanisation. For Germany believes that time is on her side.

One of the signs of Italy's weakness, as compared with Germany, is the Italo-Jugoslav Pact of last March. Italy for years had been shaking the mailed fist at Jugoslavia. Then, suddenly, threatening words gave place to a serenade. Belgrade accepted the advances of Rome, because the proposed bargain contained more advantages for the Jugoslavs than for the Italians. With the full implications of the Pact I will deal later, in connexion with Jugoslav policy. From the Italian point of view it was, it seems, worth while to sign an agreement which gave Italy less concrete gains than Jugoslavia, because of certain psychological compensation. The agreement gives the Duce calm on his Adriatic frontier at a time when he is fully occupied in the Western Mediterranean. The Pact, moreover, gives a fillip to Italian prestige in the Balkans at a time when Italian influence in Central and South-Eastern Europe has appreciably lessened as German influence in these parts has correspondingly increased.

On the surface Italian influence in Hungary is still strong. In actual fact it is less than it was a few years ago. During the Bethlen *régime* Italy had a paramount position in Hungary. During the Gombocs *régime* Hungarian eyes were turned towards Berlin. M. d'Aranyi, without actually forsaking either Berlin or Rome, is less dependent upon either. His Government received a shock at the time of the recent discovery of a plot to make a Nazi *putsch* in Hungary. Hungary now is not opposed in principle, as she used to be, to better relations with her Little Entente neighbours—on conditions. First and foremost she wants recognition of equality of rights (meaning principally rearmament, and the abrogation of the military clauses of the Treaty of Trianon). She also requires some new arrangement regarding the Magyar minorities in the Little Entente States. She no longer places territorial revision in the forefront of her programme, or insists upon it as a hard and fast precondition of any kind of co-operation with the Little Entente. Naturally no Hungarian Government can drop the territorial revision issue. But the present Hungarian Government seems disposed to retain it in the background.

This new attitude on the part of Budapest has raised hopes that there may after all be a basis for some kind of economic collaboration and political understanding between Hungary and Austria on the one side and Czechoslovakia, Roumania and Jugoslavia on the other. The early recognition of Hungary's military equality (*i.e.*, in form, for it already exists in fact) would be the price for the Little Entente to pay. An engagement not to essay territorial revision by violent means would be the price for Hungary to pay. Both M. Hodja and M. d'Aranyi are reasonable men, and there is reason to believe that neither of them is unsympathetic to such a *détente*. The constitution of the Little Entente is such, however, that the three States members, Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia and Roumania, would have to act in consultation. Taken as a whole, they may require that the recognition of Hungarian military equality should form part of a scheme of non-aggression pacts between Hungary and themselves. According to some reports a demilitarisation of the frontiers between Hungary and the Little Entente States might also be stipulated. These are possible details. But the main basis for a settlement does, nevertheless, appear to exist, especially as the embittered question of territorial revision might well be got round in the same way as it was in the case of the Jugoslav-Bulgarian Pact, when it was mutually understood that whereas one side would not press revisionist claims in fact, the other would not insist upon their denial in principle.

Ample proof is afforded that the possibilities of settlement on these lines is not entirely Utopian by the fact of German and Italian opposition to it. For Italy it would mean the loss, or at least the considerable curtailment, of her position as the leader of the Protocols of Rome group (Italy, Austria and Hungary). For Germany it would mean the collapse of her dream of *Mitteleuropa*. It is not difficult to understand, therefore, why the Berlin–Rome Axis is seeking by all means to frustrate the plan of Danubian co-operation. For this purpose both Germany and Italy have several weapons, political and economic. Economically there is the fact that without German and Italian co-operation with the Danubian States they would not be able to construct a really successful inter-Danubian economic system. They would be precluded from doing so by the fact that there is an uneven

balance between the agricultural and the industrial in the former component parts of the Hapsburg Monarchy. Politically Germany and Italy have the weapon of the bilateral agreement. This is especially the case with Germany. Germany hopes by such agreements not only to prevent a *rapprochement* between the revisionist and the *status quo* States in the Danubian basin, but also to drive a wedge between the States of the Little Entente, and particularly to bring about the isolation of Czechoslovakia.

With regard to Czechoslovakia, there has recently been an improvement in the internal situation as a result of the reforms concerning the German minority agreed upon between the Czech Government and the leaders of the activist German parties. These reforms were not well received by Herr Henlein, the leader of the *Sudetendeutsch Heimatfront*, who is himself endeavouring to introduce a scheme of his own to Parliament by the channel of one of his parliamentary deputies. An impartial examination of the new agreements, however, creates the impression that they should help to appease internal Czecho-German differences. Foreign policy is at the moment mainly concentrated upon good relations with Austria, and the improvement of relations with Hungary. At the same time the preservation of close co-operation with the two other partners in the Little Entente, Jugoslavia and Roumania, continues to be a plank in the republic's foreign policy. Relations with Russia and France continue on the basis of the Czecho-Russian and the Franco-Czech Pacts. Political relations with Germany are obviously difficult, but commercial intercourse remains active. Prague would welcome a *détente* with Berlin. In this connexion, M. Hodja, with whom I discussed his Danubian plan when he was in London for the Coronation, made it clear to me that the plan envisaged the co-operation of Germany and Italy. Czecho-Polish relations, however, remain strained in every sense. This is not due to any fundamental problem which cannot be solved. Rather is it due to the policy of Colonel Beck, the Polish Foreign Minister. Colonel Beck harbours a personal dislike of President Benesh. He tries, moreover, to pursue a double policy *vis-à-vis* both Germany and the Western Powers, which makes it difficult for other countries to come to terms with Poland.

The country which, perhaps, is destined to play the most important *rôle* in regard to the various moves and counter-moves in Central and South-Eastern Europe is Jugoslavia, for Jugoslavia is at once the strongest and the most sought-after of the Southern European States. Her foreign policy is one of limited liability. The Prince Regent (Prince Paul) and the Premier (M. Stoyadinovitch) aim at maintaining peace by keeping Jugoslavia out of rival *blocs*: by concentration upon regional security—in Central Europe by association with the Little Entente, in the Balkans by association with the Balkan Pact group—and by making bilateral treaties of friendship with neighbours. Under the last heading may be placed Jugoslavia's pacts of friendship with Bulgaria and Italy respectively.

There is, however, a difference between the pact with Bulgaria and the pact with Italy. The former is part of a natural and permanent tendency towards reconciliation between the two Slav Balkan neighbours. The latter is a matter of political expediency. Most of the advantages, both political and economic, of the pact go to Jugoslavia. Most valuable of all was the stipulation that both the contracting parties would refrain from encouraging any subversive activity against the other. As Jugoslavia had never assisted any such activity against Italy, whereas Italy had for long assisted Jugoslav terrorist *émigrés* against Jugoslavia, even to the extent of giving hospitality to some of the terrorists involved in the assassination of King Alexander, this part of the agreement was manifestly of great importance to the Jugoslav Government. Jugoslavia now intends to live in friendly relations with both Italy and Germany; but this does not mean that she has gone into association with the Rome–Berlin Axis, or that she will interpret either the Italo-Jugoslav Pact or her friendly intercourse with Germany in a sense inimical either to British or French interests. As far as Britain is concerned, the personality and outlook of the Prince Regent, a ruler imbued with the strongest Anglophil sentiments, is a sufficient guarantee of Jugoslav fidelity to Britain. As far as Jugoslav-German relations are concerned, the friendly intercourse is based on practical considerations rather than upon political sympathies, although Belgrade and Berlin share a common distrust of Soviet Russia.

With regard to the Little Entente, Jugoslavia, contrary to rumour, is not forsaking that combination. On all matters concerning which the Little Entente was originally formed, Jugoslavia continues to collaborate as strongly as ever. What she does not want is to have her Little Entente commitments extended beyond their original scope. This explains why she turned down the recent French attempts to induce her to undertake in advance to fight for Czechoslovakia in the event of a German war with that country. This does not mean that she would necessarily leave Czechoslovakia in the lurch. But it does mean that she wishes to remain free from commitments, and to be able to judge the situation for herself. Jugoslavia's attitude towards the Hodja plan for Danubian co-operation is friendly but cautious. In principle she favours the plan, but feels that there are a number of practical difficulties which preclude hurried decisions. She realises, for instance, that if Germany and Italy strongly oppose it, progress towards its realisation must necessarily be slow.

Distrust of Soviet Russia, so strong in Jugoslavia, is also noticeable in Roumania. Roumania also has friendly relations, mainly in the economic sphere, with Germany. But in spite of the pro-Nazi Iron Guard, and strong German influences in a number of political circles, Roumania is not in the German camp. Her relations with both her Little Entente neighbours, Jugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, are close, but her fears of Soviet Russia make her hesitate to allow Russian troops to cross her territory to help Czechoslovakia. She fears that once a Red army got into Roumania it might stay. Roumania has, in fact, good reason to be suspicious both of Russia and of Germany. She has an alliance with Poland. The rulers of both countries have been exchanging visits, and there is much show of mutual cordiality. But Poland's alleged attempts to bring Roumania into a vast neutral *bloc* between Germany and Russia, under Polish leadership, against Czechoslovakia would not seem to have met with any success.

To sum up: The various States of the Danubian basin and the Balkan peninsula are making considerable and not unsuccessful efforts to get together. These efforts are receiving the platonic support of British and French diplomacy;

yet it is true that many of the States of Central and South-Eastern Europe have not been insensible to the implications of the new Belgian attitude of armed neutrality. This example militates against a complete system of co-operation in the strict politico-military sense. On the other hand, there is the factor of the Rome–Berlin Axis, and the strong German propaganda drive which aims specifically at arresting the processes of co-operation, and at bringing individual States under German influence. What General Goring began in 1936 Baron von Neurath has continued in 1937. I do not think that the Neurath visit will have any startling results. His reception in Belgrade, for instance, was extremely cordial, but it did not result in any new orientation of Jugoslav policy. I have dealt with the Neurath mission in some detail less because of its possible results than because it was indicative of Germany's reaction to the interest of the Western Powers in the plans for Danubian collaboration.

I conclude that the future of the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe depends in large measure upon themselves, but also, to a considerable extent, upon the future relations of the Great Powers In the event of a change in Anglo-Italian relations bringing about a modification of the Germano-Italian association, or of a change in Germano-French relations bringing about a modification of the Franco-Russian association, the present tension in Central and South-Eastern Europe would be considerably relaxed. A continuance of the present rival alignments of the Great Powers must likewise tend to increase the tension on the Danube and in the Balkans. Consequently there is much to be said for the British Government's feeling that a Western Pact, without a parallel settlement in Central Europe, would not bring lasting peace to the West, for history has taught us that wars beginning in the centre or east of Europe are liable to spread.

C. F. MELVILLE.

THE REFORM OF THE LAW

V. THE CROWN AS LITIGANT

By A. D. HARGREAVES, M.A., LL.B.

THERE are many aspects of the Crown's activities in litigation which provide scope for the critic. Its unrelenting insistence on the strict letter of the law, in remarkable contrast to the tender paternalism of criminal procedure, where the Crown is also in theory a litigant; the power of the purse, with its grim determination to accept defeat only in the last ditch of the legal arena, and its flagrant use of this determination as a preliminary threat to the would-be litigant: the discussion of these alone would need a small tract. But critic and law reformer fulfil different functions which fail in their purpose if they are confused, and this is particularly marked in view of the pragmatism of the English legal tradition. These matters are part of the human element in litigation; moreover, they apply with equal force to all powerful litigants. They are not easily eliminated by a stroke of the legislative pen.

In civil litigation, however, the Crown enjoys privileges and immunities which are denied to the subject; they are the creatures of the law itself, and are therefore amenable to alteration by a change in the law. They are generally considered to be unnecessary, irritating and unjust. Moreover, the means of reform are readily available; the reformer has at his disposal a draft Bill produced in 1927 by a brilliant constellation of lawyers, supported by the technical care and ability, if not the good will, of the Government departments themselves. Unfortunately, the Bill's period of gestation was too long. The Committee which gave it being was appointed by Lord Birkenhead in 1921, when the mass of litigation arising out of the war-time activities of the State had emphasised both the need and the urgency of reform. In 1927 the

war was forgotten. The urgency had gone, and in its place were the old, impersonal, expressionless, forces of reaction and inertia. Moreover, the ill-timed optimism of the Labour Lord Chancellor of 1924 had induced him so to alter the Committee's terms of reference that they were relieved of the task of discussing and reporting on the desirability, as opposed to the means, of reform. Thus the Report of 1927 contains nothing but the draft Bill. There is no recommendation of it by the Committee, no statement of the evils to be remedied; it is lacking in the one essential virtue of all Government reports—propaganda value.

In consequence nothing or little has been done. What reforms have taken place since 1927 have been more in the interests of the Crown than of the subject. An order for costs may now be made both for and against the Crown; it is no longer beneath the 'dignity' of the Crown, as Blackstone ingenuously put it, to pocket what a later lawyer called the 'insult.' The Crown may now recover its debts by ordinary process both in the High Court and in the county court, instead of by the former more expensive mediæval machinery; but other claims are still to be enforced by Prerogative Writs and by Information, with its division and subdivision into terrifying mysteries clad in the barbarous garments of law Latin. We are assured that these processes are no more complex than those commenced by the normal writ. But the ordinary practitioner is unfamiliar with them; mistakes are inevitable, and he knows that the Crown will extract every ounce of lawful flesh from his innocent shortcomings.

Proceedings against the Crown are another matter. Not for the humble subject-plaintiff is the luxury of a cheap and speedy application to the county court. All actions must be brought in the High Court, and, what is more, not by writ, but by Petition of Right. The name indicates unfamiliar procedure, with all its traps for the unwary, but in other respects it belies its nature. There is no right to a Petition of Right. Unless the Attorney-General on behalf of the Crown endorses his *fiat* 'Let right be done,' the Crown cannot be compelled to appear, and the decision of the Attorney-General is final. There is no way of compelling him to change his mind, save the cumbersome one of political representations. In practice, of course, the *fiat* is invariably granted unless the

claim is clearly frivolous, but the very generality of the grant merely adds one reason for taking away its necessity and for preventing that possible clash between interest and duty which may easily occur.

The difficulties are not all overcome with the granting of the *fiat*, for it casts its shadow over the subsequent proceedings. In ordinary actions the plaintiff may amend his claim as the nature of the defence is revealed, a privilege which is intended to shorten and to cheapen litigation by avoiding the necessity of abandoning one action and commencing another. In Petitions of Right this is only permitted if the amended pleading falls sufficiently within the original claim to be covered by the *fiat*. Justice, no doubt, may eventually be done, but it is expensive, and many litigants cannot afford the extra costs. Finally, the claim itself, though valid if made against a private individual, may very easily be one which cannot be remedied at all by Petition of Right; this, however, is outside the scope of procedure and will be dealt with in its proper place. The Bill of 1927 proposes to jettison all this useless lumber, to take away the necessity of a *fiat*, and to substitute in all cases an ordinary action and ordinary procedure. It would be difficult to deny the justice of the proposed change.

Whatever form of action be adopted, and whether the Crown be plaintiff or defendant, one of the most irritating of the royal 'garland of prerogatives' is the Crown's immunity from the normal process of discovery. Discovery is a comprehensive term which includes the administration of interrogatories to be answered on oath and the disclosure and production of documents relevant to the action which are under the control of each party. Its object is to compel the opposite side to disclose its case so as to prevent the other party from being taken by surprise at the actual trial and to enable him either to prepare rebutting evidence or even to abandon the litigation before unnecessary costs have been incurred. Occasionally it provides the only evidence by which a legitimate claim may be proved; a simple instance is an action for the recovery of land the title-deeds to which are being concealed by one or other of the parties. If the function of litigation be the dispassionate weighing of conflicting claims, if its object be the ascertainment of truth and not a half-truth, then

discovery is fundamental to the just balance of procedure. Yet, though the Crown is entitled to full discovery, the subject as against the Crown is not.

No doubt the Crown generally does disclose all relevant documents the production of which is not contrary to the public interest; but 'every practitioner who has had experience of conducting proceedings against the Crown is aware that this discretion is sometimes used unmercifully, . . . and he would be a bold man who would assert that the "public interest" does not sometimes signify, in this connection, no more than the interest of the Crown in winning a case.'[1] That abuse is not impossible may be gathered from the long litigation in Australia arising out of the war-time Wheat Harvest Acts. Under these Acts the States became the sole wholesalers and distributors of wheat. Inevitably some officials exceeded their powers; equally inevitably the evidence to prove this remained in the control of the State. Litigation was commenced, but the State claimed that the necessary documents were privileged from production on the ground that to produce them would be contrary to the public interest, and it took three actions and an appeal to the Privy Council to uphold the right of the court to examine the documents in order to determine the validity of the claim. That was in Australia, where discovery may be had as of right against the Crown. If similar facts had arisen in England there would have been no question of privilege or of the right of the court to inspect the documents; the Crown would have refused discovery in the first instance, and that would have been the end of the matter.

The distinction between discovery and privilege implicit in the Australian Wheat Acts cases is one which is frequently overlooked. Under an order for discovery of documents, the *existence* of all documents must be disclosed, but they may be exempted from *production* by virtue of some privilege. A similar rule is applied to the answer to interrogatories. If a claim to privilege be made, its nature must be disclosed in the claimant's affidavit, and, if it be denied that some or all of the documents in question fall within the scope of the privilege, the decision thereon is in the hands of the judge; he may accept what evidence appears to be sufficient in the circum-

[1] J W Gordon, in *Law Quarterly Review*, vol xlv, p 187

stances, and if necessary or more convenient he may examine the documents themselves. Now privilege extends to all documents and matters the disclosure of which is contrary to the public interest, so that, even though discovery were imposed upon the Crown, there is no question of making public that which should remain secret. Under the existing law, the Crown does not answer interrogatories. Even when it consents to produce documents it does not disclose those which are 'privileged'; but as the production itself is an act of grace the Crown alone is the ultimate judge of the privilege. The subject-litigant is deprived of that appeal to an independent judge which is the outward and visible sign of justice; he is delivered over to the mercies of an official who is not only unknown and unknowable but is also his adversary.

In Scotland, in Australia, and in some other parts of the Empire the law is different. Discovery may be ordered against the Crown, and the public interest is left to the judicial protection of privilege. Unfortunately, this simple solution is not easily applicable in England. The world-wide activities of the Crown occasionally bring into being a State document the very *existence* of which must necessarily be kept secret. However rare such an occurrence may be, however remote the chances that it would become directly or indirectly the subject of litigation, its possibility prevents once and for all the application to the Crown of the ordinary rules of discovery. This difficulty has been recognised by the framers of the draft Bill of 1927. The list of documents to be made on behalf of the Crown is to contain no reference to 'documents the existence of which it would be contrary to the public interest to disclose,' though the other side may in a proper case demand a certificate signed by a Secretary of State or other Minister of the Crown or the head of a Government department to the effect that every other relevant document has been disclosed. An attempt has thus been made to place the ultimate decision upon an official who is presumably sufficiently highly placed not to be influenced by a petty desire for victory. Such a solution undoubtedly leaves the door open to abuse, and the political control by question and discussion in the House is unlikely to be of much assistance because of the very nature of the claim to secrecy. Moreover, it is surely possible to approach the problem in another

way by differentiating between the various departments of Government; there is little likelihood that bodies such as the Ministry of Health or the Ministry of Transport would be prejudiced by submission to the ordinary rules of discovery. A more serious objection to the draft Bill, however, is that it completely deprives the court of its jurisdiction to determine the proper application of the public-interest privilege. Refusal to answer an interrogatory or to produce a document on this ground is made sufficient in itself. It is true that in a proper case the machinery of obtaining a certificate from a high official is available; it is true that this in itself is an enormous advance, for the subject-litigant is assured that suspicious circumstances will be examined by a man of known integrity; but once the existence of a document has been disclosed there is no reason why it should be withdrawn from the process available in actions to which the Crown is not a party. Judges are no less alive to the claims of public interest than junior civil servants; they are no more inclined to 'talk.' Let the decision be in the hands of the Court and not of the adversary.

From procedural rules to substantive law is never a great step in the peculiarly English attitude of the common law, and the inequality and injustice of the one is more than reflected in the Crown's position with regard to the other. The remedy by Petition of Right originally lay to recover land, goods or money which had found their way improperly into the hands of the Crown, and it has been gradually extended to cover claims for damages for breach of contract. In general, therefore, if the Crown consents to appear, its contracts are treated by the courts in much the same way as contracts between subject and subject—with one exception; the Crown suffers from a legal disability which prevents it from entering into contracts of personal service on conditions other than that the servant may be dismissed at the will of the Crown. The form of the contract is irrelevant; whether or not this term is expressly incorporated, even if the contract be for a fixed number of years, the servant holds his office during the pleasure of the Crown, and may at any time be dismissed without notice, without compensation, for any reason, or for no reason at all. Soldiers, sailors, and civil servants of every class all live under the shadow of this bureaucratic sword of Damocles. Indeed, it has been said that the rule is but part

of a wider rule which prevents the Crown from fettering its future executive action by a binding contract; thus when a Swedish ship entered a British port during the war on the *faith of a promise by the Government that it would not be* detained, its owners were unable to obtain damages for breach of the contract when the Government subsequently changed its mind. If this be the true rule, then *caveat creditor*. In many cases—a munitions contract may afford one example—there is the slenderest of dividing lines between a 'commercial contract' which is enforceable and an 'assurance as to what its [the Crown's] executive action would be in the future' which is not.

It has been said that 'The difficulty of dismissing servants whose continuance in office is detrimental to the State would, if it were necessary to prove some offence to the satisfaction of a jury, be such as seriously to impede the working of the public service.' [2] Such an argument is an example of the easy confusion between the enforcement of a contract and compensation for its breach. Let the Crown dismiss its servants at will; but if there be no cause for the dismissal which appears just by 'the ordinary standards of right and wrong applied by judges and juries,' [3] let compensation be paid. To act otherwise is a form of expropriation without compensation which would raise a storm of protest if it were proposed in any other sphere of public or private life.

These vagaries of contract law have been ignored by the Bill of 1927, perhaps because they fade into insignificance when compared with the greatest vagary of all. The King can do no wrong; therefore, says the law, the Crown is not liable in tort. When the monarch was his own Prime Minister, when the courts were truly the King's courts and the law the King's law, this principle and its conclusion may well have been justified as the legal recognition of inescapable facts. It has played a considerable part in the development of the legal and conventional doctrine of Ministerial Responsibility. It may still be politically necessary as a shield to the occupant of the throne from the penetrating glare of the forum. Yet, though the principle remain, the conclusion is

[2] Lord Hobhouse, in *Shenton* v. *Smith*, [1895] A C, at p. 235.

[3] Holdsworth, *The Influence of the Legal Profession on the Growth of the English Constitution*, p 35.

no longer justified by the facts. The modern Constitution is based upon the essential difference between Crown and King, but while the lawyers were formulating in almost mystical language their doctrines of the dual corporateness of Crown and King, while the very paradox so subtly portrayed in the words 'Crown' and 'King' gradually compelled them to distinguish for some purposes the one from the other, they refused to extend their dualism so as to deprive the Crown of the divinity of kingship. To-day, the principle that the King can do no wrong means that the Government can do no wrong, that the departments of Government can do no wrong, that the injured subject has no remedy in tort against Crown, Government or department.

Nor does the maxim '*respondeat superior*' apply to the Crown. If you are injured by the negligent driving of my chauffeur in the course of his employment, I shall be compelled to pay damages to you; not because I myself have committed a tort, nor even because I am deemed to have been negligent in my choice of a servant, but because public policy demands that the employer shall bear the loss which the employment creates. Stated in its modern form, the rule is evidently a form of insurance; 'the liability of the employer to the public for injuries caused by the acts and defaults of his servants is analogous to the duties imposed with various degrees of stringency on the owners of things which are or may be a source of danger to others.'[4] Its association with tort, however, and certain peculiarities of its history have inevitably confused it with the major premise that the King can do no wrong. If, therefore, you are injured by the negligent driving of a Post Office van, you will have no right of action against the driver's employer, either the Crown or the Postmaster-General. It is true that you may bring your action against the driver. No Government official can escape liability for his torts by pleading his status. Nor is the command of a superior a defence, even though the superior be Crown or King. This is one legal aspect of our much-vaunted principle of Ministerial Responsibility. The Minister, the Prime Minister himself, must answer for his own wrongs, whether or not they be committed in the service of the State. But Prime Ministers do not usually commit wrongs; for

[4] Pollock, *Essays in Jurisprudence and Ethics*, p 128.

them there is to-day a sanction greater than the law in their political responsibility to Parliament and the electorate. Besides, Prime Ministers can usually pay; van-drivers cannot.

Many attempts have been made to escape from the meshes of these pernicious doctrines. In *Bainbridge* v. *Postmaster-General*[5] the plaintiff sought to make the Postmaster-General liable for the negligence of a Post Office engineer, alleging that the relationship of master and servant existed between them. He failed: there is no such relationship; both are alike the servants of the Crown. Yet in that case the Post Office was acting as the successor to an ordinary commercial company who by statute were expressly made liable for the torts of their servants. Indeed, no statute will suffice to alter the rule unless the alteration be clearly and unambiguously expressed.[6] It is not enough that an Act of Parliament should enable a department to sue and be sued in its own name; that is merely for convenience of procedure and in no way affects its substantive rights and duties. Even the incorporation of a department is not enough; the legal person so created may perhaps contract on its own behalf and so be sued for breach of contract by the ordinary process of law, but it remains the servant of the Crown, and its subordinate officials do not become the servants of the Corporation. Moreover, though a superior servant becomes himself liable if he orders the commission of a tort, his liability is personal; the department is not liable, even though the order be the order of the department. If the Postmaster-General personally orders an engineer to trespass on my land, I may sue both the engineer and the Postmaster-General, but I can sue neither in his official capacity so as to claim compensation out of Post Office funds. The Postmaster-General, like the Crown, can do no wrong; it is only Major Tryon who can commit a tort. The net result of these principles is that without express statutory authority there is no way by which public funds can be made available for redressing the wrongs committed by the Government. If the Crown were a philanthropist the position might be excusable, but in a democracy it is the public which both reaps the benefit of government and refuses to bear its burdens.

[5] [1906] 1 K B 178, C A

[6] One of the rare instances is the Ministry of Transport Act, 1919.

So far we have spoken of the legal position. In fact, if damages be awarded against a Crown servant for a tort committed within the scope of his employment, the Government usually does provide funds for their payment, and much has been made of this by the opponents of reform. There is no injustice, it is said, for the Treasury *pays the damages*. True; but it is 'of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done but should manifestly and undoubtedly seem to be done.' Every hiatus between law and reality lessens the respect for law, and in an age of political unrest a sense of injustice is more dangerous than injustice itself. Moreover, there is no certainty that justice will be done. In a disputed claim the plaintiff who is suing a Crown servant is not sure that the Government will accept responsibility until some considerable time and costs have been spent: every action is a leap in the dark; it may turn out that after all he is attacking a man who is not worth powder and shot. Finally, the refusal of the Government to submit to the ordinary courts of law places it in this predicament: either its payments are based on no principle at all—a conclusion hardly compatible with the 'Rule of Law'—or in applying principles previously established it is once more usurping the function of a judge in its own cause.

It is not easy to discover what objections there are to a reform of the law. The nearest approach to an 'official' defence is a paper [7] read by Sir Thomas Inskip in 1929 when the Labour Government were proposing to introduce a Bill. His argument is threefold. After pointing out that if my gamekeeper arrests a trespasser as such I am not responsible, for his authority extended to the arrest of poachers only, he continues:

> Contrast that with the position of a naval officer whose duty, for instance, is to prevent slave trading. It is his duty to do that, and nobody can say that he has exceeded his duty . . . if he arrests a ship which he believes to be a slave-trading ship that turns out not to be such, however much he was mistaken Under the present law, an aggrieved person may sue the officer, but a great many unthinking people assert that the Crown ought to be sued. This really goes much further than the law permits in cases between two ordinary persons. It is to make the Crown liable for wrongs which are done by its servants outside the scope of the authority committed to them.

[7] *Cambridge University Law Journal*, vol. iv., p. 1

Yet if my gamekeeper mistakes an honest person for a poacher and arrests him I shall certainly be liable for his tort. Secondly, Sir Thomas adopts the words of Lord Chief Justice Erle in a case of 1864 (incidentally, before the modern basis of '*respondeat superior*' had been appreciated):

> We think that the supposed analogy between the relation of the Queen to a captain in Her Majesty's Navy, and the relation of a master to a servant, fails in the following respects: First, that the Queen does not appoint a captain to a ship by her own mere will, as a master chooses a servant, but through an officer of State . . .; and secondly, that the will of the Queen alone does not control the conduct of the captain in his movements, but a sense of professional duty; and thirdly, because the act complained of was not done by the order of the Queen, but by reason of a mistake in respect of the path of duty.

Every word of this is equally applicable to the modern big employer, but it does not exempt him from liability. Finally,

> If the Crown is to be made liable for the damages which flow from the way in which these persons behave, it may be that claims will be preferred against the Crown which ought to be made directly against the officers concerned.

Again, the business-man must think the same when he has to answer for the misconduct of his employees, but the thought avails him not. None of these arguments takes into consideration the insurance basis of the modern rule; its object is, not to punish the employer, but to compensate the injured. And by paying compensation in the great majority of cases the Crown has admitted at least its moral responsibility.

The Bill of 1927 attempts to remedy this state of affairs by making the Crown, though not 'His Majesty in His private capacity,' liable in tort and liable for the torts of its servants. No attempt, however, has been made to define the meaning of Crown servant, but if the Bill is to become law some guidance on this point is urgently required. Hitherto the courts have been concerned with it from angles which do not necessarily coincide with the one now projected: Does the servant carry out public duties? Are those duties such as to exempt the persons employing him from liability even if they be not Crown servants themselves? Is he the agent of the Crown for purposes of contract? Is the property occupied by him exempt from rates as Crown property? The answers to these and similar questions have created a

tangled skein of conflicting authorities which has prevented the emergence of any simple or satisfactory rule. Is it too much to expect that Parliament will solve the problem for us, instead of leaving the solution to be hammered out on the human anvil of litigation?

Criticism of the Bill, however, must not blind us to its value. The desire for reform has in it the unique opportunity of a measure drafted with all the care of departmental supervision. Yet nothing is done. We are told that the measure is controversial, but we search in vain for the controversy. It has received the support of the leaders of both branches of the legal profession, of chambers of trade, and of business-men in general. The Committee on Ministers' Powers reported in 1932 that 'unless and until the Crown Proceedings Bill or a similar measure is passed into law, there will still remain a gap in the structure of the Constitution, where the supremacy of the law does not prevail.' Against this accumulation of reason and responsible opinion there is nothing but silence. In charity we may assume that there is some cogent reason against changing the law which is hidden in the recesses of the Government departments; but though democracy may not be entitled to liberty, it is at least entitled to explanations, and until those explanations are granted it will look with growing suspicion upon those who withhold them. Prerogative powers are as dangerous in a democracy as in an absolute monarchy.

> As spheres of Government action widen the prerogative of the Crown grows larger and larger, and the escape from obligations, or the use of preference over the rights of the ordinary citizens, would in greater and greater measure extend.[8]

Those are the words of Lord Shaw, a judge of our own time. Nearly 300 years ago, in the days before democracy, Baron Atkyns could speak with greater hope:

> The King is the fountain and head of justice and equity, and it shall not be presumed that he will be deficient in either, it would derogate from the King's honour to imagine that what is equity against a common person should not be equity against him.[9]

A. D. HARGREAVES.

[8] *Food Controller* v. *Cork*, [1923] A. C., at p. 668.
[9] *Pawlett* v. *A.-G.*, Hardres, at p. 469.

DEADLOCK IN INDIA

By Patrick Lacey

In the historical, personal, and psychological background of to-day's deadlock in India there are realities which many people overlook. It may be profitable to consider them, even if one cannot be confident that anything said about them now will still seem appropriate when it appears in print on the morrow.

I.

In *The Nineteenth Century* of May last year I mentioned possible causes and effects of Lord Irwin's pact with Gandhi in March 1931. The agreement's terms are plainer. Besides bringing a truce to moribund civil disobedience, it recorded Gandhi's consent to 'the participation of the representatives of the Congress in the further discussions that are to take place on the scheme of constitutional reform.' This was the plan already begun at the first Round Table Conference. 'Of the scheme there outlined,' the agreement added, 'Federation is an essential part; so also are Indian responsibility and reservations or safeguards in the interests of India for such matters as, for instance, defence, external affairs, the position of minorities, the financial credit of India, and the discharge of obligations.' If there is disagreement among Indians *inter se*, as well as between them and the Government, on the meaning of India's 'interests,' 'obligations,' those fatal words 'for instance,' and the safeguards needed to cover them, Lord Irwin and Gandhi must share the credit for unavoidable and perhaps prudent ambiguity on a matter of opinion.

The Congressman may reply: 'I know what you're going to say. But you have not given us "Indian responsibility," and the pact committed us only to *discussion* of your Federal scheme; so your argument is an irrelevant

boomerang.' Very possibly. But 'Indian responsibility and reservations' means something less than full responsibility; it could mean less than the provincial autonomy now operating. Its significance was plain to Jawaharlal Nehru, at any rate. In a chapter on the pact, in his autobiography, he says: 'Clause 2, with its references to safeguards, etc., gave me a tremendous shock.' He complained to Gandhi, and might have foreseen the result:

> Gandhiji . . . interpreted clause 2 of the agreement in a particular way so as to make it fit in with our demand for independence, relying chiefly on the words in it: 'in the interests of India.' The interpretation seemed to me a forced one, and I was not convinced.

Jawaharlal will not begrudge a leaf from his book. It may be fair to remind Gandhi that in principle the discretionary powers which he asked the Governors to waive are among the least of the reservations contemplated in a deed signed by his own hand and ratified by the Congress Party in full session three weeks later. The reminder appears not less legitimate in the light of Gandhi's remark that his object in seeking a contrary assurance from the Governors, in whatever form, was to strengthen the Congress in Ministerial office 'pending the creation, by means consistent with the Congress creed of non-violence, of a situation that would transfer all real power to the people.'

There was a time not long ago when words like these were familiar, and a threat of civil disobedience would be read into them as a matter of course. They may have meant the same again when Gandhi repeated them on March 30, and Indian friends report corroborative omens. He has never abandoned his faith in passive resistance. When his party last decided to stop it, he reserved to himself the right to continue it in his individual capacity, ever upholding it as a semi-religious creed. Some months ago he told a friend of mine—I admit that this is not evidence—that he thought India would be ready for it again in two years' time.

In March he may have wished—may still wish—to repeat and telescope two episodes of his past career. When C. R. Das and Motilal Nehru successfully revolted against his absolute opposition to parliamentarianism, he withdrew into

the background. Das died, and in due course Gandhi returned to lead the Congress out of the legislatures into civil disobedience. The chief of his published pretexts then was that full Dominion status had not come to India in a stipulated fortnight or so. The campaign ended in his pact with Lord Irwin, astutely exploited to make it seem that the Congress had thereby achieved a peculiar status and authority *vis-à-vis* the Government. Six weeks after the pact, but before both sides began to complain openly of its breach, Gandhi himself was promising that 'we shall have complete independence within the next few months: Sardar Vallabhai Patel and myself will be behind prison bars.' Civil disobedience began again, and once more ended in a strong move for co-operation in the legislatures. Gandhi reluctantly bows to the majority, and again effaces himself. Congress wins the elections in six Provinces, and must at last decide whether it will also accept Ministerial office in them. There are Rightists in the party who at heart wish to make the most of the new Constitution; middle men anxious to exploit office against the Constitution; Leftists who would refuse office anyhow and try sabotage from the Opposition benches. Jawaharlal Nehru, the President, belongs to the Left, and the certainty of his defeat on the office issue puts the leadership of the party in doubt, which is bad for it. Gandhi sees his chance or, if you prefer it, his duty to the party. He brings the majority and the Leftists together at his feet by conceding office-acceptance to the former while he makes it conditional on those assurances from the Governors. He does it, moreover, by his old and familiar device: he likes so to contrive his demands that Government shall seem either to be paying with interest for Congress co-operation in particular, and thus vesting the party with a peculiar status, or to be justifying renewed hostility by refusing the olive branch. He has denied that he sought a privileged position for the Congress, but the claim is obviously implicit—almost explicit—in his statement of March 30 and more recent declarations by the Congress Working Committee. And the one really astonishing thing about that statement was the astonishment with which the Secretary of State mentioned it in the House of Lords. Whatever its motives, it was typically Gandhian.

Perhaps in fairness we should also remember how Gandhi

surprised Nehru with 'one of his ideas about the future of the Congress.' Jawaharlal writes:

> I had imagined that the Congress, as such, would automatically cease to exist with the coming of freedom. He thought that the Congress should continue, but on one condition: that it passed a self-denying ordinance, laying it down that none of its members could accept a paid job under the State, and if anyone wanted a post of authority in the State, he would have to leave the Congress. I do not at present remember how he worked this out, but the whole idea underlying it was that the Congress, by its detachment and having no axe to grind, could exercise tremendous pressure on the Executive as well as other departments of the Government, and thus keep them on the right track.

This, at a pinch, makes it just possible that Gandhi sought to keep his party out of 'posts of authority in the State' by demanding prerequisite assurances which he knew the Governors would not give. Or, if he did not know as much, most of his near followers did, and some of them seem to have told him so.

II.

There can be no doubt whatever that a large majority of Congressmen went into the elections with the hope of forming Governments. Spontaneous *ennui* and Willingdonism had discredited civil disobedience for the time being, and, except in Gandhist eyes, the alternative was revolution or accelerated evolution. Memories of police methods, the ugly side of prison life, and 'die-hard' speeches in England, still stimulated nationalist passion: but there was uncomfortable awareness, perhaps, that many Indians secretly or openly enjoyed the suppression of Congress bombast, the spectacle of the 'top-dog being taken down a peg,' and we can understand that enjoyment without liking it. The outside world was too busy with its own crises to go on sparing much thought or patience for an India that made trouble for itself which led nowhere. Something must be found in place of civil disobedience to justify the Congress's existence, popular interest in the party, and energies otherwise threatening to aggravate internal quarrels. The Government of India Act was infallibly coming, and offered large powers and opportunities to those who cared to exploit them. The more the

Congressmen denied this—some of them with absolute honesty—the readier were their rivals to make the most of a fact unaltered by denials. Elections to the Central Legislative Assembly in 1934 were an interesting experiment: their result vindicated a reversal of non-co-operation. They saw the party's energies firmly directed through new channels leading to the reformed legislatures. Only so could the Congress now reaffirm and demonstrate its hold on Indian opinion.

We shall see, in a minute, to what extent the demonstration failed—that it was not quite so impressive in fact as on paper. But certainly it was a big triumph, notwithstanding the Opposition's weakness. There was plenty of sharp practice, of course. In his presidential speech to the Congress at Lucknow, twelve months earlier, Jawaharlal Nehru said the party had become 'a prey to authoritarianism and a battle-ground for rival cliques fighting for control, and, in doing so, stooping to the lowest and most objectionable of tactics.' It was unlikely to banish these altogether in the fiercer heat of electioneering, and various observers have noticed that it did not. But nor did other parties, and the Congress was not alone in exploiting opportunities offered by the superstitious credulity of illiterate millions. It won by unrivalled strength and organisation, by tremendously hard work, by clever tactics, by the inspiration of its traditional prestige. It claimed 1000 candidates and returned over 700 of them. It captured six of the eleven Provinces—not a large proportion, but of the other five Assam, Sind and the North-West Frontier have small populations. In Bombay it won only by the odd seat where it should have been able to score heavily, but in Madras and the United Provinces, at any rate, its majorities are comparable with that of the National Government in England. It did almost as well in the Central Provinces and Bihar, where it met no sort of organised opposition. Yet the triumph cost it more than effort, money, and hoarseness. It damaged the biggest and most important claim that the Congress makes for itself.

Though the Moslems as a community had seldom shown active enthusiasm for it, we were told that 'the Congress *is* India.' Though its publicists had often and needlessly offended Moslems, and its election manifesto damned the

Communal Award strongly upheld by Mohammedan opinion, the manifesto's peroration said: 'Every party and group that stands aloof from the Congress organisation tends, knowingly or unknowingly, to become a source of weakness to the nation and of strength to the forces ranged against it.' The elections, it was hoped, would show the British Government and other sceptics that the Congress had 'the Indian nation' behind it, irrespective of community or creed. In the event they seemed to confirm and emphasise belief that the party held Hindustan only, with an unfortunate stress on the first two syllables. That should have been enough to satisfy any single party, but not to justify the tactic imposed on it in March.

There are 101 elective seats in the Central Legislative Assembly. The Congress leads with forty-one or forty-two of them, but only three of its members are Moslems. It had difficulty in finding Moslem candidates for the provincial elections, which attract Mohammedans more than the Centre does. Several, however, were put up in the United Provinces. Only one of them succeeded, and he was returned from the special University constituency, where there is a big Hindu majority in a joint electorate. Among the victims was the Moslem President of the Provincial Congress Committee. In the Punjab the Unionists fought as a non-communal party dominated by Moslems but helped by a number of rural Hindus. They now hold about 100 seats in a House of 175, and of the twenty to twenty-five Congress members only one Mohammedan entered the elections with the Congress ticket. A few Moslems may intend to ally themselves with the majority in the Bombay Legislature, but not one Congress Mohammedan was elected either there or in Assam, and I have not heard of any in the Central Provinces. The Congress won eight of the sixty seats in Sind. Classification elsewhere is difficult, but in Bihar and Madras combined at least forty-four of the sixty-seven open seats reserved for Moslems went to non-Congressmen. In Bengal there were several seats for special interests, 117 for the general Moslem electorate, thirty for the Depressed Classes, and forty-eight open to the generality of caste Hindus. The Congress won fifty-five, including only seven 'Depressed' seats, and about 120 are held by non-Congress Moslems. In the North-West

Frontier the Red Shirts won fifteen seats in a House of fifty, other Mohammedans got twenty-three, and four went to Hindu and Sikh Congressmen. The Red Shirts are classified as Congress, but the alliance admittedly has often been tenuous and uncomfortable, and their leader once asked me, 'What have we to do with Hindustan?' The affiliation, anyhow, has not prevented a more moderate Government with a slight majority.

Thinking Congressmen evidently realise that unpleasant facts like these cannot be conciliated by evasion of them. Even if we count by heads alone, disregarding communal emblems and depreciating Moslems as such, 70,000,000 Mohammedans remain an important proportion of the eleven Provinces' total population. The course of the elections suggests that the jargon of to-day might credit the Congress and the Moslems with different ideologies; and something more. Look at their political geography. The Indian annexe of an Islamic *bloc*, stretching away to Constantinople and Cairo, is a group of Mohammedan territories: the tribal frontier, the N.W.F.P., the Punjab, Sind and Baluchistan, to say nothing of an 80 per cent. Moslem Kashmir. Their combined population is under 37,000,000, but for the most part they are a sturdy and powerful crowd; they hold a key position, the land gates of India; and often their sympathies seem to be shared by the Moslems to the West of them and in other parts of India. The westward sympathy can be greatly exaggerated, but events like recent affairs in Palestine make it lively. Bengal has the biggest population of all the Provinces, and is Hindu in almost everything except numbers; but democracy means the counting of heads, not primarily of the brains in them, and 28,000,000 Moslems, sometimes unwilling to call themselves Bengalis, control the Presidency's Government.

With all these facts brought home by the result of their own party's efforts, men on the Right of the Congress naturally disliked the risk of intensifying the cleavage by wide differences of constitutional method. Inter-provincial jealousy or wholesome competition sometimes bubbles up in India surprisingly—usually because of different economic interests. If certain Provinces want to go ahead with the new *régime*, they may incline to independent impatience of handicaps

caused by deadlock and obstruction elsewhere; and that impatience may embarrass Federalism or any Central Government of the future. It is inconsistent with nationalist dreams, and cannot suit the Congress book, that this tendency should be most pronounced in the Moslem *bloc* of Provinces, give them special favour in the eyes of the outside world, perhaps widen the communal gulf, and even possibly revive thoughts of Pakstan, remote though these may be just now.

I was in India till the elections were over and we first heard of Gandhi's plan. I am convinced, and so were all my betters, that wherever Congress candidates had a chance of dominating a legislature, most of them wished at heart to form a Government: most of their supporters in the electorate thought they would or should do so, whether they had a chance or not, and voted for them with that intent. The Provincial Congress Committees were asked subsequently for their arguments for or against acceptance of office. A majority of them favoured it: none suggested anything like Gandhi's proviso. Some may have feared to abandon easy opposition for harder responsibilities, and this attitude would influence discussion. But it cannot have been decisive. When rumour first mentioned Gandhi's idea, nearly all the party's newspapers rejected it. Some of them at first damned it outright on the ground that it would be an elaborate method of refusing office, and much of the criticism was inconsistent with later argument by the same people that the idea was reasonable. Then its hallowed authorship was revealed, and by 172 votes to 70 the All-India Congress Committee preferred its revised form to the Socialists' amendment for absolute rejection of office. Congressmen could become Ministers where their party had a majority in the legislatures, but only if

> the leader of the Congress party in the legislature is satisfied and is able to state publicly that the Governor will not use his special powers of interference or set aside the advice of his Ministers in regard to their constitutional activities.

No one who has seen Gandhi handling a Congress meeting can be surprised at the result of his intervention from behind the scenes *viâ* the Working Committee. It had united him with Nehru politically once more, and India guessed that one

or both of them inspired the general form in which the demand was put to the Governors. What Congressman could withstand such a duumvirate at such a point, if he wished to? Even the mild Rajendra Prasad said that 'Congress Ministers could do only what they were permitted to do by the Working Committee.' (Provincial autonomy?)

But suppose there was more in it than that. In its election manifesto the Working Committee drafted a legislative programme sketching the outline of several admirable proposals: the boldest of these are reproduced with supplementary detail in the published policy of the new minority Ministry in Bombay. The committee later addressed a charge to its subordinates in the legislatures, repeating most of its excellent proposals, but adding two caveats. Though constitutional deadlocks 'should not be avoided when they occur while pursuing the Congress policy,' the committee adhered to the 'general and basic policy of non-co-operation with the apparatus of British Imperialism *except in so far as circumstances may require variation*' (!). Imagine that the Congress's would-be Ministers were genuinely anxious to make the best of their constitutional activities, rather than see emphasis given to Indian divisions by the better achievements of other parties and communities in other Provinces. Perhaps they became really afraid, at the last minute, that Governors' interference might hamper them. We can see whether they had cause for anxiety without justifying what they did.

III.

Gandhi and his proviso are now concerned only with the special powers that a Governor may exercise in his discretion. In his statement to the *Manchester Guardian* (April 22–23) Gandhi said that 'Ministers worth their salt will accept all the special responsibilities of Governors as their own.' This, in a way, only amplifies the order in the Instrument of Instructions that a Governor 'shall be studious so to exercise his powers as not to enable his Ministers to rely upon his special responsibilities in order to relieve themselves of responsibilities which are properly their own.' The Instrument also offers the Congress specific encouragement of the best planks in its electioneering platform by requiring

the Governor to 'promote all measures making for moral, social and economic welfare,' and 'have regard to this Instruction in the exercise of the powers conferred on him' (a point unnoticed in recent Congress statements). But Lord Zetland more pointedly drew Congress's attention to the Instruction that the Governor shall be guided by his Ministers' advice 'save in relation to functions which he is required to exercise in his discretion' and 'unless in his opinion so to be guided would be inconsistent with the proper discharge of any of the functions which he is otherwise by or under this Act required to exercise in his individual judgment.'

The Congressman, reading all this side by side with the Act, naturally understands that the Governor may, according to his own ideas or otherwise, annul any Bill passed by the legislature (section 75); disallow introduction of a Bill to impose or increase any tax (section 82); reject rules or amendments relating to police organisation and discipline (section 56); prevent any discussion of a Bill which he thinks would affect the discharge of his special responsibility for peace and tranquillity in the Province (section 86 (1.)). To the Congressman he also appears obliged or entitled to do whatever he himself thinks necessary to

(*a*) prevent any grave menace to the peace or tranquillity of his Province [section 52 (1)];

(*b*) safeguard the legitimate interests of the Minorities, and of past and present members of the public services and their dependants [*ibid.*];

(*c*) protect the vague rights of an Indian State and its Ruler [*ibid.*];

(*d*) upset legislation to restrict the activities in India of British subjects domiciled in the United Kingdom, or to tax them more highly than they would be if domiciled in British India 'even though the advice so tendered him is not in conflict with any specific provision of the Act' [sections 111 and 112 read with 52 (1.) and Instrument of Instructions, para. XI.];

(*e*) veto the introduction of any legislation prescribing 'the professional or technical qualifications which are to be requisite for any purpose in British India' [section 119 with 52 (1) and Instruction XI.].

In some of these matters the Governor may decide for himself whether he should interfere at all; in others the Act

compels him to intervene in whatever way his individual judgment suggests; and the language of the Act gives the layman plenty of excuse for confusing the two cases. Sections 50 and 53 (ii.), moreover, foreclose any formal dispute of the Governor's right to use his discretionary powers if the occasion of their use suggests that it may be *ultra vires*.

Nearly everyone seems to admit that some at least of the Governor's special powers must remain as such. Lord Zetland cited hypothetically the case of a Ministry proposing to reduce the number of schools available to a minority community. That could be done quite constitutionally, and still the Governor might think, with reason, that he must veto the proposal because of his obligation under (*b*) above. Gandhi thereupon accused Lord Zetland of repeating the *divide et impera* touch: yet not so long ago Hindus, Sikhs and Congress editors begged the Governor of the N.W.F.P. to annul a Moslem Minister's restriction of the use of their favourite vernacular in schools under his charge. The Congress programme includes the relief of poverty, unemployment and agricultural indebtedness by reform (*e.g.*) of land tenure, 'substantial reduction' of rent and revenue, and proposals for a moratorium. Legislation to this end might be so drafted as to threaten a Province's peace and financial tranquillity, thus tempting intervention by a meticulous Governor; for while urban Hindus and Congress journals were still resentful of drastic Moslem legislation against usury in the Punjab, Congressmen in the United Provinces talked about halving the peasants' rent. But in considering whether he should or should not interfere, the Governor would have to choose between two evils. He might let democracy develop in wisdom from the consequences of its own disastrous though reparable mistakes, rather than aggravate it by intervening at the risk of bringing down the whole political structure. No Governor is likely to be chosen from among men who might go on burning their fingers and boats in meddlesome efforts to check the march of a progress deliberately launched by Parliament through years of hard labour. A conscientiously elastic interpretation of the Instructions may prove easier, wiser, and in the result more loyal, than a scrupulously rigid subservience to them.

On these points enough has been said elsewhere. There

remain conflicting realities in India to-day as well as the realities of legalism, liberal convention, past history in Canada and Australia, and Parliament's intention. The deadlock in six Indian Provinces is one of them, and a thought for the others may suggest a way out of it. One of the least important is a hint of humbug in the Congress attitude. It demands freedom for its would-be Ministers, and talks of the 'transfer of all real power to the people'; yet on its own showing its Working Committee is to have 'special powers and responsibilities' over its Ministers in supposedly autonomous Provinces. 'They can do only what they are permitted to do by the Working Committee.' And this committee is not elected. It is nominated by the elected president in the exercise of his individual judgment.

Among the 260,000,000 people of India's eleven Provinces there are fewer literates by far than there are in the British Isles. There are fewer literate in English than there are in two-thirds of London. Not all the 750-odd Congressmen in the legislatures can read English. What proportion of them can be expected to understand properly the drafting and implications of the safeguards in the Government of India Act? How many M.P.s do? The Congressmen naturally choose to believe what their own leaders have told them about the safeguards, and the leaders' work in the legislatures depends on the votes so influenced.

But the safeguards are there anyhow, in a formidable mass of cold print, and in spite of statutory jargon the Congressman educated in English can read them more easily than he can digest and credit soothing speeches about them thousands of miles away. For instance, the Dominions, inhabited and governed by men of British stock, are free to derive extraordinary revenue from British visitors, if they need it, and to do what they like about coastal shipping in their own seas; but India perhaps will not be. Congressmen's extravagant threats provoked this safeguard, and may have justified it; but they will not admit that. They may credit parliamentary hopes that the Governors' powers will be used most sparingly; but they have also heard the force of these powers emphasised *sotto voce* to opponents of the Act. The Instrument of Instructions tells a Governor not to use his specific right under (*a*) above to stop discussion of a

Bill unless he thinks the discussion itself would endanger peace: yet Lord Linlithgow banned the preliminary introduction of a Bill to make reports of the Central Legislature's debates privileged, like those of other parliaments. He vetoed many debates.

If any other country were to seize command over Great Britain, probably we should never see reforms as liberal as the Government of India Act. But if in such case we had reforms like these, I think we should hate the feeling that at top there was an alien and uninvited guest with an absolute right to restrict the liberty of action offered us in the reforms. The mere fact of his supervision would be an irritant, and some of us would try, no doubt, to circumvent it. Plainly, this hypothesis is not on all fours with the case of the Indian continent, but the same feeling is a reality to many Indians, and it should be appreciated if we want a satisfactory and permanent improvement of the present situation. The Governors are not only uninvited guests representing alien preserves of power. Eight of them are I.C.S. men, and so identified hitherto with a bureaucratic administration between whom and the Congress there has been dispute for decades and often bitter strife. As personalities, or even as individual administrators, they may well have been popular; but as officials they have been of the enemy, and the Service to which they belong is suspected, with good reason, of inherent hostility to the Congress as such. By their official connexion they have been associated with the past *régimes* of arbitrary ordinances, imprisonment without trial, and so on. 'To these of all people,' the Congressman seems to say, 'you entrust that mass of discretionary powers; and then you wonder why we, too, want some countervailing safeguard.' I do not say that all this is now a fair argument justifying what the Congress has done; but it helps to explain it.

IV.

Saving the intolerable alternative of arbitrary rule by Governors under the Act's 'breakdown clause,' it seems that there must be new elections in a few months' time if the Congress still refuses office. What can be done meanwhile?

We might start by curbing references to 'Government,' '*the* Government,' 'the [bureaucratic understood] authorities.'

They are being overdone in a sense inconsistent with current facts, as well as the idea, of provincial autonomy. They drive Gandhists into fallacious argument. We should rather take care to demonstrate that, so far as the Provinces are concerned, the authorities are the new Ministries.

Then we might make the most of the Act's operation in the five Provinces where the Ministries have majorities, and of the programmes of the minority Ministries elsewhere. Everything possible should be done to emphasise the Ministers' freedom of action and reveal it to the public; stimulate their boldest schemes of public benefit and make these conspicuous to the people. The Ministers are now the masters of the I.C.S. in administrative routine. Let District Officers make that clear by co-operating whole-heartedly in the Ministers' constructive policy, and by explaining that they must and will always do their best to implement the proposals of whatever party may hold office at any time, be it a Liberal minority, a Hindu-Moslem coalition, or a Congress majority. If the legislatures in the six Provinces meet meanwhile (as soon they must), let us hope the Ministries will open business with beneficent resolutions or legislation which the Congress majorities cannot oppose consistently with the party's pretensions. They will find a way of throwing out the Ministries, and they will win the consequent elections if they have not the common sense to prevent dissolution by accepting office. But if the elections are shown to be due to their rejection of beneficent measures, they may think twice before refusing office again.

All this would be better, probably, than the personal contacts suggested between Gandhi and the Viceroy. Lord Linlithgow is not a Reading, an Irwin, or a Willingdon. The precedents that I have mentioned, too, may seem to suggest that the ultimate risks from such contacts can be greater than their more obvious temporary blessings. And in the present instance operations at Simla might appear to detract from provincial autonomy. But there is nothing to prevent Gandhi from asking for an interview with the Viceroy. Anyone can, and hundreds do.

It is assumed that when the new elections come, they will happen in all the six Provinces simultaneously. They need not, and the idea of holding a test election in one or two

Provinces first might be considered. However that may be, either before or immediately after the elections a further statement by or on behalf of all eleven Governors may be thought desirable or necessary. The Cabinets of the five Provinces outside present controversy might co-operate in it very advantageously. It should be addressed most clearly and impartially to all parties, groups and communities—not only because of the reasons why the Congress appears to claim it peculiarly, but because any other address would be grossly unfair to other parties, improper, and perhaps unconstitutional. The statement should describe the work that the present Ministries have done or attempted for the purpose of showing how the Governors and Services have co-operated with them. It should affirm that promise of continued co-operation is superfluous, but such promise should be made in deference to natural misunderstanding of the safeguards. It might present to all parties and communities, explicitly or by obvious implication, at least five years' freedom of choice between (*a*) intervention by the Governor if they get into difficulties, or if a minority feels itself wronged by a majority, and (*b*) liberty to make or suffer mistakes and to learn thereby.

Here are a few presumptuous suggestions, complementary to one another. Whether they are fantastic or tolerable, or ludicrously obvious, some redress of present deadlock and folly must be found if it can be. If it cannot, the blame may lie either on the Congress's head, or between the Congress, the authors of the safeguards, and the Victorians who launched the liberal policy that made the Government of India Act inevitable. But apportionment of blame will not help.

PATRICK LACEY.

[The above was written in the middle of May. Since then a better way out of the deadlock has been opened—at least ajar—by a welcome reaction within the Congress, an admirable speech from the Governor of Bihar, and an understanding in Parliament that meddlesome questions about India are now inconsistent with the Constitution. The Viceroy also has vouchsafed a monumental pronouncement, encompassed about with so great a cloud of verbiage that it adds little else to previous facts, suggestions and omissions. For that matter, nobody alone could have added much. But if Congressmen already had decided to 'come in,' and if Lord Linlithgow none the less gets credit for the result, the Viceroy's purpose will be served. He waited long enough for his chance. —P. L.]

BOOKS RECEIVED

Soviet Money and Finance, by L. E. Hubbard (339 pp. : Macmillan, 12*s*. 6*d*. net).

[*This book, which appeared last year, seemed of such importance as to deserve a more comprehensive study than could be obtained from a single review. The following review is based upon criticisms of several experts of Continental repute, whom the Editor consulted. In acknowledging his idebtedness to them, he takes responsibility for the views expressed.*—Ed.]

Mr. Hubbard has written a readable and extremely interesting book filling a real gap in our knowledge about the financial and monetary side of the great Russian experiment. He discloses to the Western reader the mysterious meaning of the innumerable code words which govern the economic life of the Soviet society, beginning with the Gosplan and Gosbank and ending with the recent invention of the 'control by the rouble.' We have here the first complete statement of the 'theory' of the Soviet financial and monetary system as a whole in the perspective of the working of the new economic system in general. In this sense the book is more than its title suggests, and can be used as a concise text-book of Soviet economic theory with some excursions into the history of recent developments. If the author has not broken new ground in this 'theory' (an unpardonable ambition in view of the enormous Russian literature on the subject), he has approached the problems with Western conceptions, and in this sense he may be right in complaining that Russian specialists themselves have very often misunderstood their own handiwork.

This reproach made by the author is well deserved, but has its excuses: the task of the Soviet theoreticians has long been limited to harmonising the zig-zags and spirals of the 'General Party Line' (of policy) with the Marxian–Leninist jargon. Objective thinkers like Mr. Hubbard are taboo in Russia. Because Mr. Hubbard is free to think aloud, he has been able to tell us much and to give us formulæ which, though correct and harmless to society, would bring any writer in Russia into serious trouble. He explains, for instance,

that the economics of the Marxian Soviet society is not based on Marxian values, but, on the contrary, that even controlled prices are governed by the most bourgeois law of supply and demand, and may, because it is a controlled economy, deviate more widely from the labour costs than any bourgeois economy would tolerate. At the other extreme, the builders of Soviet Russia have thrown overboard and proved beyond doubt the falsehood of another pillar of Marxian economics ; '*Existenzminimum*' wages have for years past not been earned by Soviet workmen and many years will pass before they will begin to earn them. In fact, the 'digging-holes-in-the-earth' theory and policy of Mr. Keynes is, in many respects, far more akin to the Soviet system with its 'full employment' than many economists suspect.

Mr. Hubbard's studies suggest that for a planned economy of Soviet type, where the 'socialised sector' officially has already reached 97·8 per cent. of the total, and the rest is more or less represented by remnants of peasantry who are being rapidly 'planned' out of existence, it matters little in theory whether the whole apparatus is made to work with the help of continuous inflation, controlled prices, combined with rationing and forced saving, or on the basis of formally sound currency, and properly fixed prices to make the effective offer and demand meet, combined with turnover-taxes to secure the necessary 'saving' for capital investment purposes. The present system seems to be a combination of all three methods, with a tendency to move away from pure inflation *viâ* controlled stable prices and rationing towards a 'free' market supplied with planned amounts of goods.

Historically this account of current tendencies may be accurate, but it is clear from chap. xxii. that this control is not yet fully effective, as proved by the fact that the latest data on monetary circulation of the Soviet were published in April 1935, and that, up to that date, circulation was ahead of all planned percentages. If real control had been attained, there would be no need to conceal the circulation figures. Inflation has been, and in fact is still, one of the most important instruments of 'expropriating the expropriators'—formerly in the true sense, later in the sense of the State acquiring goods and services without adequate compensation. The author sees the point clearly, and is aware of the terrible exploitation of the peasantry by the State which, paying ridiculous prices for forced deliveries of the produce of agriculture, is able to make vast profits from resale, and yet charges incredibly high prices for goods it sells to the peasant ; but he underestimates the consequences of the struggle which probably constitutes the greatest tragedy in human history so far as the number of people and the degree of suffering

is concerned. He sees the process only as a means of breaking the passive resistance of the peasant, claiming that the 'famine taught the peasants that any sort of resistance to the Government was futile and they are now prepared to work on the Government's terms' (p. 152). It was not only the exploitation of the peasant remaining on the land which was thus achieved, but, at the same time, millions of 'kulaks' were carried away to work under appalling conditions to the greater glory of the Socialist State in concentration camps where many of them gradually starved to death, leaving as their memorial colossal works often of doubtful economic value.

'The destruction of the kulak as a class' had another important economic consequence; it was accompanied by a vast destruction of agricultural capital, the restoration of which started barely two years ago. If during this period live-stock of all kinds on farms fell by one-half or more,[1] it was not just destroyed, but (clandestinely or not) eaten up by hungry workers, urban and rural alike. This was, to use a Marxian term, one of the most important sources of the 'primary accumulation of capital' in the Socialist industry. It was an anti-plan development, as was the inflation, which certainly accelerated it. A simple calculation would show in figures how big values were transformed by this process into industrial capital investments.

It may well be asked whether, in face of these facts, it is correct to deny to the rouble all other monetary qualities than those of a 'unit of account,' as Mr. Hubbard suggests. ('Money therefore is a unit of account by means of which the realisation of the Plan of production and distribution can be controlled and checked,' p. 125) It is true that the 'expropriation of expropriators' by inflating the rouble has been, for all practical purposes, terminated, so far as the remnants of old society are concerned. The best proof is the liquidation of 'Torgsins,' by which last drops of capitalistic valuables were drawn into Soviet economy.

In the meantime, new private capital has been created, however, which masquerades as a socialised means of production, only because the figures are misrepresented or misunderstood, witness the live-stock in private ownership of the members of collective farms, which is growing fast and is apparently, at the moment, vigorously encouraged by the Government.

[1] The Soviet's own figures are (in millions):

	1929	1933	1934	1935
Horses . .	34 0	16 6	14 9	15 5
Cattle	68 1	38 6	38 9	46 0
Sheep and goats . .	115 2	50 6	40 8	49 9
Pigs	20 3	12 1	17 1	25 9

According to the Plan for 1936 there were in collective farms (in millions):

	1934		Planned for 1936	
	Cows	Pigs	Cows	Pigs
Owned by collective farms . .	3·0	3·5	4·0	7·3
„ „ individual members .	9·6	6·8	12·0	17·0
Total . . .	12·6	10·3	16·0	24·3
Per cent. of total in individual property	76	66	75	70

Plans propose, but economic necessities dispose, and it will not be surprising if the year 1936 shows in retrospect a still bigger increase of private property, which is already surprisingly large. If, as it is said, the individual members can dispose of their live-stock and its produce on the free market and encash the proceeds in their own favour, it is only a statistical trick to talk, as do the planners, of a 93·6 per cent. Socialist sector in agricultural production. One wonders whether there is not more Socialism in the British milk marketing scheme than in this private economy within the socialised sector in Russia.

Now, if such a collectivised member can privately possess land, buy and sell the produce of land and live-stock, build himself a better house, buy a bicycle, etc., it is plain that the rouble for him is not only a 'unit of account,' but a means of storing values, measure of value, etc.—in fact, a monetary unit with practically all its bourgeois qualifications. And for the collective farm as such it acquires the same properties through the permission to sell their surpluses in open market. These surpluses and the corresponding market are rather big, as the Plan gives for 1935 the following preliminary figures for the turnover:

Cereals	1 million tons
Meat	¼ million tons
Milk products	2¼ million tons
Potatoes	2½ million tons

The total value is said to have been 14·5 milliard roubles, compared with 73·5 milliards of total State retail trade, excluding catering.

Both these developments must be considered as concessions to the bourgeois instincts of the peasant (as was the N.E.P.), whereby the fall of production in the purely Socialist sector will be compensated, while the lessened purchasing power of the gradually inflated rouble will be the means of depriving the producers of the fruits of their labours. This is inevitable, if industrialisation and all the rest

of the capital investments of the State (railways, canals, military equipment, etc.) are to continue on the planned scale.

As gaps in the outwardly complete Socialist structure of society similar to those described above, through which goods were flowing into the private market, were always existent throughout the two Five-year Plans, the soundness of the author's thesis on the planned rouble, though logically attractive, is of doubtful validity. Mr. Hubbard maintains that during certain periods of both Five-year Plans the workers and the peasants came into the possession of unspendable roubles (because the spending possibilities of the population were planned lower than the quantity of roubles paid to them as salaries or for the products delivered to the State). It was therefore immaterial whether they parted with these unspendable roubles by voluntarily subscribing to State loans or depositing them for ever in the State savings banks. This proposition is only true from the point of view of the planners, who naturally do not admit the existence of the black market, but has no value as a statement of actual facts. The author and all other observers are unanimous in stating that one can and always could buy practically every kind of consumption goods in Russia, whether legally or illegally, if only one has enough roubles. The illegal trade was never quite wiped out, and one of the means to fight against it was to deprive the population of 'surplus' roubles. Savers and subscribers to State loans have long ago learned that their savings and subscriptions are lost money, planned into the budget as ordinary revenue, and forcibly taken from them at pay days. Leaving these 'surplus' funds in the hands of the public would have been a great handicap to the builders of Socialism, because their force of drawing more goods into channels of clandestine commerce would have been irresistible. The population would have consumed more, and therefore the actual saving would have been less.

The 'Conclusions and Forecasts' of the author are disappointingly meagre (pp. 325–30). The only positive statement on this subject is that the 'policy of allowing demand to influence supply by means of price is likely gradually to supersede the purely arbitrary price-fixing.' It remains to be seen whether this policy will be a permanent feature of planning, or whether it was only a breathing interval for the planners as well as for the planned, made possible by an occasionally good harvest. Anyhow, the weather god seems to have already upset the yield of cereals, which was decreed by Stalin himself to be this year 1020 kg. per hectare, against 870 last year.

In the concluding part of his book the author carefully avoids answering one important question to which the reader is entitled

to ask for an answer. Is the Soviet economy, so ably described and explained by careful theoretical analysis, a *real fact* or, like Plato's Republic, a dream structure, laid up somewhere in heaven—an imaginary structure existing in the 'Plans'? Mr. Hubbard admits that the figures of the Plan should not be taken too literally, but leaves us with the impression that, whatever the shortcomings of individual Plans, the mechanism as a whole is working, is fundamentally sound, and that it has come to stay. The 'Plans,' in the author's conception, seem to be a more or less true and complete picture of Soviet economy; if, in his mind, the one disclosed by the 'Plans' is misleading he offers no other. The problem is a very difficult one, and the planners seem disinclined to seek a solution.

The fact is that no outsider is able to see any real facts behind the smoke-screen of figures. The national income is given in 1926–27 figures, and discloses the astounding fact that about 75 million peasants of working age produced an income of 9·4 milliard roubles against 27·9 milliards produced by 8·4 million workers and employees engaged in industry. The value of production is given in 1926–27 roubles and partly in 1932 roubles. What is the meaning of these basic roubles in respect of innumerable articles which were not produced at all in 1926–27? We are told that the productivity of one workman in large-scale industry was nearly 9000 roubles and his average salary 2·400 roubles, while in State farms the productivity was 827 roubles and the salary 1·551 roubles! (Productivity is everywhere given in 1926–27 roubles, and salaries in effective roubles.) What are we to deduce from such figures, and how far are they trustworthy?

Notwithstanding these mystical figures, certain comparisons impose themselves. The total 'wages-fund' (incidentally, according to Marx, a notion of 'vulgar' economy) was in 1935 56 milliard roubles. Besides this there could exist only monetary incomes of peasantry, valued at 14·5 milliard roubles for the free market, and not disclosed for compulsory deliveries. (The latter sum possibly was much lower than the 14·5 milliards delivered to the free market.) From the amount of 56 milliards the wage and salary earners had to pay certain taxes, obligatory insurance and 'cultural' charges, fulfil their saving duties, etc.; they bought the above-mentioned peasant goods on the free market, and at the end of all these expenditures we are informed that the State and other Socialist retail shops had a turnover during the year of 80·5 milliard roubles. Supposing that the salary and wage earners could afford to buy from retail shops for 40 milliards, can we suppose that the peasantry had a monetary revenue of 40 milliards to fill the gap? And what

about the turnover of all kinds of black markets ? There is plainly a gap somewhere through which the State retail goods flow and are consumed outside the Socialist economy.

Such an economy, with its production, trade and consumption, *must* exist alongside of the planned one, because otherwise many figures of the ' Plan ' become incredible. We are told, for instance, that the production of flour in the Union was 12 million tons in 1935 and the production of bread 14 million tons. There were, however, 53 million tons of wheat and rye harvested. Who did the rest of milling ? Why is this industry not included in the Plan ? There were 108 million kilogrammes of sausages and smoked meat produced in the Union, or 635 grammes per head [2] per year. Is not that amount incredibly low *even* for a Socialist economy ? The production of cotton cloth was 2·632 million metres, or 15 metres per head, woollen tissues 80 million metres, or half a metre per head, footwear 85 million pairs, or exactly half a pair per head. People even in Soviet Russia are not so naked as these figures would suggest, and one must again admit the existence of an industry outside the planned one providing for the deficiencies of the Socialist system. Such examples can be multiplied indefinitely, and imply that the Plan does not represent the total economy of the Union, but part only, and that the missing part is the basis on which the Socialist sector grows and flourishes.

Expressed ' in kind,' and not in monetary units, the Soviet economy at its present stage is based on the enormous peasant population, of whose production probably about one-third is taken by the State for practically nothing (in 1935 the cereal production was 92 million tons, of which 31 million were ' marketed '). The real value of goods and services the peasant receives in exchange is probably less than he was bartering fifty years ago, and the progress of Socialism has a counterpart in the peasants falling deeper into the *Naturalwirtschaft*.[3] The food and raw materials collected from the peasants form an economic basis for the army of proletarians and the population of concentration camps, whose labour is used in experimenting in industrialisation and other ' planetary ' schemes exactly in the same manner as the Pharaohs were wont to indulge in building pyramids.

[2] For this and subsequent calculations *cf.* the figure of the population given in the Statistical Year-book of the League of Nations (170 5 millions for December 31, 1937) This figure is evidently a planned one, as the latest census is dated 1926 and the latest published figures for births and deaths (1928), and these latter only for a part of the Union.

[3] We must not be misled by the net of tractor stations which are said to serve to-day 76 million hectares of collective farm lands the 6 5 million horse-power of tractors (even if in working order) are a very inadequate substitute for the 19 million horses lost.

Only when the modern pyramids are beginning to produce consumption goods on an adequate scale will the conclusive stage formulated by Mr. Hubbard be reached. Whether this will ever happen depends on the ability of the Soviet Government to 'convince' the peasant to submit to the present system for an indefinite period. In this perspective the thesis of the author that the peasantry is exploited in favour of the industrial workers is less than the whole truth. The peasant, attached to his collective farm, the worker, fixed to the factory, and those detained in concentration camps are as a matter of fact all exploited more or less to the same degree for the sake of 'capital investment.'

Mr. Hubbard has succeeded, where others have failed, in giving shape and substance to the confused medley of contradictory facts and slogans with which he has had to deal. His theoretical analysis is brilliant: his presentation lucid. If it fails to convince, that is not due to any lack of clarity or understanding on his part. Planners, no less than bourgeois economists, will read this book with profit and will gain even greater advantage from reading it a second time.

ARNOLD WILSON.

WALKS AND TALKS

By Sir Arnold Wilson, M.P.

I paid a flying visit to Germany during June, spending two days in Frankfurt and one in Berlin. The weather was far too hot for comfort, or for the crops, which were a source of the gravest anxiety. I have never seen, from the air or a carriage window, so many children and young persons in swimming-suits, or such numbers disporting themselves in rivers, canals, ponds and bathing-pools. I noticed a number of improvised pools, close to new housing estates, full of children.

The sky was cloudless and the eye could trace the lines of the great new arterial roads for fifty miles or more—partly completed, partly under construction, partly staked out and bare of crops. These roads follow a uniform pattern, straight as any railway, and with gradients as gentle, divided into two lanes, with no level crossings. There is little to interest or to please the eye of the motorist; on the contrary, the monotony is distressing and is said to be the cause of many fatal accidents, due to the driver dozing for a moment at high speed.[1] When completed they will give Germany, together with the railways which they supplement, but do not supplant, and the air and river-canal systems, the best internal communications in Europe, and will be the best antidote to undue urbanisation and to the growth of 'distressed areas.'

The airports at all large centres in Germany and Holland are popular places of resort, with plenty of space, where tea and coffee drinkers may watch the great machines of half a dozen countries come and go. At Rotterdam, and again at Amsterdam, I saw troops of boys and girls with their teachers being shown the sights, and the interior of a machine, as part of their education—a kind of 'school journey' which is more likely to attract children than a

[1] The latest plans provide for more changes of direction and greater variety, by planting trees, etc, in order to minimise monotony.

hurried view of the ancient monuments of Whitehall and Westminster.

A fellow-passenger handed me a copy of the *Illustrieter Beobachter*, directing my attention to a page which gave the photographs of twenty-seven sailors killed on the *Deutschland:* all were quite young. He shook his head sadly. I shared his feelings, while admiring the efficiency which could provide, at the shortest notice, photographs of every member of the crew of any warship in foreign waters. I wish we could pay this tribute to British soldiers and sailors who die or are killed on service abroad. Their photographs should be in every national and local paper. It would stimulate recruiting. The only Government office which makes full use of the camera at present is Scotland Yard.

I had friends to see in Berlin as well as in Frankfurt, and I had many conversations the upshot of which, extending over three days, is not easy to summarise. I noticed far fewer brown and black uniforms in the streets: life seemed appreciably easier; the number in the restaurants larger. The news of Stalin's sixth but not, perhaps, his last purge had just arrived and was being widely discussed. My friends, one and all, could find no explanation which seemed to them even plausible. The successive killings, totalling many thousands, from end to end of Soviet Russia, rivalled those of Genghiz Khan or Tamerlane—who were also Asiatic rulers. It was a reversion—a throw-back—to the methods of those days. Such deeds, said one, should not go unnoticed at Geneva: what should we have said if this sort of thing happened, let us say, in Liberia or Haiti?

I mentioned that I was in Germany on June 30, 1934. 'What happened then may happen anywhere—once,' replied the speaker; 'Europe is not England: against the threat of violence there is sometimes only one reply. But in Soviet Russia the purge has become a colic—a cholera.'

'Surely,' I suggested, changing the metaphor, 'Germany need no longer fear the might of a country whose official structure has been so riddled with traitorous white-ants? You can now afford to relax your preparations.'

'No,' was the reply; 'it will not alter our policy. We shall neither take advantage of what might appear to be a good opportunity to press our just claims on behalf of the

Sudetendeutsche, nor shall we relax our defensive preparations. Voroshiloff is immensely popular; he is at the head of the Red army: he will one day succeed Stalin, unless killed first, and there is no knowing what he might do.'

Another of the circle, with some claim to inside knowledge, suggested that Stalin was suffering from a form of mania, such as had afflicted Tsars, and Oriental monarchs in the past like Nadir Shah. But others declined to accept so simple an explanation, as though the very atrocity of a crime were its best justification. They told me that the Russian 'Intourist' Bureaux throughout Europe had been instructed to cease to book tourists for the present. No Russians were ever allowed to make pleasure trips abroad: now foreigners were to be excluded until the purge was ended.

We discussed the *rôle* of the popular Press in the principal countries: it was agreed that there was a tendency in every country, not excepting England, to give greater prominence to foreign affairs than at any previous time for many years past. It was also agreed that few newspapers had a foreign news service proportionate to the sub-editorial emphasis on happenings abroad, and therefore made free use of 'rumours,' 'well-authenticated rumours,' and 'unconfirmed reports,' which made good headlines but were absolutely worthless as information. They cited the reported destruction of the *España* by bombardment and the alleged torpedoing of H.M.S. *Hunter*. But they thought that the public in every land had been largely immunised by repeated doses of the poison. Like the onlookers in Hilaire Belloc's *Cautionary Tales*, who knew that Matilda had once given a false alarm to the fire brigades, when the emergency actually arose

> every time she shouted 'Fire!'
> They only answered, 'Little Liar,'
> And therefore, when her Aunt returned,
> Matilda and the House were Burned.

They were confident that, in Germany at least, the effect of Press tirades is less than is commonly supposed.

Returning home, I turned to Bodley's *France*, which my father made me study before I first went abroad to learn the language, to read what he then said of the Press. Every word rings true to-day in France and in a wider sphere.

> At the end of the century, of which one of the boasted triumphs is a cheap Press, it has to be avowed that a most salutary feature of national life in France is that a large proportion of the people of all classes never read the newspapers. It is not my intention to quote any of the appalling terms which, applied by politicians to one another, meet the eye perusing a journal in search of news. . . . All that shall be mentioned here is one lamentable effect of the discussion of public topics—a heartless callousness before personal affliction, or even mortal bereavement. . . . While the humblest workman salutes the lifeless body of a stranger borne past him to the tomb, this is not the practice of politicians. . . .
>
> An Englishman reads . . . an insinuation against his nation so virulent that he fumes with indignation. . . . He may calm his ruffled feelings, for the next page is full of slanders more outrageous, aimed at Frenchmen. . . . He sees exposed for sale a caricature lampooning the British race; but close by are a dozen others more coarsely defaming French public men.
>
> The stranger . . . might gather . . . that the population . . . is wholly composed of the ignoble and the fatuous. . . . The traveller . . . would do well to raise his eyes from the envenomed print; he will soon see things which belie it.

So if, as Elijah lamented, we are not better than our fathers, we are not, in this respect, much worse.

I have studied volumes of anti-Italian and anti-German cuttings in several languages, in Rome and Berlin respectively, and similar volumes of anti-English cuttings in London. The cumulative impression is misleading because the effect on the daily-newspaper reader is not concentrated and seldom cumulative. The effect on public opinion of the Press cannot be gauged by the laborious analysis of poisonous material amassed by a process analogous to filtering, whereby all impurities in thousands of gallons of liquid are collected for examination in a single flank. We consume every year enough of half a dozen poisons in our food and drink to kill us if it were swallowed at a single meal; we are immune because we only take small doses.

That Anglo-German relations have not improved lately is not entirely our fault. German diplomacy has not always made the path of peacemakers smooth. '*Gagnez les cœurs*,' said Pascal '*les affaires sont moins importantes que les hommes*.' Germans act on the last, but not always on the first part of this adage.

But every outburst of ill-temper and ill-mannered criticism of Germany and Italy in the Commons and the Press—and there have been many such lately—serves to strengthen the 'Berlin-Rome Axis,' itself an unnatural and, at present, an unstable orientation. There is a growing belief in England that recent speeches and acts of Signor Mussolini, and manifestations of Italian policy for which he is responsible, are unworthy of the head of a great State and do not reflect the outlook of those for whom he speaks. Even those who have resigned themselves to foreign intervention in Spain, where, as Mr. Eden has said, others were more to blame than Italy or Germany, and who recognise the right of nations to protect their major interests in this way, as we have done in the past, feel that the truculent note recently heard in Rome must be firmly answered by no uncertain sounds. It is clear from Mr. Polson Newman's second article in this issue that Italy is making good progress in Ethiopia. But similar methods will not serve to pacify Europe.

* * * * *

'British Governments in recent years have seldom fully represented British public opinion in their attitude towards Germany.' Thus *The Times* on June 23, and those who have read 'Walks and Talks' for the past three years will be aware that these words reflect the feelings of the present writer. The postponement of Baron von Neurath's visit to London on the ground that the German cruiser *Leipzig* had been unsuccessfully attacked by an unobserved submarine in the Mediterranean in circumstances as yet obscure will, if prolonged, strengthen the arguments of those who believe that no friendly understanding with Germany is possible because her diplomacy is too frequently incomprehensible. The *Deutschland* incident was a cruel tragedy: the attack on the *Leipzig*, if proved, would go far to destroy the claim of the Valencia Government to continued recognition. But the occurrence of such incidents, for which *agents provocateurs* may have been responsible, is an additional reason for the frank exchange of views between principals for which public opinion in both countries was anxious and fully prepared. The withdrawal of Italy and Germany from active participation in the work of control, on this slender ground, is to be

regretted: but it should not be allowed to interfere with Baron von Neurath's visit.

* * * * *

'*Primo avulso non deficit alter, aureus.*' The Virgilian tag may fairly be applied to the new Prime Minister; the miniature general election has followed his assumption of office—no less than fourteen seats being, for various reasons, vacated. The results announced to date show no restlessness on the part of the electors, who have voted as they did at the last General Election and in roughly the same proportions, though abstentions were, as is usual at by-elections, more numerous.

The average elector believes that there is little wrong with the Government's foreign policy, and that the Opposition know it. He wants to keep out of war abroad and to be cautiously progressive at home on lines which will give him greater security of employment, against want, and in old age. He will forgive much to a Government which promises these things and seems able to keep its word.

But the fact does not vitiate Mr. Scanlon's arguments elsewhere in this number, nor discredit his diagnosis, from his own particular view-point.

ARNOLD WILSON.

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
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
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THE

NINETEENTH CENTURY *AND AFTER*

No. DCCXXVI—AUGUST 1937

THE PALESTINE REPORT[1]

By MAJOR HAROLD TEMPERLEY, O.B.E.

THE first thing to realise about this Report is that the British Government's previous policy in regard to Palestine has completely failed. As a result of that failure the Commission was appointed; hence its extremely drastic recommendations, and hence, too, the accompanying Government statement of policy, which promises to carry them out. No Government could more completely accept the failure of its previous policy or more openly recognise the fact.

The statements of previous Government policy, quoted in the Report, make painful reading. For:

> It is clear, then, that the policy of the Balfour Declaration was subjected to the operation of the Mandate System in 1919 in the belief that the obligations thereby undertaken towards the Arabs and the Jews respectively would not conflict. And this belief was still held when the draft Mandate was confirmed by the Council

[1] *Palestine Royal Commission Report* (Cmd 5479); *Statement of Policy By His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom* (Cmd 5513). Both presented to Parliament, July 1937.

of the League in 1922. Already by then the Arab leaders had displayed their hostility to the Mandate and all it involved; but it was thought that this hostility would presently weaken and die away. Mr. Churchill spoke of his 'Statement of Policy' as a basis on which he believed that a 'spirit of co-operation' might be built up. And the ground of this belief in the compatibility of the obligations was no less clear. It was assumed that the establishment of the National Home would mean a great increase of prosperity for all Palestine. It was an essential part of the Zionist mission to revivify the country, to repair by Jewish labour, skill and capital the damage it had suffered from centuries of neglect. Arabs would benefit therefrom as well as Jews. They would find the country they had known so long as poor and backward rapidly acquiring the material blessings of Western civilization. On that account it was assumed that Arab fears and prejudices would gradually be overcome.

The idea that racial prejudices would be overcome by economic advantage had already been refuted by Mr. Churchill himself in the case of Ireland: 'What shall a nation give in exchange for its soul? A tax on imported butter.'

The Report does not give this quotation, of course. And it does not tell us that Mr. Churchill, *more suo*, assumed a Jovian air during the year 1922, declared the policy immutable and eternal, and recommended its acceptance on the ground that the Government possessed irresistible force and would be deterred by no opposition or danger from imposing its will. In 1930 Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, as Prime Minister, again waved the thunderbolts. 'His Majesty's Government . . . will not be moved, by any pressure or threats, from the path laid down in the Mandate.' (Report, p. 73.) This was followed by a 'White Paper' reaffirming 'the principle that "economic absorptive capacity" was to be the limiting factor in immigration.' It indicated that the Jews would have to be content with a very small immigration in future, and (Report, p. 73) 'betrayed a marked insensitiveness to Jewish feelings.' As a result of Jewish agitation this 'White Paper' was promptly 'amended' (p. 74), and Mr. Ramsay MacDonald in a letter to Dr. Weizmann, known as the 'Black Letter,' of February 1931 was (p. 75) 'more favourable to Jewish claims than the uninterpreted "White

Paper" had seemed to be.' (Report, p. 75.) The Report continues:

In Arab eyes the substitution of the 'Black Letter' . . . for 'the White Paper' was plain proof of the power which World Jewry could exert in London and such confidence as they might previously have had in British determination to do at least what justice could be done under what they have always regarded as an unjust Mandate was seriously shaken. It is widely believed that the so-called *volte-face* of 1931 was a primary cause of the subsequent 'disturbances.'

In the passage just quoted the Report is very generous to the Government. For in this very same year, 1931, the Government threw up the principle of 'economic absorptive capacity,' and (p. 79) 'decided to accept the *fait accompli* and allowed some 6000 Jews, who admitted their illegal presence in the country, to be registered as immigrants.' The Report adds, with unconscious humour: 'But the irregular inflow continued.' Of course it did. It might have stopped, if the Government had deported every one of the admitted illegal residents, or a substantial part of them. The Government proved equally unable to protect the position of Jews 'in the security forces' (*i.e.*, the police). Here, again, the Report is exquisitely naive:

In the Police Force it has been difficult to retain the services of those [Jews] who are posted to local areas. Of 439 Jewish constables enlisted during the years 1932–36 255 resigned or were discharged (p. 197).

On the other hand, in Tel Aviv 'only Jews can be posted there with safety,' and, so we were told, "their loyalty is to Tel Aviv and the Municipal Council and its Chairman, rather than to the Inspector-General and the Government." . . . Tel Aviv was allowed certain concessions, one of which is the retention of a local force, members of which cannot be transferred' (p. 197). Thus Jewish constables cannot be transferred from Tel Aviv when there, or protected when outside that area. The Commission are not alone in thinking all this is not 'conducive to discipline.' We proceed to the deplorable, and inevitable, conclusions:

Revenue in 1936–37 was £4,639,953. The expendture on Public Security was, as mentioned above, £2,230,623. We have

also to face the fact that, despite the heavy increase in expenditure on the Police Force, the riots in 1936 were on a larger scale than previously. Yet the suggestions which we received designed to prevent a recurrence, like our recommendation in the preceding paragraph, would mean a considerable increase in the charges. (Report, p. 199.)

In addition to this 'there is good reason to suspect that, like the Arabs, the Jews possess a large number of illicit arms' (p. 200). The device of sealed armouries is admitted to have failed.

There are obvious objections to arming one section of the population to enable it to defend itself against another. The fact has been recorded above that even the issue of a limited number of Greener shot-guns to be held in sealed armouries provoked a riot in 1931. Yet the isolated position of many of the Jewish settlements demands more adequate protection than is afforded by sealed armouries, even though these can be readily opened in any emergency. Further, isolated armouries may themselves invite attack. (Report, p. 200.)

The Government has sternly restricted the use of arms (Report, p. 203):

The number of licensed weapons in the country is as follows:

	Jews.	Arabs.
Rifles	15	96
Revolvers and pistols . .	217	132
Shot-guns	1998	2410

After these figures it is somewhat remarkable to read the following:

Though it is only on rare occasions that any Jew has resorted to the use of unauthorized firearms, we were informed that in round numbers the Jews could place in the field 10,000 combatants, trained and *armed* [2] with a second line of 40,000. (Report, p. 200.)

It hardly seems possible to blame the Jews; but what a reflection on the Mandatory! A civilised rule should always mean protection and security to the ruled. Yet here, despite enormous expenditure, disorder has got worse with every year till 1936, and then there is rebellion.

[2] Italics my own.

As for the underlying causes of the revolt, it is quite easy to see these. The Government has been so occupied with its ideas of maintaining order that, until a year ago (as the Commission informs us), they had no proper sociological bureau or department of inquiry. They had therefore no means of directing the higher intelligence on all or any illicit enterprise. They entirely failed, as the Report abundantly proves, to stop the illicit immigration of Jews, and they did not even dare to deport 6000 known illegal immigrants and, by recognising their residence and condoning their illegality, encouraged others to imitate them. Are these the means to promote among Jews and Arabs what the Report calls 'a wholesome respect for the authority of the Mandatory Power'?

What has happened could easily have been foreseen. I was in Palestine during 1933, when there were outbreaks at Jaffa and elsewhere. One day in Jerusalem, the morning after the news of an incident had arrived, black flags were hung out by Arabs, and Arab boys with stones (who would, at need, have been followed by men with weapons) went through the streets intimidating every non-Arab shopkeeper and forcing him to close his shop by threatening to break his windows. British aeroplanes soared over the Holy City, mounted police rode through the streets, but no one dared to reopen his shop. The police or soldiers maintained order over the space covered by the soles of their boots or by the hooves of their horses, and no more. If that was what happened in the capital, what was likely to happen in outlying districts where bodies of police or airmen could not come? Primarily, as everyone knew then, the riots were due to the increasing numbers of Jewish immigrants, licit and illicit. I came away from Palestine believing that the problem was insoluble on existing lines, and that revolt was certain unless the Government took drastic steps. The Report says: 'In 1934 there were 42,359 authorised immigrants, in 1935 61,854' (p. 85). Now as (p. 79) in 1929 there were 5249 authorised Jewish immigrants, 4994 in 1930, and 4075 in 1931, the authorised immigration was increased to nearly eight times its previous size in 1934, and to nearly twelve times in 1935. This increase took place *after* the serious disturbances of 1933. Could anything more provocative have

been devised, could any other result than a revolt be expected in 1936? And why did not the Government set its present Commission to work in 1934, rather than wait for the revolt of 1936?

The above summary gives admissions, reluctantly made and always moderately phrased, by the Commission as to our previous policy. That policy has not been marked by firmness, by intelligence, by consistency, and, least of all, by success. There is therefore a strong case for the Report's recommendations, though there is much danger in adopting them. There is a case for doing so, however. To quote a luminous phrase from Canning, we have to choose between 'a balance of opposite dangers.' This may be the least of them. It was very fortunate that the revolt flickered out in the autumn of 1936. For, so long as the presence of something like two British Regular divisions in Palestine was necessitated, there was an evident danger to the home country and, indeed, to all parts of the Empire. At Paris, in 1919, Sir Henry Wilson is well known to have been opposed to our occupation of Palestine, on the ground that it was an onerous military obligation. And the only answer to his objection is that Palestine should be turned from an obligation into an asset in the military sense. It is with that intent that the Report has been framed. It desires no longer to unite two incompatible partners, but to assign to each a sphere and to make each a 'sovereign and independent' State in that sphere. England is to retain control of the communications of Haifa and of an area beginning with Jaffa and stretching to include Jerusalem, Nazareth and Bethlehem. Transjordania is, in effect, to extend across the Jordan, so that the new Arab State will now include Jericho, Nablus and Megiddo.

The settlement is not correct according to ethnic, strategic, sentimental, or even economic considerations. The latter are, indeed, the only ones seriously applied. Roughly, the lands settled and controlled by the Jews, in virtue mainly of their enormous economic enterprise since the war, are the areas which they are now to occupy and to hold as independent. They are excluded from the important potash works, and from the power-area of Jordan Valley. But they own practically all the coast and various fertile or potentially fertile areas

just inland. So conscious is the Commission of the fact that the Arabs have been given the poorer land that they propose that the British Treasury shall give a grant of £2,000,000, to assist the development of the new Arab State.

Comments may perhaps be permitted from one who took part, at Paris in 1919, in the drawing of several frontiers. The Jews will obtain practically all the zones in Palestine with a higher percentage of cultivation than 10. Communications for Arabs from Jerusalem to the coast, and also to Haifa, are ensured by the British, and that is a great gain in itself. But there is neither a natural border-line nor a defensible frontier between the new Jewish and Arab States. This seems to be a great weakness. Further, how will it be possible to avoid these dangerous incidents on the frontier, which so often provoke warfare between two bitterly hostile peoples? The frontier problem is therefore beset with the gravest difficulties. The one advantage is that the Arabs will be in a position to do, what the Mandatory never succeeded in doing, *i.e.*, to exclude Jewish immigrants altogether. We note, however, one remarkable lapse on the part of the Commission. The Report not only recommends total exclusion of Jewish immigrants from the Arab area, but suggests that 'the volume of Jewish immigration should be determined by the economic absorptive capacity of Palestine less the Arab area' (p. 393). Suppose the Jews decide to disregard this limitation, as they have always done in the past. They always introduced immensely larger numbers of immigrants than the Mandatory wished under the old system. They have now immensely greater facilities for doing this when there is 'a sovereign and independent' Jewish State. How are we going to prevent them now, if we failed in the past?

The next problem we must attempt to settle is whether the Jews will or can accept the proposed solution. The Report shows clearly that all sides of the Jewish case have been ably presented. The Commission shares the admiration generally felt for Dr. Weizmann, the chief leader of Zionism, and for his wisdom and moderation. But the British Government (as notably in the case of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald's 'White Paper' and 'Black Letter' above alluded to) has more than once embarrassed Dr. Weizmann by their policy and

decisions. Their last suggestion, in adopting the plan of the Commission, is the most embarrassing of all. The Jews are deprived of the Holy City, of Zion itself. Their future immigration becomes practically negligible, and high hopes of future development are dashed. They can have no belief in the protection of Jewish settlers or enterprises outside the area of the Jewish State. They must regard with scepticism such recommendations as the following (p. 389):

> In the event of Partition agreements entered into by the Government of Palestine for the development and security of industries (*e.g.*, the agreement with the Palestine Potash Company) should be taken over and carried out by the Governments of the Arab and Jewish States. Guarantees to that effect should be given in the Treaties. The security of the Electric Power Station at Jisr el Majami should be similarly guaranteed.

Who is to ensure, or to promote the carrying out of, agreements between the Arab and Jewish States? Who is going to 'guarantee' the 'security' of any Jewish enterprise in the Arab State?

Summarising the matter briefly, it does not seem that the Report helps Dr. Weizmann much in the direction of wise and moderate policy. The evidence that there are wilder forces at work in the Zionist movement—forces which at any time may escape his control, forces which fanaticism drives—has always been strong. It is to be feared that the Report will only lend strength to these extreme parties. The only thing they will fear is a British Government ready to stand up to them. The Commission remark (p. 394) that '"half a loaf" is better than no bread is a peculiarly English proverb.' Precisely, but it is not a Jewish (or an Arab) one. And it is a maxim peculiarly opposed to the ideas of fanatical Zionists, and unfortunately, at times of crisis, it is fanatics who get control.

It is, however, rash to dogmatise about Jewish views. These can only be understood by those who are Jews themselves or who have been closely associated with their recent politics, and I cannot claim authority in either respect. In fact, the Arab reaction to the Report can be more clearly presented than the Jewish. For it is likely to follow certain tendencies well known in the Near East. As the Report says, the Arabs

of Palestine and Transjordania are much influenced by the Arabs of French mandated Syria. They are much less civilised and complex in their emotions than the Zionists, and correspond to a more primitive type. But I question much whether the authors of the Report are right in attributing national consciousness, *i.e.* capacity for self-government, to the Arabs of Transjordania and of Palestine—as they appear to do. The Arabs are a race, not a nation.[3] The Report perceives that their hatred of the Jews is a comparatively new feature—at any rate, so far as the *fellaheen*, the poorer folks, are concerned. This hatred of the Jews has been stimulated by all sorts of acts, by a continuous and increasing propaganda, and by strong pressure from outside. I read in *The Times* of July 14 that the Premier of Iraq is reported to have have said:

> 'Any person venturing to agree to act as Head of such State would be regarded as an outcast throughout the Arab world, and would incur the wrath of Moslems all over the East. I declare, both as head of an Arab Government and as a private citizen, that I should always oppose any individual ready to stab the Arab race to the heart in order to secure the rulership of the proposed new State.'

That is the kind of pressure to which Arab persons, wishing to be moderate, have for years been subjected from all other parts where Arabs hold sway. During the revolt of 1936 we learn (Report, p. 179): 'the manifestoes issued by the Higher Arab Committee . . . were clearly prejudicial to law and order.' Yet these persons are now credited with the capacity to make, govern and direct a sovereign and independent State. Agitators or conspirators are not good rulers anywhere.

That the Arabs in Palestine now hate the Jews, and desire self-determination and independence, may be admitted; that they have certain gifts and abilities can be conceded. But that they are capable of self-government there is nothing to prove. If Egypt enjoys at the present time any stability, it is as the result of many years' effort, and no one can predict its duration. The Arabs of Syria, of Saudi Arabia, and of

[3] Both Arab and Jewish characteristics in Palestine are indicated, briefly but with much acumen, in *The Arabs*, by Bertram Thomas, chap. xii—a work published just before the Report appeared.

Iraq have given no indication that they can develop save under personal government or strong rule. There is very little prospect that an enlarged Transjordania can develop faculties which, in far more favourable circumstances, have not yet been apparent in the politics of Syria or of Iraq.

Two points only can be made with some certainty. Respect for the Jewish racial minority may be promised, guarantees for protection of Jewish industrial enterprises in the new Arab State may be given. But these pledges will only be observed if the ruler is sufficiently strong and determined to enforce them. King Feisal himself could not save the Assyrians from being massacred in Iraq. In such a case savage instinct or momentary impulse may well overcome all the safeguards which even a strong and disinterested ruler may sincerely desire to impose. We have no evidence of such a *Deus ex machina*. The second point is that there is no reason whatever to suppose that the new Arab State can be efficiently governed. That a number of Arabs desire 'the sweets of office' is certain. But it is also certain that they will not behave like parliamentary politicians in England, who prefer 'half loaves to no bread.' In the East they pursue the shadow of the whole loaf in preference to the substance of the half one. The idea of the Commission that the offer of sovereignty to the Arab is worth something is true. What they do not understand is that it is not worth enough. The Arab of Palestine will 'lose face' before his brethren in Iraq or Syria unless he asserts himself against the Jew in some dramatic way. To acquiesce in the Commission's Report is to be drab, to give up the dream of expelling the Jew and of controlling the Holy Cities. We cannot predict that the Palestine Arab will form a stable or efficient State for himself, and still less that he will live at peace with the neighbouring Jewish State. He begins with so small an opportunity for prestige that a man with readiness to assume responsibility is essential. And where is he likely to be found when Arab agitators in Iraq and Syria tell him he is ready to 'stab the Arab race to the heart'?

To sum up. The Report is a counsel of despair. It convicts the Government of blunder after blunder in the past, and tells them that it is time their present policy must end. The Government meekly accept the rebuke and promise to pursue

a wholly different policy in future. But they are hardly likely to impress either Arab or Jew with the idea that they are any more likely to be ' undeterred by threats ' or ' regardless of criticism,' unless they prove themselves very different in the future from what their predecessors have been in the past. No Orientals love ' muddlers through ' or ' half-loafers.' None the less, under the Report the Jews and the Arabs both secure sovereignty and independence within limits, and gain certain solid though not shining advantages. The utterances of Zionist and Arab at the present time may be regarded as the beginning of a kind of Dutch auction. Their claims will gradually abate and their prices fall, in proportion as the audience remains unimpressed by their demands. Bold leadership in Parliament by the present Prime Minister, and the undoubted knowledge of the Near East possessed by the Colonial Secretary, may serve to bring home to Parliament and people the realities of the Palestine problem. In such case we may be able to pluck up courage and *impose* on Jew and Arab a settlement which neither of them dare openly accept, but which each of them may secretly approve.[4] One of the best methods of impressing both Arab and Jew with our sincerity is for the Government to refuse to listen to suggestions of compromise and amendment to a scheme which is in itself a final amendment and the only compromise possible of acceptance. But, having compromised to secure the scheme, the Government must not compromise further. Only execution to the letter, only determined purpose, only resolute government, can save the situation.

HAROLD TEMPERLEY.

[4] It would be easy to quote half-a-dozen instances at the Peace Conference where such *imposition* was accepted by smaller Powers with open protest and secret acquiescence

HOW TO MAKE OUR ARMAMENT USELESS

By Sir Norman Angell

We have just embarked upon a gigantic policy of rearmament. Its purpose is defence, and every sane man, pacifist or anti-pacifist, whether he believes the armament necessary or unnecessary, wise or unwise, desires, since the armament is now a fact, that it shall have the effect of defending us without war; that the 'silent' effect of its power will be to deter aggression and preserve peace.

Now this it can do only if certain political conditions are fulfilled, if, that is, our Government attends to certain matters that are not military or naval matters at all. If these non-military affairs are neglected or badly managed, our armament, however great we might make it, our military and naval preparation, however complete, will fail to deter aggression, fail, that is, to save us from being compelled to choose between abject surrender of the very things we are supposed to be defending, or entering into war in which, whether we win or lose, we shall be in danger of being swallowed up and destroyed.

There are not many things in politics, especially in international politics, about which we can be certain. But of the statement just made, that only by the creation of certain political conditions can military force be made effective for defence, we can be as certain as of the statement that though a man dig his garden never so industriously he will not get potatoes unless he plants potatoes, and that eloquence about the necessity and virtue of digging will be beside the point if he omits to put in the seed. The two propositions that in the absence of the appropriate political conditions no degree of armament can save us, and that without the seed potatoes no amount of digging will produce potatoes, are of the same order of certainty; equally demonstrable by experience, equally obvious.

Yet this undeniable truth is commonly denied, or rather, ignored—for denial, once attention to the point is secured, becomes impossible. But attention is commonly withheld from a curious admixture of motives, prominent among them being the feeling that the point is of the theoretical order, a disparagement of arms, a feeling that if only we have the ships and guns and 'planes and men, the rest does not particularly matter, that politicians can then do their worst.

Yet the demonstration of experience is tragic.

When Britain had much greater power than she can ever have again—had, that is, on her side the power, not only of France and Belgium, but of Russia, of Italy, of Japan, of the United States—aggression was not prevented, victory was a near thing and, when it came, did not give us security.

Three facts, indeed, in that great episode deserve our especial attention : (1) Great power did not deter aggression, prevent war, preserve peace ; (2) great power did not effectively defend us—a million of our youth perished, our trade and general economic position in the world was much worse after victory than before, while the repercussions of the war in social upheaval and disorder are still being felt ; and (3) victory, achieved at enormous cost, did not give us security, for on the morrow of the greatest victory of history we are now proclaiming—and our rearmament is testimony to our conviction—that we are more insecure than ever.

Why did great power—greater than we could ever have again—fail in its function as a deterrent of aggression ? Why did power fail to *prevent* war ?

A dozen statesmen and historians have answered that question, and all in the same way : The war could have been prevented had Germany known beforehand that she would have to meet the forces which she did finally meet. Had she been able to foresee the resistance which her policy would encounter, she would not have followed that policy, and there would have been no war. This is merely, of course, a concrete statement in terms of events of an undeniable abstract truth. A party—person or nation—can only be deterred by force from doing something if he knows beforehand (*a*) what particular act will bring the force into play, (*b*) believes that it *will* be brought into play if he commits the act, and (*c*) that it will *not* be brought into play if he refrains. (For if he

believes that he will incur the punishment anyhow, whether he commits the crime or not, then, though he knows that he will incur the punishment, it will cease to have deterrent effect.)

These truths are childishly simple. Yet they are usually turned upside down. We are warned, just now, to avoid 'commitment.' 'Commitments,' we are told, have the result of 'turning local wars into world wars.'

Again let us look at facts.

In 1914 a quarrel, so local that it began with a murder in a Balkan town, developed into a world war. Why? Because the whole world, including distant America, was 'entangled' in 'collective commitments'? They did not exist. Not only is it a fact that the whole world became entangled although this particular kind of commitment did not exist, but, as we have seen, it became entangled *because* the commitments did not exist.

Obligations are confused with liabilities. Nothing is commoner than to hear the rhetorical question: 'Would you have Britain undertake to fight for Czechoslovakia?' Well, Britain had no undertaking to fight for Serbia, no obligation of any kind. But we were soon to discover that we had appalling liabilities. Our liabilities would have been less if our obligations had been more. We did not diminish our risks by avoiding commitment: we increased them.

Note certain other of the political conditions of effective defence and their relation to the major consideration just indicated. Allies are indispensable to our defence. In the war we had a round dozen. If our defence is not 'collective' in this sense of being made in conjunction with others, there can be no defence at all. We recognise that truth so far as France is concerned and we are committed to defend her soil. Imagine that we have to implement that solemn, unmistakable promise, and we find ourselves, as we found ourselves in 1914, attempting with our French allies to stem an onslaught from the east. If at that moment of jeopardy a great military State like Russia offered her help, should we refuse? The British Government that did so would be torn from office. Yet again, when this indubitable fact is pointed out, the usual reply is that 'it will be time enough to consider the point when the occasion arises.' It will be too late to prevent, to

deter aggression. If our hesitations beforehand have been such as to create in the mind of the potential aggressor the belief that he can rule out the probability of Russian co-operation with us, we shall have made once more the same tragic error which made the power of the Allies impotent to prevent the Great War.

But our position would be even worse if indispensable allies had been 'eliminated' beforehand. What would have been our chances in the war if Russia and America had not supported us and Japan and Italy had been on the other side? But the elimination of allies necessary to us can be achieved far more easily and cheaply by political and diplomatic than by military means. Whatever our degree of armament, our defeat is certain provided certain necessary allies can be disposed of, 'neutralised,' and certain lines of communication rendered indefensible.

Our policy of late seems to have achieved both ends. Note how.

We are an Asiatic as well as an European empire. The defence of India and the antipodes depends upon the maintenance of a certain position in the Far East. Japan threatens it, by a challenge more defiant and menacing than any heretofore levelled at the Empire. Our power of resistance is adequate only if we can count upon the potential support, economic and political, if not military, of China, Russia and the United States. Yet when at the beginning of the Japanese challenge to us the United States offered full co-operation in resistance to Japanese demands, we refused the offer so coldly and curtly as gravely to offend the American Administration. (The facts have been related by the American Secretary of State himself in a book which no one who pretends to understand the question can ignore.) We took sides, not with China, but with Japan. (By, *e.g.*, an embargo on arms which did not in the least embarrass Japan but did China, and by our declaration that we regarded Japanese aggression as a 'distant dispute in which we were not concerned.') We continued to quarrel with Russia. Despite an alignment of interest in which on the one side there was Japan (with an iron production half that of Belgium and a coal production one seventh) and on the other China, Russia, the United States, Britain and Australia, we retreated before the threats

of Japan to the cheers of our Imperialists, some of whom suggested that we offer her our alliance.

Note the almost immediate repercussions.

Here was an Asiatic State of narrow resources challenging the power of Great Britain, the United States, Russia and China—and getting away with it. Mussolini—apostle of expansion by the sword, of the creed that the world is for the strong, would-be creator of a great Italian Empire, rebuilder of that of Rome, determined to make the Mediterranean ' our sea '—has made it quite plain in his public declarations that he was enormously impressed by the spectacle. In due course he struck and saw repeated exactly the same phenomena revealed in the Japanese case: First, notifications that Britain would not resist by arms (Mussolini would have a free hand). Secondly, his victim would be handicapped by an ' embargo to both sides,' which was no embarrassment to Italy but was crippling to Abyssinia. Thirdly, moral support for Italy on the part of many British Imperialists.

De Bono's book has revealed the fact (as Mr. Stimson's book revealed facts in the Far Eastern crisis, not realised at the time) that had Britain stood firm in resistance to Italian aggression, even though she had had to drag M. Laval after her (the difficulty, indeed, would not have arisen had Britain acted early, say in 1934), Italy would not have gone on with the adventure. Far from doing this, the Government did what it did in the Japanese case—made it plain beforehand that Britain would not fight. Not as a confession with apology, but with pride, does Sir John Simon declare that he would not risk a single ship for Abyssinia—a declaration which not only gives away the position to Italy, but reveals that evidently from the first the fundamentals of the position had been misconceived. It was not for Abyssinia that the ship would have been risked, but for the Empire, for international order.

As it is, Mussolini, to the surprise of his General Staff, and probably to his own, has had a resounding success; has built in a few months an empire which constitutes a great potential reservoir of black power, of native armies, stationed along British frontiers, in a position to menace the Canal, to make the whole Eastern Mediterranean position all but impossible. Two eminent South African statesmen declared at the time of Italy's coup that if she had a cheap and easy

success in Abyssinia it would be the end of the British Empire. That may well be an exaggeration. But no one can deny that what has happened in Abyssinia greatly increases the jeopardy of the British position on the Canal and in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Just after the Abyssinian conquest Mussolini declared that Italy was now a 'satisfied' State. It had been frequently argued that if we did not gratuitously quarrel with Italy over Abyssinia we could come to a bargain with her about our respective positions in the Mediterranean so that her new source of power 'at the back door of the Canal' need not disturb us. On the assumption that she now entered the category of 'satisfied States,' we did in fact make a 'gentleman's agreement' respecting the Mediterranean. And within a few months of the statement about being 'satisfied' and of the 'gentleman's agreement' we find Italian armies in Spain. The presence of those Italian armies could have no meaning in terms of Italian policy except as their ultimate purpose was to do in the Western Mediterranean what had already been done in the Eastern—to undermine the power of Britain in 'our sea.'

After the 'gentleman's agreement' a further undertaking was given by Italy—on February 20, 1937. It was an agreement for ending intervention in Spain, a preface to the withdrawal of 'volunteers' (Franco's rapid victory at that date seemed assured). Three weeks later, on March 13, Mussolini telegraphs perfervid (and premature) congratulations to the commander of the Italian forces on the Guadalajara front expressing the hope and faith that Italian victories in Spain will continue.

The following day in Libya Mussolini had himself proclaimed 'Protector of Islam.' A few days later the Italian army on the Guadalajara front was beaten; and a few days after that, the time having come for the Non-intervention Committee to consider in detail the means of carrying out the agreement to withdraw foreign troops from Spain (an agreement to which Italy was party), Count Grandi rose and declared that *not a single Italian volunteer would leave Spanish soil until the end of the Civil War*. The names of Italian soldiers who fall in Spain are to be engraved on the same war memorials in Italy which contain the names of those fallen in Abyssinia.

Why not? They, too, had fallen to make the Mediterranean 'our sea' and to lay the strategic foundations of a new Roman Empire.

And Germany? She, too, re-enters the Western Mediterranean. Where she failed in establishing herself in Morocco in 1911 she may succeed to-day. With a foothold in Morocco, Gibraltar can be neutralised; with one in the Canaries, the Cape route also made dangerous.

But the Spanish episode introduces a new element, a new technique of aggression, which is more sinister as a menace to the Empire than anything which the two preceding cases reveal.

It is a technique of invasion and conquest without declaration of war at all, by means of intervention in the affairs of foreign States; a technique most especially applicable to the undermining of the British Empire.

Note its nature. To a dissatisfied minority in a given country a foreign Government intimates:

> 'If you care to rebel, we will supply you the means—war material and "volunteers." Then, when you have captured the Government, you can repay us with a few submarine bases, coaling stations, what not.'

The success of such methods will constitute a standing invitation, or bribe, to military adventurers in a dozen territories where Britain has to meet the discontent of minorities. Not for nothing has Mussolini proclaimed himself 'the ordained protector of Islam and the Moslem world.' The possibilities of the claim as a tool for the disruption of the Empire jumps to the eyes. Yet, again, many of our Imperialists defend the use of this method, applaud those who adopt it.

Apart from this sinister new development the Germano-Italian invasion of Spain is met by a policy on the part of Britain similar to that adopted in the previous cases. Normal international law demanded that the established Spanish Government, which we not only recognised but continue to recognise, should get arms from abroad. So we abrogate established law in favour of 'embargo to both sides,' which does not really embarrass the German and Italian invaders, but greatly embarrasses the legal Spanish Government in resistance to them. Second stage—clear

notification that the invader will not encounter active resistance of any kind from us. 'Our policy,' says Mr. Eden (Leamington, November 20, 1936), 'is non-intervention.' It may not be observed by others. 'But the fact, however regrettable, does not cause us in any way to modify our decision.' It is, applied to the Spanish affair, the same order of reasoning as that employed in the Abyssinian: 'Our policy is sanctions, but if you threaten trouble we shall drop them.'

We risked war in 1911 when Germany proposed to establish a foothold in Morocco. We would not even allow the possession of Ceuta by France. It is quite clear now that if Germany or Italy did create such bases as would render Gibraltar useless (no formal cession of territory is necessary) making the Mediterranean line of communication untenable, we should submit.

Which brings us to the third point where the Spanish business duplicates the story of the other two: that cause, the triumph of which would be most dangerous to British security, is precisely the cause which so many British Imperialists have espoused as their very own—as when they champion the cause of Franco and his German and Italian allies. Whatever the explanation, the fact of the attitude, repeated time after time when foreign nations challenge the position of the Empire, has an importance that is not appreciated.

The importance resides in this: it indicates to potential aggressors that the will to resist a process which must undermine the Empire is not present. Throughout this long story of retreat the superficial explanation has been that we had not the power to resist. But spokesmen for great sections of our public have in each of these cases said plainly: 'If we *had* the power to resist Japan in China, Italy in Abyssinia and at the gates of the Canal, Germany and Italy in the Western Mediterranean, Germany in establishing an European hegemony, we ought not to dream of doing it. Even if it could be done without war or considerable risk of war, we ought not to oppose the Japanese domination of China, the extension of Italian power in Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean, Germany's domination of Central Europe, her establishment in the Western Mediterranean. We welcome these developments.

Such views have been expressed, not once or twice this

last six or seven years, but literally on hundreds of occasions; in newspaper leading articles, by eminent publicists and politicians, often with passion and apparent conviction.

So large and important is the section of British opinion which supports that policy that it would be strange indeed if it did not find representation in the Cabinet. Indeed, as we have seen, members of the Cabinet have made statements which in effect mean: The Japanese aggressions are a distant matter that do not touch our interests; resistance to the march of Italy towards empire is not worth the risk of a single ship.

But when Cabinet Ministers express such a view, or eminent Sunday journalists recommend (as one did recently) that Germany be encouraged to form a Germanic federation comprising what is at present Austria, Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Poland, we are not told at all why, if such a policy is acceptable to-day, we fought the greatest war in our history to prevent Germany carrying it out in 1914. We believed then and said, also on hundreds of occasions, often through the same newspapers, the same eminent publicists and the same statesmen, that a Germany which could dominate Europe to the extent just indicated would place the British Empire in a position in which it could not possibly defend itself. Never is it explained why things have so altered that a situation fatal to the life of the Empire in 1914 becomes acceptable and harmless in 1937.

There has throughout been a genuine fear and hatred of war. But is indefinite retreat before aggression, a progressive weakening of our defensive position, the way to defend ourselves against war? 'We will only fight,' says the Pacifist-Imperialist, 'if and when some vital interest is directly attacked.' Yet if some small remote Colony were invaded by a 'have-not' Power, we should go to war to defend the possession, though the possession of British Honduras or the Seychelles Islands is certainly not a 'vital interest.' Economically and strategically they do not matter two straws. Why, then, should we rightly engage in war with a first-class Power, if necessary, in order to defend them?

Because we know that once we surrender the principle that our territory must be inviolate, none of it will be safe.

So long as it is known that we *will* fight to defend it, no fighting is necessary. Our power operates as defence without war. But the same truth applies where our security is dependent upon respect of any other principle indispensable to our defence—the inviolability of allies as much as the inviolability of territory. Earlier in this article it has been pointed out that this country cannot possibly defend itself against the great Powers of the modern world without allies. It could not have done so even in 1914, when all the circumstances were much more favourable to us than they could ever be again. But 'waiting until we are ourselves attacked' means waiting until all our potential allies are eliminated and our strategic position rendered indefensible. Imagine a position in which Japan and Germany together have managed so to divide and organise China that the latter's resources in material and men are available for the Japanese domination of Asia (Germany, remember, has 'recognised' the Japanese as 'Ayrian'); that, following the technique now being pursued by Germany and Italy in Spain, a Fascist Government has been established in Russia and Russia made an ally of the Fascist combination. Germany is still without colonies (the absence of which she regards, it would seem, as a deadly insult) and Italy still has to face the fact that the Mediterranean is not 'our sea.' If at that moment the 'have-not' States, Germany and Italy, make certain demands—Germany that all her colonies be returned, Italy that Britain evacuate Malta, Cyprus, Aden, Suez, the Soudan, and recognise an Italian protectorate in Egypt, Iran, and Palestine—if such demands *were* made in those circumstances, circumstances in which Germany dominated the whole continent without any sort of question, in which Gibraltar was neutralised by Italo-German bases in Morocco and the Balearics, the Mediterranean route further threatened by Italian bases in Abyssinia, and the Cape route menaced by Italo-German bases in the Canaries, what would be the hopes of effective defence?

The trouble with the Pacifist argument used by Imperialists to justify retreat is that it is used by those who do not believe it, who are not prepared to carry the argument and the retreat far enough to be effective as a war-preventing policy. The fact of rearmament constitutes a reaffirmation of our determination to defend our Empire, of engaging in war

if that is the only alternative to surrender of interests vital to the Empire. It means that as a nation we do not subscribe to the Pacifist doctrine; that, rightly or wrongly, we regard certain things like submission to foreign dictatorship as worse than war.

When, therefore, we find eminent advocates of rearmament subscribing to the doctrine that 'it is absurd and contradictory to attempt to maintain peace by threatening to go to war,' severely deprecating the threat of force where the maintenance of peace is involved, suggesting that 'coercion and the spirit of peace are incompatible,' it is clear they have not faced the obvious fact that all armed defence is 'an attempt to maintain peace by threatening to go to war.' The very existence of our arms is a notification to foreigners: 'If you do certain things we shall go to war with you, "coerce" you to prevent you doing those particular things' (which, as all our history shows, include many things besides just invasion of our territory).

If we desire to make our power a means of preventing war, instead of being merely part of the means by which we may win wars into which we 'stagger and blunder,' we must make known beforehand the policy, the status, the conditions whose maintenance we regard as defence—for which we would fight.

If we merely say to the 'have-not' States

> 'We own a quarter of the world and propose to deny you any rights of any kind in that area,'

then we shall get war, for the 'have-not' States will take immense risks to alter those conditions.

If we say:

> 'In the territory which is non-self-governing we will give you equal rights with ourselves; are prepared to have grievances investigated; are ready to develop as much as possible the principle of umpire, third-party judgment, to enlarge the organs of peaceful change; are prepared, further, to offer you the same principles of defence we claim for ourselves. We shall fight if needs be, not to maintain an Empire closed against you, but to see that it is not conquered by you in order that you may close it against us; not for the *status quo*, but against change of

> the *status quo* by your force, on your sole decision; we shall fight, not for the purpose of being judge in our own cause—for we offer third-party judgment—but to see that you as the other litigant do not become the judge.
>
> 'For the defence of these principles we are ready to enter into alliance with all who stand by them, to form a defensive confederation based on the principle that an attack on one is an attack on all. It is open to you to join it when you are ready to abide by its conditions.'

If it becomes increasingly clear that our power is for the purpose of defending those conditions or principles, then it will make for peace. Otherwise, however great, it will not defend us and will not prevent war.

NORMAN ANGELL.

TORYISM AND INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY

By J. H. Blaksley, M.C.

The test of political thought lies more in its practical application than in its theoretical soundness, and it is for Toryism, with its affinity to our aristocratic civilisation of the soil, to express itself in action in our industrial and democratic England of to-day. Environment is the chief factor in determining the outlook of a nation; and under any system of government the mentality of a mechanical age is bound to be equalitarian. It is machinery, mass production, standardisation, the motor omnibus, the cinema and wireless, more than political theory, or even than State education and high direct taxation, which has established in our midst the democratic attitude of mind.

The new conditions, with their new aspirations and ideals, have naturally affected the different circles of society in different ways. The upper class seems largely to have lost its sense of usefulness. Weakened proportionately more than any other by the slaughter of the war and the subsequent taxation of inherited property, it has become intermingled with plutocracy and has ceased to maintain its exclusive standards and ideals. The business world has begun to realise that the continuance of its economic grip upon the lives of the majority of the electorate will depend upon the fulfilment of its obligations to its employees and to the community; and the men of education and of vision who are now happily supplanting the self-made business executives are appreciating more and more the importance of human values in industry and of treating manual workers as fellow-industrialists rather than as 'hands.' The *intelligentsia* has profited by the break-away from the restraint of tradition to become more aggressive in its intellectual arrogance and to make freedom of thought an excuse for pitting shallow individual

judgment against long-tested experiences; but it is some compensation for our mistrust of ideas that we never pay much attention to people whose one claim to speak is the possession of half-educated brains.

More interesting, and far more important, is the new mentality of the wage-earner. The thought of the country labourer tends inevitably to follow in the wake of the thought of the worker in the town; but, although he may think slowly, no one detects more readily the real from the sham in men and in things. It is, however, the worker in the factory who ultimately controls our future. His mind is of the town and of the group; his ideas are borrowed from the Press; he works and finds his pleasures in a crowd; he is unhappy, and almost frightened, if alone. Sad indeed seems the contrast between him and the man of the land or of the sea! Yet beneath his shallow and unanchored mentality, with its indifference to religion and to standards and its dangerous lack of discipline, there lies a deep conception of justice and a level-headed common-sense.

The wage-earner expects of society the three things which have been the driving force of the Labour movement for the last fifty years—security, opportunity, and justice. In spite of unemployment insurance, his first desire, especially if he is married, is to keep his job. He envies the security of his friend in the Civil Service or police force, and he is roused to fury at the thought of labour-saving devices or of the importation of workers from other areas. He may understand rather vaguely that the cheapening of production ultimately increases work by increasing demand, but what grips him is the fear of immediate dislocation, and he inclines to blame the social system if invention, fashion or the fluctuations of the export trade bring to his industry an instability unknown to his ancestors of the soil who were engaged in the production of primary commodities for local and stable markets.

His desire for opportunity is often partly sub-conscious. It may take the form of silent resentment at the boredom of soul-destroying work or of an expressed desire to become an active labour leader. Provided that his wage meets his standard of living, his ambition to 'rise' in the world is diminishing with the lessening of the social and economic

distinction between clerical and manual workers; but normally his human desire to express himself and to make the most of his aptitude and skill is as strong as it is in the man of leisure who delights in shooting high pheasants.

His conception of distributive justice is becoming more enlightened. After the war he was inclined to think that the problem of poverty could be solved by dividing up outward symbols of riches, like diamonds and motor cars. But now he is coming to realise that such things count for little in the sum total of national wealth, and that wages, like profits, are derived from the process of continuous production. He realises, too, that the rise in wages and the extension of the social services have led to a great improvement in his standard of living, though largely on this account he often fails to understand that taxation is not borne only by the class on which it is imposed and that a part of all public expenditure is paid indirectly by himself. Certain other things puzzle him. He finds, for example, that his managing director, who may have been at school with his father, is worth economically perhaps fifty times more than himself, though politically he is his equal. What, he wonders, is the right assessment in the scale of social values of which he hears so much? And since he is told at every general election how singularly qualified he is to decide on such questions as collective security and the Constitution of India, he is apt to wonder why he has no say in the affairs of his own industry, of which he has first-hand knowledge and from which he derives his livelihood. He is therefore determined that his voting power shall be used to force a distribution of the good things of life, and to direct economic activity into paths which seem socially desirable. He feels much the same, when the issues are brought home to him, about those sections of the community which are depressed through no fault of their own. The determination of the country 'to see justice done' to the 'special areas' reveals a sentiment which has come to stay.

To meet the new mentality Tories must know where they stand. It is unfortunate that the word 'Toryism' has come to be used in two different senses. To many people it simply means extreme Conservatism, summed up in the alleged remark of the Duke of Cambridge: 'Any change at

any time for any purpose is highly to be deprecated.' Used correctly, it means an attitude of mind based upon a philosophy which recognises the value of tradition but which is fully compatible with change. The philosophical basis of Toryism is a moral conception of authority. According to Christian ethics, every individual is intended to be an end in himself and not only a means to the end of others. The individual's right to opportunity for self-realisation is therefore prior to all legal rights. But the nature of man is such that he must live in association with his fellows, and society organised politically is the State. It is therefore the function of the State to safeguard every citizen's primary right to opportunity against dangers from without and oppression from within, and this function gives it its authority. The conception of the State as the authoritative guardian of rights is the foundation in thought of the Tory outlook on life, which in general has found practical expression in loyalty to God and the King, in patriotism (local, national and imperial), in respect for the inheritance of the past, in the sense of trusteeship in property, in love of personal liberty, in recognition of the dignity of work, and in appreciation of the value of character.

'Toryism is a spirit, not a dogma. . . . It is more than a reasoned creed: it is and must be a way of life.'[1] The Tory spirit lies deep-rooted in our national tradition, though political adventurers and naturalised foreigners (sometimes of the Christian faith) have often exploited abuses in our midst to carry sectional or anti-national legislation neither comprehended nor demanded by the people. The natural enemies of Toryism are plutocracy, shallow intellectualism, and the combination of narrowness and self-righteousness which is known as 'the middle-class mind,' though confined to no single section of society. But Toryism, because it is national, has always found strength in the instincts of the people, and it has expressed the attitude of mind rightly associated with Englishmen throughout the world. It is both realistic and idealistic. It is not unpractical, like Socialism, and it is not, like Victorian Conservatism, a mere cult of the *status quo*; and it can never die for lack of positive content, like organised political Liberalism, because its values in some form are eternal.

[1] *National Revival* (p. 78), written anonymously by the late Arthur Boutwood

The false conception of Toryism dates from the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars. At the end of the eighteenth century English Tories rallied behind the intellectual leadership of Burke and the political leadership of Pitt in protest against the hideous carnage which was masquerading under the banner of 'Liberté,' 'Egalité,' 'Fraternité' and to resist ideas which challenged the framework of society. They achieved their purpose, but, with the exception of Canning, the Tory leaders lost in their success the habit of constructive thought; and the domestic policy of nineteenth-century Tories and Conservatives became for the most part a reluctant following in the wake of events. Peel, who accepted change as a fact, did not give his party a criterion or an inner principle of adjustment; and when we come to Disraeli we find that neither in his brilliant challenge to the Whig interpretation of history nor in his definitions of the objects of Toryism did he attempt to give his half-hearted followers the ascendancy in the world of ideas which Bentham, Mill, and Green gave to contemporary Liberalism.

Since the first Reform Act the centre of political gravity has gradually passed from the country house to the office and from the office to the workshop. It now rests with the Labour movement which Cobdenism and static Conservatism forced out of the national tradition. Toryism must recognise this fact, or sink to a state of impotence like that of the French *noblesse*. We must realise, too, that the forces now working for change—in habits, customs, standards, sentiments and ideals—are deeper even than those which were let loose upon the world by the Industrial and the French Revolutions. To find any parallel, we must go back to the Renaissance-Reformation upheaval, with its sudden diffusion of knowledge and its enlarged conception of space, the break with traditional religion, the exaltation of the power of the State, and the inauguration of a new social order. We can best appreciate the changes of the last forty years if we take back our minds with a bound to the England of 1897, when the salutes of the Diamond Jubilee defied a jealous world in proclaiming the zenith of our Imperial splendour. The characteristic feature of that time was stability. Our Navy—as a matter beyond question—was the equal of those of any two other Powers plus 10 per cent.; our Empire, to be

extended even more by the victory of Omdurman in the following year, was the untold hope of the future and the testimony to the nations of our enterprise and of the governing capacity of our upper class ; the House of Lords was at the height of its prestige through its popular rejection of Home Rule ; and Lord Salisbury and Hatfield set the tone of our public life, just as our country houses, our regiments, our universities and our public schools set the tone of our Society. The ambition of the moneyed classes was to be absorbed, slowly and honourably, in the established order ; and the wage-earners, as yet unconscious of their political power, had no expectations of sharing in the pleasure of their 'betters.' With the horse the chief means of transport, distant travel was restricted to occasional holidays by train, and consequently social groups were localised and interests were centred largely on counties and on towns. In short, the prevailing psychology was that of the land and of Consols, with the virtues of a great tradition but without the imagination to visualise the call of the new age shortly coming to birth.

It is startling to realise, in contrast, that we have passed through five first-class national crises, each of a different kind, in the last twenty-five years—the threatened civil war (1913–14), the Great War (1914–18), the General Strike (1926), the financial crisis (1931), and the Abdication (1936). These crises had their ethical and psychological, as well as their political and economic, backgrounds ; and, coming in such rapid succession, they point forcefully to the change and unsettlement of the mind of the nation, and indeed of the world. If Boer victories were the first shock to our nineteenth-century complacency, the General Election of 1906 was the second. As Mr. Balfour said at the time, this event marked the end of an epoch : it revealed the attainment of political consciouness by a new mentality. The violence of the parliamentary conflict of the next eight years expressed the hostility of two 'culture types,' and the Great War itself hastened rather than created the movement for change. After the peace, when home politics became almost wholly economic, the rivalry of capital and labour threatened revolution in 1921 and 1926. But the bitterness seemed to exhaust itself with the General Strike and the financial crisis, and the General Election of 1931 saw the biggest reaction at the polls

since 1660. Since then the nation has been unusually united, though now industrial disputes are again clouding the horizon.

What, then, should be the practical attitude of Toryism to present-day conditions? Take first the questions of property and private enterprise, which are uppermost in the minds of the democracy. Historically the association of Toryism with our land system has precluded it from accepting the idea that property has rights without responsibilities.

> The principle of the feudal system [said Disraeli] is that the tenure of all property shall be the performance of its duties. . . . You shall have that estate, but you shall do something for it: you shall feed the poor; you shall endow the Church; you shall defend the land in case of war; and you shall execute justice and maintain truth to the poor for nothing.

An aspect of the Civil War, which has been slurred over by Whig historians, was the determination of the King to maintain a strong central government against the claims of middlemen for liberty to oppress their subordinates. For most of the eighteenth century the Whigs were the party of the rich, and their successors at the beginning of the nineteenth made fortunes from the servitude of white men while they prayed for the liberation of black men. The Tory also believes in private enterprise, but to him it is a means, and not an end. The end is the creation of manhood, not the accumulation of wealth. The Socialist says 'production for use, not for profit'; the Whig, 'production for profit'; the Tory, 'production for use through profit.' Labour on the aggressive and capital on the defensive are equally anti-Tory, because they are equally anti-national. The State is the guardian of rights.

We prefer State guidance to State control because work accomplished under the former is more efficient and has a better effect upon character. But the question of what should be done by individuals and what by public bodies must be decided by expediency in each particular case. It was folly, as Dean Inge has often said, for us to behave just after the war 'as though we had come into an enormous fortune, when, in fact, we were nearly bankrupt'; and it may be argued that we should all have been better off now if

we had reverted to economic orthodoxy then—that a drastic fall in wages would have been followed quickly by a drastic fall in prices, and that without the new social services more money than they dispense would have been available for individual workers to provide for their individual needs and for firms to provide privately for the welfare of their employees. But the democracy could not appreciate the distinction between money wages and real wages, and any proposal which temporarily threatened the standard of living attained on borrowed money was met by counter-threats of revolution. It would have been as impossible to impose a policy of retrenchment at that time as it has proved impossible to enforce the Treaty of Versailles. We are realising, too, that orthodox economics was one-sided in its emphasis on production, and that it underestimated the importance of purchasing power and of human values; and individualists can gain reassurance from the fact that State action is becoming more efficient. The social services are well administered: the Marketing Boards, with all their weaknesses, have averted the complete collapse of our agriculture; and so far the imposition of tariffs, which to extreme individualists, like Mr. Harold Cox, was a form of Socialism, has proved an outstanding success. The Tory attitude towards further State control will depend largely upon the efficiency of private enterprise. At present, for example, Toryism would be opposed to the nationalisation of the railways because they are well managed: its attitude towards the mines will be determined by the behaviour of the industry. Our belated rearmament programme raises problems reminiscent of wartime contracts, with 'indispensable' trade unionists on strike and 'indispensable' capitalists growing rich from the nation's agony. Toryism will be at one with the democracy in standing to the principle—though the application is necessarily difficult—that neither employer nor employee shall benefit abnormally as a result of the country's need.

With its emphasis on the value of human personality, Toryism must stand, in its industrial policy, for the combination of the psychological and the economic approach, and it must recognise that there is as wide a field for 'the impact of science upon society' [2] in the study of the human

[2] See Sir Josiah Stamp's address to the British Association, September 9, 1926

problems of industry as there is in eugenics, diet, physica training, and preventive medicine. In his book *The Trium phant Machine* (p. 132) Mr. R. M. Fox refers to 'the conflic between those who want to humanise industry and those whc want to mechanise humanity.' It should be the policy o Toryism to show how the happiness and well-being oi labour can be combined with the economic prosperity oi firms, and how the shortening of working hours through thc extended use of machinery can gradually give the workei more opportunity for recovery from strain and for life outsidc his work worthy of English citizenship.

We must now pass from the question of property anc private enterprise to still wider issues. Our problem is tc develop in a mechanical age an aristocratic civilisation of thc land upon the basis of industrial democracy, and this woulc constitute an experiment hitherto unattempted in history Success or failure will be determined by the extent to whicl we can build upon aristocracy of instinct and of character Rousseau's statement 'every idler is a thief' should be compared with the late Lord Willoughby de Broke's definition oi an aristocrat:

> An aristocrat is not a man with a title and a black coat, though the possession of these appanages does not exclude. A real Tory aristocrat, be he prince or ploughman, is he who realises that the privileges of British citizenship are derived from the performance of duty, and who throws his whole capacity of hand, heart, muscle brain, character and soul into his daily task.[3]

Our task—and it is not a light one—is to strengthen this spirit throughout the country independently of status and oi class, and thus to transmit to the new social order what was good in the tradition of the old. It must be done by education and by leadership.

To many people education means only what is learnt at school, and some still regard this merely as a step to earning a living. A totally different conception is required. Education worthy of the name means the development of the whole personality—for work, for leisure, and for citizenship—through the balanced training of character, mind and body; and the process, which begins in infancy, is life-long. The

[3] Introduction to *National Revival.*

Hadow Report, it is true, formulates an acceptable ideal, but the practical application still, unfortunately, leaves much to be desired. Take first the State education of the child. We hear much of the need for raising the school-leaving age, but too little of the need for adjusting the teaching to the varied capacities of the pupils and of improving the existing ten years of schooling. We are not yet free from the influence of nineteenth-century materialism which valued a smattering of knowledge more than a high ideal; and the apathetic atmosphere of the home, of which teachers often complain, is in itself a reflection on our methods of the past, since we are now in the third generation of so-called State-educated people. The crux of all true education is the personality of the teachers; and no Tory can be satisfied with the results of the present method of their selection and training. With young children in particular it is more important to create the right atmosphere than to fill their minds with facts, and we want above all in our teachers people of balanced personality with a healthy and patriotic—though not Chauvinistic—outlook on life. In our secondary and higher education we need a truer criterion of merit than capacity to pass examinations. The lowest mental faculty is memory; but in few examinations can natural intelligence and ability, as distinct from acquired knowledge, be assessed by the result, and quite different tests are required to assess the vital qualities of character and of temperament. Under our aristocratic *régime* fitness for different kinds of work was determined largely by family tradition, and the result, on the whole, was good. The criterion of competitive examination is a relic of middle-class Liberalism, and the injustice to our Eastern subjects of allowing unsuitable Englishmen to govern them because they had been successfully crammed was the beginning of the decline of the prestige of our rule in India. There is nothing democratic in creating an oligarchy of memory, and Tories can invite the wage-earners with confidence to accept the principle, in the interests of the community and of themselves, that fitness for responsibility must depend upon all-round merit.

Our adult education is backward. Goethe's sentence 'democracy is ignorance with spurs on' leaps to our minds when we realise that the number of students of the Workers'

Educational Association throughout the country is but half the attendance at a Cup Tie. Many men, however, who fight shy (sometimes with good reason) of academic courses will attend classes and discussion groups which begin with the problems of daily life and work outwards to abstract questions; and in education of this kind there is compensation for the academic loss in the closer relationship to personal experience and the consequent gain in reality. Through many organisations and societies there is scope for men and women of education, who can speak in simple language and understand the worker's point of view, to do valuable national work.

Toryism, not as a political creed but as an attitude of mind, should play a far larger part than it does in the adult education of the country. It was through keenness and hard work that the Left Wing *intelligentsia* won its place in the Workers' Educational Association and in the Co-operative movement. But in these and in other movements Toryism again has its chance, with the weakening of party ties and of the artificial bad feelings they engender. We must remember that, as the first Lord Halsbury said, 'the object of a true statesman should be to bring not only great happiness to the people, but great thoughts and desires into their minds.'

Leadership is the complement of education; and it is as short-sighted to confuse the leadership of a nation with the leadership of the political platform as it is to confuse education with schooling. It is common knowledge that we want more first-class men, irrespective of their wealth, to be actively engaged in politics and in local government; and no work is of greater national importance. But here we are primarily concerned with those aspects of national leadership which bear most directly upon the lives of the industrial workers.

Returning then to industry, we may ask why it is that in some firms labour troubles are frequent while in others, with the same economic conditions, they are unknown. The answer lies in leadership. Except on questions of hours and wages, where it is supposed (often erroneously) that there is a conflict of interests, most employees look to their employers for leadership—until they are disappointed. But if once they feel themselves let down they will be suspicious

and mistrustful for years. They size up their own and their neighbours' employers extraordinarily well. They expect them to be men of their word, men who know their job and do it, and men who know how to behave. They respect the disciplinarian as much as they despise the bully. Above all, they look for justice in the letter and the spirit. They want, for example, to be certain that, if they exercise their right of appeal to a director against the decision of a minor authority, they will not be victimised subsequently in wages or promotion, or 'get the sack' on a trumped-up excuse the following week. Employers on their side differ so much, apart from the extent of their wealth, that it is misleading to speak of an 'employer class.' They vary from men of enlightenment and elasticity of mind, with a sense of responsibility like that of the best of our old landed class, to men who seem incapable of the mental effort required to adapt themselves to changing conditions and who are only deterred by fear of trade unions from worming themselves out of every obligation entered into with their employees. Tories must realise that there is compensation for the destructive taxation of the leisured class in the forcing of men into industry who would otherwise sink into idleness. Let young men of tradition take their needed places as the leaders of industry and bring to it the spirit of their background, and let them save with their well-earned salaries what they can of their country homes, and they and the nation will gain. Trade, like politics, is dirty only when the wrong men are in control.

Another wide field for leadership is to be found in the non-political organisations which exist throughout the country for meeting the various needs of our new industrial civilisation. Among the better known are the National Council of Social Service, the Central Council of Physical Recreation, the National Playing Fields Association, the Safety First Association, the Industrial Welfare Society, and the National Institute of Industrial Psychology; but altogether they are so numerous that, in addition to their voluntary workers, they employ in the aggregate more people professionally than some recognised professions like the diplomatic and the consular services. Their work extends on the basis of private enterprise the operations of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry

of Education, and its combination of voluntary endeavour with corporate responsibility should appeal to the Tory mind. But the value of all these organisations depends ultimately on the personalities, not only of the executive officers, but of the people who do the spade work. Here direct contact with the democracy is obtained, and for this reason the work, like local government, makes a call, above the interests of party politics, for the services of the best men and women in the country. No effort should be spared to attract to these organisations the most qualified voluntary and professional workers and to increase their effectiveness in every way. The need of the moment is to co-ordinate their activities without impairing their individual identities, or weakening their *esprit de corps*; and this in itself can only be done by wise leadership. But if the waste of overlapping were avoided and unnecessary overheads reduced, the prestige of these bodies would rise and more financial support could be expected; and—what is still more important—if a system were established to facilitate the transfer of staff from one society to another as openings for promotion occurred, the organisations could offer the stability and scope, which are needed, more than high salaries, to attract the right type of persons to this important, though unrecognised, profession.

In all leadership, whether it be in public affairs, in industry, in education, in social organisations or in matters of everyday life, Tories must go forward with courage. The Englishman is not by nature difficult to guide: win his confidence in day-to-day affairs, and he will welcome a lead in wider questions. It is industrial abuse which is the parent of social unrest, and bad leadership which is the source of the paid agitator's degraded means of livelihood. The task of Toryism is to point the better way. We must appeal to the good elements in the country and to the justice and common-sense of our fellow-countrymen, trust them and give them our confidence and invite their trust in return, show them we have no use for the 'rotter' whatever his station in life, and offer them the responsibility of duties in sharing with us the task of promoting the national well-being. We must approach the nation as a whole and not as a collection of classes, teach the people of England that the interests which divide them are

few compared with those which unite them, persuade them that the sentimentalist, the alien and the agitator are their enemies and that their natural leaders are their friends, offer them, not tactics nor bribes, but the truths of national policy, and convince them that the one aim of our endeavour is the welfare of all subjects of the Crown. That 'the Tory Party, unless it is a national party, is nothing,' is as true to-day as it was when Disraeli said it. But Toryism as a way of life is something deeper than any party. It is not only a political attitude of mind; it is a regenerative social and moral force which should be felt in all spheres of national life. We want our new Britain to be our old Britain on a new and still better alignment; we want strong armaments because in the present state of the world they alone can give strength to our diplomacy; and we want a united country where the duties and privileges of citizenship are a reality to all our citizens and where our manhood has opportunity for the development of its highest powers. An age of transition like the present must be an age of difficulties. Once again, we have 'nothing to trust to but our own energies and the sublime instinct of an ancient people'[4]; and we must prepare for the years which are before us. But the task is worthy of an effort: leadership is a continuous opportunity and politics an 'Endless Adventure.'

J. H. BLAKSLEY.

[4] Disraeli speech at the Crystal Palace, June 1872.

THIS FREEDOM OF THE PRESS

THE GREAT ILLUSION

By CAPTAIN M. D. KENNEDY

STRONGLY denouncing the methods employed by a section of the Press to increase its circulation, Mr. Hamilton Fyfe, in a recent issue of the *Fortnightly*, referred to the practice of 'faking and wangling and twisting news to suit the controller.' Mr. Fyfe's attack was directed primarily against the growing scandal of Press intrusion into private grief, and was concerned mainly with the exploitation of items of domestic news. This, however, is but one aspect of the evils that have developed in recent years from the degradation of so many papers into mere organs of profit. In the pages that follow it is proposed to deal with the craze for sensationalism in reporting foreign news and the way it affects the foreign news correspondent.

By the uninitiated it might be imagined that the correspondent stationed in a foreign country is given a more or less free hand to telegraph such news as he considers to be of sufficient importance or interest to merit publication. This, however, only holds good up to a limited extent. What may seem important or of special interest to himself is not necessarily regarded in the same light by the organisation employing him. If this organisation happens to be a news agency, which has to consider the requirements of its principal customers—the papers with the largest circulations—the correspondent finds himself being constantly instructed by letter or cable to curtail this news or to play up that, and being importuned to send 'news which will get good headlines' and 'human interest stories.' In addition, he is subjected to frequent admonitions concerning the necessity of beating all rivals in the matter of speed.

That any correspondent worthy of his salt should strive

his utmost to be ahead of all competitors with news of importance is natural enough, but these constant demands for speed, speed, and more speed are apt to have an unsteadying effect. They lead all too many correspondents to cable news of sensational happenings without waiting to confirm the full truth of the reports on which their messages are based. Even if they take the precaution to qualify their cabled despatches with some such phrase as 'it is reported . . . ,' or 'it is understood that . . . ,' these messages are likely to be published with glaring and grossly distorted headlines in the more sensational sections of the Press, although a 'follow-up' may come later intimating that the initial report had proved exaggerated or even baseless. In nine cases out of ten the papers which thrive on sensation either leave the *démenti* unpublished or else place it in an inconspicuous corner, where the bulk of their readers, who take their news of foreign affairs from misleading headlines, can be counted upon to overlook it. The result is obvious. The million readers of the *Daily Scream*, and all those other millions who patronise news organs of similar calibre, are left convinced that the Kingdom of Ruritania has been swept out of existence by some terrible seismic disaster or that the Emperor of Utopia has ordered the execution of his whole Cabinet.

In saying this, I am not writing purely figuratively; for, while serving as a correspondent in Japan, I frequently had instances of this kind brought to my attention. In the spring of 1925, for example, I received a telegram from my principals in London reading: 'Opposition reports two cities outwiped thousands dead why have you sent nothing.' The truth behind this curious report was as follows: A rival correspondent had received a garbled telephone message telling of an earthquake shock in the Osaka district, expressing fear that serious damage had been suffered in some neighbouring locality. Knowing that considerable damage had been done by an earthquake in south-western Japan a few weeks previously, and bearing in mind the terrible havoc wrought in Tokyo and Yokohama two years earlier, this correspondent—doubtless spurred on by fear of rebuke from his head office if he allowed some rival to beat him with the news—decided to take a chance and make a good story of it while he was about it. With a few embroideries of his own to make sure

of good headlines, he 'flashed' a brief message accordingly and gave his agency a wonderful 'scoop.' But the sober truth was that the earthquake in question was of very limited dimensions, the kind of shock that is of frequent occurrence in Japan. A few tiles had been dislodged from roof-tops; but no buildings had suffered any serious damage, and there was not a single casualty.

Many similar instances of grossly exaggerated reports could be quoted. It will suffice to mention but one more. In the summer of 1933, while spending a week-end up in the Nikko hills, a member of our Embassy told me laughingly that, while taking part in a race on Lake Chusenji a few days previously, his yacht had capsized and he and his wife had been thrown into the water. In view of the sudden squalls that are apt to arise on this lake, such incidents are not infrequent. No one treats them very seriously. I thought no more about it, therefore, until some days later, when I received a cabled rebuke from London for having failed to send them anything about the 'narrow escape of the British counsellor and his wife from drowning.' Knowing the facts of the case, I cabled back saying that the report, which I found had been despatched by another correspondent with most graphic and entirely unfounded embellishments, was greatly exaggerated. But not one of the papers that had published this highly sensationalised report to the accompaniment of glaring headlines troubled to publish my denial and, as a result, considerable anxiety was caused to friends and relatives, who telegraphed anxious inquiries to the 'victims of the disaster.' These two instances are typical of the kind of irresponsible reports that are cabled home by Press correspondents under the two-fold spur of demands for 'news which will get headlines' and for 'beating all rivals.' The fact that news of this kind is bound to cause distress and anxiety to friends and relations in England appears to count for nothing in the eyes of those who think only in terms of 'news value' for increasing circulation.

It is hardly too much to say that this constant harping on the need for 'human interest stories,' items which will ensure good headlines, and speed in despatch are responsible for the bulk of the distorted and misleading news of foreign countries and their affairs which find their way into the columns of the

Press. In so far as 'speed' is concerned, it is probably true that most editors are careful to tell their correspondents that 'accuracy must never be sacrificed to mere speed'; but the effect of this healthy admonition is largely nullified by the qualifying words—'but speed is essential.' If my own personal experience is anything to go by, it is generally regarded as a far more heinous offence for a correspondent to be beaten by a competitor than that he should be guilty of giving rein to his imagination in his zeal to ensure good headlines. Provided the news he sends is sufficiently sensational and 'snappy' and has at least a basis of truth, a correspondent need seldom fear serious rebuke for letting his imagination come into play. But let him be beaten by even the narrowest margin on news calculated to appeal to the public's love of sensation, and he will call forth the strongest condemnation.

In this demand for being 'first with the news' editors frequently appear to lose all sense of proportion. I myself was severely reprimanded on one occasion for being eight minutes behind a competitor in getting through a piece of news from Tokyo to London, and I know of instances in which correspondents in America have been severely censured for being beaten by the narrow margin of a minute or two on the news of a 'movie' star's death or the death of some well-known pugilist. On the other hand, the most hearty congratulations will be cabled to the correspondent who, by a combination of luck and good management, contrives to beat all others by a similar margin. When, for example negotiations were in progress for the release of Mrs. Pawley after her capture by bandits in Manchuria in the autumn of 1932, I received telegraphic instructions: 'Essential unbeaten Pawley release'; and when subsequently I had the good fortune to get the news of her release through to England ahead of all others, I became the recipient of a most complimentary telegram of thanks from my principals in London. Similarly, on the eve of the Jehol operations in February 1933 the instructions cabled to me were: 'Imperative you ahead all spot news if when big story breaks.' In this case, too, fortune, combined with loyal co-operation from my Japanese colleagues, enabled me to carry out these instructions to the almost entire satisfaction of the news organisation for

which I was working. I say 'almost' advisedly, as there was one item of 'spot news' in regard to which I apparently failed to be 'first with the news.' This concerned the capture of Jehol city itself. On the day that the capital city of Jehol province fell, I received no less than three telegrams from London querying reports from other correspondents alleging its capture; but to this day I know not whether they or I were first with the actual news of its submission. All that can be said for certain is, that the majority of correspondents were so fearful of being beaten by someone else with this particular bit of news that a goodly number took chances and, resorting to intelligent anticipation, reported the fall of the city as soon as it became clear that it was only a matter of hours before the Japanese entered the Jehol capital.

For the twin evils of desire for being first with the news and of seemingly callous delight in making newspaper capital out of private and national grief, the cabled instructions sent to correspondents in Tokyo in May 1934 when poor Togo, the 'Nelson of Japan,' lay dying provide a striking commentary. I myself, after reporting his serious condition, received a telegram reading: 'Thanks Togo Presume you set deathwatch Want firstclass coverage when outpasses.' This was followed soon after by another: '. . . has Togo died Flash present position immediately.' Although I was able to reply that the report was premature, I had to 'flash' the sad news of his death early the following morning. In due course came the cryptic tribute: 'Thanks Togo beat.' This, it should perhaps be explained, was meant to convey the thanks of my London principals for my having beaten all competitors with the news of poor Togo's death. Doubtless I should have felt complimented and elated, but my feelings were more correctly reflected in the entry that I made in my diary at the time: 'Glad to hear we were first with the news, but competition of this kind smacks unpleasantly of indecency, callousness and—almost ghoulishness.'

As an ironic commentary on the rapidity with which the interest of the sensation-loving public is switched from one news topic to another it may be added that, in spite of cabled instructions to report fully on Togo's funeral, these orders were cancelled on the very morning of the funeral by a

telegram reading: 'Evenings monopolised Sweep Derby.' In plain English this meant that, as the evening papers were, for the moment, pre-occupied with the Irish Sweepstake and the Derby to the exclusion of all else, descriptions of the scenes witnessed at the funeral of the 'great little Japanese Admiral' would be of insufficient 'news value' to warrant cabling to England. It called to mind the telegraphic instructions received a year or so earlier at the height of the Manchurian crisis. At that time the whole world appeared to be absorbed in the drama of Japan flouting the Western Powers. Correspondents in the Far East were being constantly pressed for news and more news. The absorption, however, was seemingly more apparent than real, for suddenly came a telegram reading: 'Curtail drastically Interest absorbed Test Match'! Enough, however, has been said to indicate the part played by the constant urge to be first with the news. Something more must be added concerning the twin demands for 'human interest' and headlines.

Personal experience goes to show that a correspondent is far more likely to receive thanks and eulogies for news of a sensational or 'human interest' character than for items of a more serious nature. Serious matter, unless with a sensational angle, appears generally to be at a discount—a fact that may possibly account for the lamentable ignorance of the general public concerning the background of international affairs on which they presume to pass judgment. Considering that the type and quality of news sent from abroad depend not so much on what there is to send as on what is ordered to be sent, this ignorance is perhaps but natural, for in many instances these orders are calculated to give a totally false impression of the actual facts. This is well illustrated by the case of an American correspondent in Tokyo who was instructed by his paper to 'play up Jap Soviet tension.' On his replying that reports of tension were greatly exaggerated, it was clearly intimated to him that, unless he did as he was told, someone more willing than he to comply with the journal's requirements would be sent to replace him.

All too many correspondents have pressure of one kind or another brought to bear on them in this way and, rather than lose their jobs, they acquiesce. Hence it comes about that the reading public is presented with a sadly distorted

*picture of the situation, the distortion being increased n infrequently by the 'editing' of the news by the paper tha publishes it. The harm done to international relations b such mischievous practices is incalculable, as national senti*ment is aroused and mutual misunderstanding developed to a dangerous degree. The pity is that no law of libel and slander exists to protect nations from malicious and mendacious Press reports such as exists for the protection of the individual. Yet slanderous Press attacks on or by other countries are a far greater menace to world peace than are slanders and libels directed against private individuals. If non-aggression pacts were made to apply to Press attacks and Press misrepresentations as well as to armed attacks, the prospects of world peace might be improved very considerably.

While possibly more innocuous in its results than the demands for headlines and speed, the craving for 'human interest' stories likewise has harmful effects, for it sets up a false standard of values and establishes a faulty sense of proportion. Details of a sensational suicide or an unsavoury scandal are given pride of place in the day's news, while matters of real importance are relegated to the background or even left unpublished. The story of General Nagaoka's whiskers provides a good example of distorted sense of proportion. It concerns an incident that occurred during the visit of Amy Johnson to Japan in the summer of 1931. For some time past I had been receiving requests for 'human interest stories.' Amy Johnson's arrival provided me with an excellent opportunity to send one. As she was landing at the aerodrome an old gentleman in frock-coat and top-hat ran forward to meet her. It was General Nagaoka, at that time President of the Imperial Aviation Society and famous for the wide span of his flowing white moustache. To everyone's amusement and surprise, he gallantly embraced her, a form of greeting quite contrary to Japanese ideas of decorum. Here, I felt, was a piece of that 'human interest' for which the British public so craved. Accordingly I mentioned the incident in my message telling of Amy's safe arrival. Had I performed a highly meritorious act, I could hardly have been complimented more warmly. On the following day came a telegram from my superiors in London: 'Whisker story

excellent press. Heartiest congratulations'! It is always pleasant to have one's work appreciated, but it surely betokens a curiously distorted sense of proportion when such words of praise can be telegraphed to a correspondent for cabling an item of news of this kind—a kind that might be composed by the veriest office boy without much difficulty—whereas seldom a word of thanks or appreciation is sent to him for real hard work requiring a modicum of intellect, such as is performed by him, month after month and year after year, in dealing with news of a more serious nature.

While on the subject of sense of proportion, an example of a rather different nature may be quoted. On March 3, 1933, an earthquake, followed by a tidal wave, caused wide-spread death and disaster along the north-east coast districts of Japan. All day long, messages came pouring in from the afflicted area, bringing fresh details of villages destroyed and of other damage and casualties suffered. Foreign correspondents in Tokyo spent a busy day collecting and despatching these reports to their respective news organs in other lands. Now it so happened that Mr. Bernard Shaw was visiting Japan at the time, and Mr. Shaw, it seems, is always good 'news.' Some enterprising journalist therefore decided that G.B.S. must be linked up somehow or other with the disaster. Good headlines would then be assured. Quite truthfully, though sadly misleading, he cabled accordingly that, despite the catastrophic nature of the disaster, Mr. Shaw himself had 'escaped injury.' The effect on my head office in London was immediate. Along came a telegram at urgent rates asking me peremptorily why I had not reported this outstanding feature of the whole sad story. The explanation was simple enough. Mr. Shaw was, as I knew, in south-western Japan, fully 600 miles from the scene of the disaster. Had a serious calamity occurred at John o'Groats, one would hardly have been expected to cable across the world that the King had 'escaped injury' if His Majesty was known to be at Land's End at the time. But apparently this, or something very like it, is required in the case of Mr. Bernard Shaw. Despite my explanation, the correspondent who sent this deliberately misleading telegram was held up to me as an example to be followed, while I myself was taken to task for failing to show a similar degree of enterprise. As

indicating the requirements of the 'popular Press,' a better example would be difficult to find.

Lest my remarks be considered to reflect on the particular news organisation for which I was working at the time, I should perhaps emphasise that my strictures are not directed against any individual concern, but against the existing system as a whole. I have merely quoted my own experience by way of illustration; but a good indication that this experience was similar to that of others is well shown by what Mr. Myles Vaughn, who was for some years a fellow-correspondent of mine in Tokyo, says in his recently published book of reminiscences, *Covering the Far East*. The famous American humorist, the late Will Rogers, he tells us in this volume, expressed great surprise to him at the way in which correspondents appeared to content themselves with simply cabling 'spot news' without attempting to explain its significance. 'You got brains,' he quotes Rogers as saying. 'Tell 'em what you think about it. After all, you're here on the ground and you got a chance to see what's what.' Vaughn clearly agreed with Rogers's suggestion in principle, for he remarks ruefully that he tried 'interpreting the situation,' but had to give it up, as no one was interested, and his despatches merely found their way into the editorial waste-paper basket or, if published, brought him letters of abuse accusing him of being in Japanese pay. It was with great interest that I read these remarks of his, for my own experience in this respect was identical. I was constantly being told that there was 'no interest in political screeds,' and on several occasions when, from first-hand knowledge and study of the facts, I attempted to explain events and situations which were being grossly distorted and misinterpreted in the British Press and elsewhere, I was accused by Chinese and others of being in the pay of the Japanese General Staff.

There are, of course, honourable exceptions, news organs which welcome 'interpretative news' and which pride themselves on a decent standard of ethics and sober presentation of facts. But against these must be set papers which have, in recent years, built up and maintained inflated circulations by exploiting the public's craving for sensation. News agencies often against their will, are compelled to provide these paper with the particular brand of 'headline stuff' demanded

Failure to do so, or relative slowness in delivery, is met by threats of cancelling subscriptions. This is sufficient to bring the unfortunate delinquent to heel, as no agency can afford to lose its best customers.

While, however, one may criticise the methods adopted by the more sensational section of the Press, the general public must be held in part responsible. It is only a relatively small proportion of the population that is satisfied with what is sometimes slightingly described as '*Times* suet.' The overwhelming majority demands lighter and more highly spiced fare. One may deplore such taste, but it is difficult to see where the remedy lies. It is, in fact, part of the price to be paid for 'the blessings of Democracy,' under which the masses have been given an education sufficient to give them an appetite for sensational news and easily digested headlines, but insufficient to whet it for more solid reading matter. Those journals which place profit-making before principle cater for these masses accordingly, and appear to see no harm in coining money by debauching their readers in this way.

The newspaper controllers and editors responsible for this would probably have hard things to say of the man who, for his own financial gain, deliberately encouraged a craving for drugs and then proceeded to exploit the consequent demand for narcotics; yet this is, in effect, what they themselves are doing. They deliberately stimulate and exploit a demand for glaring headlines and sensational details, which are, in many respects, just as insidious and deleterious in their effects as 'doping.' And so it comes about that the news correspondent in a foreign capital is constantly being asked for 'headline stuff' and 'human interest' stories, or being queried about entirely fictitious reports appearing in some paper or other. 'Japan turning out secret mass production of submarines,' 'Attempt on Emperors life,' 'Thousands killed severest typhoon on record,' 'Japan declared war Russia,' 'Thousands Japanese swarming into Abyssinia Dangerous threat British interests,' 'Japan decided abolish Manchoukuo annex it.' These are but a few of many actual reports completely devoid of foundation, referred to me telegraphically for comment. Similar queries are doubtless common to foreign correspondents in all countries.

It sometimes happens, of course, that, without any

deliberate intention to mislead, news reports are distorted in the course of editing, as even the most reputable papers are often compelled to cut down or rehash reports in order to economise in space. News despatched by correspondents is sometimes, in fact, so cut about and compressed in the process of editing that the whole sense becomes altered and a false impression conveyed in consequence to the readers. Particularly is this true if, as not infrequently happens, the message has been twisted in such a way as to fit in with the preconceived ideas or prejudiced views of the editor. It is, in fact, a form of that 'faking and wangling and twisting news to suit the controller' to which Mr. Hamilton Fyfe referred in the article to which allusion was made at the outset.

Bearing in mind what has been said above, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that, under cover of our much-vaunted 'freedom of the Press,' there is a great deal of high-handed action on the part of editors and managers which is the reverse of true freedom. Here in England we are wont to criticise the strict control exercised over the Press in less democratic countries; but are we ourselves entitled to boast of our 'freedom of the Press'—in the literal sense of the term—when news organs have their policy, their conduct, and even their code of ethics, dictated by anonymous financial groups in the background, groups whose primary object is to make money by pandering to the public's love of sensation, and who seek to compel editors and correspondents to play up one side or another on questions of vital importance to international understanding and world peace? Seeing that public opinion on foreign affairs is formed and swayed to a large extent by Press reports and editorial comments in the papers, the evil influence and dangerous potentialities of such practices require no stressing.

In his presidential address to the National Union of Journalists' conference at Torquay on March 25 this year, Mr. H. C. Humphrey appears to have had this in mind when, in referring to the present troubled state of Europe, he emphasised the serious responsibility resting on the Press of every country. That responsibility, he remarked, was 'to ensure that the enormous influence wielded by the Press was used for good, not ill; for peace, not war; and that efforts were directed towards promoting international under-

standing, not misunderstanding, as could so easily be achieved by mischievous comment or provocative and meddlesome articles on foreign affairs.' It would be a sorry day indeed, he added, 'if the virus of ultra-sensationalism which was infecting one or two of our journals to-day were to spread from the confines of home to foreign affairs,' and he made it clear that he deplored the growing tendency to depart from what he called '*The Times* tradition—accurate, informative, and sober.' While it is to be feared that 'the virus of ultra-sensationalism' has already spread to foreign affairs in certain sections of the Press, is it too much to hope that the disease will be checked and finally eradicated before it is too late?

Although I have confined myself in this article to examples drawn from my own experience while serving as a correspondent in Japan, one has only to glance at the news posters and placards displayed daily all over London to appreciate that what has been recorded specifically of Japanese news holds equally good in respect to news in general. Having insufficient inside knowledge of the sensational happenings reported from Spain and elsewhere, I do not presume to pass judgment on the highly contradictory reports published concerning them. But the experience gained during a number of years spent 'behind the news' in Tokyo has made me extremely sceptical of all 'headline news,' and has brought home to me, in no uncertain manner, a realisation of the immense harm done to international relations by the way in which national animosities are fanned by irresponsible Press campaigns based on misleading reports and headlines. Will Rogers probably got nearer the truth than he realised when, in his inimitable way, he remarked to a group of foreign correspondents in Japan: 'Trouble with you boys is that you all want to write headlines instead of news!'

Referring to the harm done by exaggerating facts and by making 'comments and criticisms that cannot but be regarded by some foreign countries as deliberately offensive,' Lord Hardinge, in his letter to *The Times* of May 24, made an eloquent appeal for more restraint and moderation. It is to be hoped that his plea will receive the attention it deserves, for, as he emphasised in the same letter, 'the British public, in demanding a wider control than heretofore over foreign

affairs, must realise that such control entails responsibilit commensurate with the power they wish to exercise.'

It is the old, old story of freedom in relation to respon sibility. Freedom is rightly prized, whether it be of the Pres of speech, or of religion; and few Englishmen will be founc to cavil with Lord Hardinge in his refusal to advocate any curtailment of established liberties. But freedom divorced from responsibility quickly degenerates into licence, which is the reverse of true freedom. It is well, therefore, that those who are most jealous of the freedom of the Press should recognise this and do all in their power to curb those who, by their irresponsible actions, give rise to demands that legislation be passed for curtailing existing liberties in order that abuses which have developed so greatly of late may be remedied.

What has been said of the handling and mishandling of foreign news applies with equal force to domestic news, and it is only necessary to recall the question asked in the House of Commons on May 28 by the member for Hitchin to realise how, despite the pious hopes expressed and the resolutions passed, the exploitation of private grief by a section of the Press continues unabated. Well may it be asked, as it was asked by Sir Percy Hurd in his letter to *The Times* of May 12:

> Is the profession of journalism, comprising proprietors, editors, and the whole rank and file of the profession, able and willing unitedly to devise means to put and keep their house in order as do other professions?

M. D. KENNEDY.

'OUR FATHERS THAT BEGAT US'

By Sir John Marriott

To praise famous men and our fathers that begat us is at once a pious duty and a wholesome exercise. It is, then, fitting that in this its 'Diamond Jubilee' year the *Nineteenth Century and After* should recall the memory of its founder and first editor, and of the well-beloved son-in-law who succeeded to the chair vacated by Knowles's death.

James Knowles was one of the outstanding figures in the literary history of the last decades of the Victorian Era. Not that he was himself a great craftsman in letters. As far as I know, or can ascertain, he never wrote anything that deserves to be recalled. But he was keenly interested in literature, in philosophy, in politics and in art—in all things, indeed, that to intellectuals are lovely and of good report. Moreover, he was a born *entrepreneur*—perhaps the greatest literary *entrepreneur* that this country has produced. With an instinct amounting to genius he perceived exactly what the reflective public wanted, or rather what they would want in the months immediately ahead. And he allowed no obstacle to stand in the way of his getting the most competent, and the most prominent, persons to write on the several subjects he had decided to deal with. But more than that. He not only 'presented' (to use a current vulgarism which he would most properly have deleted from any article I wrote for him) to a large public the most wonderful body of artists ever assembled on a single stage, but he had the magnetic quality with which only the greatest of orchestral conductors are endowed. His intrumentalists were, as a rule, the most accomplished living performers on their respective instruments, and Knowles had the rare gift, given only to Toscaninis and the like, of drawing out the very best that was in each individual performer, of making every man obedient

to his baton play rather better than he ever imagined could.

These are the supreme attributes of a really great editor and Knowles possessed them in unusual measure. He was not born free of the craft of letters. Like his father, he was by profession an architect, and practised it successfully for thirty years. He built a number of churches and houses, he built the Thatched House Club in St. James's Street, and a great palace (never occupied) for Baron Albert Grant at Knightsbridge; he laid out the gardens (hard by the office of this Review) in Leicester Square, and—most significant of all his architectural achievements—he built for Tennyson (I believe, without fee) the house at Aldworth. Of that more presently. Meanwhile, we may surmise that it was the practice of his architectural craft that taught Knowles that sense of *proportion* that he possessed in an eminent degree and imparted to the Review he founded. As in Letters and in Art, so in the conduct of a great Review, proportion is of all virtues the most indispensable.

Another gift was Knowles's in conspicuous measure. He had the truly philosophic mind. Not in the vulgar sense of accepting with equanimity the 'slings and arrows' as well as the caresses of inconstant fortune, but in the true and original sense: he was a real lover of wisdom. To the age-long question 'Where shall Wisdom be found?' Knowles's considered answer was 'In full, free, friendly and frank discussion between wise men of strongly opposed convictions.'

The quest for wisdom and truth led Knowles to found, in conjunction with Tennyson and Mr. (afterwards Sir C.) Pritchard, the Metaphysical Society (1869). Writing to Tennyson's biographer, Knowles said that it was entirely 'through Tennyson's adhesion to the plan for it that this remarkable club was set on foot.' Dean Stanley, also, cordially encouraged the idea and was one of the original members of the Society. Remarkable, indeed, it was.

At first it was intended [wrote Knowles] that no distinct and avowed opponents of Christianity should be invited, though Anglicans of all shades, Roman Catholics, Unitarians and Nonconformists should be eligible But it was soon felt that if any real discussion of Christian evidences was to take place, the opposition ought to be fully and fairly represented. . . The object of the Society therefore was that those

who were ranged on the side of faith should meet those who were ranged on the side of unfaith, and freely interchange their views [1]

Into the net of the Metaphysical Society Knowles adroitly drew many, perhaps most, of the great men of that day. Among the original members, besides Dean Stanley, Tennyson, and Knowles himself, were Tyndall, Huxley, W. B. Carpenter, J. R. Seeley, Froude and Walter Bagehot, Cardinal Manning, W. G. ('Ideal') Ward, James Martineau and R. H. Hulton, Henry Sidgwick, Mark Pattison, Shadworth Hodgson, and Bishop Ellicott, the prelate whom Disraeli, but for the opposition of the Queen, would have placed in the chair of Saint Augustine. The Society was afterwards joined by Ruskin, the Duke of Argyll, Grant Duff, F. D. Maurice, Dean Church of St. Paul's, FitzJames Stephen, Lord Selborne, John Morley, Frederick Pollock, A. J. Balfour and others of like eminence. The members of the Society met every month, dined together, and afterwards listened to and discussed a learned paper. 'The subjects originally suggested for discussion,' writes Tennyson's biographer, 'were the comparison of the different theories respecting the ultimate grounds of belief in the objective and moral sciences, the logic of the sciences whether physical or social, the immortality of the soul and its personal identity, the personality of God' and similar high topics. The Society flourished until 1881, when, by common consent, it was dissolved. Huxley suggested that 'it died of too much love'; Tennyson that it 'perished because after ten years of strenuous effort no one had succeeded in defining the term "Metaphysics".' Anyway, the Metaphysical Society was not sterile. Four years before its demise the Metaphysical Society had given birth to *The Nineteenth Century*.

But *The Nineteenth Century* was not Knowles's first adventure in periodical literature. It was as editor of the *Contemporary Review* that he discovered his powers. He discovered also the harassing restrictions that are apt to irk an editor who has not complete and individual control over his medium. Knowles had already contributed a number of literary and philosophical articles to various periodicals, when in 1870 he decided to abandon architecture for literature, and was

[1] Tennyson's *Life*, II., pp 166–67

appointed to succeed Dean Alford (its first editor) as edit of the *Contemporary Review*. Knowles held that position onl for seven years, and when, in 1877, the Review passed int new hands, he decided to resign and start on a venture his own.

In March 1877 there appeared the first number of *T Nineteenth Century*. Vividly do I recall the interest excite even among schoolboys, when we found, in the Scientif Library at Repton, the first number of the new Review wit a prefatory poem by the Poet Laureate. And, apart fro Tennyson's, what a galaxy of great names on the conten table of that first (and of many subsequent) numbers! The was Matthew Arnold with that fine essay on Falkland, t which the biographer of that most lovable and cruelly mi represented statesman hereby acknowledges (not for the fir time) a heavy obligation. There was an Anglican bisho Dr. Ellicott of Gloucester and Bristol; an eminent Catholi Cardinal Manning, told 'The True Story of the Vatica Council'; a Nonconformist, the Rev. J. Baldwin Brow asked a question which is not yet authoritatively answere 'Is the Pulpit Losing its Power?'; Professor Croo Robertson contributed a philosophical article; the Edit ('advised by Professor Huxley') reviewed Recent Science a famous Russian scholar, Mr. W. R. S. Ralston, wrote o 'Turkish Story Books'; and the tale was completed b three eminent M.P.s—(Sir) M. E. Grant Duff on 'Russia Sir John Lubbock 'On the Imperial Policy of Great Britain and Mr. Gladstone himself (in the leading place) 'On th Influence of Authority in Matters of Opinion.'

Mr. Gladstone was the great stand-by of the new ventur In June 1898—the month after his death—Knowles printe a list of Gladstone's contributions to the Review. The numbered no fewer than sixty-seven. In view of the fa that Gladstone was in office as Prime Minister for seven o of the twenty-one years (1877–98) that elapsed between th foundation of the Review and his death, this is a trul amazing record. Hardly was he quit of office before h again picked up his pen. He wrote his famous review Mrs. Humphry Ward's *Robert Elsmere* as well as three oth articles in 1888, and in 1889 no fewer than ten. There wa of course, in *Robert Elsmere* much that was highly displeasin

to Mr. Gladstone, but he found it 'a tremendous book' and 'wholly out of the common order,' and to Lord Acton he wrote: 'one could no more stop in reading it than in reading Thucydides.' With Lord Acton he had a long correspondence about Mrs. Ward's book of great intrinsic interest, and well worth turning up in Morley's *Life* (III., pp. 356–61). As a contributor to this Review Knowles regarded Mr. Gladstone as a 'model,' of 'extreme personal modesty,' absolutely punctual in the delivery of copy and proofs, and, indeed, possessed of all the virtues most highly prized by editors.

Matthew Arnold, also, was a very frequent contributor; R. A. (afterwards Viscount) Cross wrote on 'Housing,' and among other statesmen who contributed from time to time were G. N. Curzon, A. J. Balfour, and Sir Evelyn Baring—better known to a later generation as Lord Cromer. Even in the 'nineties Knowles detected the delicate wit of Augustine Birrell—but why continue a catalogue which contained almost all the most distinguished names of the day? The catalogue indicates the organic connexion between *The Nineteenth Century* and its progenitor the Metaphysical Society. It indicates, also, the policy pursued from first to last by Knowles. It was more than a policy, it was a principle. 'Modern Science ought at any rate to have taught men to separate light from heat.' So said Tennyson at one of the preliminary meetings of the Metaphysical Society. It was adopted as the rule of the Society. It was equally appropriate to the discussions carried on in the columns of this Review. Those columns were open to men of all schools of thought, of deeply divergent views, provided they had something to say and knew how to say it. For Knowles was a stern critic of style, though not more precise than his successor. Nothing slipshod was admitted.

It was sneeringly suggested by the critics of the new venture (nor did they lack numbers or venom) that Knowles was, to put it bluntly, a literary snob, caring only for great names. Frederick Harrison, himself a frequent and valued contributor, once said to Knowles: 'Bismarck and the Pope are the only eminent men you have not got hold of for your Review.' It was not far from the truth. Knowles was both a keen student of human nature and a shrewd man of business. Unless the new venture could be made to pay, it was certain

to perish prematurely, as similar ventures have perish before and since. Knowles was well aware that nothing so certain to attract to a salon as the presence of a lion. Bu lions were no use to Knowles unless they could roar. No unless they were labelled.

Hence one of the governing maxims of the new Review no anonymity. That was a new departure: nay more, it was a journalistic revolution. How great a revolution it is difficult for us, who daily see unknown names appended to unimportant articles, to realise. From the first Knowles was on this point, adamant. No signature, no admission. To this rule against anonymity Knowles admitted, in all the 350 numbers he edited, only, I believe, one exception. That was an article on the Channel Tunnel, a project to which Knowles was strongly and unalterably opposed. Only on that subject did he depart from his second governing principle—complete impartiality. When the idea of a tunnel was first mooted in 1882, Knowles organised an influentially signed appeal against it, and when in 1890 the project was revived he offered to it the same determined and successful opposition. 'A statue of you ought to be put up at Dover with the inscription "The man who stopped the Channel Tunnel",' so said Mr. Gladstone, after the defeat of the Bill, to his old friend. For friends the two men remained until Gladstone's death, though Knowles was not blind to the defects of his friend's statesmanship. Even at the age of eighty-five, when partial blindness had fallen upon him, Gladstone wrote, what he was not allowed to read, two theological articles for this Review. To both friends the long association was fruitful. Gladstone found in the Review an outlet for his exuberant literary vitality; Knowles naturally found in one of the foremost statesmen of the day a coadjutor of incalculable value to a new venture. But never was Knowles tempted, even by his affection and admiration of his friend, to put the Review at the service of any one party in politics, in theology, or in any other sphere of intellectual activity. Nor, though he liked the society of great men (who doesn't?), was he any respecter of persons. In later life he was honoured by the friendship of King Edward VII. and Queen Alexandra; he was frequently their guest at Sandringham, where he received from the King his knighthood in the Victorian

Order, and in their Coronation year he was asked by Queen Alexandra to assist her schemes for giving pleasure to the poorest of the King's subjects. He responded with alacrity and displayed the same administrative ability that he had shown thirty years earlier when he organised the Mansion House Fund for providing food for the starving poor in Paris (1870). For Knowles's opposition to the Tunnel scheme was in no way inspired by dislike of France. On the contrary, his cordial liking of the French was one of the bonds of sympathy between King Edward VII. and himself.

An even stronger bond was their common appreciation of the significance of certain tendencies hardly perceptible as yet by less observant spectators of the contemporary scene. One of these was the growing political importance of the wage-earning class. To this appreciation the pages of the Review had long ago borne testimony. As far back as 1881 Knowles had published an article on 'Working Men and the Political Situation' by Thomas Burt, a Northumbrian miner who had been returned as M.P. for Morpeth in 1874 and continued to sit for the same constituency during the next forty years. Other articles from the same pen appeared in 1882 and 1894. Henry Broadhurst, another Labour leader and M.P., was in the list of contributors in 1885. Mr. John Burns, a London engineer, who had just come into prominence in the Trafalgar Square riots in 1886, and was later elected to the London County Council and to Parliament, wrote the first of several articles in March 1892, his subject being 'Towards a Commune.' But of the articles accepted from Labour leaders by Mr. Knowles much the most important was one on the attitude of the Labour Party towards Liberalism, published in January 1899. The author was a Scottish miner, Keir Hardie, who had as his collaborator a young journalist, already well known in the Socialist Party, and soon to become the secretary of the lately-formed Labour Representation Committee—Mr. James Ramsay MacDonald. Down to that time 'Labour' had been content to be in a parliamentary sense the handmaid of Liberalism, but Liberalism seemed to the Socialists no longer worthy of such service; it had (said the writers) 'done its work.' The 'Lib.-Labs.,' like the Burts and Broadhursts, were to give place to out-and-out Socialists. At the General Election of

1900 Mr. MacDonald's Committee ran fifteen candidates, but Keir Hardie was returned with only a single colleague. Knowles's prescience was, however, justified: he saw what was coming, and readers of his Review were not unwarned.

To represent Knowles as a man immersed in high Philosophy, in Politics (high or low), or indeed in any one subject, would be to give a totally false impression of the man. He was just as keenly interested in the drama at the Lyceum as in the drama at St. Stephen's; he was as generous and discriminating in his patronage of Art as in his encouragement of Letters; he was, in the best sense of the phrase, a man of the world, delighting in the company of his fellows, and he was a perfect host. His beautiful house, Queen Anne's Lodge, was a monument to his good taste, but full as it was of good pictures and *objets d'art*, it remained, not a museum, but a home: *sibi et amicis*. Among those friends I dare not include myself; it was only towards the end of Knowles's life that my acquaintance with him began, but I shall never forget his kindness when for the first time I went to Queen Anne's Lodge, nor the cordiality with which he received my first contribution to his Review and the encouragement it gave to a young writer that the first was so quickly followed by a second. More than fifty others followed in due course.

Most of these were, however, contributed during the editorship of Walter Wray Skilbeck, Knowles's secretary, son-in-law, and successor. With Skilbeck my association was close, cordial and continuous.

It was a critical moment in the history of this Review when in 1908 its founder died. That anyone could be to it what Knowles had been was, of course, impossible. But, by common consent, no one could have carried on the Knowles tradition and policy with such perfect loyalty, and with such a large measure of success, as Skilbeck. No two men could, indeed, have been more unlike each other. Educated at Harrow and Trinity, a lawyer by profession, Skilbeck was best known in his younger days as a fine athlete, and to the end he indulged a fierce passion for physical exercise. Like his predecessor, however, he was pre-eminently a patriot, with an intense affection for England and an unshakable belief in her people and their destiny. He shared Knowles's affection

for France and, like him, was a sane Imperialist. His convictions were not perhaps more deep-rooted than Knowles's, but if he had not been fated to sit in an editorial chair they would have been far more passionately expressed. In private, indeed, the pent-up passion frequently burst forth, but in his conduct of the Review he adhered firmly and loyally to the principles laid down by his predecessor. Every point of view must still be presented in its pages with complete impartiality, and a more kindly and considerate editor could never have existed. Nor a more scrupulously careful one. I do not remember that he ever made more than a very few verbal corrections on my proofs, but the marginal 'sums' demonstrated a Cambridge man's mistrust of Oxonian arithmetic! Skilbeck always made sure that my totals tallied with my items, and the location of the 'damned dots' was carefully checked. But Skilbeck was no mere mathematician; he had a really fine taste in literature and a keen sense of style. No one was more appreciative of a happy sentence or a neat paragraph. For eleven years Skilbeck carried on Knowles's work with rare discrimination, and (as far as an outsider could judge) with hardly diminished success. The stature of contemporaries diminishes as we descend the mountain of life: even Sydney Smith would have found it difficult to regard with reverence and awe a bishop who at school had been his fag. But even making allowance for this natural law, Skilbeck's contributors were not perhaps such giants as those who, in its first youth, established the fame of this Review. Yet in the earlier numbers under the new *régime* we note such names (to mention only those who have gone) as Lord Milner, Goldwin Smith, Lord Dunraven, Frederick Harrison, Herbert Paul, Harold Cox, W. H. Mallock, H. C. Beeching and the Diceys (A. V. and Edward). Most unfortunately Skilbeck's career and life were cut short by his devotion to patriotic duty. The difficulties and responsibilities of an editor in war-time were, of course, exceptionally onerous, but to these Skilbeck, though no longer quite young, insisted on adding the work of a special constable. That he died for his country there can be no question: for death called him suddenly in 1919.

It may well be that Skilbeck will be better remembered as a man and a friend than as an editor. He was, as one of his

successors happily expressed it, 'excellently unprofessional.' He was the least pompous of men, and the most considerate of 'employers.' He possessed pre-eminently the *joie de vivre* and communicated it to his associates. Nowhere was his premature death more deeply mourned than at his club. He was wont to lunch every day at the Oxford and Cambridge, at a particular table with five or six chosen friends, and I have been told that after his death not one of them ever sat at that table again. That is one of the little touches that are so much more revealing than more formal and elaborate panegyrics. Such panegyrics no one would have resented more than Skilbeck himself. Nor did he ever reveal, save to a few very intimate friends, another side of his character. The man's heart was as tender as his temper was hot, and his tongue (occasionally) violent. 'It was perhaps,' as one of his intimate friends well said, 'appreciation of his own strength . . . which gave him such untiring gentleness and sympathy with those less happily endowed.' A particularly touching illustration of his pitifulness is given in the charming tribute paid to his memory by another friend in this Review for March 1927. To that article curious readers may be referred.

Fortunate, indeed, was it for this Review to have had such a man as Walter Wray Skilbeck to carry on the work of its founder James Knowles: *uno avulso non deficit alter.* With fervour does one of its oldest contributors ejaculate, may it be ever so.

J. A. R. MARRIOTT.

THE REFORM OF THE LAW

VI. The Problem of Conveyancing

By Harold Potter, Ph.D., LL.B.

I.

Economic circumstances and the structure of society in the Middle Ages caused the early common law of land to receive form and definition to an unexampled extent. Those familiar with mediæval thought would expect a degree of dogmatic formalism and unreality wearing an unfamiliar look to modern eyes. Indeed, there is more than a trace of scholasticism in the old common law rules, of which the doctrine of Seisin, now happily shorn of most of its former glory, represents a formidable illustration. On this rigidity the liberalising influence of Equity was brought to bear, but with some complications rendering the rights and titles of owners of interests in land almost incomprehensible save to the specialist.

In such circumstances it is not surprising that a demand for reform of our land law has been constant through many generations, though the decreasing importance of land as a social and economic unit has perhaps made it less insistent in modern times. This era of reform may be said to have begun as early as 1832 with the Prescription Act of that year, and the Real Property Limitation Act, Fines and Recoveries Act, and Inheritance Act—all passed in the following year. Important as were these and other early Acts in modifying some of the more extravagant features of the land law, the real attack upon the complications of title and transfer of land began in the seventies and eighties of last century. After this date there has been a steady stream of legislation culminating in the spate generally known as the Property legislation of 1925. This last consisted of the Law of Property Act, with 209 sections and seven schedules, the Settled Land Act, with

120 sections and five schedules, the Land Charges Act, with 26 sections and one schedule, the Trustee Act, with 71 sections and two schedules, the Administration of Estates Act, with 58 sections and two schedules, and the Land Registration Act, with 148 sections and one schedule, and some consequential amendments in other statutes. Since then there have been one or two minor annulling Acts, such as the Law of Property Amendment Act, 1926.

Though this legislation made great changes, the large part of the law remains the old common law and equity which has come down through the ages. The good reason and sense behind this fact is that such a law represents the experience of the needs of the community.

In this summary survey no mention has been made of complications introduced by recent legislation having as its background the welfare of the community as a whole, such as the Housing Acts, the Town and Country Planning Acts, and the Ribbon Development Act. While not doubting the political expediencey of this form of legislation, it should be said that such substantial interference with the rights of private ownership cannot take place without material effect upon the position of landowners and a consequent complexity in their titles.

Despite all these considerable labours, it is believed that there still remains a dissatisfaction on the part of laymen, at least, that the creation and transfer of interests in land should be so expensive and subject to so much delay. This apparently reasonable complaint is made because transactions involving thousands, or hundreds of thousands, of pounds can be carried through in respect of stocks and shares in the course of a day or two and with comparatively small expense, while the purchase of a dwelling-house for a few hundred pounds, or a piece of land for much less, may take weeks and a correspondingly disproportionate expense. A comparison with some other forms of valuable property, such as a motor car, is even less encouraging. The apparent validity of this comparison must be examined before attempting a further analysis of possible reforms.

Generally speaking, the land law may be divided into two parts—first, the principles affecting the enjoyment of land; and secondly, the rules governing the creation and transfer of

the interests which confer the rights of enjoyment. These two parts have a necessary reaction upon one another, and in order to give them each adequate scope some complexity may arise. For very many generations land has been regarded as a form of property upon which some part of the social structure of the country depends. This has involved the creation of successive interests, such as life interests and entailed interests, which in times past were responsible in some measure for the complications of the land law. It is true that this use of settlements has now been extended to other forms of property—in particular stocks and shares—without great complication in the law governing its transfer; but there are two differences between the old law of strict settlements and the modern trusts of personalty. The first lies in the fact that hitherto it has been customary to regard as inherently part of the scheme of settlements of land that the life tenant should exercise control over the property itself, both in his residence there and his conduct of its affairs generally. On the other hand, with stocks and shares the property is vested in the trustees and not in the life tenant, and this is reasonable enough, since there are no duties of residence, nor can there be the question of control The receipt of dividends differs, both legally and socially, in an incomparable degree from the good management of a landed estate. The second difference follows from the first. The very control exercised by the trustees and the comparative simplicity with which they can deal with the trust property has made it far easier for the trustee of stocks and shares to defraud his beneficiaries. Regrettably enough, cases of conversion by trustees are by no means rare, but where land is settled in the old form there are few examples of a successful fraud, and even then the results can hardly be so devastating. The community must be prepared to pay a price for safety.

However, were it only in respect of successive interests, the problem of reform would not involve all its present difficulties. The real obstacle to simplicity in the land law lies in the varied uses to which land may be put and the variety of interests that may at any one time represent these different forms of user. Leaving aside the restrictions upon user imposed by such Acts as the Ribbon Development Act and the Town Planning Act, any owner may be limited in his

capacity of enjoyment by the existence of rights of light or way enjoyed by his neighbours, by restrictive covenants imposed on the land by previous occupiers, by the existence of leases of the whole or part, including such interests as rights of fishing or of pasture. These and similar rights form part of the existing social and economic order. To alter their fundamental character and integrity is a matter of general policy which cannot be lightly considered. At the same time, it is manifestly impossible for the average purchaser of land to disregard the possibility of their existence. Such an investigation must take time and involve technical skill. It is, perhaps, unnecessary to point out that no such complications can exist in connexion with other forms of property: a right of way or light over stocks and shares or a steam lorry is meaningless. At the same time, some experience of the difficulties arising from hire-purchase agreements lead the writer to believe that even comparatively straightforward modifications of the scheme of absolute and complete dominion must be paid for by the possibility of fraudulent dealings. Therefore the simplicity of the law of personal chattels can only be retained at the expense of occasional loss, even where change has been made by statute, as witness the Bills of Sale Acts, 1878–82.

Finally, some mention must be made of the problem of identity. In suburban dwelling-houses the extent of the property will usually offer no difficulty save in disputes concerning the ownership of walls and fences—sometimes troublesome enough. Fortunately, most of England is not suburban, and here the problem exists on an extensive scale. Not infrequently it is hard to identify the land at all from any existing plan or map even with the help of verbal descriptions in deeds. This results from land being held by the same family through many generations, during the course of which some external changes in the land have taken place in the development of the countryside and its agricultural or pastoral history. In particular this difficulty is felt in connexion with boundaries of property. To these complications arising from user of the land itself may be added those interests which affect the value of the land because they are annexed thereto. These include rentcharges attached to land for a variety of causes, annual sums which vary considerably

in amount. Apart from these creations, however, there may be, for example, tithe annuities and land tax. These annual charges in one respect present the least difficult part of the problem of the simplification of the land law because they are not strictly associated with the user of the land itself, and consequently could be rejected without serious disadvantage after an initial period of reorganisation, as is being done with the tithe annuities. This introduction has been necessitated because no sound fundamental reform of our land law can be dissociated from the purposes which the community wish the social and economic factors of land to serve. Law reform differs from pure law in that the latter must largely disregard while the former constantly serve these factors.

II.

Apart from such general matters as town planning, the many reforms mentioned at the beginning of this essay have been concerned primarily with the mechanics of conveyancing —that is, the creation and transfer of interests in land. The aim of them all has been simplicity. One reform that has from time to time attracted notice is the protection afforded by a form of compulsory registration. In the earlier stages this demand was largely associated with the elimination of fraud and was met by registration of deeds relating to the title. This did not simplify, but complicated, the actual creation or transfer of interests, since to what was necessary where registration was not required was added the registration of the appropriate instrument. It has never been popular, and in fact was confined to the counties of Middlesex and Yorkshire. It is thought that the real point is that fraudulent dealings with land are very uncommon and, independently of registration, can rarely be committed and are easily detected. In this respect the land law seems to have manifest advantages over the law relating to other forms of property.

A more recent reform is that of registration of title itself. Begun with the Land Transfer Act, 1875, it has been modified by Acts culminating in the Land Registration Act, 1925. Although protection in the case of frauds or errors is afforded, the primary purpose of this innovation is the simplification of conveyancing itself by the substitution of less complicated forms of disposition and a register containing a description

of the land and a simple title. The provision of printed instruments and a register of proprietors is clearly adopted from the share register, but an indemnity fund and the entry of notices and restrictions has circumscribed the possibilities of the commission of fraud. These desirable, if not essential, requirements have modified the pristine simplicity of a register, and, as will be seen hereafter, the system is not without objection in its present state. It is, however, a great advance on the registration of deeds, and in the county of Middlesex has now been adopted in its place.

It is now necessary to turn more specifically to the recent great legislative reforms under the 1925 Acts. They are concerned almost exclusively with the problem of the simplification of conveyancing and ignore, or appear to ignore, the other aspects of landholding. When the benefit of their full operation is felt, they will have undeniably simplified the ordinary transactions of sale and purchase, and perhaps mortgage, though temporarily this has not proved to be so in every case. It may be added that the full benefit will not be experienced for about thirty or forty years. On the other hand, with regard to the rights of user of property, including the rights of persons having successive interests under settlements, it is the writer's opinion that these reforms have only accentuated difficulties and given rise to serious doubts.

The object of these reforms is the simplification of the investigation of title to rents and profits or the occupation of land in order to make the ordinary transactions of sale, lease, and mortgage as free as possible from difficulty. To this end the theory employed is that the transferor in such cases should always have vested in himself the largest possible interest in land, which is called the fee simple, or a term of years absolute—that is, a leasehold interest. Any other interests formerly capable of appearing on the title, such as life interests and entails, must never appear on the title at all. As a result, the documents of title made since 1925 for dealing with the absolute interest (fee simple) or terms of years are comparatively simple. However, in order to preserve the existence of life interests, entails, and such limited rights, they are allowed to continue in the form of beneficial interests behind trusts. The result is that a highly complicated machinery has been introduced in order to ensure that the

absolute interest is always vested in a person capable of selling it. In fact, two separate methods are available. One takes effect under the Settled Land Act, 1925, in which the person beneficially entitled to a life or greater interest has the absolute interest vested in him from time to time subject to certain restrictions. The other is to vest the absolute interest in trustees who hold the land on trust for sale—that is, they are supposed to sell it, but they can postpone the sale indefinitely. Neither method really fits the facts, and, though some very competent authorities prefer the method of trust for sale for technical reasons, it is suggested that the theory of an imperative direction to sell is misleading, and the land ought in many cases to be more under the control of persons having beneficial interests.

Difficulties having also arisen where the land was vested in co-owners, the same method has been applied, and, apart from some small exceptions too technical to notice here, co-owners can only have an interest by the creation of an estate ownership under the Settled Land Act or a trust for sale. As the law stands it is not clear whether estate ownership under the Settled Land Act can be vested in more than four persons, and it certainly cannot in the case of a trust for sale. Normally, therefore, more than four persons cannot have a common law interest, and if there are more than four persons interested as co-owners the remainder must be content with an interest which is vested in trustees on their behalf. In this respect the law is more restricted than that applying to ordinary chattels.

With regard to subsidiary interests such as charges, easements, including rights of way and light, and profits such as rights of pasture and fishing, half-measures only were taken. It is still possible for a number of these to be impliedly created without any mention in any instrument: so, where a vendor sells part of his land with a house on it, it may subsequently appear that he or his successor in title is restricted in his building on the remainder of the land because of an implied grant of, say, a right to light to the first purchaser. Secondly, though a few of these subsidiary rights can only be protected by registration under the Land Charges Act, 1925, the bulk of these interests do not require to be registered, and their existence is a constant trap for the unwary, as the law

reports show. Registration, furthermore, is made against the owner by name and not against the land itself (thus differing from the system under the Land Registration Act). Consequently, a purchaser must search against the names of any prior owners on the title after 1926 unless an old search form covering this period is produced. This practice of producing old search forms is followed, but does not add to the simplicity of titles.

It should be added that to the method of trust for sale there is a substantial objection which arises from the old doctrine of the Court of Chancery called Conversion. Under this doctrine of conversion the interests which take effect behind the trust for sale—that is, the real beneficial interests—are not regarded technically as interests in land at all, but in the proceeds of sale of land, whether or not the land has been sold. This, of course, seriously modifies the character of those interests. The creation by statute of trusts for sale has produced some even stranger results, as where a right of pre-emption granted to a beneficiary under a will was extinguished by the application of the statutory trust for sale.

It is impossible in an article of this character to go into detail—this would not serve its purpose; but it is hoped that from what has been said the character of the major proposals here made will be apparent. Minor matters of reform are inevitable, but these may be taken in their stride.

III.

In the writer's opinion it is fundamental that the law should not operate to defeat the natural uses to which society has shown that property should be put. In almost all cases there must be some conflict in property rights, and it is for the law to resolve these with a minimum of friction. Secondly, in the case of land the ease of transfer should be subordinated to the requirements of user. Here the analogy between land and shares is false. Stocks and shares represent the use of money, which is indirect in its social sense as property; land is physical property the primary object of which is personal user. Sacrifices, that may be legitimate to ensure cheap transfer of money, may cost too much where land is concerned.

It is therefore suggested that probably reform has gone too far in the subordination of some interests in land to the

project of simple conveyancing. Certain inherent intricacies in land law must remain so long as land is to serve its present social purpose. If the community is prepared to sacrifice this characteristic of land it might be easy to modify the land law, but this involves prophecy that is the province of the political scientist, and not the lawyer.

It is thought, then, that the logical conclusion of the reforms of the 1925 Acts is the general application of the system of registered titles. The system of registered titles really depends upon the land being vested in one or more proprietors who have a power of disposition over all the interests comprised in the actual title. If the proprietor has this, his title can appear very simply on a register which describes the property and gives his name and address as proprietor.

Since the ideal of the 1925 legislation is to vest the land in an owner who has complete power of disposition over the fee simple, or absolute, interest, or over a leasehold, it is natural and reasonable to adopt the process of registering the land and making any necessary alterations in the name of the proprietor. This is simpler than the simplest series of deeds each describing the property in turn, which is the object of the legislation in connexion with unregistered conveyancing.

The preservation of successive interests in the land, such as life interests and entails, is readily achieved by noting a restriction in the proprietorship register that the whole interest in the land can be disposed of only in accordance with the Settled Land Act or the law governing trusts for sale. In the writer's opinion these restrictions could be improved by being more explicit in stating the precise beneficial interest of the proprietor which by statute need not affect his powers of disposition by sale, lease or mortgage. Moreover, they would enable the law to abolish the existence of statutory trusts for sale simply by permitting registered proprietors to dispose of the land in accordance with the restriction. The present technical advantages of trusts for sale in making a title would disappear with registration and their unreality in presuming an intention to sell the land would be avoided. The advantages of the indemnity fund need not be stressed to readers who may themselves become purchasers of land.

Furthermore, the instruments for effecting sales of land,

though not leases or mortgages, are undoubtedly simplified and the burden of investigation is lessened. This will save expense in these transactions, though it will be increased in the case of settlements.

Accepting this principle of registration for a proprietor of the whole interest for the purposes of disposition, it is still desirable that the rights of successive limited owners should be preserved and defined. The common law and the Court of Chancery had developed some well-recognised rules governing user and the right to take profits such as timber and minerals. The new law, with its superior position of trusteeship, whether by trust for sale or under the Settled Land Act, has in fact left the application of these rules in doubt. An urgent reform is that there should be new definition. The old rules have an archaic flavour and could be settled anew with advantage; but they should be settled. For example, it should be clear law whether a life beneficiary, whether under the Settled Land Act or a trust for sale, should be able to allow the residential property to fall into decay, to pull it down, or to build afresh. Indeed, under a system of registered titles it is doubtful whether the distinction between trusts for sale and settled land should continue to subsist. The trust for sale was largely a conveyancing device which is rendered unnecessary, though a settlor might desire trustees to have control of the property. On similar grounds most of the complications now imposed upon co-ownership could be removed. The restrictions on the number of co-owners might even be relaxed.

Turning to subsidiary interests in land, such as rights of way and light, or profits of pasture or fishery, these should clearly continue, and should bind successive owners of the land. Their existence must complicate titles, but a land law that ignores them is mutilated. At the present day, if properly created, they will bind a purchaser though he had no knowledge of their existence when he purchased and yet he may be without remedy. In the present state of the law this applies to both registered and unregistered conveyancing. This should be remedied by the requirement of registration, whether in registered or unregistered conveyancing. In registered conveyancing it will have the effect of modifying the present simplicity of the register, though not to any

serious extent. In unregistered conveyancing it will simply extend the list of registrable interests, which now include such matters as restrictive covenants, frequently more comprehensive than most of the rights now recommended to be registered.

This reform would exclude in future the creation of implied rights, such as implied rights of light and drainage and even more extensive rights. This may increase the onus of care in preparing conveyances and contracts, but it will relieve the uncertainty now sometimes arising. On the other hand, it would increase the efficiency of registered conveyancing by eliminating the investigation on sale of abstracts of title of matters not required to be registered, called overriding interests. Prescriptive rights need not be abolished but be rendered effective against a purchaser only after registration by the person having acquired his prescriptive right. This should minimise disputes.

Here a reference might be made to titles by adverse possession. If registered conveyancing were universally adopted, titles by adverse possession should be abolished. The purpose of the statutes of limitation was to avoid protracted and frequent disputes. Where a proprietor appears upon a Government title no dispute can arise. If there is no merit in trespass there can be less merit in a trespass that has been continued over twelve years. Hence an adverse possessor can have no moral claim to the land, nor is there any legal reason why such a claim should be sustained.

Again, the writer is not convinced of the necessity of annual charges on the land. If it is intended to continue rentcharges, tithe annuities, and similar outgoings, these should be binding against purchasers of the land only where they are registered. At the present day they are not required to be registered, and in some cases they need not be disclosed to a purchaser on the ground that the land is deemed to be subject to them. This is an unfortunate rule, because it no longer tallies with the facts. To get rid of land tax and tithe annuities must be a matter of years, but the Tithe Act, 1936, has pointed the way in the tithe redemption annuities, which will be extinguished not later than sixty years hence. Other Government charges, such as land tax, should likewise be compulsorily redeemed. With regard to private rentcharges, such as

those created by way of consideration for the transfer, it is questionable whether this is a social or economic necessity, and it certainly gives rise to complications in the case of freehold interests. If it should be necessary to continue it, it should be registered, and under the system of registered conveyancing this would normally be the case.

There are also certain other liabilities, such as repair of channels, sea walls and embankments, that are of an occasional nature which should require registration but do not. While registration is not universal there is difficulty in insisting upon registration in such cases, but in the event of general compulsory registration this objection would fall.

While thus advocating some decrease in the number of possible interests in land there is ground for pressing some increase and definition. The position of restrictive covenants, which have been of rapidly increasing importance with recent land development, is very unsatisfactory. Apart from provisions relating to registration, the law on the subject is a late development from equitable principles, which has been engrafted with some common law rules that have not been happy in their surroundings. The result is a curious admixture of the rule of covenant, or contract, giving rise to relative freedom, and of grant operating as a restriction. It is suggested that a rule that covenants imposed for the benefit of a defined neighbourhood or plot of land should always be binding upon the restricted land and enforceable by any occupier of any part of the defined neighbourhood or plot of land would be simple and effective and avoid some of the present complications. No doubt the present law enabling relaxation in certain circumstances could be continued. Covenants not expressed to be binding in favour of a defined area should be matters of contract between the parties alone. Furthermore, the present distinction between negative and positive covenants, the result of the law of injunctions, might well be modified. A covenant to maintain a fence should be as enforceable as a covenant not to build. There is a problem, however, that covenants involving expenditure of money must be more onerous and more difficult of compliance, though experience of long leaseholds does not seem to warrant too much insistence upon this aspect of the subject.

Finally, some reference should be made to the problem of identity. Adoption of the system of registered conveyancing would resolve most of these difficulties, since description is always by reference to the Land Registry map or plan. Under the system as it exists at present, however, the Registry take no responsibility for boundaries unless they are clearly defined upon the plan. It is suggested that the scheme should be amended to ensure that no registration should be completed without adequate definition of the boundaries, whether on first registration of the land or upon transfer of part of land comprised in a title. Initially this may make registration more expensive, but ultimately it will avoid disputes that may be protracted and involve considerable loss to one of the parties. It may be added that this requirement of description of property must in the nature of things render any but the simplest transactions more complicated and require greater skill and technical knowledge than dealing with blocks of shares that can be most simply defined.

IV.

In conclusion, then, it may be said that these proposals for reform do not fulfil the ideal that transactions with land on sale should be as free from technicalities as transactions with stocks and shares. Even with regard to beneficial interests operating behind a trust there must be complications arising from management and enjoyment which are not to be found in ordinary settlements of personal estate, though here, perhaps, the distinction is less marked. Adoption of the proposals here made would lessen some of the technical difficulties at present tending to obscure the position of individual landholders and so rendering investigation of their title sometimes lengthy and expensive. Their rights and liabilities would be defined and easily ascertainable.

Nevertheless, the exact extent of these rights and liabilities, and their creation and protection, would still involve a considerable degree of skill and technical knowledge. Few purchasers would be willing to trust to their own ability to determine whether they were prepared to undertake the liabilities to which they might be subject, and where new rights are to be imposed upon the land fewer still would be content to rely upon their native wit to ensure that this was

properly done. As has been said, this is inherent in the character of land and the multifarious uses to which it may be put. Without some technical limitations and definitions it would be impossible to attain that degree of certainty essential where a variety of possibilities occur. Familiarity with the attempts of testators to make their own wills without legal assistance proves that without the help of known forms and precedents it is singularly difficult to express exactly the intentions of the party. Where rights are to be created to be enjoyed by one person over land in the occupation of another, or where another's occupation is dependent on the determination of a prior right, it is inevitable that precise definition is essential. It seems unlikely that such a result can be achieved simply by the use of a printed form, though a multiplicity of printed forms might enable a skilful chooser to achieve his object in many cases. Let it be added that failure to attain the ideal that land should be transferred as cheaply and expeditiously as a penny whistle is no reason to hold back from such simplicity as may be obtained. It is the purpose of this paper to press the major problems and to offer solutions which could be given in a short time.

HAROLD POTTER.

THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN THE IRISH FREE STATE

By W. A. Beers

The Constitution of the Irish Free State was enacted on December 6, 1922.[1] After a period of fourteen years it is interesting to review the growth of legislation, to note the main differences which have arisen between the legal system in operation in the Irish Free State and the English system, and to try to form some estimate of the change which has taken place. Since 1922 the basis of law in Ireland has been the Constitution. A decision of the High Court in the case of *Cahill* v. *The Attorney-General*[2] has made this position quite clear. In his judgment in this case Mr. Justice Meredith said: 'The Constitution must be recognised by the Court as an original source of jurisdiction, and as regards the whole code of law to be applied it is the one and all-sufficient root of title.' It is therefore clear that the present judicial system in the Irish Free State must be considered in the light of its relation to the Constitution.

Two factors during the closing period of the Anglo-Irish struggle were of fundamental importance. One was the gradual usurpation by the military court of the civil jurisdiction and the other was the creation and the growing strength of the Dail courts. In the case of *The King* v. *Allen*[3] the Irish Court of King's Bench reached the astounding interpretation that the civil court had no power during war or insurrection to interfere with the decision of a military court, even where a capital sentence had been pronounced, and was about to be executed for an offence not punishable capitally under the ordinary criminal law. This remarkable

[1] All references to the Constitution of the Irish Free State are references to the Constitution as enacted on December 6, 1922, and subsequently altered by a series of amending Acts

[2] [1925] 1 I R. 70; 59 I L. T. R 29.

[3] [1921] 2 I. R. 241

decision had the effect of putting arbitrary power into the hands of the military authorities. It led to the infliction of the death penalty on many prisoners, and scandalised legal opinion both in Ireland and in England. It is in the light of such a precedent that certain of the provisions of the Constitution, and the temporary regulations adopted prior to its enactment by the Provisional Parliament, must be interpreted. The Civil War which followed on the establishment of the Irish Free State created a situation of extreme delicacy from the point of view of the Executive. The Provisional Government sought and obtained power from the Dail to give the army authorities the necessary means of securing the public safety and restoring order. The validity of the quasi-judicial powers thus entrusted to military authorities was tested in two important cases—the case of Mr. Erskine Childers, which was decided by the Master of the Rolls in the Chancery Division,[4] and the case of *Johnstone* v. *O'Sullivan*,[5] which was tried in the first instance by the Chief Justice in the King's Bench Division and subsequently by the Court of Appeal. In both these cases the extraordinary and special powers of the Irish Provisional Government were upheld, but the decision was based upon the unhappy precedents of the former *régime*. Articles 6 and 70 of the Constitution deal with the question of extraordinary powers which may be granted to military tribunals in times of war or armed rebellion, and it should be noted that in the debate which took place in the constituent assembly which enacted the Constitution the then Minister for Local Government said, with reference to Article 6, that 'nothing in it by any stretch of imagination should be held to authorise or accord liberty to the military to do anything other than to arrest and detain persons.' It would appear, however, that under Article 70 of the Constitution there is a definite transfer of jurisdiction to military tribunals in special circumstances, but this transfer of authority is subject to the proviso that its exercise is to be governed by regulations to be prescribed by law. By this latter qualification the parliamentary control of the law in procedure of these extraordinary courts has been effectively ensured. The provision of these two articles clearly amounts to a com-

[4] [1923] 1 I. R 5
[5] [1923] 2 I. R. 13, 57 I L T. R 17.

promise, and while it is to be regretted that the Irish Legislature was compelled to recognise the need for the subjection of civilians to military jurisdiction in certain circumstances, yet the imposition of the requirement of statutory authority deserves commendation. The most disturbing feature of the conclusion of the British *régime* was the fact that not merely were the judges military officers, but the law which they administered amounted to little more than the will of the army commander.

The system of Dail courts was established by a decree of the first Dail Eireann in 1919, and it provided a most effective weapon against British rule inasmuch as it gave rise to a judicial system which was strongly supported by popular opinion. The system which was created by this decree established three types of courts—parish courts, district courts, and a Supreme Court, which enjoyed unlimited jurisdiction. The experiment was far-reaching, involving as it did some 900 parish courts and seventy-seven district courts, each of which drew its quota of business away from the British tribunals. It is interesting to examine the Code of Rules which was provided for the guidance of the judiciary in the courts. The Code states that

> the Law as recognized on January 21st, 1919, shall until amended continue in force except such portions thereof as are clearly motived by religious or political animosity Without prejudice to the foregoing and pending the enactment of a Code by the Dail citations may be made to any Court from the early Irish Law Code, or any commentary upon them in so far as they may be applicable to modern conditions and from the Code Napoleon or other codes, the Corpus Juris Civilis or the works embodying or commentating on Roman Law, but such citations shall not be of binding authority. Save as aforesaid no legal text-books published in Great Britain shall be cited to any Court.

These courts were in fact a most effective weapon against British administration, and they were as much relied on for this purpose as for their importance as legal tribunals. However, quite apart from the political policy which underlay their creation, they had indeed a definite value for practitioners mainly because the British courts had virtually collapsed Many magistrates had resigned their commissions, or had indeed been removed from them. These law courts continued in operation over a considerable area until the truce of 1921,

but from that time onwards difficulties arose, and the justice of their decisions, always based on rough-and-ready considerations, began to be open to question. There was evidence that they were used as channels of corruption by people anxious to obstruct justice, and accordingly the Government of the Irish Free State, which succeeded the Provisional Government, decided to wind them up, and in 1923 the Dail Eireann Courts Winding-up Act was passed. Under this Act commissioners were appointed to dispose of cases which were pending in the courts, and the commissioners had authority to afford relief in circumstances in which hardships and anomalies had arisen. It was clear, from the unsatisfactory condition of things which obtained in the Dail courts, that they could no longer serve as effective instruments of justice in the new State. At the same time, the Government felt that the British tribunals, which had become so distasteful in the eyes of the people in the closing years of the British *régime*, could no longer be regarded as a possible basis for the judicial system. Article 64 of the Constitution had provided that courts were to be established, and accordingly on January 27, 1923, a Committee was appointed to advise the Executive Council on the establishment of a judicial system. The President of the Executive Council addressed a letter to each member of the Committee, and, in the light of the Committee's recommendations, it is particularly interesting to note the terms of this document:

> In the long struggle for the right to rule in our own country there has been no sphere of the administration lately ended which impressed itself on the minds of our people as a standing monument of alien government more than the system, machinery, and the administration of law and justice which supplanted in comparatively modern times the laws and institutions till then a part of the living national organism. The body of laws and the system of judicature so imposed upon this nation were English (not even British) in their seed, English in their growth and English in their vitality. Their ritual, their nomenclature, were only to be understood by the students of the history of the people of southern Britain A remarkable and characteristic product of the genius of that people, the manner of their administration prevented them from striking root in the fertile soil of this nation. Thus it comes that there is nothing more prized among our newly-won liberties than the liberty to construct a system of judiciary and an administration of law and justice according to the dictates of our own needs, and after the pattern of our own designing. This liberty is established and the head-line

is set in the Constitution drawn up and passed by the elected representatives of our people. The Committee is requested to approach the matters referred to them untrammelled by any regard to any of the existing systems of judicature in this country, to examine the nature and classification of the legal business, both contentious and non-contentious, for the due discharge of which, in the interests of justice, machinery and establishment should be provided by the State, and to consider and report upon the requirements of the litigants and other persons interested, and especially as to accessibility, efficiency, expedition and cost.

In order to understand the significance of the Committee's Report it is necessary to have some idea of the judicial system which obtained in Ireland prior to the Courts of Justice Act of 1924. This Act, in fact, embodied the ideas which had been put forward by the Committee. The British system had in the main consisted of three types of courts—the petty sessions courts, the county courts, and the Supreme Court of Judicature. Besides these three courts, which carried the main business of the country, there was the Court of Crown Cases Reserved. This was the only court of criminal appeal, and its function was to consider questions of criminal law reserved for its consideration by the judge of the High Court at the trial. Its sittings were infrequent. The petty sessions courts were courts of summary jurisdiction. They were presided over chiefly by unpaid magistrates, and in certain cases a paid resident magistrate, who was usually a retired officer of military or police experience, also sat on the bench. The civil jurisdiction of this court was extremely small, and it was limited in the main to debts under £2. The county courts, one of which existed for each county, were presided over by county court judges. These judges were appointed from members of the Bar. This court enjoyed a very varied jurisdiction. In the main it exercised on the common law side a jurisdiction in contract and tort up to £50, and in the case of disputes as to land where the Poor Law valuation did not exceed £30 per annum. Its equity jurisdiction dealt with property not exceeding £500 in value. Its jurisdiction in criminal matters and in regard to the Admiralty was limited, the former covering most minor offences and misdemeanours triable by jury at quarter sessions. The Supreme Court of Judicature was made up of the High Court of Justice and the Court of Appeal. The former had unlimited original jurisdiction, and carried the great bulk of the legal work of the

country. The old divisions of the High Court had been *abolished—at least, theoretically—but in actual practice* a separate office remained for each class of work. The High Court was under the presidency of the Lord Chief Justice. The Court of Appeal was a separate court under the presidency of the Lord Chancellor, and it had, of course, its own offices and officials.

The Committee completed its labours and issued its Report on May 25, 1923. The scheme of the new judiciary as set out in the Courts of Justice Act (No. 10 of 1924) was roughly as follows:

The old petty sessions court was replaced by a district court, which was presided over in all instances by a paid *district justice*, who was required to be a practising barrister or solicitor of at least six years' standing. The justices of the peace, as the old unpaid officials were called, have now ceased to have any effective powers in the Irish Free State. Their title has been changed to peace commissioners, and they take no part in the deliberations of the court. They do, however, retain certain powers, mainly connected with the swearing of affidavits and the taking of depositions in certain circumstances. In the new system the jurisdiction of the district court is greatly increased over that of its predecessor, the old petty sessions court. In place of the old civil jurisdiction of £2 the new district court has a jurisdiction up to £25 in actions based on contract, and £10 in damages in actions for tort. On the criminal side its jurisdiction corresponds, roughly speaking, to that of its predecessor—namely, summary jurisdiction for minor offences. Perhaps the most interesting contrast between these two courts is the demand for legal training on the part of the presiding justice, which compares very favourably with the unprofessional status of the old unpaid magistrates. It is of particular interest to notice that this scheme has recently been put into operation in Northern Ireland. Its advantages are obvious, and it would appear to many that the extension of the system throughout England would be generally beneficial; but it must be remembered that an extension of such jurisdiction and the creation of a large number of paid magistrates to deal with the business now controlled by unpaid magistrates in England would involve a very heavy increase in expenditure.

The greatest change in the whole legal system has been occasioned by the abolition of the county court and the substitution in its place of a new court known as the circuit court. This court, instead of having its jurisdiction territorially limited by the county which it controls, has its area demarcated on a basis of population. A circuit court has jurisdiction over an area possessing a population of approximately 400,000 inhabitants. Originally, under the Act of 1924, there were eight circuits, but the subsequent Courts of Justice Act (No. 48 of 1936) increased the number of circuits to nine. The jurisdiction of the circuit judge extends to all claims for debt or damages up to £300, while in equity matters he can deal with all questions of administration, mortgage, specific performance, etc., over assets up to £1000, or in land in which the Poor Law valuation does not exceed £60 per annum. The criminal side of this court is extremely comprehensive, and it may deal with all felonies and misdemeanours with the exception of murder, high treason, and piracy. The circuit judge also exercises an appellate jurisdiction from the district justice, and deals in the first instance with claims under the Workmen's Compensation Act and the Malicious Injury Code.

The appeal on the civil side of this court goes to the High Court. On the criminal side the appeal goes to the Court of Criminal Appeal, a court which did not exist under the British *régime*.

The abolition of the old county court has probably been the most striking change made in judicial organisation, for, with its disappearance, the county no longer constitutes its judicial area. When we consider the jurisdiction of the old county court and contrast it with the circuit court, we get some idea of the tremendous importance of the new court and realise to what extent its jurisdiction has been enlarged. In the case of *Sligo Corporation* v. *Gilbride and the Attorney-General*[6] the late Chief Justice Kennedy, in dealing with the civil jurisdiction of the circuit court, said:

> The effect, I think, is that jurisdiction was conferred on the circuit court in civil cases generally, subject to the exclusions specified in section 56, and the quantitative limitation of section 48. The Act intended not only to transfer the class of equity cases formerly dealt

[6] [1929] 1 I. R. 361.

with in the county court, but also to confer generally, within the prescribed limits of amount of subject-matter and locality, the jurisdiction in all classes of equity cases, and matters within the special purview of the former Chancery Division.

And Mr. Justice FitzGibbon in the same matter says:

> In my opinion the new court of local and limited jurisdiction established by the Courts of Justice Act under powers conferred by Article 64 of the Constitution are not subject to the restrictions imposed by the Civil Bill Act or the County Officers and Courts Act upon the county courts whose jurisdiction has been transferred to them. The only limitations upon the jurisdiction of the circuit court are those expressed or implied in the provisions of the Courts of Justice Act. Subject to these limitations, the circuit court has within its locality all the jurisdiction of the High Court.

The central court remains to be dealt with. The High Court consists of six judges, one of whom has the title of President of the High Court. The judges of the High Court preside in turn at the Central Criminal Court in Dublin, where the more serious criminal cases are tried. The High Court has transferred to it the jurisdiction given to it by the Constitution, and also all the jurisdiction vested in its predecessor under the British system. An interesting provision which has been the subject of a number of important cases is its original jurisdiction in all questions on the validity of statutes, as being within or without the Constitution, and also on all questions of what were formerly called 'Crown Office cases.' The Supreme Court, which consists of five judges sitting under the presidency of the Chief Justice, has an appellate jurisdiction from the High Court prescribed by the Constitution, as well as all the appellate jurisdiction formerly exercised by the old Court of Appeal under the previous system. The special jurisdiction of the Chief Justice exists over certain matters such as solicitors, notaries public and commissioners of affidavit, while the President of the High Court deals with minors and lunatics. A new court, the Court of Criminal Appeal, has been set up with permanent session in Dublin, unless for a special reason. The procedure in this court is similar to that in England. The decision of the court is final unless a certificate is obtained from the Attorney-General that the case involves a point of exceptional public importance, when in these circumstances an appeal is

allowed to the Supreme Court. The Court of Criminal Appeal consists of three judges, one of whom is the Chief Justice, or a judge of the Supreme Court, the other two being members of the High Court. The new Central Criminal Court is merely the terminology used to designate the judge of the High Court who is, for the time being, acting as judge in criminal matters. The court sits in Dublin at intervals throughout the year, and tries all felonies and misdemeanours not tried in the circuit court or transferred to the central court from any part of the Saorstat on the application of the Attorney-General.

It is of particular interest to consider the effect of this Act of 1924 and the subsequent Acts dealing with the courts of justice which were passed in 1928, 1932, and 1936. The new system has enabled the courts to get rid of a certain amount of cumbersome machinery incident to the old system. First of all, all grand juries were abolished, and the indictment is now preferred straight to the jury who try the case. The main reasons for the abolition of the grand juries were, first, they served to complicate judicial procedure, and, secondly, their personnel came very largely from the Unionist section of the population. To-day the old travelling assize courts no longer exist. Under the Act of 1924 it was, indeed, contemplated that the High Court should travel on assize to deal with certain types of criminal cases, and it was intended that the judges should travel as commissioners of assize. This proposal was never put into practice, and the clause which allowed for the institution of these commissioners was repealed by the Courts of Justice Act of 1926. It is, however, interesting to note that the provisions were re-enacted ten years later in the Act of 1936.

In contrast to the system of judicial administration which at present obtains in England, the main object which lay behind the Irish Act of 1924 was the decentralisation of justice, and there is little doubt that the intention of the Oireachtas has been fulfilled in this respect. It would appear that the advantages of the Irish system cannot be questioned. Perhaps the best example is the remarkably efficient working of the district court. Its sessions are regular, and, to a very large extent, the unfortunate delays and arrears of cases have been almost entirely eliminated. In rural areas especially its

jurisdiction is sufficiently wide to deal with most problems. Throughout the Irish Free State this simplification of judicial process has given very great satisfaction to the mass of the people.

Perhaps the most disquieting feature of the legislation of the Irish Free State since its inception have been the Public Safety Acts, 1923 to 1931. These Acts provided for the removal of certain cases from the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts to the control of tribunals appointed by the Executive Council. The object of these Acts was to give to the Executive extraordinary powers for the suppression and control of armed rebellion in the State, or for dealing with circumstances likely to be destructive to the State, and designated under the Act as circumstances of national emergency. The tribunals set up in pursuance of these Acts have been granted extraordinary powers. If a tribunal finds a person guilty it may, in lieu of the punishment provided by law, sentence the guilty party to suffer greater penalties up to and including the death penalty, if it be deemed necessary or expedient.

The Public Safety Acts really fall into two categories. In the first class are those whose object is to meet a special emergency and whose operation is limited in point of time. In the second category we find those which, although passed to deal with a particular emergency, confer upon the Executive statutory powers which they may at any time call into operation by means of a proclamation. While the former type may perhaps be justified on grounds of expediency, the second have no real justification. They confer powers upon the Executive which the Executive ought not to have if the Constitution is to have any proper force.

Looking back over the fourteen years of the Irish Free State's existence, and regarding the legislation which has been passed and which has directly affected the administration of justice, one comes to the conclusion that, in so far as that legislation has been directed, as it was in the Courts of Justice Acts, 1924 to 1936, towards the betterment of the procedure and the elimination of unsatisfactory delays, the Executive and the Oireachtas deserve congratulation; but when we consider the extraordinary legislation which was a feature of the Public Safety Acts from 1923 to 1931, we realise how unsatisfactory it is that the powers of the court should be

interfered with except in times of the gravest national emergency. The powers of control which have been placed in the hands of the Executive are wide—nay, even despotical; and it seems little justification to say that the Executive have, in fact, used those powers sparingly. Much can be said in favour of placing the powers to be used by the Executive in times of national crisis upon a statutory basis, but when the statutory basis is so wide as to confer upon the Executive an absolute despotism, then the entire enactment becomes absurd.

'Repressive legislation,' says Dr. Nicholas Mansergh in his book on *The Irish Free State Constitution, its Government and Politics*, 'was a recurrent feature of English rule in Ireland, and it is perhaps one of the saddest legacies of the Irish Civil War that it was found necessary to revive such legislation again after 1921.'

W. A. Beers.

ITALIAN EAST AFRICA—III.

By Major E. W. Polson Newman

Having already described some of the more important individual aspects of Italian development in East Africa, it now remains to give some details of what is being done and what has been planned on the material side. Apart from communications—a direction in which important results have already been achieved—material development consists chiefly of agriculture, mineral and other resources, and public works.

Current investigations indicate that, while there are extensive possibilities for developing and improving existing crops, there are great opportunities for the introduction of new forms of cultivation, thereby producing a large annual yield of a quality sufficiently high to compete successfully in world markets. Cereals of various kinds can be raised all over the country; cotton, oil-seeds and rubber can be cultivated in the valleys of rivers and wherever irrigation is possible; coffee, already extensively grown, can be greatly improved in quality and the production rationalised; products such as bananas, sugar-cane, tea and quinine can be introduced with every prospect of success. Various forms of native corn are already grown, such as taff, which thrives at altitudes of from 3000 to 9000 feet, and is used extensively by the Amharas for bread. Dagusa is also used to a lesser extent for bread, and by the Gallas it is employed in the production of native beer. Dhurra is used all over the country, and it produces a form of alcohol; an inferior variety of maize is extensively cultivated. Oats and wheat are at present scarce, as they require more attention than other grain, but the former may be grown between 3000 and 10,500 feet with two harvests a year, while the latter can be cultivated up to 9000 feet. Wild cotton is found in most parts of Ethiopia

except in the higher altitudes, but the best districts for its cultivation are the Shire, Gimma, Lake Margherita, and along most of the river valleys. Varieties equal to the highest quality of Egyptian cotton are to be introduced, as has already been done in the plantations of Eritrea and Italian Somaliland, such as Tessenei, Genale, Villaggio Duca Abruzzi, and the concessions on the Juba River, and should become one of the more important commercial products. Several varieties of oil-seeds are already grown. Nug, which can be cultivated from 5000 to 7000 feet, produces oil for lighting and cooking. Other oil-seeds are linseed and sesame, while arachide (monkey nuts) is produced in considerable quantities in the Somaliland concessions. Although investigations of the possibilities of rubber are not yet complete, it is expected that supplies will be obtained from the vast number of trees known as *Forbia Candelabra*, which is very common throughout large areas. While the coffee of Harar is already well known, it is seldom realised that the name derives its origin from the region of Kaffa in Ethiopia, where a good quality of coffee has long been grown. Other districts from which coffee is already exported are Gimma, Sidamo, Lekemti and the Gojjam. As Italy has a trade agreement with Brazil for the import of coffee, it is intended in Ethiopia to produce a good quality at a reasonable price for sale in Egypt, Europe, and the United States. The cultivation of bananas has been most successful in the plantations along the Webi Shebeli and Juba River, and there are many other parts of the empire where the cultivation of bananas can be profitable. Sugar-cane is now grown at the Villaggio Duca Abruzzi, and could be extended to other localities under 6000 feet, while beet sugar can be produced on the high plateau. The prospects are also favourable for the introduction of tea and quinine, but the latter takes fifteen years to mature. Although the quinine plantations in Eritrea are as yet only eight years old, they appear to be in a healthy condition.

Other products for which there are great possibilities are vegetables, fruits, tobacco, castor oil and olives. As hitherto the Ethiopians have made no attempt to grow either vegetables or fruits, these will be introduced. This has already been done to some extent in the colonies of Eritrea and Somaliland. It is surprising to see the rapidity with which

vegetables grow in many parts of the country which differ widely in altitude and climate. At Bahr Dar (on Lake Tana), at Saio (in western Ethiopia), and at Negelli (in the south of Sidamo) I have seen gardens started only a month previously which were already yielding an adequate daily supply of tomatoes, beans, cabbage, lettuce, etc. Citrous fruits and olives grow wild over a considerable part of the country; and a visit to the concessions on the Juba and the Webi Shebeli is sufficient to show the success that can be attained, wherever irrigation is possible, with the cultivation of oranges, grapefruit and bananas. Besides the products already enumerated, there are many others, such as kapok and tobacco, which may well be cultivated successfully in suitable localities; for there is a wide range in the varieties of soil and climate, and it would be difficult to find anything which would not thrive in some part of Italian East Africa. Flying over the western half of Ethiopia, one obtains a striking impression of the vast regions of fertile country, well wooded in parts, which is available for Italian cultivation and development. At the same time, it is remarkable to see here and there the very small patches of native cultivation, which are infinitesimal in proportion to the agricultural possibilities. It would be hard to imagine a countryside more promising, and in which less had been done to make use of the rich gifts of Nature. Even in the regions of southern Eritrea and eastern Amhara there are vast stretches of fertile plains where water can be obtained near the surface, and which would seem to hold out good prospects for agricultural enterprise.

Live-stock also forms an important factor in the agricultural wealth of the country, and in this direction there are great possibilities for improvement and development. This branch of agriculture is of importance to Italy owing to the large quantities of cattle and meat which she has formerly had to import from abroad. While cattle raising has been successfully carried out for some time in Italian Somaliland, in Ethiopia only the most primitive methods of stock farming were known. Cattle were employed by the natives for food and as draught animals, while the export of hides constituted the chief trade of the country. Sixty per cent. of these hides found their way to different parts of the British Empire. This old-established trade is being encouraged by the Italians,

who continue to export to foreign countries in order to increase their supplies of foreign currency. Previous to the Italo-Ethiopian War it was estimated that there were from ten to twelve million head of cattle in Ethiopia, but this number was considerably reduced during the war by the depredations of the Ethiopian army, and for many years the natural increase has been checked by disease. Ethiopian cattle, however, have good powers of resistance and respond well to inoculations, whereas European cattle have mostly succumbed when subjected to this treatment after importation. An extensive veterinary service is being established in order to deal with all forms of cattle disease. The institute for research work and for the preparation of vaccines at Asmara is most up to date, and branches are being established in various centres. At present there is only one main breed of Ethiopian cattle with certain variations, the humped type known as the 'zebu.' The quantity of milk given by the cows is poor, but the fat content is high in proportion, and is nearly double that of the average European cow. For this reason the prospects for dairy farming are good, and a company has already started investigation into its possibilities. The question of cross-breeding is also being carefully studied, and investigations are being carried out in Kenya, where conditions and climate are similar. Naturally, the quality of the cattle varies very considerably in different localities. While those in northern Eritrea are thin and poorly nourished, animals in such districts as Lake Tana, Wollo Galla, the Gojjam and the whole south-western area are larger and fatter according to the respective value of the pasturage. The Italians intend to exploit to the fullest extent the whole industry of cattle raising, partly with the idea of establishing an export trade in frozen and tinned meats. Sheep are found all over Ethiopia in many breeds and cross-breeds, but the wool is poor in quantity and quality. For this reason it is the intention of the Italians to introduce into certain regions of the Ethiopian plateau Merino sheep, which are successfully bred in Kenya. The best districts for this purpose are those situated between 4500 and 8500 feet. In Eritrea breeding has been tried between the Persian Astrakan and the local black goat, which has produced a cross-bred with fine glossy black pelt. Owing to the importance which Italy attaches to the

production of wool, considerable research work is being carried out with regard to cross-breeding and the importation of suitable strains.

Hitherto horse breeding has been confined to the Galla tribes, and these horses have been chiefly used throughout Ethiopia for the breeding of mules. The Ethiopian horse, however, is a small but sturdy type, and has been found to cross satisfactorily with Arab stallions and Sardinian mares. Mules and donkeys have long been used by the Ethiopians for transport purposes, and there are a great many of them in the country. The Ethiopian mule, well known throughout the world as a good saddle and pack animal, will continue to be bred for use in these vast tracts of country lying between the new lines of communication. At present they cost more than horses but, as the demand decreases owing to modern forms of transport, the price should fall accordingly. Native poultry, though numerous, cannot be regarded as a table delicacy, and the eggs are very small; but arrangements are being made for the importation of various breeds from abroad, and incubation experiments are being carried out. Bees are kept to some extent by the natives in the west, and a large production of honey and wax for export is possible in the future.

In visiting the country in the west and south-west of Ethiopia it was obvious that there are regions possessing extensive timber resources. In the districts of Gimma, Kaffa, Saio and the Lakes there are dense and extensive forests containing valuable woods suitable for building purposes and the manufacture of furniture. In the Anfilo forest it is said that fifty-six different varieties of wood have been counted, and among them ebony, mahogany, juniper and varieties of rosewood. Hitherto the only use to which these woods have been put has been for the manufacture of furniture by missionaries, and to a very limited extent for building purposes. In fact the timber wealth of the country was so little appreciated by Menelik that he gave grants of land to those who destroyed the forests. During the time of the ex-Negus six concessions were granted for the erection of saw-mills, but three of these were never put into operation. Small saw-mills are now being started by the Italians to meet local needs, but it is expected that the timber trade will become

one of considerable importance when the whole subject of the forests has been fully investigated, and when means of transport have been provided. At the time of writing only the main arterial roads in western Ethiopia are under construction, and it will undoubtedly be some time before much use can be made of these timber resources. The subject of re-aforestation has already been approached, and forest guards have been appointed to exercise control over forest fires and the cutting down of trees.

The mineral resources of Italian East Africa cannot yet be described in much detail owing to the long time necessary for complete investigation in so large a territory, but there is a certain amount of definite information available about minerals which are known to exist and those which there is good reason to believe are present in certain regions. It has long been known that gold exists in Ethiopia, but much misleading information has been current regarding the significance of this fact. The truth is that gold is to be found in Eritrea and in western Ethiopia. In the former case it is to be found in the neighbourhood of Asmara and between that town and the Sudan frontier, while in the latter it is found in the rivers of Wollega and Beni Shangul, especially in the Bir-Bir River and in the valley of the Ghibie, a tributary of the Omo. The existence of the gold mines of Eritrea has been known for hundreds of years, and traces of old Portuguese workings are still clearly discernible, while remains of ancient Roman works have also been found. During the Portuguese occupation the native population used to pay tribute to the church at Adowa in gold dust. Early in 1900 mining activity died out for lack of capital, unscientific methods, excessive cost of power and the depreciation of gold. Later, however, geologists and engineers reported favourably on the prospects of these mines, but considerable capital expenditure was necessary in order to make them into a paying proposition. Owing to the proximity of the frontier and the constant danger of Ethiopian raids, it was impossible to find this capital, and some of the mines were abandoned, although in 1935 twenty-five small mines were still being worked by the old primitive methods. The rocks of this neighbourhood are pre-Cambrian, and there are numerous quartz outcrops, indicating the presence of gold. Most of the gold is found

in combination with sulphides and, although the percentage varies considerably, many of these mines hold out good prospects of becoming profitable concerns. One mine has a present output of nearly 100 kilogrammes a month. Further investigations are taking place, and modern plant and machinery are being set up where the prospects justify this course. In western Ethiopia, on the other hand, there has been as yet practically no scientific investigation, and there remains a doubt as to whether there is any source of gold other than that recovered from the rivers by the native method of washing. Although a considerable quantity is found in these rivers, it appears to be too scattered to justify the cost of installing modern machinery. The only source of platinum is near Iubdo, on the Bir-Bir River, where the mines have for some years been worked by an Italian concession. The output here is 200 to 250 kilogrammes a year of platinum, mixed with gold and other minerals in the proportion of 80 per cent. platinum, 15 per cent. gold, and 5 per cent. other minerals. There are prospects of raising the output to 350 kilogrammes a year.

Other minerals known to exist are mercury, in the region of Cher-Cher, west of Harar; coal at Debra Libanos, in the valley of the Angareb, and near Ankober; and salt in considerable quantities in the Danakil depression and on the sea-coast at Massawa and Assab. Chloride of potash is also found in the northern part of the Danakil depression; and mica exists in different parts of the country. Marble has been found near the Takazze River and also in northern Somaliland. While the presence of the foregoing minerals has already been established, there are others which geologists have good reason to believe exist in quantities of commercial value. There are believed to be deposits of silver and lead in certain districts of central Ethiopia; there is good reason to suppose that iron will be found at Ankober, Entoto (near Addis Abeba), Debra Tabor, and in the districts of Arussi and Gojjam; and sulphur is expected in the Danakil and the valley of the Awash. Moreover, the geological formation of the Ethiopian high plateau is of such a nature that the presence of these and other mineral deposits may safely be presumed, but it is impossible at present to obtain any further information on the subject.

Although much has been said and written about the presumed presence of oil in Ethiopia, expert investigation up to date does not justify undue optimism. There is no doubt that oil does exist in the regions to the south of the Red Sea. It has been found in British Somaliland, although it has never been used for commercial purposes, and it is used by the natives of the Danakil. There is also oil in the islands of the Dahlak Archipelago, off Massawa, and experts believe that the quantity may be sufficient to be of some commercial value.

Industry and commercial activity may be divided into three categories:

(1) Small industries and concessions previously operated in Ethiopia and the Italian colonies. These included the working of gold in Eritrea and in western Ethiopia, an Italian platinum concession at Iubdo, the long-established trade in hides and skins, the export of coffee, and two saw-mills and other small concessions in Ethiopia. In Eritrea there was a tobacco factory, cotton was grown at Tessenei on the Sudan border, salt was worked near Massawa and at Assab, and there was a cement factory at Massawa. In Italian Somaliland there was at Villaggio Duca Abruzzi a sugar factory supplying cane sugar to the whole colony, cotton ginning at Vittorio d'Africa, and a considerable export trade in bananas, while some kapok and other agricultural products were also grown for export. The conquest of Ethiopia has had a remarkable effect in stimulating the further development of trade and industry in Eritrea and Italian Somaliland, which was previously hampered through insecurity. Consequently, efforts are now being made to enable these territories to take their part in the general development of the whole of Italian East Africa.

(2) Factories are beginning to appear for the supply of materials urgently needed for construction purposes. Under this heading come a factory for the production of cement by a new method at Massawa, and a second factory more recently opened at Diredawa. Brick factories are already in full operation at various centres, and the traveller will come upon such factories being hastily constructed wherever the necessary materials can be found. Small saw-mills and forges of a temporary nature have been erected here and there by the Blackshirts for local use. As the urgent needs of an extensive

system of motor transport calls for a continual overhauling and repair of vehicles, the most up-to-date repair shops have been set up by the military authorities. A visit to one of these established at Mogadishu creates the impression that a civilian motor industry will flourish here in the near future.

(3) Future industrial development at present takes the form of investigation by companies which have sent missions to prepare the way. These missions, about twenty in number, cover a large variety of industrial activities, and are dealing with the following types of products: live-stock breeding; wool; prospects of creating a meat industry in the Gojjam and other districts; milk derivatives; hides and skins; tanning; cotton; textile fibres; oil seeds and fruits; cocoa; timber; gold and other minerals; cement; bricks; and the electrical resources of the country. These companies are working with the object of obtaining concessions as part of the industrial branch of Italian colonisation, but the prospects in these various directions cannot be stated until the reports of the different missions have been submitted. There is only one company at present with foreign participation—*i.e.*, the Italo-German Mineral Company, which has permission to explore for ores in the Harar district.

At present the chief pre-occupation of the Italians with regard to trade with other countries is the establishment of satisfactory trade routes on all the frontiers of Italian East Africa. The eastern part of this territory depends on the ports of the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden; the southern part uses the Somali ports of the Indian Ocean; and the natural outlet for the western half of Ethiopia is by way of the Nile. In the east work has already begun on the construction of a new port at Assab, where a large sum of money is to be spent, to supplement the ports at Massawa and Jibuti. An agreement has also been reached between the British and Italian Governments for the use of the ports of Berbera and Zeila, and for transit through British Somaliland. This agreement, which came into force on March 1 for a period of two years, is renewable by mutual agreement. The roads to be opened for transit are Berbera–Hargeisa–Jijiga, Zeila–Buramo–Jijiga, and Zeila–Aisha. These roads are to be made suitable for the traffic contemplated at all times of the year under normal conditions, and the ports of Berbera and Zeila are to be made available to

Italian shipping. These two ports will eventually be able to handle 200 tons and 50 tons per day respectively of ordinary goods. No customs dues are to be charged, but a small *ad valorem* tax on transit will be levied. Facilities are to be given to Italian firms engaged in the transit trade, but local native labour is to be employed. While this agreement will be of considerable benefit to Italy, it will also be of appreciable advantage to British Somaliland. In the south, in addition to the Italian Somaliland ports, trade is also possible with Kenya, and for this reason it is hoped that an agreement will be reached with that Colony. On the western side there are four important transit routes between Italian East Africa and the Nile valley, an agreement with regard to which would be of mutual benefit to Italy and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. These routes are:

(1) From Kassala (connected by rail with Port Sudan and by a good road with Khartoum) to the terminus of the Massawa–Asmara–Agordat railway. This route, *viâ* Port Sudan, would be shorter and more convenient for western Eritrea than the present route across the high mountains to Massawa.

(2) From Gallabat to Gondar, connecting the Sudan with a large healthy and fertile area.

(3) From Kurmuk to the somewhat isolated region of Beni Shangul.

(4) From Malakal (on the White Nile) to Gambela, by way of the River Baro. Although river navigation between Khartoum and Gambela is now only possible during four months of the year, it is understood that this period could be doubled by dredging. The question, therefore, arises of making Port Sudan available for Italian transit trade and of giving Italy facilities for making use of the Nile navigation.

As far as actual trade is concerned, Italian policy is to confine this to countries who have recognised *de jure* Italian sovereignty in Ethiopia, and with whom commercial treaties are made. Although the principle is to establish a reciprocal exchange of goods, it is obvious that this is not always possible for a country in urgent need of certain classes of raw materials. The need for oil for motor transport is already great, and the demand may be expected to continue, and possibly to increase, as the road system develops. There are a number of essential

materials which Italy cannot herself supply, such as iron and other metals. On the other hand, the products of industrial colonisation in East Africa are intended for world markets, and in course of time should greatly increase the volume of Italy's foreign trade.

In the department of public works a vast scheme has been drawn up, involving the expenditure of 12,000 million lire (about £130 million). Of this nearly 8000 million lire is allocated to road construction and 2000 million lire to building projects. Among the more important works to be carried out is the improvement of existing towns and the building of new ones. As a capital Addis Abeba presents many difficulties. Its area is considered to be as great as that of Paris within the fortifications, and it is thickly wooded throughout; deep foundations are necessary for the erection of permanent buildings; and the altitude (over 8000 feet) is considered by many to be unsuitable for the position of the central Government. Although the climatic conditions may not seriously affect younger officials, there is no doubt that it is trying to older men. At the same time, Addis Abeba is the obvious site for the administrative and commercial capital, being the central point on which many long-established trade routes converge. It has therefore, I understand, practically been decided not to move the capital elsewhere, but to remove the residence of the viceroy and headquarters of the Government to some place at a lower altitude in the neighbourhood. Akaki, situated on the Jibuti railway, has been mentioned as the most likely locality. In view of this uncertainty with regard to the future, there has been a certain reluctance to build more in Addis Abeba than seemed absolutely necessary. But in all their building projects the Italians are faced with a shortage of lime and building materials. Limestone has been found at Mogadishu and Diredawa, and I have also seen some at Negelli, but further local supplies have not yet been discovered. In a previous article it was stated that the town-planning of Addis Abeba provided for the division of the town into certain well-defined zones. In the industrial zone over 100 firms had made arrangements for accommodation by April 30 last, and a further 100 firms had made substantial progress in building. In the commercial zone land has already been allocated to permanent premises, work on which

is already in progress. In a few months' time it is expected that over seventy shops will be ready to open, and that about fifty flats will be available for use as living quarters or offices. Work is already well ahead with the restoration of permanent buildings partially destroyed at the time of the ex-Negus's flight. In the central and residential zones arrangements have been made for readapting old houses, and for temporary buildings to be replaced later on by permanent houses. In the native quarters 180 new *tuculs* have been built. These are made of stone with thatched roofs, and it is intended to increase their number as rapidly as possible. All the monuments of the time of the Negus have been removed. I first saw the gilded Lion of Judah standing opposite the station entrance at Addis Abeba ; it is now at the foot of the Dogali monument near the railway station in Rome. The importance of aviation in the development of Ethiopia cannot be overestimated, but as yet concrete landing-grounds have only been provided at Addis Abeba and Asmara. As there are many centres in the south and west still largely dependent on aviation for supplies and services, it is a matter of urgency to provide concrete runways in places where heavy rain often makes landing impossible.

Asmara, on the other hand, is a colonial town of many years' standing, with permanent buildings of a solid type. Although there is a serious shortage of accommodation owing to the recent enormous increase in the population, the building of houses is strictly controlled on the ground that the number of inhabitants is likely to decrease as other centres develop. Mogadishu is the best laid-out and quite the most attractive town of the whole empire, with its white Oriental buildings, broad streets, and palm-trees. It is clean and beautiful, and the tropical heat is mitigated by fresh breezes from the Indian Ocean during the periods of the monsoons. This port also has considerably increased in size, but not to the same extent as Massawa. In centres such as Dessié, Gondar and Gimma great changes are taking place. Dessié is expected to become the second most important commercial centre of the country when the roads to Assab and Gondar are completed, and still more so if the railway from Assab to Dessié is constructed. Consequently, a modern town is planned some miles from the present site, and this principle

is being applied in a great many other places. At Gondar a beginning has been made in the building of a European town about five miles from the old Gondar, famous for its Portuguese castles, but until recently the only accommodation has been in tents. The same applies to Gimma, the capital of Galla Sidamo. Similarly at Negelli there are plans for a new town, and buildings are already being erected. These will be used in the immediate future by workmen, but are ultimately intended for other purposes. I was surprised to see electric light, and to find that a water supply with pumping plant was already in operation. At Adowa a new market-place with stone buildings was well advanced three months ago, and a site had been chosen both there and at Axum for entirely new European towns. At Makalle, where the buildings are chiefly of stone, the work of an enterprising commissioner has produced a town as clean as circumstances permit.

Besides the port at Assab, where construction work was about to begin at the time of my visit, provision is made in the six-year plan for improvements at the ports of Mogadishu, Merca, and Kisimaio. Of these Somali ports the last named has the advantage of small islands off-shore which facilitate the building of a breakwater. When the roads are complete, it is intended that Mogadishu should serve a hinterland extending from Harar to the Ogaden. Merca will be used almost entirely for the banana trade, for which special ships have already been built. Kisimaio will become the port for Negelli and for the towns on the Juba River. Another important undertaking is the construction of a canal from the Webi Shebeli to the sea, near Merca, with the object of draining the swamps of this river, which is higher than the surrounding country and has no natural outlet to the sea. Irrigation schemes have also been begun on the Juba River, the right bank of which was previously British territory. In a country with many lakes and important rivers the Italians have been quick to realise the prospects of producing electrical power, and it is estimated that the whole of Italian East Africa can be supplied with electricity from these lakes and such rivers as the Blue Nile, the Omo, and the Awash.

After reading this account of what is being done to develop Italian East Africa, one of the first questions that will be asked is how the money is obtained to carry out these

works. Although I am not in a position to make anything approaching a full statement on the financial position, I can give a rough outline of the method employed. It should be remembered that a large proportion of the money expended on development finds its way back to Italy, and that Italy's policy in external trade is one of reciprocal exchange of goods. Also, two sources of wealth, often overlooked, are the tourist trade and the substantial sums annually sent home by Italians all over the world. At the same time, it seems obvious that heavy expenses for essential raw materials must have been incurred abroad, and that these cannot be met by this method. In order to meet the expense of the war a conversion loan was arranged in 1936, in which interest was increased from 3½ to 5 per cent., with a capital charge of 15 per cent. This transaction brought in eight milliards of lire and did not increase the public debt. To finance the development work in East Africa an internal compulsory loan was levied on owners of property. This loan pays an interest of 5 per cent., and has already brought in seven milliards. As far as can be ascertained, provision has now been made for the heaviest burden of expense, and it seems that the most urgent, and therefore the most intensive, development work has already reached its peak. Although it is possible that foreign capital may be welcomed later on, there is no question of relying on this in any way. As time passes, the agricultural and mineral resources of the country should relieve Italy of a heavy expense in raw materials, while the introduction of taxation and customs dues in Italian East Africa should help gradually to restore a normal position. The whole question of taxation is being examined with a view of introducing a new system suitable to the condition of the country, but this presents many difficulties owing to the peculiar type and methods of taxation previously employed in Ethiopia. As far as the district of Addis Abeba is concerned, the system operating in Eritrea is being applied. A new system of customs tariffs is also being drawn up in conformity with international agreements. Meanwhile a provisional system is applied, which is based on the tariffs existing at the time of the Italian occupation. This includes an import tax of 10 per cent. *ad valorem*, and an 8 per cent. *ad valorem* export tax. A small additional tax on imports and exports covers all the

miscellaneous extras previously levied by the Ethiopian customs. A large proportion of goods, however, coming from Italy are at present admitted free of duty. From the time that the Italians took over the administration of the Ethiopian customs up to the beginning of the current year the revenue from this source amounted to nine million lire. The Bank of Ethiopia has now been taken over by the Bank of Italy, and other Italian banks have opened branches in Addis Abeba and the other principal towns. Both the lira and the Maria Theresa dollar are legal tender throughout the country, and the exchange is at the rate of ten lire to the dollar.

The potential wealth of Italian East Africa, together with the results already achieved and the nature of the plans for the future, convince me that there are great prospects for this whole region; but everything depends on European peace. The Italians in Africa are enthusiastic and confident, but are apprehensive lest their hopes and plans be shattered by a European war. In this territory, at least, war in Europe is regarded as synonymous with disaster, whatever be the ultimate issue.

E. W. POLSON NEWMAN.

Mogadishu, Italian Somaliland, June 1937.

THE MAKING OF A BOOK

By Cecil Palmer

When I hear people remark—as I often do—that the published price of this or that book is too dear, I am terribly tempted to ask them the pertinent question, 'Do you appreciate the intricate and relatively costly processes involved in the manufacture of a book?' I am very much afraid that the reading public is badly informed on the subject. Authors are notoriously ignorant about it. I have the authority of twenty-five years' personal and practical experience of every branch of book publishing to support me in the assertion that books are, relatively speaking, the cheapest human luxury in the world to-day. But cheap as they are, they could be and would be cheaper still if the ever-increasing public which reads books could be persuaded to buy them instead of borrowing them. But that matter raises important and highly controversial issues far beyond the scope of my present purpose.

I want to take readers on an imaginative journey, beginning with the author's original manuscript as it is submitted and finally approved by the publisher, and ending with the finished product as it is displayed for purchase or loan in the bookshops and in the libraries.

The first and by far the longest stage in the manufacture of a book is the process of printing. It would be more accurate to say 'a series of processes,' for the printer's task in book production introduces a number of technical operations, each of which involves expert supervision and highly skilled mechanical labour. But, first of all, the publisher himself will have to decide one or two important points. His job, in actual fact, is to visualise a manuscript as a fully produced book, and that test of imagination can be and often is severe. It is his decision alone that decides in advance

the size of a book and the publication price—relatively th two most important decisions in every publisher's routine, i we except, perhaps, the initial decision to accept or rejec the author's manuscript. The decision regarding the pub lication price and, in a slightly less degree, size and format determine the ultimate commercial success or failure of mos books.

The publisher's decision regarding these two importan points having been made, the manuscript goes to the printer Here it must be noted that book printing, as distinct from ordinary commercial printing, is in a class by itself. The firms which specialise in book work are well able to render valuable assistance to the publisher in such important matters as style and size of type and the general lay-out of the printed page, with especial reference to the width of margins, setting of headlines and chapter headings, and the position and type of page numbering or, as it is technically termed, pagination. Before the printer can proceed with his job he must first of all give the publisher a detailed estimate of costs. To this end, he carefully estimates the number of words in the complete manuscript. Having 'cast-off' the manuscript—to use his own jargon—he can calculate the exact number of type pages required for actual printing.

The number of printed pages required is obviously determined by the size of type selected. But an interesting technical point emerges at this stage. Speaking generally, the printer does not base his calculations on single pages of type. The reason for this will be apparent in a moment. His estimate of costs is almost invariably calculated on either 16 or 32 complete pages of type. Each 16 or 32 pages makes one 'signature.' If the reader will glance at the foot of page 17, or, more generally, page 33, of any book on his shelves he will make an interesting discovery—probably for the first time. The initial letters A, B, C, and so on which appear throughout the book at regular intervals of either 16 or 32 pages are called 'signature marks.' They are placed there for a purpose of great utility—namely, to enable the binder, in due course, to collate and fold the printed sheets in correct order of pagination with the minimum risk of error. Similarly, this principle of calculating in multiples of 16 or 32 pages is adhered to in the second part of the printer's

estimate, namely, the cost of 'machining'—*i.e.*, the actual printing. In practice, however, the printer finds it simpler to base his machining or printing charges on the amount of paper used, but this does not lead to any inconsistency or confusion, because all paper used in the manufacture of books is supplied by the paper mill in sizes that can be folded subsequently into multiples of 8, 16, 32 and, in cases of very large editions, 64 pages.

We will now assume that the publisher has persuaded himself that the printer's charges are so reasonable as to be irresistible. At this point the printer's real troubles begin. The author's manuscript is now 'in hand,' or rather in several hands. For what actually happens is this. The manuscript is broken up into sections and distributed to two, three, or four skilled compositors whose work it is to transform the author's typescript into type. (I should mention here that setting up type by hand is now virtually obsolete in general book production. The exceptions are expensive volumes of the edition *de luxe* class and scientific and highly technical works.) Setting of book type to-day is usually performed by 'tapping'—similar in every way to the tapping of the keys on a typewriter. The process is known as monotype, a mechanical method of setting up type by separate letters in contradistinction to linotype, which sets up a whole line of words. The latter is used mainly in newspaper printing.

The next stage of the work reintroduces the author and the publisher. The printer having submitted, usually in small sections, proofs of the composition, the publisher and more particularly the author are expected to correct the proofs. These first proofs are submitted on long narrow slips of paper varying in length from 24 to 36 inches. They are termed galley or slip proofs and are pulled up in this form for a particularly practical reason. Authors, like ordinary beings, are sometimes guilty of errors and have been known to change their minds. Hence galley proofs, which have not been paginated, permit the author to make drastic alterations, deletions and additions without incurring exorbitant extra charges for 'author's corrections.' On the return of the galley proofs to the printer, three important operations follow. First, the proofs are carefully revised in accordance with the author's corrections. Secondly, the slip proofs are

made up into page form and each page is numbered consecutively. And thirdly, these revised page proofs are examined by the expert eyes of the printer's reader. The public can have no conception of the value and importance of this individual who works so efficiently behind the scenes in every printing house which has a reputation to lose. Every day and in every way he protects authors against themselves. His modest queries in the margins of page proofs, which invariably give so much evidence of mental vigilance, must often have astonished and dumbfounded even authors of front-rank eminence. Authors' 'howlers,' as we all know, do occur in print sometimes, but it is safe to say that there would be a vast increase in such literary anachronisms if it were not for the encyclopædic versatility of the printer's reader.

When the printer's reader is satisfied that his check-up is complete, the page proofs are despatched *viâ* the publishers to the author. His task should now be a comparatively simple one. He will, however, be warned to avoid anything in the nature of rewriting, as this would certainly overrun the type page and necessitate drastic alteration of the pagination. If the printer has done his job well the author should be able to return the proofs passed for press with virtually no further corrections at all other than slips in punctuation and occasional misspellings.

Having reached the 'going to press' stage in the manufacture of a book, other agents are called upon to assist in the final stages of production. The two most important of these are the paper merchant and the bookbinder. We will deal with the paper merchant first. To the lay eye all book papers appear to be more or less similar in appearance. In actual fact, book papers vary greatly both in texture and weight. There are, indeed, hundreds of different qualities of book papers of variable weights, sizes and thicknesses. But, generally speaking, the two grades of paper most commonly used in book work are antique wove and antique laid. The former is more serviceable for novels, memoirs and travel books, because antique wove is a paper which 'bulks.' The public is very shy of a thin book, even though such a book contains as many, and even more, pages than one twice its thickness or bulk. On the other hand, antique laid paper

has a smoother surface and a stouter texture, but chiefly because it does not bulk its uses are more or less confined to books which do not in any degree depend for their popularity on size and apparent value for money.

Book papers are supplied to the printer in flat sheets, which must not be confused with the common street scene of lorries conveying colossal rolls of paper to the presses. The latter are almost exclusively used in newspaper and magazine printing. It will make for clarity, I think, if I take a simple example of a standard novel by way of illustration and describe the size and weight of paper required and the number of copies which can be printed from a given quantity of it. We will assume that we are printing an edition of 1000 copies of a novel of the average length of 320 pages. Each sheet of paper measures 30 by 40 inches, technically called a quod crown sheet. The paper is supplied to the printer in bulk, calculated by single reams. Each ream of quod crown paper will print 100 complete copies of a 320-page novel, or, in other words, we shall require ten reams of quod crown paper measuring 30 by 40 inches per single sheet to print a first edition of 1000 copies of a standard novel. The average weight of each ream of paper used in the manufacture of a novel is 80 lb., or 800 lb. (approximately a third of a ton) of paper for every 1000 copies printed. The chief raw material of the paper I have quoted in this example is 'wood-pulp,' and its 'bulking' properties are such that 320 pages produce a book-thickness of about 1⅛ inches.

We must now return to the printer, who has not been idle during the interval between the return of the author's proofs passed for press and the delivery of the paper from the mill. Having satisfied himself that the author's final corrections have been adjusted in the type, he will proceed to impose the pages in 'signatures' of 16 or 32 pages. Imposition, or make-up as it is sometimes called, may be defined as the arrangement of type in a chase or form for the purpose of printing a complete signature of pages in one operation. Precautions must be taken to prevent the type from working loose whilst it is on the machine, and this is effected by what is termed locking up the forms with wooden or metal furniture, wedged in between the margins of type and the borders of the printing chase or form. There now remains only

one further preliminary in the lengthy and complicated process of book printing. I refer to the preparation of the printing press itself. The forms of type must be adjusted in the bed of the machine with meticulous accuracy if faulty registration, type out of alignment, and uneven printing are to be avoided, and not a little skill and infinite care are necessary in providing the rollers of the machine with an exact sufficiency of ink. An error of judgment at this stage will inevitably lead to the costly waste of paper and print. All is now ready—the release signal is given. The machine roars and thuds through several non-stop working hours. The book is printed.

The printed sheets delivered to the binder are called flat sheets. They are despatched to the bindery in bales each containing approximately 500 flat sheets of signature A, signature B, and so on. We will imagine that the flat sheets now being dealt with by the binders represent our previous example of an edition of 1000 copies of a novel of 320 pages. In this case the binder will first of all have to face the tricky task of unpacking twenty bulky and heavy bales of flat sheets, taking the utmost care, on the one hand, to avoid damage to the sheets and, on the other, keeping a sharp look-out lest a bale of one particular signatures becomes mixed up with another.

While there is very little female labour used in book printing, women and girl labour preponderates in book binding. The binding of a book, like the printing of a book, is a series of processes. I will attempt, very briefly, to define them. The first stage is the folding and collation of the flat sheets—that is, flat sheets of type, printed both sides. These are folded to make 32 consecutive single pages of reading matter. When the folding of the sheets is completed, they are collated or assembled in consecutive signatures to make single copies of a complete book. They are then sewn together and taped. On examining a book it will be noticed that a narrow strip of tape joins the printed sheets to the binding case itself. The tape does not obtrude, because it is covered by the end-papers pasted down on the inside of the cover at the front and end of the book. We have now reached a stage when it is true to say that we have a complete book in its unbound state.

Now comes the all-important binding-case itself. The material used varies according to the class of book and the cost. But, generally speaking, cloth of various qualities and colours, or the more durable and rather more costly buckram, is the covering of ninety-nine out of a hundred books published to-day. The cloth is backed or stiffened by strawboard of sufficient weight and thickness to support the printed pages. The lettering and, if there be any such, the design are drawn by an artist, and from his sketch blocks, in either zinc or brass, are cut. From these zincos or brasses the lettering and decoration are blocked by machinery on the front and the spine of the binding-cases. Everything is now ready for the final process. The tapes already referred to are treated with glue and the sewn sheets with glued tapes are inserted in the binding-cases. The book is now placed in the 'binder'—a machine which subjects each book to enormous pressure.

I was about to say that the making of a book is now completed. But it is not. Quite a number of people share my belief that not the least important or the least interesting part of many modern books (particularly works of fiction) is the jacket or wrapper. Something, therefore, must be said about it, in view of its almost incomprehensible importance and its commercial value. From the publisher's point of view the wise choice of a book-jacket often presents exasperating difficulties. The problem is full of 'snags,' the chief of which is the almost impossible task of attempting to please his salesmen, the author, the artist, and the booksellers at one and the same time. Not one of these interested parties sees it from the same angle, and each of them thinks he knows better than the other what is and what is not an ideal book-jacket. But, in a general way, the publisher tackles the problem in the following manner.

A complete set of rough proofs is sent to the artist. If either the publisher or the author has any suggestions of his own—and usually they are both embarrassingly prolific in a matter of this kind—they are conveyed to the artist in order the better to confuse and confound him at the start. The artist, in turn, submits two or three rough sketches, and after much wrangling and bitter controversy one of them is finally approved. The finished drawing is then made and

forwarded to the engravers for block-making. Most jackets for novels are produced in three colours, and therefore require three separate blocks for printing. An interesting point about jackets is worth mention. The artist's finished design is always drawn one and a half times the size of the printed reproduction. The equivalent reduction is made photographically when the blocks are made. Infinitely better reproduction is obtained from drawings thus reduced than from drawings the blocks of which are identical in size. Each jacket passes through the printing-press three times, and at each of the three stages the colours are superimposed on each other, allowing an interval for drying between printings. The printed jackets are now sent to the binders to be placed on the books—to serve, like a young lady's dress, to arouse interest, to attract, and to protect the binding, as in the case of gloves, against careless handling of chance acquaintances.

A book is a work of art, the joint product of many craftsmen working in harmony. Well-made books, to those who understand them, are more than merchandise: they contain more than even the author put into them. Hence the love of book-collectors and the deep affection of book-lovers for the best specimens of the printer's handicraft.

CECIL PALMER.

GREEK VERSES OF SWINBURNE HITHERTO UNPUBLISHED IN ENGLAND

THE following are the Greek verses published in the collaborative memorial volume to Théophile Gautier, to which reference is made in my article on Swinburne in the June number, 1937. This volume, the tribute of eighty-three European writers, including many of the most distinguished poets of the time, as well as others whom it is charitable not to qualify, was published by Lemerre sixty-four years ago, and for a long time now has been out of print. Swinburne's five Greek poems, as I have mentioned, have never been printed in England, and it may be considered a service to him and to humanism to rescue them from the oblivion into which they have been allowed to fall. We may be sure that Swinburne himself would wish them to be permanently preserved. Defending compositions in Latin and Greek (in a letter where he refers to these poems), he said that 'good verse of any kind at any time is a good thing'; and he would not have given them to the world if he had not thought them up to his own high standard. Jowett bestowed upon them his exacting professorial approbation; as Landor had extended something much greater than professorial admiration to the Greek verses which are almost an integral part of *Atalanta in Calydon*. Moreover, Swinburne, in an expansive epistle to a familiar, said that he was 'rather cock-a-hoop about' the verses which are now published for the first time in the land of his birth.

I have detected some twenty errors of various kinds in the French printing of the verses, and I have made what seem to me to be the necessary emendations. Some of these errors are glaring and barbaric, and one wonders at the carelessness (or something worse) of those charged with the supervision of the volume.

In the versions of the poems which I have ventured to make, and of whose imperfections I am fully aware, I have

not attempted to reproduce the elegiac metre of the first four; but I have essayed to maintain the choriambic movement of the last poem (υῡ|–υυ–|–υυ–|–υυ–|υ–).

RANDOLPH HUGHES.

EPITAPHS FOR THE TOMB OF THÉOPHILE GAUTIER

I.

Πᾶσι θεοῖς πάντως δὲ θεῷ φίλον ἄνδρα Λυκείῳ
ὡς νέον ὄντ' ἐτύμως ὠνόμασαν Χάριτες.

'Dear to the most high gods that rule the earth,
Dear chiefly to the lord of song and light':
Pierian voices greeted him at birth
And named aright.

II.

Ἐνθάδε πιερίοισι κόμην στεφάνοισιν ἑλιχθεὶς
τύμβον ἄκαιρον ἔχων οὔνομ' ἄθαπτον ἔχει,
οὔνομ' ἄθικτον ἀεὶ θανάτου καὶ ἀτρύμονα τιμὴν
ἡδυεπὴς Μούσαις ἡδυθρόοις θεράπων.
Ἦν ποτ' ἐπωνυμίας χάριν εἶχε θεῷ φίλος ἐν γῇ
τήνδε θανὼν ἔτ' ἔχει νέρτερος ἐν φθιμένοις,
Περσεφόνῃ τ' Ἀΐδῃ τε θεῷ φίλος· Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλων
οὔτις ἀοιδοπόλων τοῦδ' ὑπερέσχε μέλει,
οὐδὲ λύρᾳ συνέπλεξε λόγους ἡδίονι ῥυθμῷ
τερψίνοον τερπνῶς Κύπριν ἐπᾳσόμενος.
Ἡ μὲν Καλλιόπης ἄρ' ἔφυ γένος, ἡ δ' Ἀφροδίτης,
τοῖον ὃς ὑμνοθέτων αὐλὸν ἔκρεξε νόμοις.
Εἰ δ' ἔτι τοῖς εὕδουσι πανύστατον ἐν χθονὸς ὄρφνῃ
ὕπνον ἔνεστι φίλων ἢ πόθος ἤ τι χαρᾶς,
τῷδ' ἐπιβάλλοντες χαροπώτερον ὄμματος ἀκμὴν
οἱ πάλαι ἐκ Μουσῶν στέμματα δεξάμενοι
ὕμνον ἐπᾴσονται ξένιον σύμπαντες ἀοιδοὶ
καὶ προσεροῦσι πέδον πρόξενον Ἠλυσίου·
Χαίρειν αὐτομάτῃ δ' ὄπι μειδήσασα κελεύσει
Περσεφόνη Μούσαις μουσοπόλοις τε φίλη.

Here now, with Muses' chaplets on his head,
The Muses' priest is come among the dead.

He dies untimely, but his deathless name
Through all the ages lives, a steadfast fame.

The gracious name he had when he drew breath,
He hath it still in nether lands of death.

For dear to Hades and his queen is he
Whom none have e'er excelled in mastery.

Glad music to the gladsome Cyprian
Was ne'er more sweetly made by any man.

From Aphrodite or some Muse he sprung
Whose songs to ordered beauty all were sung.

If those who sleep the sleep that makes an end
Think ever sad or sweet thoughts of a friend,

Then surely those who wore the Muses' prize
Will see him come with recognising eyes;

Yea, all dead poets, stirred to song again,
Will hail new greatness in the Elysian plain.

And there, with instant smile, Persephone,
Dear to the hierophants of poesy,
Will draw him home and bid him welcome be.

III.

Κλῦθι γόων, Κυθέρεια, φιλομμειδής περ, ἀοιδοῦ
οἰχομένου, σὺ δ' Ἔρως αἴλινον εἰπὲ θεός.
Παντοδάπων γὰρ ἰδὼν μορφὴν ἐφίλωσεν Ἐρώτων,
πάντας ἐπιστάμενος, πᾶσι δ' ἔκρουσε χέλυν,
πᾶσι δ' ἐπισπείσας γλύκυν οἶνον ἔλειφεν ἀοιδῆς,
πᾶσι συναρμόζων ποικιλόγηρυν ὄπα,
Κύπριδος ἐκ θιάσων ἵνα μή τι ποθεινὸν ἀπείη
Οὐδ' ἔτ' ἄπεστι· Θανὼν γὰρ φίλος ἔστι θεᾷ.
Παῖδα δ' ἔθ' ἡμιγύναικα θεᾶς ἐσέβιζε καὶ Ἑρμοῦ,
ἀμφιθαλεῖς πλοκάμων ἀμφιβαλὼν στεφάνους.
Πάντα δ' ἐφ' ἱμερόεντα μέλη λίπ' ἔχρισεν ἐλαίῳ
ἡδυπνόῳ, διδύμοις δισσὸν Ἔρωσι γάνος
ἡμιθέῳ διφύεντι διπλῆν χάριν Ἑρμαφροδίτῳ
παρθενόχρωτος ἐρῶν εἰκόνος ἀμφιλόγου.

Blithe Cytherean, hear us who mourn him so,
A poet gone, and thou, Eros, sing woe.

For he saw many loves, he loved them all,
And sang of them with cunning musical;

In ranging tones of subtly suited speech
He made libation aptly unto each;

Thus Cypris' train lacked no wild reveller,
And he too now has gone beloved to her.

By him with blooms of splendour were bedight
The boy's or girl's locks of Hermaphrodite.

And with sweet oil he laved the limbs' rich line:
Twice adding grace to double sex divine;

Loving the ambiguous shape, the maiden sheen,
A twofold charm he lent the Epicene.

IV.

Κλαίετε πρὸς βήσσαισι καὶ οὔρεσι, κλαίετε νύμφαι,
πιστὸν ἐφυμνοῦσαι πασίφιλόν τε θεοῖς,
ὃς νῦν παννυχίαν θανάτου δὴ τέρψιν ἰαύων
κοῖτον ἄνυμφον ἔχει γῆς ὑπὸ παιδοβόρου
Ταύταις δ' ὦ χάριτες συγκλαίετε· Τίς γὰρ ἔτ' ὄντων
τοῖος ἐν ὑμετέροις κύκνος ἐπῇδε χόροις;
ἐκ δὲ τάφου θάλλοι ῥόδα ποίκιλα μουσοφιλήτου
λείρια δ' ἐκθρώσκοι, πᾶν δ' ἐφύπερθε κρίνον,
λευκόιόν τε καλὸν σὺν ἴοισι μελάνθεσι βλάστοι,
καὶ πολὺς οἰνοτρόφων βόστρυχος ἀμπελίδων·
καὶ γλυκὺν ἡμερίδος κλάδον οἰνάνθην τε τέρειναν
γαῖα τρέφοι μύρτου δ' ἔρνεα κυπρογενοῦς,
Φοίβου θ' ὑψίκομον δάφνην, κισσὸν τε κορύμβους,
πάντα θ' ὅσ' ὑμνοθέταις ἄνθινα δῶρα πρέπει.

Mourn on the scaur, O Nymphs, and in the dell
A true man's passing whom the Gods loved well;

Who now sleeps on for ever, having died,
On brideless bed neath Earth the Infanticide.

Ye too, O Graces, the lament prolong:
Who of his peers was such a lord of song?

Let roses of all shades spring from his grave,
Let one proud burst of lilies o'er them wave.

And let there rise dear violets black and white,
And foison of vine tenderlings all bright.

Yea, gracious vine shoots burgeoning round his tomb,
And tendrils of the amorous myrtle bloom.

Ivy, and lofty bay-fronds Apolline,
And all the floral scent and all the shine
Befitting masters of the mighty line.

V.

Ὦ θεῷ φίλ' Ἀπόλλωνι, θεῶν φίλτατε φιλτάτῳ,
πειθοῦς ἱμεροέσσας τέκνον, ἢ σ' Εὐφροσύνης φράσω;
καρδίας γε πεδήσας ἐπέων χρυσοδέτων πέδαις
ἄλλων, στὴν δὲ κόμην Πιερίδων δησάμενος πλόκοις,
νῦν δὴ παυόμενος τερπνοτάτης ἐν βιότῳ λύρας
εὔδιος, ἀμβροσίαν ἡμὶν ἀεὶ μνημοσύνην λιπών.

SWINBURNE.

O thou, dear unto him, lord of all song, dearest of gods on high,
The Word's fosterling thou, child too of Joy, now must we say goodbye.

Chaplets set by the nine Muses of Art lovelier made thy hair,
All men's hearts didst thou bind fast with thy words, shining like gold, all fair.

Thy hand touches no more music from lyre sweeter than e'er has been;
Now thou, leaving behind marvellous fame, passest from us serene.

BOOKS RECEIVED

The Oxford Book of Modern Verse (1892–1935), chosen by W. B. Yeats (Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, 8*s.* 6*d.* net).

Mr. Yeats' long-awaited anthology has pleased his fellow-countrymen but staggered his English critics. Had it been labelled 'The Dublin Book of Modern Verse,' it need have done neither. In the days of the great and ferocious Reviews we should have had a tournament between Irish Bards and British Reviewers. To-day there is only time to point out the beauty and the curiosity to be discovered in this volume. It appears to confer the Oxford canon on many not secured to fame in Quiller Couch's previous anthology, but it must seem strange to lack a sonnet from Lord Alfred Douglas or stanzas from Chesterton's *Ballad of the White Horse*, which are among the very good things of our time. Anthologies must be judged, like diadems, as wholes, without paying too much attention to the individual pearls and paste. This book is a twain rather than a whole. There is a collection of wild Irishry and another of very varied moderns, most of whom are intellectual but not always intelligible. The series of Oxford Verse Books has never contained an Irish or Gaelic collection, but this volume will go far toward filling the gap.

Mr. Yeats has here worked as a pioneer in poetical effects rather than as an editor of the classic. His own poems have satisfied the ear and spirit of two countries. Form, melody and half-lights have always been his; but why has he chosen so many poems without any of his own high poetic marks? Nothing has he lacked in the past save the intellectual quality. This lack he must feel, or how explain his gentle subservience to inferior poets who possess that note? This book shows

two loyalties: his twin desire to bathe in the Irish fairy well and yet to swim breast high amongst the moderns. The considerable Irish section triumphantly grafted in an Oxford Book might be labelled 'a section of Ireland's Revenge'! There was an English invasion of Ireland, but this is an Irish invasion into England's most sacred Parnassus. Sometimes we are near the Abbey Theatre and sometimes upon the haunted hills, and sometimes we get a glass of Dublin porter flung with an oath in our faces. It is all very exhilarating!

The 'Old Woman of Beare' is upon us twice in versions by Frank O'Connor and Lady Gregory. She is as difficult to escape in Irish anthologies as the great 'she bear' in the Hymn Book. Frederick Higgins is the Irish star with two clinking ballads as well as his delicious dirge for Jezebel—'God rest that Jewy woman.' Thomas McGreevy brings Red Hugh O'Donnell from his Spanish grave, and James Stephens has a bunch of merry curses ending 'the High King of Glory permit her to get the mange'! It is a pity that, except in one case, the name of the Irish original is never given. It would add to the interest and the scholarship.

Laureates like Masefield and Bridges seem to be admitted *ex-officio*, but merry Saxons like Kipling and Drinkwater and Squire seem to be there on sufferance Space and generous vision have been accorded to the moderns, and the reader is rewarded with fine bursts and sudden vistas away and afar It seems startling to meet Empson's 'hydroptic soap,' or MacNeice's 'Pomade dazzle, a slick beauty of gewgaws,' in an Oxford Book of Verse; but we have been suckled for a generation on Q., and it is time for our weaning. It is good to find Wilfrid Blunt appraised as 'permanent in our literature.' As a survivor Mr. Yeats is also a judge. William Watson 'had not rhetoric but noble eloquence.' Had Housman gone a mile further 'all had been marsh.' Oliver Gogarty escaped the firing squad to become 'one of the great lyric poets of our age'; Bridges is as distinct as Whistler's painting, and Eliot is 'satirist rather than poet.' In the moderns Mr. Yeats points out courageously the 'lack of form and consequent obscurity.' There is the axe laid to the upas tree. The next Oxford Book will be the true commentary on this experiment.

SHANE LESLIE.

Euthanasia, and other Aspects of Life and Death, by Dr. Harry Roberts (Constable, *7s. 6d.*).

This is a collection of essays, some of which have already appeared in print. Probably the subject which will arouse most interest at the present day is the one which gives the volume its title and is also placed first—'Euthanasia.' Dr. Roberts, writing as a practising doctor, approaches this question so impartially that one may doubt on which side his sympathies chiefly lie.

He begins by quoting concrete cases, one from a dying patient of his own who wrote to him stating the acuteness of his suffering and begging for release: 'I thank you for your kind attention and I want to make one last request of you. I trust you will grant it. You know the torture I am in, and you know that in any case I can live but a very short time. Will you save me from this painful death? I am, yours gratefully . . .' Dr. Roberts says that every doctor who has been many years in practice must have been confronted, again and again, by essentially similar requests. It is one of the dilemmas with which doctors are faced. What are doctors to do in such circumstances? If they accede to the patient's wish, they are, as the law now stands, guilty of the crime of murder. Consequently it is often cowardice rather than conscience or professional honour which leads them to observe the established convention. He suspects, however, that very many doctors do, on occasion, allow their sympathy and feeling of pity to guide their procedure. To a humane man, he observes, the inclination to administer the merciful overdose is often almost — not infrequently quite — irresistible. He quotes Mr. Justice Goddard, who at a recent 'mercy murder' trial at the Central Criminal Court, after pointing out the danger of accepting as an adequate plea 'I killed in mercy' or 'I killed in pity,' went on to suggest that it might be wise to alter the existing law 'so that the passing of a person afflicted with an incurable disease might be expedited. But assuredly, if ever this were to become legal, it could only be under the most rigorous safeguards, and not at the uncontrolled discretion of a relative.'

In setting out the case against voluntary euthanasia, the author says: 'If suicide is "right" in one case, why not

in another? Who is to say that the prospects are worse, or the suffering greater, of a patient with incurable cancer than of one whose heart is broken or for whom the possibility of satisfying the primal needs of his nature is absent?' Surely the difference lies just in the fact that the cancer case is incurable, and the patient in any case doomed, whereas broken hearts and poverty are essentially curable. Another argument against legalisation which he puts forward is that doctors are perhaps the least enthusiastic advocates of the proposed reform. It is doubtful if this is correct. Admittedly some doctors are strongly opposed, but others, like the late Lord Moynihan, are just as strongly in favour. We understand that already over seventy members of the medical profession, including some very distinguished ones, have joined the Voluntary Euthanasia Legalization Society, whose chairman, Mr. C. J. Bond, C.M.G., F.R.C.S., is himself a surgeon of distinction.

In summing up, Dr. Roberts quotes the traditional Roman Catholic view that life is a trust for which we must in due course give account. It is no slight matter to substitute, at short notice, for such an attitude one of cold practicality and expediency. There is a plausibility, he says, about the conclusions of utilitarian common sense that makes one hesitate about accepting them without critical contemplation. Obviously, if we are going to legalise the killing of other people, from whatever motive, adequate precautions must be taken. But here comes in another difficulty, for by over-elaboration of safeguards we can defeat the whole purpose of the suggested reform, and he is inclined to regard the procedure suggested in the draft Voluntary Euthanasia (Legalisation) Bill as unduly cumbrous.[1] He is not out of sympathy with the objects of the new society, but thinks that the restrictions imposed under the Bill would make it of narrow applicability even if it became law.

The second essay in the volume is on 'The Ethics of Suicide,' a cognate subject; and here Dr. Roberts says at once that it has always seemed to him strange that in a country which is neither Roman Catholic nor totalitarian

[1] In the Bill recently introduced into the House of Lords by Lord Ponsonby the procedure for obtaining euthanasia was appreciably simplified.—C. K. M.

the one thing of which a man is not at liberty to dispose is his own life. No matter how useless or how painful his continued existence may be, if he attempts to withdraw from a world in which he is so miserable and burdensome a visitor he is branded as a felon; whilst those who assist him to escape are liable to be charged as murderers. He says, truly, that the general reaction of the public to suicide is one of pity and sympathy rather than condemnation. He quotes the ancient philosophers Seneca and Epictetus, who extolled suicide where life had ceased to be either useful or happy, and he says that he knows of no utterances more noble in the literature of philosophy or religion. To one who does not accept the dogmas of Catholicism or share its beliefs it is hard to follow the ethical and philosophical objections sometimes raised to the act of suicide. Obviously, to kill oneself in order to escape the liabilities which we have voluntarily incurred is both cowardly and dishonest. But of how many of us is it true that the world would be a loser were we to end our citizenship? In his opinion, very few. It is well that we should look upon other people's lives as sacred, but he doubts if it is nobility of mind that makes us attach such cosmic and sacred significance to our own. He thinks that suicide (attempted) should cease to be a penal offence, as is already the case in Scotland and in almost all civilised countries which have not inherited British Canon Law.

All the essays are well written, lucid and to the point, by one who knows what he is writing about and how to write about it. The book is one we can heartily recommend.

C. KILLICK MILLARD.

WALKS AND TALKS

By Sir Arnold Wilson, M.P.

THE parliamentary session just ended has been fruitful of sound legislation, but will leave the Statute-book smaller than before, for it included several sorely needed measures of consolidation. The Civil List Act more than doubled the sums that will in future be annually available for Civil List Pensions. The Agricultural Acts should do something to prevent the steady shrinkage in the number both of men and of acres devoted to the production of food. The Government has been authorised to spend such sums as it may require to place the Fighting Forces of the Crown on as strong a footing as they held, relatively to the forces of other countries in Europe, twenty-three years ago, and the Exchange Equalisation Fund has been raised to a point which will enable the Treasury to play its part in this department of our National Defence. The Navy and Air Force are growing according to plan: the Army, as Captain Macnamara shows elsewhere in this issue, lags behind, being so short of men both for the Territorial and Regular services, and of modern weapons for their use, that it is clear that drastic measures will be necessary, when the House reassembles, to provide the number of men sanctioned by Parliament—a number which is, in fact, far fewer than was deemed necessary in 1914.

We were steered in masterly fashion through the legal mazes of the Abdication Bill by Sir John Simon before we were able to rejoice at the perfection of seemingly effortless efficiency displayed at the Coronation by the Government offices concerned—and few were not—and we survived a dozen elections without loss of tempers, or seats. Ministers of the Crown will now be paid on an intelligible system, and on a scale more commensurate with their responsibilities than hitherto, and members of Parliament will in future be a little less dependent upon commercial or professional employment,

or private means. The result should be to make members somewhat more independent: but the position will not be satisfactory so long as they—or their organisations—have to pay anything from £500 to £1500 by way of election expenses.

We have placed on the Statute-book a comprehensive measure dealing with hours and conditions of labour in factories, admirably piloted by Mr. Geoffrey Lloyd, and for the encouragement of physical training and recreation, the latter, properly understood, being supplementary to the former. The National Health Insurance and Pensions systems, both on a contributory basis, have each been extended to cover further wide categories of the population. The ice of nationalisation, or unification, of coal royalties has been broken and the first steps for creating a national road system taken. These measures have been supplemented by the Herbert Act—now on the Statute-book—by which eponymous title the Matrimonial Causes Bill, following ancient and respectable precedents, deserves to be known to future generations, who will have reason to be grateful to the initiative of a private member, representing an ancient university, and of another private member, Mr. de la Bère, who used his success in the Ballot to give the Bill a chance.

On these topics and on a score of other matters of little less intrinsic importance the Opposition has effectively performed the constitutional task of criticism and of exhortation whilst making it clear that it accepted the underlying principles.

It is unfortunate that the same cannot be said of the debates on Foreign Affairs, which have been more numerous than in any session since 1920. The Opposition have made it clear that their support of non-intervention, like their objection to the acceptance of the Salamanca Government as a belligerent, arises from their desire to oppose the establishment in Spain of a form of government which they fear will resemble that of Italy and to which they believe that of Valencia to be preferable. They support the latter, not because it is 'legal' or 'democratic,' but because it is 'anti-Fascist' and, as Lord Cranborne suggested in the House on July 15, they would not support a 'legal' Government in any totalitarian State in the unlikely event of a democratic and insurgent movement arising against it. Their views are not

widely shared in Britain; the average man is less anxious for Britain 'to keep the ring' than to keep out of it.

* * * * *

The unsparing honesty of the Report of the Royal Commission on Palestine has been widely praised; the historical introduction is admirably written and well-balanced, but it tells us less than some of us knew before, and much less than we should know, of the circumstances which led to the Balfour Declaration. In some respects it is inconsistent with Mrs. Dugdale's account in her *Life of Lord Balfour* (vol. ii., chapter xi.). It shows conclusively that historical inaccuracy of the account of the origin of the Balfour Declaration given by Mr. Lloyd George in his *War Memoirs* (vol. ii., pp. 584 *sqq.*) where he describes British policy in Palestine as a kind of *quid pro quo* for the genius of Dr. Chaim Weizmann in discovering and developing a process fot the manufacture of acetone. It ignores the passionate hostility to Zionism at the time of Mr. Edwin Montagu, and of perhaps the majority of leading Jews in this country and America, and the recorded doubts of the British Cabinet A full publication of all official documents bearing upon the subject, on the lines of Messrs. Gooch and Temperley's classic series of 'Documents relating to the Origins of the Great War,' is much to be desired.

* * * * *

Another statement of the Royal Commission which does less than justice to the permanent officials of His Majesty's Government at home and abroad is the observation 'that at the time of the Balfour Declaration little seems to have been known about the size and character' of the population of Palestine. The *Handbook on Syria and Palestine*, prepared by the Historical Section of the Foreign Office under the general superintendence of the late Lord Ernle, contains (at pp. 14 *sqq.*) as good an account of the racial and linguistic composition and distribution of the inhabitants as anyone could require. It estimates the Arab population of Palestine at 475,000 and emphasises that the native Christians are of the same Syrian stock as their Moslem neighbours. It puts the density of population in Western Palestine at 119 per square

mile, and refers to the immigration, principally of Jews, into Palestine as the chief cause of the modern growth of Jerusalem and Jaffa. It may well be that the Cabinet Ministers responsible for the Balfour Declaration paid *insufficient regard to these figures. But the basic facts relating to Palestine were in a convenient form at their elbow.*

Another handbook in the same series is *Zionism*, published in 1920, but also apparently in use in the Foreign Office from the spring of 1918 onwards, and periodically revised. It gives a fuller account of the origins of Zionism than is given by the Royal Commission, and it is written with no less distinction than conviction. It recalls the fact, not mentioned by the Royal Commission, that Lord Shaftesbury prepared in 1838 a memorandum for Lord Palmerston suggesting the settlement of Jews in Palestine under the guarantee of the Great Powers, a scheme to which the British public, headed by *The Times*, was intensely sympathetic.

These two handbooks suffice to show that if our statesmen erred it was not because the facts were not accessible to them. But their good faith is not impugned by the Report.

* * * * *

In the diary of the late Lord Bertie we have the pithiest, fullest and most authentic statement of the inception of Zionism, at second hand; it reads as follows: 'Dec. 30, 1917. Paul Cambon . . . said that Balfour explained his support of Zionism as partly financial, partly political and also sentimental . . . it would be an interesting experiment to reconstitute a Jewish Kingdom.' Yet every British Government since 1919 has declared that Zionism was not irreconcilable with Arab aspirations in Palestine. The Commissioners take the opposite view. Successive Governments have declared it to be their policy to regulate the numbers of Jewish immigrants by the economic capacity of the country to absorb them. The Commissioners, agreeing at every point with the Arabs, declare this policy to be mistaken; they condemn the policies of successive Governments, and they pointedly abstain from paying any sort of tribute to the British administration of Palestine.

They hope that water may be found in areas now uncultivable for lack of it. Whether their hopes are well-founded should be ascertained by large-scale borings during the next ten years. Work should be begun at once, for the possibility of a transfer of population from the Jewish to the Arab zone must depend largely upon the outcome.

The Commissioners hope that the minority populations—Moslem, Arab, Arab-Christian and German—in the new States can be induced, or compelled, to accept a scheme of transfer. I do not believe it, but it does not follow that the scheme will break down in consequence. Few Jews are to be found outside the suggested Jewish State, and the bulk of the great Arab population within the boundaries as now proposed may prefer to remain there, and may be welcome as citizens, when tempers have cooled, for it takes all sorts to make a world, even in Palestine.

The difficulties—personal, economic, racial and religious—are tremendous. Yet three days' study of the Royal Commission's Report left me with the conviction that though the remedies proposed are drastic they are less impracticable, and on a long view more hopeful, than any alternative which the wit of man can devise, and should be supported by all concerned. It may well be that by our support, in complete good faith, of Zionism we did a great wrong to Jewry as well as to Syria. Vagueness of language, often mistaken for diplomacy, and infirmity of purpose, born of war-weariness, did much to render our aims nugatory though they may always have been impossible of fulfilment. Mr. Lloyd George and those who laboured with him at Versailles have much to answer for, but, in the words ascribed to Plutarch to the Censor, 'It is hard that I, who have lived with one generation, should be obliged to make my defence to those of another.' It is difficult for us to recapture the ardent feelings, the haste, the hopes and the fears of those days.

Everything will depend upon the manner in which the recommendations of the Royal Commission are put into practice, both in Whitehall and in Palestine. In the words of Richard Burton in West Africa over eighty years ago: 'What England has done, England must undo.' An exchange of populations on a large scale is, as Greece has proved, no impossible, but it should not be necessary.

The proposed enclave for Jews, in the form of a Jewish State, is not novel. It was intended to form such a State for the Armenians, but infirmity of purpose of the Allies ended in the massacre by the Turks of such as were left. It was hoped to form a like enclave for the Assyrians. The perverse decision of a Commission appointed by the League in 1925 prevented this. Hongkong and Shanghai, and even Portuguese Goa, are not parallel cases, but they have sufficient resemblance to encourage hopes of success, and there are precedents nearer at hand, in the Lebanon and Alexandretta, for schemes of administrative separation based upon race and religion which do not stand self-condemned on that account.

Neither the Arab nor the Jewish State will number over a million citizens; neither will find it easy to choose a head or to secure obedience to him when chosen: their entry into the League of Nations will not add to the prestige of that body. Their economic resources will be scanty and, unless they can come to terms, their communications, and particularly those of the Arab State with neighbouring countries, will be bad. Both States will always need a big brother, and if they are to maintain their independence their choice must be identical. Syria is geographically indivisible and Palestine is part of Syria: it is scarcely less easy to divide it administratively, though we have done our best. It seems unlikely that the last word has been said on the subject of boundaries. The present proposals include several almost exclusively Arab areas in the new Jewish State. It would be worth while for the Arabs to forego a subsidy from the new State in return for the frontier rectification which would place them in Arab territory.

These and many other matters will be decided during the next few years. There is no 'solution,' but there is no need to assume an endless feud between the new States.

The responsibility for reaching a *modus vivendi* is primarily ours. It can be discharged if Parliament and the country will support the responsible Ministers, once they have reached a decision, in giving effect to it, and if the Ministers, in their turn, will support their representatives in Palestine in any action necessary to carry it through.

* * * * *

Paul Van Zeeland, Prime Minister of Belgium, is one of the ablest of the younger generation of European statesmen. President Roosevelt's declaration that 'he has no rabbit, and no hat,' with which to cajole the rival economic theorists of Europe throws us back once more upon our own resources, amongst which Monsieur van Zeeland, if he retains his health, may prove to be of the greatest value. To understand the man it is necessary to recall something of his history. Born in Hainault, educated as a Catholic in Louvain, decorated with the Military Cross in 1914, taken prisoner soon after, he twice escaped and was twice recaptured, but ill-health secured his internment in Switzerland.

In 1920 he went on an official mission to the United States and remained to study economics at Princeton. He joined the National Bank of Belgium in 1921, was delegate to the World Economic Conference at Genoa in 1922, and was adviser to the Greek Government in 1924. Two years later, as vice-governor of the National Bank, he helped to form the Bank for International Settlements. He returned to Louvain as a Professor of Economics, and in that capacity visited Soviet Russia, advised Egypt on her finances, visited the United States to study the New Deal.

His chance came when the French Government refused, in March 1935, to give financial aid to Belgium. M. Theunis resigned and his place was taken by M. van Zeeland. He decided that Belgian finances should not again depend on those of her neigbours. He devalued the belga once more, obtaining from the Chamber and Senate the dictatorial powers needed to ensure success. The severity of the remedy lost him and the Catholic Party which he led many votes, and at the next election the Socialists obtained a majority. But M. van Zeeland was still in office, though not in power. Stay-in strikes followed; he did not hesitate, but ordered the gendarmerie to expel the strikers, who forgot that they were not in France.

A few weeks later Socialists and Liberals agreed to form a coalition Cabinet under his premiership. Two years later the Rexists challenged him and announced their descent on Brussels in special trains. M. van Zeeland cancelled the trains. They challenged him again at the polls; he accepted the challenge, and won by 275,000 votes against 69,000

without the use of the radio, not wishing to upset the country unnecessarily.

I met him first in London last November—a lively figure, slim, dark, well-dressed, composed, and apparently detached in his outlook. Yet he has his enthusiasms. He believes, as is natural in one of Flemish descent, that the best policy for Belgium is one exclusively Belgian; the other is the stratosphere. He is a rich man, and he was largely responsible for Professor Piccard's triumph in this new and hitherto untouched field of science. Europe needs such men, and as long as it can produce them we need have no fear for its future.

* * * * *

Three million houses have been built since the Armistice —of which about 900,000 by local authorities, the rest by private enterprise. At an average of six to the acre, including new roads and social services, they must cover about 500,000 acres. It is reasonable to assume that arterial roads and road-widening, aerodromes and public works of one kind and another, including reservoirs, power stations, and new gravel pits, account for 100,000 acres each, making a total area lost to cultivation of 800,000 acres in the last ten years, and this may well be an underestimate. It is customary to call this 'land development' and to refer to land dedicated to food crops as 'sterilised'—an abuse of terms only possible in the mouths of an urban race.

The statement of the Ministry of Agriculture that the arable acreage has fallen in the last twelve months by 273,000 acres should be read in the light of these figures. Yet no country in Europe produces such good crops per acre as we do even now. Uncontrolled urbanisation inevitably entails national decay; some of us, like John Bright, already hear the beating of the wings of the Angel of Death. But the sound can scarcely be heard above the tumult of the cities. This year's legislation to encourage the improvement of land now under grass as well as under the plough is a small but important step in the right direction.

Sir Philip Sassoon's statement on July 13, as First Commissioner of Works, that the Government propose to sell an island site in South Kensington opposite the Victoria and

Albert Museum to the highest bidder, if he offers enough, is another instance of the futility of looking to Government departments to take long or broad views when dealing with property. When the Commissioners of Crown Lands rebuilt Oxford Circus twenty years ago they refused to enlarge it so that a ' concourse ' for the Tube station could be made below it, and it is no bigger now than it was a hundred years ago. A few years ago they tried to convert Carlton House Terrace into offices. Now the Office of Works, doubtless under Treasury instructions, is dealing with one of the best sites in South Kensington just as the typical bad landowner does—that is to say, it is trying to get as much as possible for it, without regard to the future. *Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?* Cromwell Gardens lies conspicuously within the chief institutional art-science area of London, at the southern apex of a zone of great buildings that begins to the north with the Royal Albert Hall and continues southwards with the Imperial Institute, the three Royal Colleges of Music, Science, and Art, the Natural History Museum, and the Victoria and Albert Museum.

It has long been thrown in the teeth of Kensington that it is ' too high-brow.' The site is open and commanding; it would make a good site for a cinema—one of the great chains which are acquiring a monopoly in many areas—or perhaps for yet another block of high-class flats, the builders of which have displaced thousands of working-class families in Chelsea and the neighbourhood in the past ten years, exiling them to distant suburbs and saddling them with grievous travelling expenses. Or perhaps it will be used for a great new chain store. Parliament and local authorities are apparently powerless in such matters, but future generations will have better reason to blame us than we have to blame the Victorians who laid out London. The Prime Minister's assurance that regard will be paid to the use to which the site is destined by would-be purchasers may save this particular site, but how many are ruined because there was no one to raise the question in Parlment, or no authority who could interfere?

ARNOLD WILSON.

CORRESPONDENCE

'THE FUTURE OF LABOUR'

To the Editor of the NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER

SIR,—Mr. Scanlon makes a misstatement of fact, which is a serious fault in a controversialist. It was the late Sir Sydney Russell-Wells, not I, who opposed and defeated Mr. H. G. Wells.

As it happens, my own first election, in 1924, contradicts Mr. Scanlon's statement that 'the party label is always a deciding factor.' In the 1924 election I stood as an Independent, and I was opposed by official candidates from all the parties—Conservative, Liberal and Labour. The medical faculty of the University of London, with its twelve famous medical schools, is one of the largest and most important in the University. Because of this circumstance a medical candidate who has the confidence of his profession starts with a considerable advantage, and it is probably this peculiarity of London University which explains the fact that in the 1924 election both the Labour and the Conservative candidates were, like myself, medical men, this choice being probably determined by the desire to neutralise my own medical vote.

Recent university elections have further emphasised the independence of party designations shown by university voters, which, in my submission, is quite a proper attitude.

I am, etc.,

E. GRAHAM-LITTLE.

House of Commons, July 16, 1937.

THE

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
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No. DCCXXVII—SEPTEMBER 1937

PALESTINE

A PROTEST, A PROSPECT, AND A COMPROMISE

BY COLONEL THE RIGHT HON. JOSIAH C. WEDGWOOD, D.S.O., M.P.

MAJOR TEMPERLEY [1] writes of the Palestine Report as one welcoming partition. 'The British Government's previous policy has completely failed,' so he begins; and he ends, 'having compromised to secure the scheme [partition], the Government must not compromise further. Only execution to the letter, . . . can save the situation.' His sympathies are with the Arabs; the failure of the British Government was that they did not stop Jewish immigration, and also what he calls the 'Jovian' policy of Mr. Churchill in 1922. 'We have failed to carry out the mandate,' and I am sure Major Temperley would add 'and a good job too.' The Mandate to him was folly.

My point of view is exactly opposed to his. I think the

[1] The *Nineteenth Century and After*, August 1937.

mandate was a wise and correct responsibility for England to undertake; that Mr. Churchill's policy in 1922 was right; that Jewish immigration has been of benefit to all and should be encouraged; that it is not British policy which has failed, but the British administration in Palestine which has succeeded in wrecking British policy. Mr. Morgan Jones, speaking for the Labour Party, rightly called their action sabotage. They have wrecked our policy, our reputation for government and, at present, our good name. Conciliation, according to the Royal Commission, has been carried to the extreme limit, and has failed to achieve anything save the contempt of both beneficiaries and victims. Major Temperley thinks conciliation of Arab nationalism should have gone even further and that Jewish immigration should have been stopped years ago at the request of the Mufti. I have no doubt that the Palestine Administration agree with him and were only prevented from that act of 'conciliation' by H.M. Government. It is the opinion of a great many people in this world that Jews are objectionable socially, that they have no rights morally, and that promises made to them need not be kept. Hitherto it has not been the view of H.M. Government, and those who share that view should not have been called upon to administer Palestine under the Mandate. I should not be surprised if the Jews accept partition in order to escape from such a policy and such administrators.

A large part of the Report is concerned with pointing out the inequity and weakness of the Administration in Palestine. The Commission could hardly fail to do so, even though they excused themselves from judging the actions or inactions of the High Commissioner during the last year.

Let me quote a few extracts:

> The official tendency in Palestine to take up a defeatist, almost an apologetic attitude . . . helped to foster a belief in the Arab mind that if Arab resistance were sufficiently obstinate and forcible, the Mandatory Power might presently be worried or even frightened into giving it up.
>
> The general uncertainty . . . has made it possible for the Arabs to interpret the conciliatory policy of the Palestine Government, and the sympathetic attitude of some Government officials as showing that the British determination to implement the Balfour Declaration is not wholehearted.

The Royal Commission find confirmation of the charge that the Palestine Administration was strongly anti-Zionist :

> The complaint was made by the Jews that several officers displayed pro-Arab sympathies ; that, even if they did not dislike, they did not understand the Mandate, and their obligation thereunder. This evidence receives support from other quarters.

The Administration's attitude towards Arab insurrection calls forth the following remarks from the Royal Commission :

> If one thing stands our clear from the record of the Mandatory administration, it is the leniency with which Arab political agitation, even when carried to the point of violence and murder, has been treated.

And again :

> there was no real attempt at disarmament.

Their attitude towards Arab official insubordination rouses even Geneva to irony.

Evidence of the appalling laxness of the Administration in putting down crime finds expression in the Royal Commission Statement :

> 82 Jews killed. . . . There were no death sentences for killing a Jew.

During the disturbances the Administration gave the Mufti and members of the Higher Committee free rein to continue their activities inciting the Arab masses to acts of terrorism. The Royal Commission in their Report mention an instance of this :

> At an early stage (in the course of the disturbances) the Mufti and members of the Committee were allowed to make a tour throughout Palestine. We were informed that one district had been fairly quiet until the Mufti was given this permission and held Conferences at which neither police nor officials were allowed to be present.

And in the Arab Press :

> Inflammatory articles which would not have been tolerated in most other countries continue to appear

With regard to the land problem, the vital problem for Palestine, the Administration has done almost nothing. Though required under the Mandate to introduce 'a land

system appropriate to the needs of the country,' the Royal Commission state:

> It is true that no new system has been introduced, and no new land code has been enacted.

And the Royal Commission conclude that:

> In this matter of land settlement . . . the Administration, we consider, has not yet discharged, their obligations under the Mandate.

Finally, with regard to the primary attitude of any Government, namely, the maintenance of public order, the Royal Commission state without mincing words:

> It is evident that the elementary duty of providing public security has not been discharged.

The Commission arrived in Palestine to find the country in a state of anarchy. Their Report shows that the administrative weakness had encouraged that anarchy. Yet instead of urging firmer government they urge surrender to violence, as though that was ever a solution of any difficulty. Their sympathies likewise were for Arab against Jew, even to the misreading of the McMahon terms. They propose to force the Jews into a Palestine ghetto by the dread alternative of stopping land sales and limiting Jewish immigration to 12,000 a year. Firm government is not to be thought of: the Mandate must be dropped. To secure this solution they allege that agitation and disorder has gone too far, that the Levantine Arab is a Sinn Fein Irishman.

But observe what happens immediately the Report is published and partition becomes the 'determined policy' of the Colonial Office. Unlike Michael Collins, the Mufti refuses to accept terms of surrender; Arab officials in comfortable jobs protest against being put into Transjordan; Arab cultivators object to transference; and peace reigns. Only the Nashashibi faction continues to welcome Emir Abdullah and the fleshpots of Amaan. The mere threat of martial law and the departure of the British, produces consternation—and peace. The difference between a good political cry and getting what you cry for has never been more manifest. These are not Sinn Fein Irishmen, not even nationalists. They are rival fifteenth-century robber barons,

with Husseini and Nashashibi representing York and Lancaster, or they may even be the rival gangsters of Chicago. Loot and retaining fees do not make for either patriotism or sacrifice. Why should sober Englishmen suppose that self-seeking effendi landlords speak for the terrorised Arab fellaheen, or for the prosperous business men whom they blackmail and murder? *Credat Judaeas!* They—and Major Temperley and the High Commissioner—suppose it, because they want to suppose it. 'Call them Sinn Feiners,' so they argue, 'and we can terrify the British Government into breaking their word' and surrendering the Mandate.

We stood up to the job in Cyprus, in British Guiana, in Malta, in Ceylon, and all went well at once. We shuffled out of our responsibilities in Irak, and they massacred the Assyrians because they fought for us in the war. If we shuffle feebly out of Palestine, presumably either Husseini or Nashashibi will be killed first, but the Christian Arabs of Ramallah may expect and deserve their turn next. The Jews, who fought for us and trusted us, will defend themselves better than they have been defended up to now. Some people, it is good to think, get what they have asked for.

But the case of the Arab fellaheen is different. Jew or Englishman or both have given these half-enslaved cultivators a taste of better things—better wages, better methods, better security. Shuffling out of our responsibilities involves handing them back to the Middle Ages, and to the mercies of Jemal and Kallidi and Arab justice—all because Major Temperley and his like are afraid.

Lord Winterton, who, just because he has had some experience of administration, does not go so far with his Arab sympathies as Major Temperley, objects that to persevere would involve armies in Palestine and impossible expense. Neither the late G.O.C. in Palestine nor the present Chief of the Police would agree with him; but I pass that by. Suppose perseverance and the keeping of our word did involve armies and expense; does anyone suppose that partition will reduce the trouble and expense? First, raids for loot over frontiers impossible to defend; then, retaliation by the Jews; then such war as will excuse to Mussolini his desire to protect Islam; then 'volunteers' and munitions through Gaza and the Egyptian frontier. And what then no man can

say, but assuredly we shall have more expenses even if we have more surrenders. You can never avoid war by buying off the barbarians; but you can still further humiliate Great Britain.

The more serious argument in favour of surrendering the mandate and dividing Palestine is that Arabs and Jews hate each other and will hate each other more and more as time goes on, not less and less. They say that hating and killing will increase indefinitely till no power on earth can stop it. A misconception! The Jews of Palestine do not hate the Arabs; and they even know that the Arabs would not hate them, were they not encouraged and stimulated to do so by the effendis of the Higher Arab Committee and by a Government which does not like Jews and lets the Arabs know it. It was a noticeable and lamentable fact that the Arab mobs marching to loot and murder in 1929 ever shouted: 'The Government is with us.' In that pogrom too, at the request of the Mufti, the Jewish Defence Force was paraded and disarmed. In 1933 the Boy Scouts, on whose conspicuous violence the Report comments, were used to watch the coast and catch illegal Jewish immigrants; and sixty-three of these unfortunates, landing from a sailing-boat, were caught and marched in chains to Acre Gaol. Naturally the Arabs believe that the Government is with them in their desire to get rid of all Jews, even by murder. Throughout the whole of last year murder followed murder, and not one Arab was either caught or convicted. What else can the Arab think—or the Jew?

Like all Orientals, the Arabs love plunder, especially when there is no penalty attached; they seem quite inclined to loot each other on the same terms. But the poor Arabs don't hate anyone enough to take risks unless they are paid. They think more, as do all cultivators of the soil, of the next meal than of greater Arabia. Of devotion to a leader they have none.

A culpably weak Government has caused the trouble to grow and violence to flourish. What a culpably weak Government has done, a strong Government determined to maintain order can undo. The Mandate can still be carried through, to peace and not to war; and our good name can yet be saved.

The usual *clichés* are used to deny this. 'No sensible man believes that we can govern Palestine now.' 'Everybody

knows that this is impossible,' cry the scuttlers and partitionists. One should always suspect these claims of what 'everyone knows' or 'believes.' I know that quite half the House of Commons still believes that with a firm Government in Palestine peace would join prosperity. I could name a dozen governors who could put matters right—Field-Marshal Sir Philip Chetwode and Brigadier Spears, M.P., to begin with. Let them be given a free hand and told to carry out the Mandate, and they would not hesitate to increase the numbers and strength of our friends in Palestine against that day when the dictators strike. Britain has been unfortunate, but she is not incompetent.

The Jews have our promise. They implemented their bargain in the war. I fought beside Trumpeldor and the first Jewish soldiers at Sedel Bahr in Gallipoli. Three battalions helped us conquer Palestine. We had better keep our word, keep our friends, and see it through. If the Jews accept partition it will only be because of the threat to abandon the Churchill policy of 'absorptive capacity' and cut immigration to 12,000 a year. Apart altogether from the sufferings of those millions in Eastern Europe and Germany, it would be wise for us to have as many friends as possible in the Eastern Mediterranean, instead of all exasperated enemies.

Let it not be said that I lay too much stress on our promise to the Jews. The Royal Commission brought up again General McMahon's proposals to the Arabs. Though the Palestine Arabs fought against us in the war, the Commission hold that the McMahon bargain contradicted and balanced our promise to the Jews. Mr. Ormsby-Gore in the House, Sir Henry McMahon himself and others in *The Times* have shown that Palestine was, in any case, excluded from the bargain. That I can confirm myself, for in 1916 I had much to do with Sir Mark Sykes on the question of Palestine. After consulting with Lord Cecil and Mr. Runciman I went over to America in December 1916, with a plan of peace terms which America should guarantee. Palestine was to be the Asia-Africa buffer State. The terms got to President Wilson, who approved (but not the guarantee); they seem also to have got to the Germans, who disapproved. A few months later America had joined in and Colonel House came over. He sent for me—'only to say that your visit was the most

useful we have had.' Naturally that was the proudest moment of my life; but it is as natural that I should now feel that we, from cowardice, are breaking our word to more than the Jews.

It is risky to prophesy, but I think that both Jews and Arabs will reject this partition; if so it will be impossible for the Government to put it through, or at least to negotiate their treaties. The Arab effendis and officials will not accept union with Transjordan so long as the Husseini are the ruling clan. The Jews will not accept the surrender of Jerusalem, Haifa, Degania and the Negeb. It will certainly be difficult to get £2,000,000 out of the British taxpayer for what nobody wants. The policy of scuttle will get more and more unpopular in Great Britain as the danger from Mussolini becomes more obvious. Officials of all sorts in Palestine with a vested interest in their jobs will press for a compromise which finds room for themselves.

If Government, here and there, is determined not to carry on firmly and see the Mandate through on Churchill lines, what is possible? Three autonomous provinces under a central British Government seems possible. In the Arab province no Jew would be allowed to buy land or live till the Arab rulers changed their mind. In the Jewish province immigration would be allowed and the police would be Jewish under Jewish control. These Jews should be allowed to tax and rate land values and buy or sell registered land as they choose. The third province would be British for all time, would include all the south and would be governed like any Crown Colony, free to admit such Jews and capital as they may think good for the country. The Central Government would control railways, trunk roads, post-office and agreed customs. But all else, taxation, justice, police, elementary education, public health, agriculture, roads, etc., would be provincial subjects as in India. With these powers the Jews would make the best of it; the Government, put on its mettle, would try to do as well in the southern province, which with Jerusalem and the Dead Sea would be rich enough. The Arabs in their province would get their chance of showing how much better they can govern than can Transjordan, and learn how much worse off they were without the Jews. That there would be trouble across the

frontiers is probable; but that would diminish when Jews are allowed to defend themselves.

So far as the southern province is concerned, surely we may consider British Imperial interests for once. Gaza in hostile hands would be dangerous by sea, air and land. It is incredible that we should risk opening that door for the new Roman Empire. The Suez Canal Concession falls in soon. How can we bargain, if we now give away into hostile hands the alternative route to Akaba? With modern pumping the greater part of the Negeb may become at least as productive as the Queensland sheep runs. Above all, we want in our hands the buffer State between Europe and Asia. No one else may so fitly hold the gates through which Armageddon has passed for 6000 years.

Such a solution leaves no room for representatives of Abdullah and the Jews on the League of Nations. All Palestine would remain for at least another generation under the British flag. In the British province English would be the official language, English would be taught in the schools, there, too, British could immigrate and retain British citizenship. We should have that jumping-off ground for English culture that we so foolishly neglected in Egypt. In their own province the Arabs would be free at last of Jew and of British official. To the Jewish province Jews could go without fear of chains and prison and the spies of a hostile Government. They will say there is not room enough; but where there is room to stand there is room to work. Should such a settlement come about I believe that, in ten years, not only the Jewish but the Arab population in the Jewish province would double. At last the economic truth, alluded to with dismay by the Royal Commission, would become evident to all: 'absorptive capacity increases with immigration.' The immigrant makes more work than he takes. Or as stated by Henry George in reply to Malthus: 'Men and hawks eat chickens; the more hawks, the fewer chickens; but the more men, the more chickens.' There is room enough, if they can use the land.

Major Temperley thinks that both Jews and Arabs will protest in public and approve in private. He points out that at Versailles many Powers accepted terms with open protest and secret acquiescence. He is quite right; Germany

did, and the Jews may; but the Versailles Treaty was hardly a settlement. Why, however, should the Arabs accept or acquiesce? They are the victorious Power. Have they not beaten England? Above all, why should the Mufti accept? It is as much as his life is worth to be subject to King Abdullah, and he must have learnt something of the fate of the Prime Ministers from Irak. Better the Mandate and cash, than the bow-string and oblivion!

But of course this is only a dream; of course there will be, as Major Temperley urges, no compromise. The Government has said what they will do. When a weak man digs in his toes, saving face becomes to him more important than saving the country. Major Temperley wins. He and Colonel Blimp rule; the House of Commons does so no longer.

JOSIAH C. WEDGWOOD.

THE ARMY TO-DAY

Why it is Not

By Captain J. R. J. Macnamara, M.P.

The whole British electorate to-day demands security. On every hand—sometimes, admittedly, reluctantly—there is agreement with the Government's rearmament programme. There are indications already that, owing to the confidence which this rearmament programme has instilled into our statesmen and public alike, we are about to embark upon a more positive foreign policy. In fact, people are beginning to congratulate themselves that, when the explosion comes, the shield around them is already sufficiently strong for the fragments to bounce harmlessly off it.

There is no justification for this confidence. It is true that our Air Force has been expanded with commendable rapidity and will be able to bomb recalcitrant tribesmen in yet more parts of the world and will shortly be able to hurt the civilian population of any country in Europe as much as that country can hurt ours. With a sigh of relief we read that the Navy is at last being made proof against air attack—at least, according to itself—although some of us may still feel nervous of the one-man torpedo and the swift small craft that seem destined to repeat the victory of the easily manœuverable English Fleet over the lumbering Spanish Armada. At the same time students of history know, whatever may be the latest modern inventions of the day, which service eventually has to bear the brunt of a serious war. It is only because of the time lag between the outbreak of a war and the moment when an army has simply had to take the field—a time lag possible only due to the special circumstances in which the British Isles find themselves—that the British public has allowed itself, through laziness and parsimony, to take a risk on land.

Now it can afford to take this risk no longer. Not only have conditions in Europe altered, but *it may not be near at* home that our next field army on a large scale will be required. As I see the portents, never before have we needed such an efficient and so prepared an Army as we do to-day. And have we got it? Ask any soldier to answer honestly. Look at our Regular Army—23,608 men short on May 1, 1937; on the same date our Territorial Army nearly 50,000 under strength! Does that justify confidence in our security? Is any serving soldier in either the Regular or Territorial Armies satisfied that he is armed with efficient modern equipment, or in some cases even armed at all, so as immediately to be able to take the field? Do not forget that part of the Territorial Army is nowadays officially as much a front-line force as the Regulars, and probably in practice all of it would have to be. It will be some time yet before even the anti-aircraft units—so to speak, the outposts even in front of the front line—will have their most modern weapons. It does not seem to me that the security at present provided by the British Army offers the public any cause for congratulation.

I suggest that the inefficiency of the Army, because of its lack of both men and material, is a matter of urgent importance to which the public is not paying the attention it deserves. It must be put right. Already there has been a long enough period of drift, and things are not getting better. The Government should concentrate on this question. The Government concentrates best when forced by public opinion to do so. The Army needs an organ of public opinion, a force outside itself which will help it fight its battle for recognition in the programmes of the nation.

What is loosely known as the Army consists of the Regular Army at home and abroad, the Reserve of the Regular Army, plus various supplementary reserves, and the Territorial Army, but no Reserve to the Territorial Army, except for a few officers, and an assortment of cadet forces.

This quaint collection of military forces is the result of British character. Through the lot runs a central line of thought: that it probably is the duty of every citizen to be prepared to share in the defence of what is his, although Heaven forbid that anyone should force him to do it. This is combined with the commercial instinct which constantly

whispers that all armed forces are a waste of money anyhow, so let us waste as little as we possibly can.

One cannot consider the Army, or rather the collection of these armies, as anything but a nucleus for future expansion in their present form. As such they in some ways serve their purpose well, although much might be altered so as to bring the systems up to date, particularly with a view to encouraging more men to join them now, which, after all, is the crux of the problem. Not all the expense in the world on equipment will give us satisfaction unless we also have the men to handle the equipment.

Let us examine why it is young men do not flock to the Colours. At first sight the Regular Army offers an attractive career. Its posters advertise a chance to see the world on full pay, with free board and lodging and clothing the while. There is also a hint of a pension. Why is it then, with some two million unemployed in the country, that the Army cannot make up its 23,000 short?

Is it lack of spirit in the youth of the country? Many have said so. All the same, the Air Force, a more dangerous profession, has more applicants by many thousands than it can deal with. The Navy likewise never wants a man, nor the Marines—the soldiers of the Fleet, administered by the Admiralty. Is it the pacifist talk that has been so prevalent in recent years? This talk has, again, not hindered the Air Force or the Navy. Personally I do not think such talk influences a man much one way or the other when it is his career he is considering. It might affect Territorial recruiting, but not Regular recruiting. It looks to me, if only by a process of deduction, that there might be something wrong with the Army itself internally.

The recruit joins. We will now trace his career, and we will see whether he thinks the Army so attractive as the recruiting posters would have him believe. If he does, he will advise his younger brothers and his friends to join him; if not, he will say 'Keep right away.' It is the serving soldier who is the recruiting agent first, last, and every time. This is, in fact, the opinion of the official Report on Army Recruiting.

Full, no doubt, of initial keenness, the lad enters his first barracks, the depôt of the regiment which is to be his for

seven years. Never is the mind of the youth in more pliable mood. He is anxious to learn soldiering and to start at once. Owing, however, to the system of regimental recruiting, modified in recent years it is true, he finds that he is not to start soldiering at once. Recruits come in slowly and he must wait several weeks before being allowed to start on his new career. Meanwhile he becomes, in his own language, a 'scivvy.' Expecting to be ennobled, he becomes debased. He is given a bucket and a rag and put on washing the dank passages of an officers' mess built before the time of modern improvements. Nothing could be calculated to break the heart of a keen man so easily. All his soldiering life this and other 'fatigues' will constantly gnaw at his military soul. They could be swept away by the recruitment of a labour corps of old soldiers, to the great benefit of the training of those serving. It would be most desirable also to loosen the strict regimental system, so that recruits might start their military training at once on joining.

Another word about the regimental system. The recruit finds that he has joined the Hampshires, or the Dorsets, or the Wiltshires. He is quite prepared to learn the traditions of his new unit and to accept them as his own, although he himself may speak with the accent of Birmingham, where he has lived all his life. Perhaps these three regiments do not require their men to buy anything out of their own pockets. But many do. For the honour of his regiment the recruit finds himself shortly presented with a bill for extras. His commanding officer may prefer a different type of hat to that issued. A new one must be bought—at the recruit's expense. Breeches with fancy strappings may be considered more attractive than the humdrum ones which were issued. Nickel spurs shine more brightly than steel ones. A yellow lanyard may add just that finishing touch which makes this regiment more glorious than the one next door, which only wears white. And so on; but the soldier is the man who has to pay. He does not pay when he has saved up enough money to be lavish on luxuries. He is debited with the amounts at once and he goes into debt, and for weeks and weeks he will not draw his full pay, but only a small portion of it.

Stoppages such as these are absolutely illegal, and severe action should be taken against officers demanding them. And

yet can one blame the officers entirely? In some cases, yes. Some fancy extra bits of uniform are unreasonable. In other cases, however, owing to the lack of proper and sufficient issues, they are forced to adopt this procedure. Such a practice should be stopped absolutely and completely. Where there is a justifiable case for a different or better uniform, the soldier should be provided with it out of public funds. Where there is not, no one should be allowed to change the pattern of His Majesty's uniform to suit his own tastes. No captain of a ship in the Navy can order his men to wear grey flannel Oxford bags in place of the bell-bottomed trousers. No squadron leader in the Air Force can decide on pink ties for his men instead of black. Again I point out that these stoppages are illegal. Officially they have been forbidden. The law should be rigorously enforced in this respect.

These are not the only stoppages. There are others—for hair-cutting, for sports, for library subscriptions, for washing, and so on. Some of these have been eased in recent reforms, but it would be well to sweep stoppages away altogether. Certainly the recruiting posters would lead the general public to think that a soldier is kept free. I suggest this should be made a fact. After all, the pay of the soldier is very small, so small that he can afford no cuts.

This brings me to the question of pay. On joining the recruit receives 14*s*. a week: that is about the equivalent of the pay of the lowest grade of domestic servant, the housemaid, who, however, does not suffer from stoppages. A good soldier after a couple of years' service should, through his own proficiency, be earning himself an extra shilling a day, but even then the total is small. After all, a soldier is a man. As a man he is entitled to expect to be able to send a little money home to help support his family besides providing reasonably for himself.

Not only can he not send money home, but it is often a great strain on his finances even to go home himself occasionally. He may come from Scotland, but the Army may send him to Dover or the Channel Islands. Even with a reduced fare the journey comes very hard on him. I consider that the recruit should start on a wage of £1 per week and be given a free journey home once a year. Shortly after completing his

recruit's training, within about eighteen months the trained soldier will more than probably be sent abroad, and, likely as not, it will be India that will claim him for the remaining five or six years of his service.

Well, he is seeing the world, as the posters say, but not very much of it. He will be cooped up on board a troopship —the conditions on board these troopships should be inquired into (it is a false economy in peace-time to crowd as many troops on board a ship as may be necessary in war)—until he reaches the port of disembarkation. He is not even taken for a march through Port Said whilst the ship is coaling, although personally I feel that a little more trust in the soldier would be well rewarded.

In India he is segregated in what is known as a cantonment, usually a long line of barracks on a plain of dried mud which stretches as far as the eye can see. Much of what might possibly interest him is out of bounds. He is left to organise his own amusement with very limited resources, in a country he does not understand and which he is given very little opportunity of understanding. He is bored stiff. One would think that as some small compensation he would receive some extra allowances in cash, in the same way as does every civilian employed so far away from home. But not a bit. Far from being better off, he is worse off. He is paid still at English rates in a country where expenses are very high and where for the honour of England he has to keep up European standards in front of natives. Once again he is driven into debt because he has had to buy privately uniform and equipment which either should be issued or which he should not be forced to possess, in the same way as happened to him before in England.

Then there is food. In India the soldier actually has to pay money out of his own pocket to supplement his rations in order to be fed at all. The ration allowance has just been raised in India, but it still will not cover his expenses. The soldier is told before joining that he will be fed free. This should be carried out faithfully in every part of the world, even in parts so far away that it may be difficult for the soldier to get into touch with outside people who will air his grievances for him.

There are all sorts of other extras which the soldier has

to meet in India. One, for instance, is washing. In a hot climate a man's clothes have constantly to be washed. This not only means laundry fees, but also the speedy ruin, and therefore replacement, of the clothes. One way and another it boils down to this—that when the soldier is on service abroad he should receive some pecuniary advantage both to recompense him for his separation from his homeland and in order to help him defray the extra expenses to which he is, of a necessity, put.

The Report on the Health of the Army for the year 1935 (the latest available) has a few enlightening passages on India. Talking about sandfly fever in the Northern Command it says: 'It is very noticeable, both with barracks and bungalows, that in old buildings, particularly those with mud walls, the majority of occupants invariably succumb, whereas in new or well-repaired buildings the occupants remain free, provided rubble heaps or other breeding places are eliminated from the immediate vicinity. Unless we obtain some prophylactic preventive method, it seems very unlikely that we can expect any real reduction in this disease as long as the present conditions of housing continue.'

We go in for all sorts of slum-clearance and health schemes at home, and yet we do not hesitate to send our sons to live in conditions abroad which would never be tolerated by local medical officers of health in this country. It is no use pretending that the soldier does not run an extra risk, and certainly an extra discomfort, because of his service in India, and as this is so he should receive extra remuneration as a reward. Listen to this passage in the same Report: 'In addition, barracks and cantonments are frequently sited within easy fly range of cities, municipal areas, villages, and bazaars, the sanitary arrangements in which, when judged by European standards, are, to all intents and purposes, non-existent.'

There is another passage in this illuminating Report which deserves attention, although it applies as much to England, or for that matter to China or to any other station, as to India. It runs: 'Swimming-baths. In the Army there is no general authority for swimming-baths; each proposal . . . is considered on its merits. Among the civil population bathing has become a universal pastime . . . it is the most healthful that can be indulged in during the summer months. . . '

Our soldier whose story we are tracing now nears the end of his service. The normal terms of service, except for the short-service Guards regiments, are seven years with the Colours and five with the Reserve. Our friend joined up when he was somewhere between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five. Therefore he is now between twenty-five and thirty-two. He has once more got to make a start in the world. Unless he has learnt some trade in the Army he has little chance of taking his place half-way up the ladder in civilian life, and is really too old to start at the bottom. He is destined to drift from job to job where employers need men—worthy ones, it is true, but not where there is much hope of carving out a successful career in a profession.

No wonder a young man, the good type who thinks ahead as to his future, hesitates before the possibility of damning his future for the sake of seven years' temporary security in the Army. The Army vocational training centres train a certain number of men to take their places as skilled men in civilian life. This privilege should be extended so as to include every single man who desires to take advantage of it.

This question of employing the soldier on completion of his Colour service should be the immediate concern of all Government departments. All could co-operate, and between them and the vocational training centres they could guarantee all soldiers good jobs on leaving the Army. At present it is evident that there is not the good will in this respect that one would expect. Perhaps it is lack of courage on the part of those at the top, who are afraid to force what is obviously a just principle on others below who may be prejudiced because of political or other theories. It is time a strong man insisted on whole-hearted co-operation in this connexion. It would not be impossible either for, say, the Post Office to allow, even to encourage, telegraph boys to do seven years with the Colours and then take them back into the Post Office, allowing their Army service to count towards Post Office promotion and pension. Other Government departments could adopt similar measures. It is true that the Post Office does keep a certain number of vacancies for ex-soldiers, but it is notorious amongst the rank and file that these jobs are the worst paid and not ones likely to offer prospects of high advancement. The soldier must be given equal opportunities

with all other comers, and should in no way be prejudiced because of the years he has served in a military uniform.

There certainly is a case to be made out against Government departments for their lack of co-operation as regards the soldier, from the time before he joins the Army to the time after he has left it. It seems to me, in the first place, that the Ministry of Labour is afraid to make any effort to recruit the Army through its labour exchanges. Why? The Army is a profession, and an honourable one. What an admission of failure it is to agree that the Army is so unpopular that one dare not, for political reasons, attempt to recruit it up to strength through the labour exchanges! And yet that is what is happening. A local official will tell an unemployed lad of conditions in the Army only if asked. If there are other jobs going, however, he will persuade men to take them.

And now let us turn to a department which does much to discourage recruiting, although perhaps it does not itself know that it does so. Those who deal with the pensions of veterans would do well to observe a less rigid and more humane attitude, one based less on red tape and economy at all costs, but more on an understanding of human circumstances and human failures, even where these failures are so gross as to mean not being able at every time in your life to understand all the complicated and constantly changing regulations of our social structure. Time and again border-line pension cases are turned down, and every time there is a man who thinks he genuinely deserves a pension but does not get it there is one more anti-recruiting agent in the country added to the many there already.

So one way and another we see that many of the soldier's troubles in the Regular Army are economic. That means that, if they are to be put right, the taxpayer will have to pay more for those who serve him, but not so very much more, and it is all so well worth while. After all, contented services are the foundation of law and order. These facts must be faced, and faced soon. Already the Regular Army is nearly 25,000 men short. This is serious enough, but in twelve months' time it may well be 50,000 short, and that would be a national catastrophe. In five years, at the present rate, the Army would virtually have ceased to exist. The choice to the taxpayer is: pay up, or—conscription.

The situation is still more serious when one considers the position that the Reserve finds itself in to-day. In 1931 and subsequent years the intake of recruits was artificially stemmed for economy's sake. About now we are beginning to feel the lack of foresight in this pennywise policy. Our present Reserve is not much more than 130,000 men, compared with 210,000 in 1914. That means that the combined Regular and Reserve strength of our Regular Army is about 112,000 below that of 1914, and our world commitments are greater. Owing to the dearth of recruits the Reserve situation is becoming steadily worse. During the last ten years we have, at times, had to despatch emergency forces to Shanghai, Egypt and Palestine. In every case it has strained our military resources, to the extreme. We have only been able to send these expeditions by calling up Reservists from civil life. Thank God that the emergencies came one at a time! We could not have met all three together with our Regular forces. A former War Minister, Mr. Duff Cooper, in the House of Commons, bore out what I have just been saying—that it would have been virtually impossible for us to send two such expeditions at one time.

But it is not only other ranks that the Army requires. It is short of over 1000 officers. In the cry for men sometimes the officers are forgotten. Again reason for the lack of officers is largely economic. Once upon a time the Army may have been the career of the wealthy. This is nowadays no longer possible or desirable. The Army is a technical profession whose leaders are required to do jobs of work and be experts at them. I feel that officers themselves attempt to live at a standard that the average upper-class family nowadays considers unnecessarily opulent, and that much could be done within the messes to cut down extravagance. If anyone would give a lead it would be welcomed all round, especially by the younger officers. The mentality that will give no ground in this respect is the same which demands the retention of a dummy spur in mess kit, even though the unit which jangles it has ceased to have horses to kick along for many years.

Allowing, however, for internal reform, there is still a strong case to be made out for better financial prospects for the officer. His life, unless he has private means, is one long struggle from the day he is first gazetted. Furthermore, some

provision should, nay must, be made for the wife and children of an officer who dies. Under present conditions they can be left penniless.

There is another reason, in my opinion, why the Regular Army is short of officers. It is because those who are officers are bored. For this reason many of the keenest leave after but a few years. The modern officer wants to work, or at least he does when he joins. In the same way as the soldier recruit has his soul destroyed in his first few weeks by doing domestic duties instead of military training, so the young officer's soul rots through idleness. During the winter months at home, or the summer months in India, subaltern officers tumble over each other in their company offices, making themselves some little job here or there, usually having nothing better to do for many hours than to slap their calves with the irritating army cane. It is not their fault. There are precious few of them who would not welcome an interesting military job if offered it, and when lucky enough to get one will perhaps work hours and hours' overtime. Surely, with so much to learn, with so much happening in the world, the higher command could reorganise the education of the junior officer on lines such as would interest him and benefit the taxpayer who is providing for him. Every officer might at least make himself proficient in one language and study at least one foreign army. He might even study modern wars —the campaign in Abyssinia or the conflict in Spain—instead of re-reading the campaigns of Marlborough for promotion examinations.

In a frank way I have tried to put my finger on certain weaknesses as far as the Regular Army is concerned. It is only by facing them that we can put them right. Meanwhile, however, until they are put right, and even when the Regular Army is once again up to full strength, the Territorial Army of to-day has to face more onerous duties than before the war.

The Territorial Army now provides the front-line coast and anti-aircraft defences. I have already pointed out that the Army cannot stand the strain of more than one foreign expedition at a time. Let us admit it openly that the whole Territorial Army is already virtually as much a front-line force as the Regular Army. If there were any serious European outbreak or sudden invasion of our islands the Territorial

Army would be called into play at once, in exactly the same way as would be the Swiss militia if Switzerland were attacked.

The men of the Territorial Army are more ready for such an emergency than is generally supposed. The training and efficiency of the modern Territorial Army man is of an exceptionally high standard. It recruits intelligent men who are keen to soldier and quick to learn. Its men are as fit to take the field as many European conscripts. But as an army its state is deplorable. In the first place, it is 46,000 under strength, and nothing will apparently induce the Treasury to grant just that little extra which would bring it up to strength in officers and men at once. Far worse, however, is its lack of equipment and weapons. It is an insult to ask an intelligent and busy man to give up his spare time to train for the defence of his country and then give him dummies to play with; yet it is done, and there continue to be men sufficiently patriotic to swallow the insult for the sake of the ultimate good of their motherland. Officially the Territorial Army uses Bren guns. They have none: moreover, each battalion possesses but half the machine-guns it should have. Tanks may attack them on manœuvres, and they must blush, a laughing-stock, as they point their dummy pieces of wood which represent anti-tank guns. Waving noisy rattles, with scraps of wood and puffs of smoke to represent mortars, with a chaotic array of grocers' vans serving as army transport lorries, with twenty gas masks between 400 men, the Territorial Army trains for war! And with such equipment who knows that it might not suddenly have to go to war?

There is another factor working against recruiting for the Regular and Territorial Armies. It is the living in the past. Tradition rightly demands guidance in thought, and therefore action, from the successes of the past. At the same time we are in a modern world—a world of motor bicycles, of wider general knowledge, of the collar and the tie, of a groping forward. The Army demands certain standards so as to ensure steadiness in adverse circumstances in war. Where methods assist toward this end there is no complaint. On the other hand, much of what the Army does is laughed at by the man in the street. It is all an out-of-date joke, and the Englishman hates being laughed at, so he avoids putting himself in a position where he is open to it.

In a two-man tank, how can a man be marched to an officer by a lance-corporal, halted two paces in front of him, and then told to say what he has to? Yet the regulations demand such a procedure before a man can legitimately address an officer. In a shed full of lorries, with mechanics adjusting carburetters, how can the whole place crash to attention on the approach of a second-lieutenant? What is required is not a relaxation of discipline—not a bit—but a modernisation of discipline. Unless discipline is modernised to meet the times it will be as useless for war purposes as the drill of the barrack-square; and do not forget that barrack-square drill was once tactical training for war. The modern man, because of his better education, rightly demands more freedom, more trust and ordinary treatment as a human being. A bold forward policy in this connexion would, I am sure, be well rewarded. It seems absurd to tell the civilian that you want him to join the Army because it is a more honourable profession than any to be found in civilian life, and then, when he commits a military misdemeanour, march him, without a belt, escorted through the streets to detention, for all the world to see, whilst the civilian criminal is conveyed in a closed van, and, furthermore, always to irk him with a special military police force, who pull him up and demand his pass in front of his girl. The mere fact of having a separate police force for the soldier spells in the mind of the public that he is something dangerous and inferior, something which the ordinary civilian policeman cannot deal with.

When the Army itself goes out of its way to drive an inferiority complex into its members, one can scarcely blame the outsider if he adopts the same attitude towards them too. I do blame them, however, for it shows a lack of common-sense. The public will be only too ready to run after soldiers and wave handkerchiefs at them in time of emergency. What did Kipling say? 'It is thank you, Mr. Atkins, when the drums begin to roll.' The Government could give a lead to a better spirit. So often have those concerned with Army recruiting waited in recent years for encouragement in the speeches of Ministers, including the Prime Minister. So often have they waited in vain, not a reference being made. In spite of all these examples, and

therefore possible excuse, I still blame certain individual members of the public, however. I have known dance-halls where soldiers in uniform are not admitted, likewise public-houses. In the name of the continuity of the British Empire, why? It ought to be an offence against the law to draw such distinctions against honourable servants of the State. Of course the Army does not help matters by putting places out of bounds. Where there is danger of sedition, naturally the Army has a right to take precautions. In all other circumstances it will find that unless it starts off on the assumption that it can trust its men and that its men can look after themselves it will never get men who are of a type who can be trusted or who can look after themselves, and, as most modern young men are neither dolts nor milk-sops, it leaves rather a limited choice for the Army to recruit from.

I have already given a certain amount of food for thought in this article. I hope those who may study it will read it in the spirit in which it is written—that is, with a desire that our armed military forces should be efficient for our needs in as short a time as possible, and believing that as a start it is wise to admit frankly what is wrong with a view to putting it right. But all I have written does not touch the real problem. The first essential is for the War Minister, the Cabinet, the nation, to have a clear conception of what our Army is for and what our Army policy really is.

Much reorganisation will have to be done. By reorganising our whole system we could put right many of the wrongs I have already mentioned. I would like to deal with the question of the functions of the Army and its organisation so as to fulfil these functions at length at another time, perhaps in a separate article, as it would be too long to tackle satisfactorily here.

The Cardwell system means that a soldier does approximately the first two years of his service at home and the remaining five with a linked battalion or regiment abroad. India, where there are 55,000 white soldiers, is the country which, above all, is a drain on our man-power. The system is unsound in two major respects. First, on the outbreak of war, the flower of the British Army is serving abroad and England is left with only the young recruits and Reservists from a depleted reserve, men who have to get used to Army

life again, and may even have to learn how to handle new weapons which may have come into use. If the war is serious, England will certainly recall her soldiers from abroad, and so India and the Colonies do not benefit either. The good troops are withdrawn, too late to help at home in the initial, possibly critical, battles, and raw new troops are sent to our dependencies to undertake tasks of which they have no knowledge.

I could elaborate on this at length; but I will suggest, without further explanation, a simple solution—namely, the creation of an Empire gendarmerie. Such a force would relieve our Regular Army from long, tedious years abroad, which would encourage recruits at home, and, being a career, would get plenty of men for itself. It would be cheaper in the end, for fewer men would be required in it because of what would be gained in authority through the intimate knowledge of the subject by its individual members.

The other major point to be considered is the nation's responsibility in general. This has got to be thrashed out in debate, in articles, in every possible way until some conclusion is reached. It may be that at the end of such an examination the nation may look upon its duties *vis-à-vis* the Territorial Army, in particular, in a different light.

Modern science may have brought us many advantages. In military questions the evolution it has caused is not yet fully understood by the public. There was a time when the country was content, and able, to send its soldiers to war. From the days of the French Revolution onwards we have had to think, not in terms of the soldiers in arms, but of the nation in arms. Now, however, a further stage has been reached. We had a slight taste of it in the last war. Spain should be bringing home the lesson to us to-day. We shall probably never again be able to think in terms of a nation in arms; but it will have to be of a nation at war, and that is a very different thing. War is now the job of civilians. It is for civilians to face this fact and to decide how far they are prepared to train themselves to withstand its strains and to bring it to the conclusion they desire, such training to be, not after its outbreak, but, in their own interests, before.

J. R. J. Macnamara.

ON SPANISH CIVIL WARS

By Sir Charles Oman

So many writers on the unhappy condition of Spain in 1937 seem to take it for granted that year-long civil wars are abnormal in that country, and that the presence of masses of foreign auxiliaries in the Peninsula is as unparalleled as it is undesirable, that a backward glance on the record of history in modern Spain may not be out of place.

Of course all countries of Europe have had their civil wars. Sometimes their origin was religious differences, sometimes class-hatred, sometimes local particularism, sometimes racial animosity, sometimes constitutional disputes, sometimes even mere faction-rivalry. We need not forget the Wars of the Roses, the Great Rebellion, the Fronde, La Vendée, or Germany torn asunder by the Thirty Years' War. But Spain has suffered more than most countries from this plague. It is well to remember that it has only figured as a unit since Ferdinand and Isabella joined two old rival kingdoms of Castile and Aragon by marriage, after which the conquest of Granada and Navarre followed in a few years. All the original Peninsular kingdoms had local civil wars of their own before the Union. The Catalan subjects of the Aragonese Crown repeatedly tried to cut themselves loose from Saragossa, and often called in French help for their rebellions. Granada was a hotbed of dynastic civil wars while it was still a Moorish state. Even the tiny Navarre had its strife between the 'Béarnais' and the 'Agramontais.' In Castile endless troubles took a professedly dynastic shape, ostensibly on questions of heridItary succession, yet the root of the matter was a contest between sovereigns and leagues of nobles. But the disastrous thing in the history of Spain was that the formal union of all the old States in the time of Ferdinand and Isabella brought no real cohesion between the units. Those great Sovereigns took as their badge the bundle

of arrows bound closely together by a cord, and placed it on their coins and on the walls of the many churches which they built. But the cord was not very secure: it bound together things incompatible. Even the great Emperor Charles V. had to face rebellions, though he was the ruler of half the world. His splendid 'tercios'—the best troops of their age —might dominate battle-fields from Tunis to Muhlberg, but they represented a professional military caste, not a united nation. Indeed their very efficiency was a snare, for from their exploits rose the unhappy tradition that the soldier must not descend to the status of the mere citizen—the hand that had wielded pike or sword must never turn to the plough. Military pride and self-consciousness led in the end to mutinies that were the despair of generals and rulers.

Eighty years of enforced political union from Ferdinand and Isabella to the abdication of Charles V. had not welded the Spaniards into a single nation: they were still a bundle of dissident races, with age-old grudges between them. And so they were to remain: down to this day Catalans call their neighbours 'Castilians' not Spaniards. And the Basques have always looked upon their sovereigns as 'Lords of Biscay' not Kings of Spain. Under the black bureaucratic tyranny that started with Philip II., discontents always smouldered and rebellion broke out from time to time. We may leave out of consideration, perhaps, the long Morisco Wars, which were not deliberate risings of a religious minority, but explosions of despair on the part of a 'non-Aryan' and non-Christian section of the King's subjects, on whom Philip II. worked out ultra-Hitleresque methods of forced conformity by stake and sword. But it is very much more important to remember that the local provincial Cortes, till they were reduced to nullity by the iron hand, spent all their time in protesting against centralisation. Philip II., whom we envisage mainly as the enemy of Queen Elizabeth and the oppressor of the Netherlands, was also the conqueror of a lively rebellion of the Aragonese, fighting for their old constitutional rights in vain. Philip IV. saw the Catalans up in arms for local independence for more than ten years, and saluting Louis XIII. of France as Count of Barcelona and their king. But the French Government betrayed them at the Peace of the Pyrenees, just as some sixty years later the British

Government was to betray them at the Peace of Utrecht. It was the memory of this betrayal which made the Catalans, in the days of Louis XIV., fight for once heartily against the French, even for such a king as the imbecile Charles II., the last of the Spanish Hapsburgs.

This seventeenth-century war gave the precedent for the intervention of large foreign contingents in Spanish local strife. The so-called War of the Spanish Succession, in the time of our own Queen Anne, was, from the Peninsular point of view, a contest for the crown between Philip of Anjou, the grandson of Louis XIV., and the Austrian Archduke Charles, brother of the Emperor Joseph I. No doubt from the general European outlook, it was an episode in the long struggle for predominance between the Bourbons and the Hapsburgs. But to the Spaniards it was not so much a contest between two very uninteresting and unattractive descendents of two Spanish princesses, both equally foreigners, as an opportunity for the settling of old local particularist grudges. The Castilians favoured the French candidate, consequently the Austrian got strong support from Catalonia and Valencia—then (as now) always prone to differ in matters political from their Western neighbours. How bitter was the strife may be gathered from the fact that the Catalans held out with desperation long after their nominee 'Charles III.' had retired to Vienna, and their other foreign friends—British and Portuguese—had departed.

For this war, which lasted from 1702 to 1714, when Barcelona at last fell into the hands of Philip V., was essentially a struggle between Castile and Catalonia, though each got lavish help from outside. Foreign auxiliaries were never so numerous in Spain as in these dismal years. Half the armies of Philip of Anjou were often composed of French regiments lent by his grandfather Louis XIV. But, on the other hand, three-fourths of the field-armies of Charles of Austria consisted of English, German and Portuguese troops, lent to him by Queen Anne, the Emperor Joseph, and João of Portugal, *rex fidelisimus*. Their Catalan friends were mainly employed in guarding their own borders and cities—which they did most efficiently. It is interesting to note that at Almanza (1707) King Philip's victorious army was composed of 12,000 French and 12,000 Spaniards, while at Saragossa (1710) the

most successful fight of the supporters of the Archduke Charles, there were only 3500 Catalans in an army 23,000 strong—the rest of the host consisting of 13,000 Germans, 4000 British, and some smaller Portuguese and Dutch contingents. But that the struggle was, nevertheless, essentially a Spanish civil war, is sufficiently shown by the fact that when in 1711 the Archduke left Spain, having become the heir to the Hapsburg inheritance in Germany by the unexpected death of his brother the Emperor Joseph, the war went on for three years more between Spaniards. The Catalans held out alone, after they had been (not very honourably) deserted by their British allies at the Peace of Utrecht (1713). The Tory Government retired from the game, with Gibraltar and Minorca as prizes, without securing reasonable terms for the dissidents whom they were surrendering to King Philip. If one wished to add more touches to the picture of this most curious civil war, mainly waged by foreign auxiliaries on both sides, it might be worth while to mention that among the most distinguished units in the army that was finally victorious were six Irish regiments—Jacobite exiles—and that Philip's best cavalry officer was named Mahony. His great general was, of course, the Frenchman Vendôme: the defeated adherents of Charles were commanded in the earlier years of the war by the Huguenot Henri de Ruvigny—now an English peer—and in its last period by the Austrian Stahremberg.

No one would call the Peninsular War of 1808–14 a civil war, though Napoleon tried to make out that his brother Joseph, the 'intruded king,' had a serious Spanish following—which was not true. Joseph kept Spanish ministers and officials, and maintained a few leaky regiments of renegades, who mostly deserted to the national flag whenever his cause looked on the decline; but as a matter of fact he had no help save from French bayonets. France was the principal not the auxiliary. The struggle was essentially settled by the clash of French and British armies—certainly not by the unlucky if patriotic levies of Cuesta, Areizaga, or Joaquim Blake, though everyone knows that the guerilleros played an invaluable part on Wellington's side. If Spanish local resistance had flickered out, and the French could have turned all their 260,000 sabres and bayonets of 1812 against the 40,000 British and 30,000 Portuguese of Wellington's host, the game

would have been hopeless. But the majority of the French troops were pinned down as an army of occupation spread over provinces in a state of suppressed insurrection. They could never collect the overpowering numbers that would have been necessary to crush the tough and war-worn veterans whom the 'Sepoy General' led with such untiring skill. 'How absurd,' exclaimed Napoleon, 'that 40,000 English can spoil the whole affair.'

When we come to the next block of Spanish Civil War, the foreign auxiliaries have a more prominent *rôle* than even in the old days of King Philip and King Charles. In 1822 when the followers of the Absolutist but imprisoned Ferdinand VII. rose in all parts of Spain, the Liberals, predominant for the moment, got the better of them, till Louis XVIII., sympathetic to oppressed Bourbon cousins, obtained a mandate from the 'Holy Alliance' of the reactionary powers at the Congress of Verona, and sent nearly 100,000 French troops across the Pyrenees, under his nephew the Duke of Angoulême. Joined at once by thousands of the irregular bands of Ferdinand's 'Absolutist' friends, under generals whose names recall the days of the Peninsular War, the invaders swept away the Liberal Government with ease. Only Corunna, Barcelona, and Cadiz made any serious resistance, and the captive king was replaced on his throne (October 1823). He made such a ruthless use of the triumph of his foreign helpers, that Angoulême withdrew his army in disgust—one can be too reactionary even for reactionaries.

Just ten years later, at Ferdinand's death in 1833, a new and very lively civil war broke out, between the Absolutists, headed by his brother Don Carlos, who claimed the Crown on the Bourbon theory of male inheritance, and the widowed queen Cristina, defending the cause of her infant daughter Isabella. Ferdinand had settled the succession on the little girl with the full consent of his Cortes, who had joined him in repudiating all Salic law inhibitions. Queens regnant were no novelty in Spanish history—as witness Isabella the Catholic, whose splendid name was to be tarnished a few years later by the strange vagaries of Isabella the Second—but in 1833 the infant queen was a helpless child, whose orphanhood touched many sympathetic hearts.

Since Don Carlos appealed to the reactionary and Legiti-

mist element in Spain, Queen Cristina had to buy support from her late husband's old enemies the Liberals, as well as from the more moderate admirers of constitutional monarchy. Cristina found herself in a parlous plight, for her partisans quarrelled bitterly among themselves, so that it seemed on occasion that not one but several civil wars might be going on simultaneously. The extremists of the Liberal party—spiritual ancestors of the Left Wing extremists of to-day—took to burning churches and massacring all Carlist prisoners. It was a mob of 1835 which set the example, only too well followed in 1936, of gutting the glorious tombs of the Kings of Aragon in the Abbey of Poblet—a woeful sight ever after. The Legitimist cause got much more whole-hearted service from the Basques and Navarrese, and from the Catalans of the inland, who detested, and exchanged atrocities with, the mob of Barcelona. After the Queen's armies had suffered many checks she sought foreign aid. A few years back a Bourbon king of France would undoubtedly have supported the Carlists. But in 1830 Charles X. had been expelled, and his successor, the 'citizen king' Louis Philippe of Orleans, was bound to be the enemy of Legitimism. Hence came applications for help by Queen Cristina not only to the professedly Liberal French King, but not less to Great Britain. There public opinion looked upon all foreign Liberals, Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, Hungarian or Polish, as enemies of the Absolutist European powers, and therefore as proper objects of sympathy. Neither Louis Philippe nor the Melbourne Government in London sent regular troops to Spain, but both authorised the enlistment of large numbers of volunteers in the name of Queen Cristina.

It seems odd to envisage Louis Philippe and Lord Melbourne acting as Mussolini and Hitler have done a century later—though lavishing aid on the Left Wing, not the Right Wing, party in Spain. But the cause of Queen Cristina and 'constitutional monarchy' received so many foreign auxiliaries that it was saved from collapse. The rather dismal story[1] of the 'British Legionaries' raised by Colonel De Lacy Evans, the ultra-Radical Member for Westminster, should never be forgotten. They were a large force—8000 at least—and including cavalry and artillery. They started with high

[1] See Sir G. MacMunn, *The Nineteenth Century and After*, June, 1937

enthusiasm when landed in Biscay, and fought in many mountain campaigns about San Sebastian and Bilbao. Seldom paid, and always put in the forefront of the battle, they gradually melted away in deep disillusion, and the majority of them returned to England in 1837, following their general, who had not unnaturally quarrelled with all his Spanish colleagues. He resumed his seat in Parliament, and (strangely enough) survived to command a British division in the Crimean War at the age of sixty-nine! Most of our Crimean generals were about as old—the Commander-in-Chief Lord Raglan was an exact contemporary of De Lacy Evans.

The Carlist War flickered out, long after the British Legion had departed, owing to the utter exhaustion of the Legitimists, who had made a marvellous fight against great odds. In their last desperate efforts they raided as far as the outskirts of Madrid; there was fighting at Arganda in 1837, and at Las Rosas—a name familiar during the summer of 1937 but the raiders could not stop in front of the city. Finally the Basques abandoned the Carlist cause, on condition that respect should be given to their Fueros, the old local privileges of the North, and signed the Convention of Vergara (August 31, 1839), while the last desperate Catalan insurgents retreated across the French frontier (June 1840) with their general Cabrera, the perpetrator of numberless atrocities, who had fought on when all hope was lost for the Legitimists' triumph.

British interest in Spain waned when it was discovered that the victory of the Cristinos meant not the establishment of a model constitutional monarchy, but a *régime* of military and parliamentary intrigues, punctuated with 'pronunciamientos,' and worked with a farcical Cortes, in which governments 'made the elections,' and allowed only a dozen or a score of opposition members to be returned. In 1846 the scandalous affair of the 'Spanish Marriages' disgusted English public opinion both with the Queen Regent Cristina and with our supposed ally Louis Philippe of France, who had joined to make market of the hands of the unfortunate young Isabella II. and her sister Maria Louisa. It was impossible, for a whole generation, to take any sympathetic interest in Spanish politics, and no British auxiliaries appeared in the civil wars that dethroned Isabella, or kept the second Don Carlos from

taking advantage of the imbecility of the 'Provisional Government' of 1868–70, or the Republic of 1873–74.

The moral holds to-day, when, after sixty years of peace, circumstances a century old seem to repeat themselves, and a Government which inspires even less confidence than that of Queen Cristina in 1835 begs for international sympathy and support on the alleged legality of its position. Spanish civil wars had better be allowed to settle themselves—one thing is certain, that the essentially individualistic Spanish nature is not likely to make itself the slave of either Bolshevism or Fascism—and that it hates foreign interference, though each of two contending parties may be eager to accept it for the moment. This is a particularly distressing civil war, in which compromise seems impossible, since the fundamental principles of the two belligerent parties are incompatible. 'Traditionalism' is as hateful to the various sections of the Left Wing, as Internationalism is to all the members of the Right Wing—whatever their precise theory of government. They must settle matters for themselves: British interference is wholly undesirable.

C. W. C. OMAN.

THE POSITION AND PROSPECTS OF THE LABOUR PARTY

A Reply to John Scanlon [1]

By A. L. Rowse

The position and prospects of the Labour Party, like everything else in our internal politics, are dependent upon the European situation. So long as that continues to be threatening—and, though tension has lessened somewhat of late, nobody can say that danger is wholly averted—it is unlikely that there will be any sensational change in the disposition of parties. I think that is perfectly well understood abroad. When I was in Italy this spring, a very intelligent article appeared by one of the best-known of the younger Fascist writers, in their new weekly, *Omnibus*, on the internal situation of British politics. It said that power was fully in the hands of the Conservative Party, that it was likely to remain there for a number of years, and recognised that it was with the Conservative Party that Italy would have to reckon. I am sure the same calculation is made by the Nazis; certainly they spare no pains to seduce Conservative elements and waste no time or trouble about the Labour Opposition.

This means, then, that so long as the European situation remains unchanged, and danger threatens from abroad, there is likely to be no considerable recovery for the Labour Party and not much improvement in its prospects. It is this that very largely accounts for the ill-success of the Labour Party in the 'miniature General Election' this year and for the decline in its vote. Though even here it should be remembered that these contests were in circumstances very favourable to the Government; all the seats were Government seats, and the decline in the Government vote was even

[1] 'The Future of Labour,' by John Scanlon, the *Nineteenth Century and After*, July 1937.

larger than that of the Labour Party. All the same, an unbiassed spectator would probably allow that if there were a General Election now, the Government would be safely returned, though with a good many fewer seats than in 1935.

The reason is not hard to find. Fear, as a very able young Conservative once said to me, is the strongest psychological force to which Conservatism appeals. And the electorate is certainly afraid—afraid of what is going to happen in Europe. In these circumstances it turns instinctively to its natural leaders, the governing classes, and votes Conservative. This is no time for taking risks, it feels: Safety First—which is what it did not feel in 1929. We had better get on with our armaments programme so as to be prepared for whatever may come in Europe. That is what they feel—for they do not think: no electorate can be expected to think; and they naturally vote Conservative. In fact, the irony of the situation to an intelligent socialist is that the nearer the National Government has brought us to war, by its inept and dangerous foreign policy, by its betrayal of such of a collective system as there was in Europe, by its succession of humiliating and totally unexpected retreats before the Fascist Powers all over the world (Japan in 1931, Italy in 1935, Germany in 1936, and now Italy and Germany combined over Spain), by its sabotage of the Disarmament Conference in 1931 and 1932 while there was still some hope of disarmament in Europe, and by its failure to rearm during 1933–35 from the moment it was obvious that there was none—by all these things, in our view, the National Government has brought war nearer; and the nearer we get to it, the more people vote Conservative to save themselves. Not very reasonable, perhaps; but then, one does not expect reason from human beings in the mass—or if one does, one is bound to be bitterly disappointed.

That about describes the situation as we see it. I was putting this point the other day, accounting for the Labour Party's failure to make much impression in the country at the present moment, to Mr. Herbert Morrison; and he assented to it. I think everybody would agree that that is the explanation—the underlying fear and anxiety about the situation in Europe, and elsewhere.

And that is the answer to Mr. Scanlon. Whatever the Labour Party did at the present moment, however energetic

it showed itself, whatever efforts it made to stir up agitation against the National Government, it would not make much impression or change the situation much. It is the answer to Sir Stafford Cripps and the Left wing of the Labour Party too, as I should have thought they had learned by recent experience. But really, these doctrinaires on the Left never seem to learn by experience, and the people never to learn through their heads: 'What a world is this; and how does Fortune banter us!' The Socialist League, the I.L.P., and the Communist Party came together a few months ago to start a Unity campaign. There was a great deal of sound and fury, and a number of more or less successful meetings were held up and down the country at which audiences were privileged *to see and hear Sir Stafford Cripps, Mr. Maxton, and Mr.* Pollitt upon the same platform. But what has it all come to? The thing has collapsed utterly; and not because the Labour Party threatened to expel Sir Stafford if he went on with it—the rumblings of that thunder would hardly intimidate a Cripps. For, lo and behold, the I.L.P. is now more at daggers drawn with the Communists than the Communists are with the official Labour Party! The fact is that the fear of the European situation which dominates everything has melted away all chances of a response to a Unity campaign like the snows of yester-year. The British people as a whole are not in the least likely to listen to the charms of this trio, charm they never so wisely—and even if the trio had remained in being for a bit, and not broken up as soon as formed. The electorate has its eyes—so far as its eyes are upon anything, its own best girl, speed-track records, cricket scores, the latest lunacy of the Press in the 'silly season,'—what remains of its eyes is upon Europe and the danger of war.

It is not that I am being unfair to Mr. Scanlon and Sir Stafford Cripps, or that I do not wish things were otherwise; *Je constate seulement*, and this is the fact: there is not likely, *other things being equal*, to be much change in the prospects of the Labour Party so long as the situation in Europe remains what it is—frozen, unliquidated.

But in politics other things do not remain for long equal; and we have to consider two very important possibilities which may alter the whole face of things. If there is a war in which this country is involved—I do not say that that is

what is likely, but it is at any rate not beyond the bounds of possibility—then the whole face of our party politics will change. If the nation is forced into a war and is fighting for its existence as such, then the whole nation will rally as one. (It is an interesting reflection upon the totalitarian State that it is doubtful whether in similar circumstances Germany would rally so completely—say, 95 per cent.—behind its Nazi leadership.) If we were involved in a war, it could only be conducted by a real National Government—that is to say, by a coalition of the Conservatives with Labour. Those are the two elements essential to a National Government, as everybody will recognise. (The fact that one of them is missing from the present 'National' Government is a sufficient commentary on its national character—to anybody capable of thinking for a moment.) That means that in order to conduct the war there would have to be Labour participation in the Government, as in the last war. One of the most illuminating passages in Mr. Lloyd George's *War Memoirs* is where he points out that a modern war cannot be conducted without the active participation of the responsible organs of the working-class movement—the trade unions and their political party; and that it was only their participation that enabled him to form his Government in 1916 which won the war. That means to say that Labour participation in the case of a future war will be even more important than it was in the last. For the Labour movement is very much more powerful and indispensable now than it was in 1916; it was then a small and insignificant minority politically, and the trade unions had not much more than a million members. In the interval since then, Labour has risen to the second place in the State. The question of its participation in a war-time Government is one of decisive importance.

But suppose there is no war in the next five years—which may equally well be. Very well, if a break-up should come about in Nazi Germany in the interval, that would change the face of things in Europe. The nightmare would be removed and a new beginning could be made. All the hopes and the causes which were so rudely shattered from 1931 onwards—reconciliation in Europe, the reconstruction of the collective system, disarmament, the building up of international order, peace—could be taken up again where they were left. It

would mean a revival of the forces of the Left, of liberal and social democracy, throughout Europe. (No doubt that is why so many people on the extreme Right have been so anxious all along to prevent the Nazi *régime* from collapsing—even though that may mean another European war brought about by the revival of militarist Germany and the aggressive designs of the Nazis, and even at the expense of jeopardising the safety and security of this country; for nobody doubts that a pacific and democratic Germany suits our interests better than an aggressive and militarist Reich under the Nazis.)

We must expect, however, that any catastrophic break-up of the Nazi *régime* is unlikely enough in the immediate future. It is more likely that the situation in Europe will go on as it is, with its increasing burden of armaments upon the peoples, in the state of continuing crisis we have been in since 1931; for, as we know, there is no hope of any international order which can give us peace except through the emergence of liberal and pacific social democracy in the leading European countries. It may be that some among these peoples, sick and weary of the burden which their own foolery has let them in for, and which a maniac nationalism has imposed upon them, will turn away from it at length and return to their senses. After all, the German people put up with intolerable privations and sufferings for the four years 1914–18; but they broke at length and refused to put up with it any longer. That may happen again; and if so, sanity may return to Europe and a new beginning. But if not, can we be so sure that other things will remain equal? Is it not even probable that this burden, imposing an intolerable strain upon the whole economic system, in the end cramping consumption in the interest of more guns and aeroplanes, battleships and submarines, will impose its own revenge? The economists are already talking of the next slump—indeed, there seems to be general agreement that there is one on the way; the only question at issue seems to be when it is due to arrive. Many people take the halt upon the Stock Exchange this year—indeed, the marked recession in prices—to mean the end of the boom we have been enjoying since 1933.

If there is going to be a slump, that will change things

drastically, and very much against the Government under whom it happens. The last one broke every Government in power when it came. The mighty and entrenched Republican Party, that had been in power in the United States virtually from the time of Lincoln, was broken by it; it destroyed democracy (and much more) in Germany; in Japan it ruined the liberal and moderate *régime* in being and brought into power this thing which is running amok over the Far East In this country it brought about a signal setback to the Labour Party and put it out of power for ten years. The wonder is that it did not do more when all is said and done; parties have been divided from top to bottom and broken for good and all in lesser storms than these. It is an extraordinary tribute to the fundamental strength and cohesion of the Labour Party, and so much evidence (*pace* Mr Scanlon) that it is built on right lines, that in the hour of its desertion by its leaders not a single local Labour Party or trade union branch went with them. Unity, in spite of defeat, remained unimpaired.

Certainly, then, if there is a slump coming, it will have serious repercussions upon the party in power, and we assume that the Conservatives will be. The extent of the repercussions will depend on the severity of the slump and the success of the attempts made to deal with it. So far there is no sign that Mr. Chamberlain is any better prepared than Mr. Snowden was last time. The warning of the Oxford economists, in a letter to *The Times*, that now is the time to think out and prepare schemes for public works to be undertaken when the slump comes, seems to have gone unheeded. Mr. Pakenham, who was a member of a Conservative Committee under Mr. Chamberlain to think out remedies for the last slump, tells us that Mr. Chamberlain was as helpless as Mr. Snowden.[2] One can well believe it. Nor need one suppose that the Conservative Party will fare much better than the Labour Party did last time, if caught in a vicious spiral of declining trade and mounting unemployment figures. It may not be their fault, any more than the world depression of 1930–33 was our fault; but its political effect will be similar: they will be held responsible for it by the country and their support will correspondingly decline

[2] The *Spectator*, August 6, 1937

Most Labour people are inclined to assume too readily that the Conservative Party would be let off more easily than we were, that it would not mean such a serious blow to them electorally. It might well be more serious; for last time, by about 1930, many people outside the Labour ranks were beginning to have serious misgivings about the working of capitalism as an economic system. (The tragedy of 1931 was that by the ineptitude of MacDonald and Snowden the whole opportunity afforded by the Macmillan Committee to canalise these misgivings in the direction of constructive Socialism was missed and the way left open for the idiotic reactionism of the May Committee, the panic and the electoral *débâcle*.) A second slump, anything like as severe as that which descended upon us in 1930, would finally convince a great many more people that there was something fundamentally wrong with the existing economic system; and in looking for the way out, they would certainly turn their back upon the Conservative Party. Mr. Attlee's modest statement of his fundamental belief in the Labour Party as offering the only way out would then appear to be well justified in the minds of millions of his countrymen: 'Throughout these years I have never wavered in my faith in the cause of Socialism. I have never lost my early enthusiasm. I have never doubted that the Labour Party, whatever faults or failings it may have, is the only practical instrument in this country for the attainment of a new order of society.' [3]

That, too, holds its answer for Mr. Scanlon: wouldn't he agree?

I have dwelt on the external factors at length, for it is upon these that the prospects of the Labour Party depend, rather than on itself. This is how things happen in politics; however good a party may be, it cannot create its own opportunity. It has to take circumstances as they come; but of course it must be in a condition to make the best use of them. A great deal will depend in the next few years on how the Labour Party takes advantage of its opportunities. The opportunities have not been good in the last few years; but certainly it has to be admitted that it has not put them to the best advantage. Too often it has been a case of snatching

[3] C. R. Attlee, *The Labour Party in Perspective*, p. 8.

defeat out of the jaws of victory, as a leader in *The Times* unkindly put it.

This is where Mr. Scanlon's criticism comes in; and there is a good deal in his main point with which one can agree, in spite of much that is very silly. He feels that of late years the Labour Party has lost something of its immediate contact with the working class which the old pioneers had. For myself, I do not know that the party was much better off in this respect when led by MacDonald and Snowden than now that it is led by Mr. Morrison and Mr. Bevin. But there may be something in his charge; for the Labour Party has been extending its appeal to the middle classes, and may have dispersed some of its strength in the industrial areas in the process. It is true that in the last General Election we failed to carry a considerable number of industrial seats we held in 1929, or even in 1923. Though here again the reason for that is to be found in the circumstances in which the election of 1935 was fought, rather than in any weakness inherent in the Labour Party itself. Moreover, it has to be remembered that even in that election, a very favourable one for the National Government, the total Labour vote recovered to about 8,000,000—the high-water mark of 1929.

The notable thing about the distribution of the vote was that though we lost ground in the industrial areas, where previously our strength had been concentrated, we gained very considerably in the county constituencies of the Midlands and the South—though, naturally, not as yet in sufficient quantity to win seats. The position in regard to seats in Parliament is thoroughly unrepresentative of the vote There are some 800,000 people in the counties south of the Thames who voted Labour in the last election; and not a single Labour seat! Nor will this position be very considerably altered until the thickheads of the Labour and Liberal Parties are driven to come to some understanding. For the Liberals are also adversely affected, though not so adversely as we are; for their southern counties vote of something like a quarter of a million they receive the grand total of two seats Actually, though, an understanding with Labour in this southern area would be a greater advantage to them; since most of the small number of seats they can now hope to win are in this area. But that is another story; the point here is, in

reply to Mr. Scanlon, that the voting, though slow, is not unhealthy for the Labour Party. What we have to do is to continue this new feature of our advance in the county constituencies and in the towns of the Midlands and the South (*e.g.*, our progress in London), while at the same time recovering our previous hold upon the industrial areas.

Nor is it fair to charge the party with neglect of the industrial areas, if something of the old intimacy has lessened and their exclusive position diminished. The trade unions remain in as intimate contact as ever; the Labour Party has been very assiduous on behalf of the unemployed and the distressed areas. Only this year the party has sent a Commission of its own under Dr. Dalton to investigate conditions in all of them, and a very valuable set of reports and suggestions they have produced. But naturally they can hardly be implemented until there is a Labour Government to put them into effect. Then, again, the National Council has been working out a comprehensive pensions scheme to be brought into operation by the next Labour Government; the purpose of it is to provide all persons earning under £8 per week with a pension which will give a reasonable standard of comfort upon their retirement from industry after the age of sixty-five. There is no space here to go in detail into the complicated provisions of a scheme to which both the Labour Party and the trade unions have devoted a great deal of attention, and which has only just been announced; but it does not look like neglect on their part of either the interests or the conditions of the working class.

Mr. Scanlon is on even weaker ground in what he says about the appeal to the middle class. I say nothing about the silliness of his 'Why this slavish adulation of the middle class has grown and spread in the Labour movement is a mystery. It is rife even amongst working men, who are just as well endowed with brains, and have more practical knowledge of things, than the middle-class men.' The plain fact is, to anybody who knows them both, that they are not; and to think that they are is only so much evidence of the pathetic inferiority-complex characteristic of the I.L.P. But he is hopelessly out in his account of the recent London County Council election. 'None of them [the seats] was won,' he says, 'because Mr. Morrison's ability and respectability had

persuaded [middle] class electors to vote Labour. They were won, as in previous years, because the working class were in a majority.' But not all the working class, alas, has the sense to vote Labour, as Mr. Scanlon very well sees. The obvious fact is that thousands of L.C.C. electors who do not ordinarily vote Labour voted for Mr. Morrison and the London Labour Party on this occasion because they had got on with the job and done it well. That, at any rate, is Mr. Morrison's view of the matter, and no one is in a better position to know.

Then, too, there is Mr. Scanlon's depressing table of constituencies which we cannot possibly win, or at least which we are no nearer winning than we were in 1923. There is nothing so depressing as statistics properly handled. It looks as if Mr. Scanlon has just gone through the list of all the seats we do not hold in the present Parliament and put them down as either gone for good or hopeless. As a candidate for a Cornish constituency, I naturally turn to Cornwall's place in the forlorn column : all five seats are given as no nearer being won now than in 1923. As candidate for one of them, Penryn and Falmouth, I protest. When it was first contested by a Labour candidate, after the war, he polled some 4000 or 5000 votes ; in 1929, the high-water mark for the Labour vote throughout the country, the vote was 11,000 ; in 1935 my vote was over 13,000, and only 3000 off from the Tory. A mere turnover of 1500 votes will win the seat for Labour. And in fact, from my own knowledge of the county, I know that two of the five seats are winnable by Labour, and the remaining three by Liberals. What is wanted, of course, is a sensible understanding between Liberals and Labour, and the county would be swept clean of Tories. Or take the next county, Devon, admittedly an unpromising field for Labour. Mr. Scanlon puts down all ten seats as hopeless, including the three Plymouth seats ; but one of those has already returned a Labour member and the second has got very near it, while if the Liberals were given a free field in the rural constituencies four of the seven could be won by them from the Tories. Very much the same thing is true of the other south-western counties, Somerset and Dorset. And so one might go through the whole list, showing that the position is by no means so hopeless as Mr. Scanlon makes out.

All the same, it is, *so long as circumstances remain as they are*

[illegible] not hopeful of a majority. The clue to that is understanding between Liberalism and Labour. I ha calculated that a turnover of 5000 votes on average in th constituencies, provided that there is a working agreement between Liberalism and Labour, would give them a majority in the country, even on the basis of the 1935 election—admittedly a very favourable one for the Conservatives. And if the Labour Party wished for power, this is what it should turn its attention to. The publicists of Mr. Gollancz and the Left Book Club get all feverish—it seems to be their natural temperature—about the necessity of a United Front (*i.e.*, between the Labour Party, the I.L.P., and the Communists) as a prelude to a Popular Front with the Liberals. It never seems to strike these fevered minds, living in a world of yellow dust-covers rather than the world of politics as it really is, that the Labour Left wing is precisely the obstacle to an understanding with the Liberals; that you may choose *either* an understanding with the Communists, etc., *or* an understanding with the Liberals, but you cannot have both: it is like the game in which there are three balls and only two holes to get them into. Nor has it struck them that, from the electoral point of view, an understanding with Communists and I.L.P'ers is a game not worth the candle; the Communists are a mere handful—I do not think there are more than 7000 members of the Communist Party in the whole country; while the I.L.P. occupies just three seats in the House of Commons. By all means let the lunatics who vote for them go on voting for them; it is a pity that the Labour Party should put up candidates against this eccentric representation in the House. But if the Labour Party means business, the only thing worth turning its attention to electorally is an understanding with the Opposition Liberals. There is still, on the basis of the last election, a Liberal vote of 1,000,000, perhaps more (they were 5,000,000 as recently as 1929); and of these a very considerable proportion must be working class; I know that is true of the south-western counties. The more reactionary elements among the Liberals have gone in with the National Government, so that what remains of the Liberal Party is distinctly more progressive and forms a body with which Labour should be able to co-operate. Certainly in this Parliament the two wings of the Opposition, under

Mr. Attlee and Sir Archibald Sinclair, seem to work very well together. Perhaps the association may become still closer as time goes on. It is very much to be hoped so, since it is obvious that the best models we could possibly hope to follow for a Government of the Left in this country are those of Denmark and Sweden. In those countries there have been stable, progressive Governments under Labour leadership, and with Liberal participation, carrying out careful and gradual programmes of economic progress and democratic control, in these years when the great Powers have been rushing into insanity and reaction, with their natural concomitants of an armaments race and the threat of war.

If the Labour Party really wanted power, it would turn its attention to working out such an agreement, which would form the basis of a Government of the Left, beforehand. But neither the Liberals nor the Labour people appear keen; and, in addition, the Labour leaders and Transport House are so afraid of the Left wing that they would not for anything appear to be in favour of an alliance with the Liberals. Yet that is the way to power. One is forced to conclude that the Labour Party does not want power—at any rate, not at present. It may be that Transport House is thinking in long-range terms; that for a Socialist Government to come into power in this country while the danger from Nazi Germany is unliquidated would be undesirable; that we could not go through the disorganisation which the transition to Socialism would involve, with the extension of public control in finance and industry, a political struggle with the Lords, etc., with Nazi Germany ready to strike at any moment. That was the underlying reason for the failure of the first Socialist Government in France; Blum simply could not carry France through to Socialism face to face with the peril from Germany. At the same time, Transport House no doubt thinks that the Labour Party could not afford to form another mark-time Government without carrying out a considerable measure of Socialism—that that would ruin the spirit of the party; and it is probably right. In that case we have to wait, possess our souls in patience, and meanwhile keep our powder dry. It is better for a Conservative Government to take the responsibility for carrying out the vast rearmament programme their fatal misconduct of our foreign policy has necessitated; and

if there is going to be another war between the Imperialist Powers in Europe, it is better that the Imperialists should fight it. We can afford to wait; time is on our side: we know that there is no hope of international order and peace save with the Left in Europe; in time the peoples may turn to sanity and reason again.

That, I think, is the reasoning. And it means that Transport House and the Labour leadership are prepared to wait until we get an independent majority. That, as we have seen, does not depend upon elaborate electoral calculations, either Mr. Scanlon's or mine, but on the general situation in Europe and the trade cycle, with the inevitable coming of another slump. In view of what may happen from these causes, he would be a rash prophet who would say that it is impossible for the Labour Party to achieve a majority. Even Mr Cole, I notice, says: 'I do not regard a Labour majority at the next election as possible, *unless the situation changes in a totally unexpected and unpredictable manner*.'[4] The point is that it may change, and in not so unexpected a manner either. Look at the extraordinary change that overtook the country over the Hoare-Laval agreement within a few months of the Government's being elected! If a Conservative Government had been in power from 1929 to 1931 when the slump came, there would have been a permanent majority for Labour government by now. The luck was the other way. There is a *natural* majority for Labour government in this country, as even Mr. Scanlon sees: 'The wage-earning classes—that is, those earning under £250 per year—are in a majority.' Another slump, or similar circumstances, might bring about a complete change-over, rallying that natural majority to Labour. You never can tell in politics: that to the observer is half the fascination of the game. But I am pretty sure that the Conservative Central Office is taking no chances. An historian, or a 'political meteorologist,' is in a better position to judge than our depressing Left-wingers, who will never attain power themselves and do their best to prevent the more sensible elements in the Labour movement from doing so either. But Professor Pollard's letter to *The Times* on this subject summed up the situation very pointedly. He compared the recent miniature General Election to the

[4] G. D H Cole, *The People's Front*, p 271.

one that took place in similar circumstances in 1894: 'The resignation of Mr. Gladstone in March 1894, and the succession of Lord Rosebery, occasioned seven by-elections in March and April. All were contested: in three (or four) the Government candidates increased their majorities, and not a seat was lost. Fifteen months later that same Government was defeated at the General Election of July 1895, by a majority of 152, which established the Unionists in power for 10 years.' And he concludes, with all the authority of an historian, who has the best claim to reliability as a political observer: 'That a Labour Government will eventually recur I have no doubt; the date depends upon the success with which the present Government deals with its extreme Right, and Labour with its Left.' [5]

A. L. ROWSE.

[5] *The Times*, July 27, 1937

THE REFORM OF THE LAW

VII. Administrative Tribunals

By E. C. S. Wade, LL.D.

I.

> The distinctive development of our era is that the activities of the people are largely controlled by Government Bureaux in State and Nation It has well been said that this multiplication of administrative bodies with large powers has raised anew for our law, after three centuries, the problem of 'executive justice,' perhaps better styled 'administrative justice' A host of controversies as to private rights are no longer decided in courts.
>
> Chief Justice Hughes
> of the United States Supreme Court

In the United Kingdom the problem of executive justice, which we agree is better styled administrative justice, is no less insistent. It is part and parcel of the immense growth of public administration, which is the universal feature of modern government, though here the problem is less before the eye of the general public. The United Kingdom has been spared the constitutional battles in the Courts which have resulted in set-backs both to President Roosevelt's New Deal in the United States and to Mr. Bennett's attempts to introduce similar social legislation in the Dominion of Canada. This we can explain by reason of the federal structure of the constitutions of these two great American States. Indeed it is true, not only of the United States and Canada, but also of Australia, that they have developed their social services and State control of economic resources less fully than we have. On the other hand, in Germany, Italy, Soviet Russia and many other States where the philosophy of government involves the incorporation of the individual in the State, we have nearer at hand an elaborate system of administrative law which operates independently of

judicial control. How is it that in the United Kingdor we have acquired a body of administrative law which enable the governmental organs to provide public services and t impose regulation upon economic activity which in a Feder State are so difficult to achieve ; and which in the totalitaria State seem necessarily to result in rigid bureaucracy, usin that term in the sense of administrative rule by officials ? T answer this question fully would involve a lengthy examina tion of constitutional and political history, which it is n part of this article to undertake. All that can be done i these few pages is to explain to some extent how the adminis trative machine functions in the United Kingdom wit special regard to that small sphere of administration whic involves the solution by administrative tribunals of dispute between the individual citizen and a governmental agency It is important to realise that adjudication of disputes form but a small, albeit important, part of the daily work of th administrator.

If foreign affairs and those of the Dominions, of Indi and of the Colonies and the control and disposition of th Armed Forces are excluded, public administration in th United Kingdom to-day is for all practical purposes base upon Acts of Parliament mainly of recent enactment. Thes Statutes detail the constitution and the powers of particula bodies providing specific services. Parliament has neve sanctioned a New Deal ; it has less dramatically over a lon period of years evolved a series of authorities and a vas body of powers and duties, most of which contemplate inter ference with personal liberty or the interests of private pro perty which were so jealously regarded in the nineteent century. In addition to the Central Government Depart ments and the various local authorities, there are to-day number of independent boards, such as, to take four ver different examples, the Unemployment Assistance Board, th Central Electricity Board, the British Broadcasting Corpora tion and the Agricultural Marketing Boards, which mus equally be regarded as organs of public administratior These Boards and Commissions, the independence of whicl lies in the absence of a Minister answerable for their activitie in Parliament, form one of the most striking developments i the sphere of our political institutions which have take

place in the present century. They are mentioned here because they, equally with the Departments of State, are concerned with administrative justice. *By this term must be understood the solution of disputes upon justiciable issues arising out of the organisation, powers and duties of administrative authorities, which Parliament has excluded from the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts. At the same time, the* courts themselves are concerned with administrative law, as, for example, in an appellate capacity when application is made to the High Court under the Housing Acts to question the validity of clearance orders, or compulsory purchase orders, or in the first instance when dealing with the powers of companies and adjudications in bankruptcy. In examining administrative tribunals we are chiefly concerned with those which are set up by the Departments of State; for here the suggestion that the executive government is encroaching on the sphere of the judiciary is the more obvious. But there is at least some ground for supposing that administrative justice administered by Boards and Commissions for which no Minister answers in Parliament may be as dangerous to liberty, as the term is understood in the twentieth century, as are tribunals operating under appointment by Ministers of the Crown directly answerable to Parliament for their administration.

II.

We must now attempt some classification of administrative tribunals. There are, broadly speaking, three types of tribunals to which are entrusted powers of judicial and quasi-judicial decision in administrative matters. In the first place, there are a number of specialised Courts of Law, to use the term applied by the Committee on Ministers' Powers. The third section of the Report of this Committee [Command Publication 4060 (1932)] is a source of important information upon the subject of administrative tribunals. Some of these specialised Courts are not appointed by, or on the advice of, Ministers of the Crown. For example, under the Solicitors Act, 1932, re-enacting previous legislation, a statutory committee, known as the Discipline Committee of the Law Society, was established for the purpose of hearing applications against solicitors, either to strike them off the Roll or to

compel them to answer allegations made against them by clients. This Committee is appointed by the Master of the Rolls. For hearing of applications there sits a board of at least three members who are practising solicitors. Formerly only advisory, the Committee now has power to order a solicitor to be struck off the Roll, to suspend him from practice or to order him to pay costs. It acts as a judicial body hearing formally applications by complainants, administering oaths and generally conducting its procedure as a court of law. Every order made by the Committee must be prefaced by a statement of the findings in relation to the facts of the case. An appeal from an order of the Discipline Committee lies to the High Court of Justice. This tribunal affords a good example of what is meant when it is said that the rule of law can exist without a single system of judicature. Another tribunal of this character is the General Medical Council, which, like the Discipline Committee, exercises powers of professional life and death over members of a profession.

The Railway and Canal Commission, which bears the closest resemblance to an ordinary court, is another example. This dates from 1873 and exercises the jurisdiction of the old Court of Common Pleas in matters connected with railways—other than fares and rates of freight—and facilities for working minerals. But perhaps the most interesting Court, in view of the criticisms which have been directed against the Civil Service, is that known as the Special Commissioners of Income Tax. Its members are appointed by the Treasury, and when not sitting as Commissioners they act as administrative officials in connexion with the assessment of taxation. But as a Court they have appellate jurisdiction, and, like the High Court Judges, they go in pairs on circuit for the purpose of hearing appeals.

In the second place, there are tribunals whose members are appointed for the express purpose of determining justiciable issues in connexion with the work of a Government Department. These courts may be named Ministerial Tribunals, and it was with this type of tribunal that the Ministers' Powers Committee was particularly concerned. To give two examples from their Report :—

Under the Unemployment Insurance Acts, 1920 to 1930 (now the Act of 1935), a claim for benefit is submitted to an insurance officer

appointed by the Minister of Labour. The insurance officer may either allow the claim or refer the matter for decision to the Court of Referees (which consists of an equal number of representatives of employers and insured contributors and a chairman appointed by the Minister), or, if he is of opinion that the claimant's unemployment is due to a trade dispute, may himself disallow the claim, subject to appeal to the Court of Referees. Elaborate provision is made for appeals from the decisions of the Court of Referees to the Umpire appointed by His Majesty; the Umpire's decision is final

Under the Widows, Orphans, and Old Age Contributory Pensions Act, 1925, any person dissatisfied by the award or decision of the Minister of Health (or Department of Health for Scotland as the case may be) in respect of any pension may have the question referred to a referee or referees selected from a panel of barristers and solicitors appointed by the National Health Insurance Joint Committee No officer of the Department may be a member of the panel. The decision of the referee or referees is final and conclusive, except that they may state a case on a point of law for the High Court (or in Scotland the Court of Session) or in either case the Court may order them to do so

In the third place, a Minister of the Crown may himself be the appointed tribunal. Under the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1935, it is for the Minister of Labour to determine the question whether any employment or class of employment is such as to make the person engaged therein an employed person within the meaning of the Act. From the Minister's decision an appeal lies to the High Court, or alternatively the Minister, instead of himself deciding the question, may refer it to the Court for decision. This power is purely judicial, since the dispute is upon a question of law, and can only be settled by a finding upon the facts in dispute and an application of the law to those facts, which must involve a final ruling of law (subject to any right to appeal).

We have mentioned above that administrative tribunals possess powers of judicial and of quasi-judicial decision. It is only in respect of a strict judicial decision that the function of an administrative tribunal comes into conflict with that of an ordinary court. It is the function of a court of law in deciding a dispute, first, to listen to the presentation of the case by the parties—though the presentation need not necessarily be oral, since even the High Court admits written evidence upon affidavit. Secondly, to ascertain the facts, if they are in dispute, by means of the evidence produced by the parties. Thirdly, to consider the submission of legal argu-

ment, and finally to dispose of the whole matter, having found the facts, by an application of the law of the land to those facts, including, if necessary, a ruling upon any disputed question of law. For example, when the Minister of Labour is determining who is an employed person within the meaning of the *Unemployment Insurance Act, he is giving a decision* which disposes of the whole matter at issue by a final ruling of law. In just the same way a judge with, or without, the assistance of a jury finds liability in a running down case, or in a case involving breach of contract for the sale of goods.

Now a quasi-judicial decision, with which Ministers individually rather than Ministerial Tribunals are principally concerned, involves a dispute between two or more parties, the presentation of the case, the ascertainment of the facts, but not necessarily a submission of legal argument, and, according to the Ministers' Powers Committee, never involves a final decision based upon an application of the law. A Minister's decision in such a dispute is based solely upon administrative policy. For example, under the Road Traffic Act, the Minister of Transport is given appellate powers in connexion with what are known as public services vehicles, *e.g.*, motor buses. These vehicles are licensed by traffic commissioners, and an appeal lies to the Minister from the refusal or failure of the commissioners to grant licences or against any condition imposed by them. A local authority or other opponent to the grant of a licence has similar rights of appeal, and the Minister's decision is final. In giving his decision, the Minister's task is clearly to decide questions of policy involving the volume of transport facilities desirable in any given area. He may, for instance, be prepared to grant a licence subject only to a condition that a long-distance motor coach shall not take up intermediate traffic. This is not a matter of law, but purely one of administrative policy. To take such a decision is, indeed, the normal task of a Minister of the Crown, since the determination of policy is his responsibility.

Now it is not easy to draw the line between a power of judicial and a power of quasi-judicial decision. It has been suggested that the distinction is one of form rather than of substance, *since any power of deciding a disputed issue can* be made to depend either on a fixed rule of law or on adminis-

trative discretion at the will of the Parliamentary draftsman At the same time, it would probably be conceded that there are many decisions of an administrative character which can more appropriately be given by an administrative authority than by a court of law in the ordinary sense. Whether this is so or not, it is important that the disputant who comes into conflict with a governmental authority shall have the feeling that he is getting a square deal. Parliament may ensure this by prescribing the procedure which a tribunal is bound in law to follow, though it does not always prescribe the procedure of a law court. Moreover, unless Parliament provides to the contrary the High Court has the power to intervene at the instance of the person aggrieved if the decision of any lower tribunal, whether administrative or not, appears to involve an abuse of certain rules of natural justice, such as the refusal to hear the applicant, or the presence of bias or prejudice on the part of a member of the tribunal.

As all administrative tribunals are statutory, there is also available the plea of *ultra vires*, *i.e.*, exceeding the jurisdiction conferred by statute, save in a case where Parliament may have expressly prohibited the review by a court of law of the action taken by the tribunal, and such cases are rare. It must be admitted that the High Court procedure, which, like the better known Habeas Corpus procedure, is based upon the old prerogative writs, which do not compensate for injuries, but only compel the doing of acts or restrain the commission of unlawful acts, is still unduly complicated. This was recognised in 1934 when provision was made by the Administration of Justice Act for a simpler procedure. But this procedure has not yet been promulgated.

Upon the question whether Parliament ought ever to entrust in the first instance to a Minister or to a tribunal appointed by him, the decision of a dispute by the making of a final ruling of law, it may be argued that, while administrative policy may safely be entrusted to a Minister, responsible as he is to Parliament, the ordinary courts are alone fitted to decide the former type of dispute. This is the view which found favour with the Ministers' Powers Committee, though they were prepared to admit exceptions, and it is still approved almost universally by the Bench and the Temple. But the layman may well hesitate before expressing his preference for

the decision of the issue in a court of law. Against the advantage of having his dispute tried by a judge, and maybe a jury, he must set the lack of knowledge of the administrative problem from which probably the judge, and certainly the jury, will suffer. He will regard the formalities of the law, the technicalities of the law of evidence, and perhaps even the dignity of the proceedings, tinged as they are with some relics of mediæval splendour, at all events in the case of the High Court, with distrust. He may very well prefer to have his claim to a pension or to insurance benefit, or even his objection to the demolition of his house property, determined by a separate tribunal exclusively concerned with the matters in question. Take, for example, the question of assessment to a tax, like the income tax. This rests at present with an administrative official in practice, though actually the General Commissioners of Income Tax—a body which contains no official element and is interposed between the taxpayer and the Crown—confirm the assessment. Appeal against an assessment is made to the General Commissioners or the Special Commissioners at the option of the taxpayer and thence to a Judge of the High Court. An issue of this description can hardly justify, at all events in the first instance, the setting in motion of the machinery of procedure in a law court. Provided that there is preserved an ultimate appeal to the courts, as there is in this particular case, there need be little danger of official tyranny. It is indeed well recognised that the Special Commissioners who, as we have seen, are a body of Inland Revenue officers, are a far better appellate tribunal than are the General Commissioners, who contain no official element.

There was one question which was more or less shelved by the Committee on Ministers' Powers, the establishment of a system of administrative tribunals with a central administrative court at the head. Now it would be an exaggeration to say that there exists in the United Kingdom to-day a system of such tribunals, but there are undoubtedly many instances of isolated tribunals, each with their own narrow jurisdiction and each entrusted with the discretion of making decisions with which the High Court cannot normally interfere. But there is certainly nothing to correspond with the *Conseil d'Etat*, which under the admirable French system

is not merely the final tribunal in administrative cases, but also performs the important task of advising the various Ministries as to the form and content of the schemes and regulations which it is the perennial task of Government Departments to initiate and to control. Much that seems desirable to the Committee on Ministers' Powers with regard to delegated legislation might be achieved by the establishment of some such body in our Constitution. The proposal would involve the abolition both of the supervisory and of the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court in matters appertaining to administration. For it is of the essence of the French system to separate administrative law and its tribunals from the civil law and its courts. This, the Committee considered, would result in the withdrawal to a great extent from the influence of public opinion of those judicial activities which are inseparable from administration. But the answer to this is surely that the French system does give protection to the French subject against the arbitrary acts of the public service. The present English system gives such protection less completely, for to this day no action for civil injury—other than a breach of contract—can be brought against the Crown in the High Court, while in what is supposed to be the poor man's civil court—the County Court—no proceedings can, as a rule, be instituted against the State. And even in those cases where there is a procedure by which the Crown can be sued in the High Court the subject by reason of the ancient learning of the royal prerogative is intentionally placed at a peculiar disadvantage.

There would appear to be no need to fear that the establishment in this country of an appellate administrative tribunal would be to the disadvantage of the citizens, but there seems little likelihood of so logical a solution of the administrative problem being achieved in the near future. Even if we cannot hope for a system of administrative tribunals, we can at least plead for a greater uniformity in the rules of procedure of the many types of judicial and quasi-judicial bodies which exercise jurisdiction to-day.

III.

To appreciate the attitude of the High Court and of lawyers as a whole to administrative tribunals we must

remember that historically the function of administration lay largely with judges and justices of the peace. This has now ceased to be the case. After the active administration of the Privy Council ended in the seventeenth century, the judges of the King's Bench Court were left as the sole controlling agency over the justices, whose duties were as much administrative as judicial. The justices in petty and quarter sessions possessed independent powers of action and capacity for development upon their own lines, but in matters of law they were subject to this control by the judges. New powers could only be obtained from Parliament. It was natural that when new bodies were set up by Parliament in the nineteenth century they should be given some degree of independence. But this autonomy was, and is, regarded jealously by the Higher Courts, who could still exercise control where matters of law were involved through the prerogative writs. *Ultra vires* acts could be restrained; abuses of natural justice checked. To-day the organisation of the Civil Service is entirely outside the jurisdiction of the courts; that of other authorities is determined by statute, but always involves the exercise of administrative discretion independent of the courts. But opportunities for control by the courts were not lacking by reason of the hostility which greeted new bodies, like the guardians of the poor and local boards of health in the nineteenth century and the host of post-war governmental agencies of the present day. Thus, there is still a measure of judicial check upon public administration. The courts have since the Great War increased their pressure, prompted by the outcry in the Temple which greeted the recognition that the war had left behind it legacies in the shape of governmental agencies empowered to settle their disputes with the citizen without resort to the Bench and Bar. This has resulted in fierce opposition to any proposal for the establishment of a system of administrative tribunals on the French lines.

It is impossible to estimate the attitude of English lawyers to administrative law without considering the influence of that great Oxford writer on the Constitution, Professor A. V. Dicey. *The Law of the Constitution* was first published more than fifty years ago and must have been studied by most of the men who during the present century have been in public

life. One feature of this classical work is the exposition given of the Rule of Law. Dicey claimed that the Rule of Law had three meanings, or might be regarded from three different points of view. Two of these points of view are relevant.

That 'rule of law' which forms a fundamental principle of the Constitution [says Dicey][1] has three meanings, or may be regarded from three different points of view. It means, in the first place, the absolute supremacy or predominance of regular law as opposed to the influence of arbitrary power, and excludes the existence of arbitrariness, of prerogative, or even of wide discretionary authority on the part of the Government. Englishmen are ruled by the law, and by the law alone; a man may, with us, be punished for a breach of the law, but he can be punished for nothing else.

It means, again, equality before the law, or the equal subjection of all classes to the ordinary law of the land administered by the ordinary law courts; the 'rule of law' in this sense excludes the idea of any exemption of officials or others from the duty of obedience to the law which governs other citizens or from the jurisdiction of the ordinary tribunals; there can be with us nothing really corresponding to the 'administrative law' (*droit administratif*) or the 'administrative tribunals' (*tribunaux administratifs*) of France. The notion which lies at the bottom of the 'administrative law' known to foreign countries is that affairs or disputes in which the Government or its servants are concerned are beyond the sphere of the civil courts and must be dealt with by special and more or less official bodies. The idea is utterly unknown to the law of England, and indeed is fundamentally inconsistent with our traditions and customs.

When Dicey writes of 'wide discretionary authority on the part of the Government' he cannot be taken to refer to discretionary powers, which, though they may be wide in character, are actually conferred by an Act of Parliament. Englishmen are ruled at least as much by Acts of Parliament as by the Common Law. This view of governmental authority seems to refer exclusively to the old prerogative powers of the Crown which have ceased to be important in modern administrative law. But modern writers have seized upon this view to support their attacks upon the exercise of the powers given by Parliament to Government Departments and other authorities in the statutes which have created both the modern social services and the various forms of the economic regulation of to-day.

When Dicey refers to 'equality before the law' he pre-

[1] Dicey, *Law of the Constitution*, 8th ed., pp. 198, 199.

supposes that there can be only one type of tribunal, namely, the Law Courts as they are generally understood. It is perfectly true that officials, as others, are required to submit to the law of the land in all their activities, but it is not true that the Government and its servants possess the same rights and duties as the ordinary citizen. It is obvious that the policeman can arrest, in some circumstances, when the ordinary citizen may not; that the Inspector of Nuisances may enter premises without leave of the occupier; that the Collector of Taxes has powers which no private creditor possesses, and that the executioner may commit a legal form of homicide. Add to these, examples drawn from the innumerable services which the State renders to the public to-day and in return for which it demands submission to various forms of regulation, and it is easy to see that officials cannot be subject to the same rules as ordinary citizens. Just as they possess special duties, so they have special powers, and these powers include the power to adjudicate disputes if Parliament so determines. The basis of the whole judicial system to-day is to be found in Acts of Parliament. Whether it be the Supreme Court of Judicature, the County Courts, the Criminal Courts or Administrative Tribunals, each and all must be regarded as part of the single system if we are to give meaning to the doctrine of equality before the law. For this can only mean that each class of subject, *i.e.*, married women, property owners, civil servants, members of professions, are all treated alike by the particular laws which govern their status and functions.

In conclusion, it may be well to summarise the extent of the present-day activities of the ordinary courts (as Dicey understood them) in relation to administrative law.

(1) In many cases an appeal lies on a point of law either to the Court of Appeal or the High Court or the County Court. Instances of this are to be found in the Housing Acts, the Income Tax Acts and in the law relating to street paving charges.

(2) It is in the High Court that administrative authorities in general can be restrained by the doctrine of *ultra vires*, and it is by this tribunal that they can be compelled to observe the rules of natural justice, even where Parliament has prescribed no particular form of procedure for the administrative body.

(3) If we except the Government Departments which are still sheltered by the immunity of the Crown from liability for civil injuries (torts), public authorities and their servants remain liable in the ordinary courts both for breaches of contract and for other civil injuries. These include the failure to perform a duty owed to an individual under the Common Law or the provisions of an Act of Parliament. Moreover, not merely the failure to perform but also the negligent performance of such duty is actionable. But it must be remembered that what may be wrongful when done by a private individual may not be wrongful in a public authority or its servants.

IV.

What of the future? It is clear that administrative law and its tribunals have come to stay. It seems natural that the chaos of jurisdictions will one day be systematised with a counterpart to the French *Conseil d'État* at the head. The function of Parliament should be to keep a close watch upon the powers conferred upon tribunals of such great variety, and as far as possible to provide them with a uniform procedure. It is for the courts to continue to see that administrative tribunals do not act in excess of their statutory powers; in other words, to control them so far as issues of strict law are concerned. In so far as the decision of disputes is required to rest upon administrative policy, there can be no question of the work of administrative tribunals being handed over to the courts to substitute their own discretion for that of the administrator. It is important to ensure that publicity should be given to the conduct of proceedings. As far as possible laymen should be associated with their activities as with the Courts of Referees under the Unemployment Insurance Act and with the Railway Rates Tribunal. Suspicions are easily aroused by secrecy and perhaps equally by the knowledge that the judge belongs to the official class. It is no disrespect to the British Civil Service to say that the confidence which the public reposes in it would be strengthened by the increasing association of laymen with the solution of administrative disputes.

E. C. S. WADE.

THE FAR EASTERN CRISIS

By Captain M. D. Kennedy, O.B.E.

To devote an article to a book published close on a year ago may seem unusual. Even at this late date, however, a critical examination of Mr. Stimson's work on the Manchurian dispute [1] should prove not unprofitable, for the developments now taking place in the Peking-Tientsin area are the direct outcome of this dispute, and an examination of the book in question may help to emphasise the mistakes to be avoided by our own and other Governments in dealing with the present situation.

As an ably written, lucid statement of the case against Japan, this book by the former American Secretary of State is as interesting as it is important; but, as the work of one who has held such high office in the realm of international affairs, it seems sadly lacking in that balance and broad-minded impartiality which one expects from a statesman. It calls to mind, in fact, a passage which, though omitted from the official text presented at Geneva, occurred in the advance copy of *Japan's Observations on the Lytton Report* issued to foreign Press correspondents in Tokyo on November 20, 1932. It read: 'Judgment on Manchoukuo is pronounced from Ebal and not from Gerizim.' [2]

In line with an unfortunate tendency to weight the scales heavily against Japan, Mr. Stimson exhibits a curious inability to understand the national psychology of either of the two disputants. Moreover, he seems unable to appreciate that the policy he advocated at the time of the dispute has, in actual practice, increased rather than reduced the difficulties of restoring peace and stability to the Far East. In short, in

[1] *The Far Eastern Crisis*, by Henry L. Stimson.

[2] The reference was to the curses from Mount Ebal and the blessings from Mount Gerizim mentioned in Deuteronomy xxvii 11-13. It was omitted from the final text on the ground that it was too abstruse.

regard to the general sentiments expressed and to the suggestions put forward, the book may be said to reflect greater credit on the heart than on the head of its distinguished author. It is because of this that an article, pointing out the speciousness of some of his arguments and deductions, appears warranted at the present moment, when the situation in the Far East is such that a repetition of the mistaken policy pursued by the Western Powers five and six years ago may have consequences disastrous to all.

Mr. Stimson's inability to recognise the harm done by the policy he pursued during the greater part of the Sino-Japanese controversy over Manchuria stands out in sharp contrast with the statesmanly attitude adopted by himself and his advisers in the opening stages of the dispute. This attitude is clearly indicated by a quotation taken from his diary for September 23, 1931, five days after the outbreak at Mukden. 'My problem,' he noted, 'is to let the Japanese know that we are watching them and at the same time do it in a way which will help Shidehara,[3] who is on the right side, and not play into the hands of any nationalist agitators.' In other words, while just as anxious as the League to stand up for the principles enunciated in the post-war treaties, he was fully alive to the danger of taking any action liable to inflame Japanese sentiment and play into the hands of the reactionary elements.

In the early stages, too, as shown by his stand on the question of 'direct negotiations,' he showed greater readiness than the statesmen of most other Western countries to appreciate the danger of aggravating the situation by careless handling. His lively appreciation of this danger is clearly reflected in the following passage from his book:

> I deprecated the proposal of sending by the League at that time [September 1931] an investigating committee over and against the objection of Japan. I suggested that in as much as *Oriental people* were not so well acquainted with the method of judicial investigation and findings by third parties, but, in my opinion were *more inclined to settle their difficulties by direct negotiation between the parties involved*, they should be permitted to try this method first.[4]

Had the League of Nations shown itself as appreciative of this fact as the American Secretary of State, and if Mr.

[3] Baron Shidehara, Japanese Foreign Minister at the time of the outbreak.

[4] Page 43. (The italics are mine)

Stimson himself had maintained this same prudent stand throughout, the unfortunate developments of the past few years in the Far East might well have been avoided and China herself might to-day be in a very much happier position than she is. Baron Shidehara and his Cabinet colleagues, as Mr. Stimson freely admits, did their best at the outset to localise the outbreak in Manchuria and to hold their more hot-headed countrymen in check; but they were handicapped from the very start by the way in which Geneva, by its maladroit handling of the situation, played into the hands of the nationalist extremists in Japan. On no one point was this more marked than on that of the vexed question of direct negotiations. From start to finish Japan remained firm in her insistence on settling the Manchurian question by means of direct negotiations with China, without interference from any third party. But the League and, later, Mr. Stimson, by raising false hopes of active assistance, led China increasingly to believe that she could safely refuse to negotiate direct with Japan. As a result, China's attitude was stiffened, and the stiffer it became, the harder became the task of the more moderate elements in Japan to restrain the rising flood of national sentiment in their own country. What Mr. Stimson had foreseen as a possibility, therefore, became an actuality; and although he might still have been able to exert a restraining influence if he had remained cool, he allowed himself to be deflected from the wise course that he had pursued at the start and was soon in the van of those who, in a sincere but misguided attempt to compel a peaceful settlement, indulged in actions which merely made matters worse.

In so far as the League was concerned—and Mr. Stimson seems to have approved of its action—one of the worst of its earlier blunders was the passage of its resolution of October 24, 1931, directing the Japanese Government 'to begin immediately and proceed progressively with the withdrawal of its troops . . . so that the total withdrawal may be effected before the date fixed for the next meeting of the Council'—namely, November 16. With the best will in the world, such a withdrawal, under the conditions then prevailing in Manchuria, would have been impossible; and from private talks that I had at the time with some of the leading foreign diplomats in Tokyo, there is good reason to believe

that more than one ambassador to Japan warned his home Government beforehand of the serious consequences if this resolution were passed. But, as so often happens, the men on the spot were apparently regarded as prejudiced or unduly influenced by their surroundings. Their warnings, which were to prove all too well founded, went unheeded.

That even persons closely connected with the machinery of the League recognised the serious mistake committed was evidenced by a talk I had in Tokyo, some three weeks later, with an official of the League who was visiting Japan at the time. His remarks I find recorded in my diary for November 14 as under:

> W—— frankly admitted that the League had blundered badly in setting a date, and that the whole handling of the question had been unlike the usual methods of the Council, though he thought this was largely due to a bad attack of nerves, everyone being scared lest the situation should develop in such a way as to bring on another World War. (In other words, China simply tried to stampede the League into action in order to serve her own ends; and apparently she succeeded.)

It was shortly after this that Mr. Stimson made the first of a number of utterances fated to do more harm than good. On November 28 came a Press despatch to Tokyo from Washington, quoting him as denouncing Japan in strong and most undiplomatic terms for the advance made on Chinchow the previous day and accusing her of breaking her pledges. Exactly what he did say is not quite clear, and unfortunately his book fails to throw fresh light on the incident; but although official despatches from the American capital subsequently denied the alleged outburst, Mr. Shiratori, the Japanese Foreign Office spokesman, intimated to foreign correspondents on November 29 that Mr. Stimson had admitted to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington that he had been guilty of an unfortunate slip. This was, that he had inadvertently made public the assurances given confidentially by Japan that no attack on Chinchow was contemplated.

While there is no reason to doubt that Mr. Stimson's breach of confidence had been wholly unintentional—and, as he had expressed his regret, the correspondents were asked by Mr. Shiratori to say nothing about it in their cables—his indiscretion had two very unfortunate results. It led, in the

first place, to the Japanese Foreign Minister being strongly censured by his more excitable countrymen for 'giving away State secrets' to the United States—an accusation which dealt yet a further blow to his moderating influence—and it led Chang Hsueh-liang to revoke his proposal to evacuate Chinchow, as he felt he could safely remain there if the Japanese had no intention of driving him out by force.

In his book Mr. Stimson is inclined to take credit for having indirectly helped to stop the Japanese advance on Chinchow on this occasion. His belief may be justified, though it is doubtful whether the whole facts of the case will ever be made known. Some entries made in my diary at the time may, therefore, be of interest. Following the usual daily interview of the foreign correspondents with the Japanese Foreign Office spokesman on November 27, I wrote:

> Despite very convincing Press reports to the contrary, Shiratori professes complete confidence that the army has no intention of attacking (Chinchow), as the Government has pledged itself to refrain from such action and the army heads concurred with the Government in giving this assurance to the Powers.

Under date of November 28 comes the entry:

> In the morning came the news that the Japanese, after advancing as far west as Koupangtzu, had withdrawn to Hsinminfu and that (General) Honjo expected to withdraw all troops west of Mukden back to the S M R. within the next few days. A most surprising development after the alarms and excursions of yesterday. Shiratori, of course, simply sits back in his chair and unconcernedly says in effect: 'Didn't I tell you so? Weren't my assurances of yesterday thoroughly justified?' I can't help feeling, though, that his air of confidence last night was a cloak for very grave apprehension on his part, and that he must be feeling very relieved that the troops have not only ceased to advance, but have actually been withdrawn.

Further light is thrown on this same incident by an entry appearing in my diary on December 12, referring to a talk with a British official, who had just returned to Tokyo from Manchuria:

> Much interested to hear from him that, in his opinion, the Japanese assertion that the operations on the 27th were for the purpose of rushing help to the garrison at Tientsin was justified.[5] When this explanation

[5] Serious disturbances had broken out at Tientsin and the Japanese Consul-General had requested that reinforcements be rushed there for the protection of the large Japanese community. His request, however, had been turned down.

> was given out at the time by the War Office, it struck me as a rather poor attempt at propaganda, as reinforcements could be rushed to Tientsin far quicker by sea; but from what S. tells me, it seems that the W. O. may have been right after all. The troops, he said, were thoroughly aroused by the reports from Tientsin, as it really looked as though the situation was pretty desperate. Momentarily, therefore, they 'saw red' and decided that the best way was to blast their way through *via* Chinchow, as this would serve the double purpose of sending reinforcements and easing the pressure on Tientsin by diverting the attention of the Chinese.

Whatever the true reason of the sudden advance on Chinchow may have been, it seems probable that the prompt withdrawal was due not only to ethical but also to military considerations, as the Japanese Higher Command in this—as in all the other main operations carried out in Manchuria during the years 1931–33—were always careful to act on the principle laid down by the ancient Chinese strategist Sonshi—namely, to keep up pressure to show that they were prepared to use more force if necessary, but to leave a loop-hole for the enemy to escape by, lest he be driven to desperation and fight with the courage and tenacity of despair.

For the army to have tried to 'blast its way through' at Chinchow would have been contrary to this fixed policy. It only remains, therefore, to recall that, thanks to the unswerving application of this policy, the entry into Chinchow was finally effected peacefully on the afternoon of January 2, 1932, Chang Hsueh-liang having quietly started to withdraw his troops a day or two before on realising that the Japanese really 'meant business,' and that they were prepared to throw him out by force if he did not go of his own accord.

A few days prior to the termination of these operations a final attempt had been made by Britain, France, and America to persuade Japan to avoid any action liable to precipitate a clash at Chinchow. Notes were presented to the Japanese Foreign Office on December 24 expressing the apprehensions of the three Governments concerned; but, although officially Japan professed to regard these notes as expressions of 'friendly concern' rather than as a 'warning,' the action caused considerable resentment and only served further to aggravate national sentiment and play into the hands of the more reactionary elements. To anyone acquainted with Japanese national psychology it should have been clear from

the outset that such would be the effect, for the simultaneous presentation of these notes recalled vividly to the Japanese mind the 'friendly advice' tendered by Russia, France and Germany on the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, and few things are more calculated to excite the popular mind in Japan than the merest suggestion of a new Triple Intervention. Although, to judge by what he says in his book, Mr. Stimson appears blissfully ignorant of the depth to which the lessons of the Triple Intervention have been driven into the very soul of Japan, it is greatly to be regretted that he and the statesmen at Geneva failed so pitifully to appreciate this fact, for the whole history of the Manchurian dispute is strewn with instances of the situation being aggravated by actions on the part of the great Western Powers which, while well-intentioned, had the effect of rubbing salt into open sores.

A typical example of this was when, on February 9, 1932, Mr. Stimson invited Great Britain to join with America in invoking the Nine-Power Treaty. In his book he is highly critical of the British Government for failing to fall in with his suggestion. In actual fact, however, Britain acted wisely in declining his invitation, as Japanese national sentiment was highly inflamed at the time, and nothing would have been more calculated to precipitate a serious explosion than this proposed manifestation of Anglo-American unity, smacking so forcibly—as it would have done—of coercion and encirclement, and recalling once more the bitter lesson of the Triple Intervention. Committed as she was just then to the Shanghai operations, Japan could not possibly have backed down under the threat of pressure from Britain and America without a most serious loss of 'face,' which the nation as a whole would never have tolerated. She must, then, have inevitably declined to heed the warning; and if Britain and America had thereupon decided on active measures to compel her, war would have been unavoidable.

There are, I know, many who believe that Japan was merely bluffing, and that it only required courage and firmness on the part of the other Powers to call her bluff. As one who was well placed to judge of the highly inflamed state of public opinion in Japan at the time, I have never been able to accept that opinion. The more excitable and reactionary elements in the country were freely talking and writing of the steps to

be taken if Britain, America, or any other Power attempted to interfere actively with Japanese actions on the neighbouring mainland, and were stirring up their countrymen in general to follow their lead. If, therefore, anything in the nature of active outside intervention had been attempted—either in the form of economic sanctions as advocated by some or by actual armed force—there seems little doubt that Japan would have taken counter-measures which would have meant war. Admittedly it would have been a desperate and possibly foolhardy gamble on the part of Japan; but, in the existing circumstances, it was a gamble more preferable to the Japanese than the alternative of a 'climb down' at the dictation of foreign Powers, and it becomes intelligible if one stops to consider the whole trend of Japanese policy since the time of the Triple Intervention in 1895. In that instance Japan was compelled to bow her proud head in face of *force majeure*, as the alternative was national extinction; but she paid dearly for it by seeing Russia step into her shoes at Port Arthur and by being forced, in consequence, to fight another costly war ten years later. She therefore determined that never again would she allow herself to have her actions dictated to her by any foreign Power or combination of Powers, and the whole course of her policy since 1895 has been to ensure the security of her position in the Far East in such a way as to guard herself against any possibility of dictation from without. It was because he fully appreciated this fact that one very shrewd military attaché in Tokyo at the time of the Shanghai operations, on being asked for his advice as to what action the Powers should take in order to put a stop to them, promptly replied that they should agree to shut their eyes for a week or two while the Japanese drove back the Chinese troops from around the city.

This, in effect, is the course that was ultimately followed; and, although Mr. Stimson is inclined to criticise the other Powers for what he clearly regards as a supine policy towards the Shanghai trouble, the question to be considered at the time was: 'Which is better? To refrain from interference while Japan slays a few hundred Chinese in order to restore peace in that area, or to bring further pressure to bear on Japan and thereby risk precipitating a World War, in which millions may be killed and civilisation dealt a blow even

greater than in 1914–18?' Thanks to the advocates of the first of these two alternatives having their advice followed, the Japanese carried out their declared intention of driving back the Chinese troops to a distance of 20 kilometres from the city, and then, having ensured by signed agreement that the Chinese would not return, they quietly withdrew.

Mr. Stimson tends to wax sarcastic over the inability of the Japanese to complete their task at Shanghai more expeditiously; but, while there is no doubt that the Japanese found themselves up against a far harder proposition than they had anticipated, Mr. Stimson apparently fails to appreciate the difficulties and handicaps under which they laboured, and it is impossible to agree with his contention that the primary object of Japan's 'attack on Shanghai' was 'to cripple China's defence (of Manchuria) by a new attack upon her at Shanghai.'[6] In so far as the time taken is concerned, it was a fellow-countryman of Mr. Stimson's who, after first-hand observation of the operations, remarked to me:

> One thing on which most foreign observers went wrong was in failing to realise that the seemingly slow progress made by the Japanese troops at the outset was not so much due to their inability to drive back the 19th Route Army, but rather to their policy of avoiding heavy casualties. If they had wished to do so, the Japanese could have driven them back straightaway; but it would have entailed far heavier losses for themselves.

In this same connexion an entry in my diary for February 22, 1932, is of interest. It reads:

> Whether reinforcements were sent or not, the army, according to Shiratori, expects to drive back the 19th Army to the 20-kilometre line within a week or ten days.

This forecast proved remarkably accurate, for, by the afternoon of March 3, just ten days later, the Chinese had been driven back the requisite distance, and General Shirakawa thereupon ordered the cessation of hostilities accordingly.

Much could be written in refutation of what Mr. Stimson has to say about the handling of the Shanghai trouble and other matters; but space is limited, and, before concluding, two other points call for special attention. One is the doctrine of non-recognition, of which he was the sponsor; the other

[6] *Vide* p. 116.

is the question of moral condemnation. On both these points he has much to say; but, while fully recognising his honesty of purpose, it is difficult to agree with his conclusions. The Stimson doctrine of non-recognition is no doubt excellent in theory, but, to judge by what has already happened in the case of Manchoukuo and in regard also to Abyssinia, it has proved no great deterrent to the party against which it is directed. Those who apply the doctrine are, in fact, made to suffer far greater disadvantages, especially commercially and economically, than the country which they adjudge to be the guilty party.

In the same way, can it truthfully be said that 'moral condemnation' in itself causes any very serious inconvenience to the country condemned, or that it serves to hold it in check? It certainly had little or no effect on ourselves at the time of the Boer War, unless to unite the Empire all the more in its determination to see the matter through. It certainly did nothing to restrain Mr. Stimson's own country in the case of Panama, whose creation as an 'independent State' was effected by methods which reflected little credit on the parties concerned. Incidentally, one cannot help wondering if any good purpose would have been served had all the other Powers applied the doctrine of non-recognition in that particular instance.

While one cannot but sympathise with Mr. Stimson and post-war statesmen in general in their efforts to work out ways and means of checking wars and aggression, the regrettable fact has to be faced that very little real progress has been made in this direction since the close of the World War. The Kellogg Pact may have served to prevent war in name, but it has done nothing to stop fighting; and although Mr. Stimson credits the League with 'a great achievement' in the matter of Manchuria, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the main result of its action was to aggravate the situation and to prolong the agony for China.[7] Equally difficult is it, in the face of recent developments in Europe, to share his enthusiastic belief that, as a result of the League's achievement

[7] Compare what M. Spaak, the Belgian Foreign Minister, said last year about Abyssinia: 'If there had been no League, Ethiopia would no doubt still be in existence. The Negus would not have based his defence upon bankrupt principles. He would have looked for a compromise' *Vide* Brussels telegram in *The Times* of October 28, 1936.

in Manchuria, there is now 'a steadily accelerating movement to seek a method of limiting and preventing war through the co-operation of the nations of the earth.'

No good purpose is likely to be served by schoolmasterly admonitions and threats of coercion directed against Japan. It may seem but a counsel of perfection; but the one thing needful above all else is close and friendly co-operation between Great Britain, Japan and the United States, and nothing could be more harmful to the cause of peace than for Britain to repeat the folly of 1922—when the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was abrogated—by courting the friendship of one at the expense of the other. To this I am tempted to add that, if non-aggression pacts were made to apply to venomous Press attacks as well as to armed attacks, the prospects of world peace would be vastly improved.

M. D. KENNEDY.

LABOUR AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

By John Scanlon

The Labour Party is holding an inquiry into the cause in the fall of the vote at the recent by-elections. When the inquiry begins let us hope for the Party's sake that the first witnesses to be put in the box will be those bright young men who invented the word 'sanctions.' The adoption of that word alone does not, of course, explain the demoralisation, but when the bright young men get to the witness box, the judges will see one of its chief causes. The judges, too, might well reflect on their own folly in allowing a Party, created specifically to abolish poverty from Britain, to be diverted from that task into one for fomenting hatreds abroad by these same young men. They might study the foreign policy of the Labour Party adopted in 1921 when it was a Socialist Party, and if they compare it with the foreign policy adopted in 1934, they will find in the difference much of the cause for the decline in the vote. Foreign affairs predominate now in the Labour Party to the exclusion of everything else, they predominate in Parliament largely because the Labour Party makes them predominate, and to-day all of us who belong to the organised working-class movement are committed to a foreign policy which has no relationship to Socialist philosophy, ignores all the fundamental principles laid down in 1921 and, what is probably worse from the Party managers point of view, it is costing thousands of votes in every constituency.

The present foreign policy of the Labour Party was adopted at the annual Conference held at Southport in 1934, and although Mr. Arthur Henderson, in giving it his blessing, said there was nothing new in it, it actually differs in every respect from the policy adopted in 1921. Anything I say here may not succeed in convincing loyal League of Nations supporters in the Labour Party that it is a dangerous policy, but

from Party resolutions I at least can show that Mr. Henderson was wrong in saying it was not a new policy. Nor can any justification for our anti-German feeling be laid at the door of Herr Hitler's foreign policy in scrapping, bit by bit, the Versailles Treaty. There was scarcely a Labour leader in 1921 but was urging the scrapping of that Treaty, and so well did they state their case that a large part of the nation was converted to the view that there could be no peace in Europe until it was scrapped. In tracing the sad history of Labour's blind folly in departing from the policy of 1921 to complete trust in a capitalist League of Nations, it will be necessary to go back only to the end of the war. The war itself had shattered the International. The majority of the leaders in each country forgot their International principles, and those who supported their Governments in the respective countries were actually more nationalist than the nationalists themselves. When any particular piece of Germany hating was required, a Labour leader could always be relied on to supply the need. In Germany nobody sang their hymns of hate with greater gusto than the German Socialists. Immediately hostilities were over the minority, who had refused to support the war, at once turned their attention to the task of bringing together again the Socialist International. This was made easier by the harsh terms imposed by the victors at Versailles. There was, too, the disillusionment amongst the workers which follows all wars. By 1921 most of the German hating had vanished from Britain, and the men who were already achieving popularity in the Labour Party were not those who had seen us through to victory, but those who had advocated peace by negotiation. Mr. Clynes, the ex-food controller, was much less popular amongst the rank and file than was Mr. MacDonald—the alleged pacifist. The two idols at all propaganda meetings in those days were Mr. MacDonald and Mr. Snowden. Mr. MacDonald's popularity, indeed, was so great that in a national prize draw run by the I.L.P., a speech from Mr. MacDonald was the first prize. Yet Mr. MacDonald had never supported the Allied war aims, or accepted the view that Germany alone was responsible for the madness of 1914–18.

I mention this merely to show what was our attitude to Germany then, and if our attitude is different to-day it is not

because of anything that Herr Hitler has done in the realm of foreign affairs. Indeed, there is nothing he has done in the way of tearing up scraps of paper but what he or his predecessors were advised to do by the responsible and popular leaders of the Labour Party. Following the publication of the Treaty of Versailles, Mr. MacDonald said in *Forward*, on May 17, 1919:

> . . . The document does not carry out President Wilson's views, it could not be worse had the Kaiser never been dethroned, it is in contradiction to Mr. Lloyd George's pledges to the Labour Conference in the Central Hall, it is not in accordance with the Labour Party's War Aims Memorandum, it is in conflict with the guiding decisions of the Berne International. Every Labour pronouncement is flouted. . . .

On June 28 of the same year, Mr. MacDonald went even further. He said, again in *Forward*:

> . . . The issue in Germany is, however, of the greatest importance. Were I a German Minister, and had the responsibility of deciding whether I should or should not sign, I should do the former only after making it plain that my signature was obtained under compulsion, and that the provisions were such that I could not guarantee they would be carried out. The more honest a German Minister is, the more is that course of action imposed upon him. . . .

Mr. Lansbury said:

> . . . I think the terms are harsh, military and provocative of future wars. They settle nothing. . . .
>
> *Star*, May 8, 1919

Mr. C. P. Trevelyan, who was Minister of Education in the first Labour Government, on June 3, 1919, wrote in the *Daily Herald*:

> . . . Let there be a declaration that the first official act of a Labour Government would be to denounce the Peace Treaty as void as far as Great Britain is concerned. . . .

At Blackpool on June 21, 1919, the Right Hon. Arthur Henderson said:

> . . . The Peace Treaty is not our Treaty, and we shall never accept

reconstructed. We believe that, now the news has come that Germany is determined to sign, this will provide Labour in this country with opportunities for creating a clean democratic peace founded upon justice and fair play all round. . . .

It is true Mr. J. R. Clynes was not so condemnatory as those quoted. Mr. Clynes said:

. . . The terms are very stringent but less stringent than Germany, if successful, would have imposed upon us. . . .

The Times, May 19, 1919.

It is only fair to Mr. Clynes to say, however, that by 1921 he was a member of the National Executive of the Labour Party which, 'in the name of humanity,' called for a revision of the Treaty.

There, I think, is sufficient proof that the Labour Party in 1919 was definitely of opinion that the Treaty was not only harsh to Germany, but was also a menace to the peace of the world. The League of Nations, which we now love so much, was responsible forth at Treaty, as it was composed almost entirely of the victorious powers, and the League's duty was to see the terms of the Treaty enforced. Why the Labour Party has come to love the League may be worthy of inquiry by the Committee entrusted with finding out why the working class don't vote Labour, because in 1919 we did not love the League, and as the League has not changed fundamentally in that time, and has never lifted a finger to modify the harsh terms of the Treaty, as suggested by the Labour Party, it can only be that the Labour Party has changed. At any rate, in 1919 we saw no reason to love the League or respect it, and certainly none at all for trusting it to ensure peace. The Party's attitude was that, whilst they did not oppose the League, it could never be of use as an instrument for ensuring peace until its structure and composition were materially altered. Meetings of the International had already been held at Berne, in February 1919, and also later at Amsterdam and Lucerne. At these meetings, committees were at work preparing memoranda on the future attitude of the International to European affairs, and a full International meeting at Geneva endorsed the programme submitted. When the Labour Party Conference met at Brighton in June 1921 a full statement was

submitted as the policy of the International. British Labour was the dominating force on the International, and its attitude to the League of Nations was made clear there. After declaring that the fall of the Russian, German, and Austrian Empires had caused the disappearance of the most sinister forces for peace, the Geneva Socialist Congress said:

> . . . But these hopes will be deceived unless the proletariats persevere in their tireless efforts to control foreign policy and develop their work in the direction of peace according to the political and economic conditions in the different countries. . . .
> . . . The International Socialist Congress therefore calls upon the national Labour and Socialist Parties to secure the entry of their delegates to the League as organised at present, and to its various committees, so as to change the constitution from within and extend its powers in order that the League may guarantee the security and harmony of all nations equally interested in the maintenance of peace. . . .

Examine that declaration as you will, there is no escape from the fact that British Labour, by its policy of 1934, committed the working class of Britain to support the League of Nations, and not one of the conditions for support decided on in 1921 had actually been fulfilled. Before dealing with the International declaration in detail, I will quote the declarations of 1934 on the policy which Mr. Henderson said was not a new policy. On this point, Mr. Henderson said:

> . . . May I make it clear that the Executive is not putting forward a new policy. That I want to be very clearly understood. We are restating Labour's aims and Labour's policy, and indicating the method by which we hope that policy may be applied. In the statement we may have put a little emphasis here and there. In the methods that have been adopted there may be one or two methods that have not been seriously discussed in this Conference, but which have been brought before the Movement in the literature of the Party, especially in the pamphlet issued about fourteen or fifteen months ago entitled, 'Labour's Foreign Policy.' . . .

Before the end of the debate, however, Mr. Attlee, leader of the Labour Party in the House of Commons, claimed that it was a new policy. He said:

> . . . We have absolutely abandoned every idea of nationalist loyalty. We are deliberately putting a world order before our

loyalty towards our own country. We will be called very disloyal because we own allegiance here to a world order rather than to what is called patriotism. We say we want to see put on the statute book something which will make our people citizens of the world before they are citizens of this country. . . .

Mr. Attlee had described precisely what the new Labour policy was. It gave the League of Nations power to go to war when a majority so decided, and it gave it to precisely the same League as the British Labour Party in 1921 decided was unfit for such responsibility. Only the fact that the majority of Labour delegates are really uninterested in foreign policy explains why Mr. Henderson's statement that a pamphlet had been issued fourteen months previously wiping out decisions and findings of the International and the British Labour Party which had stood for fourteen years passed through the Conference without serious opposition.

Now let us compare the policy of 1921 with that of 1934 (and to-day), because all our support for the League in 1921 was conditional on the League being something quite different from what it was then. In 1921 the Labour Party believed there was no hope of peace until the proletariat had succeeded in getting control of foreign policy. In 1934 Labour had decided that there *was* hope of peace and the proletariat was not in control of foreign policy in any country in the world.

Take another point in the declaration:

. . . Therefore the Congress (in Geneva) asks the proletariats to remember their historic duty at the present hour. This duty is to assume the leadership of the popular pacifist movements in their respective countries, to carry on against imperialism and militarism a struggle more violent and effective than ever before—and with all the means, political and industrial, at their disposal. . . .

What was the historic duty of the proletariat as interpreted by the Labour Party in 1934? It is contained in the new policy as follows:

. . . *Sanctions—Assistance*—the duty unflinchingly to support our Government in all the risks and consequences of fulfilling its duty to take part in collective action against a peace-breaker. . . .

Well, that, too, seems clear. Our Government, which is the present National Government, is from Labour standards

an Imperialist Government. In 1921 we had to 'carry on' against it. In 1934 we had to give it unflinching support. Loyal Labour will say, of course, that that unflinching support was only to be given when it was carrying on its work for the League. Loyal Labourists cannot have it both ways. As League of Nations supporters they blame the Fascist Governments for the tension in Europe. As Labour politicians they blame the National Government. When not speaking exclusively for the League of Nations the Labour Party denounces the National Government as being Imperialist, and it does not cease to be Imperialist merely because Mr. Eden, the Foreign Secretary, pays periodic visits to Geneva.

Another condition which the Labour Party made in 1921 before the League could be considered worthy of support was quite forgotten in 1934. Not even the most loyal Labour man would claim that the proletariat of Europe or the British Trade Unions have yet been allowed to send delegates to the League or its various Committees. Still another declaration was made at the Geneva Socialist Congress and quite ignored by the Labour Party in 1934. This declaration was:

> . . . The League of Nations cannot be an effective guarantee of peace except on the condition that it is a democratic international organisation, including all nations without exception, and possessing powers which will enable it to bring about through the establishment of an international police force the universal disarmament of nations by land, sea and air. . . .

It should be made quite clear, of course, that the Socialist International was not opposed to the theory of a League of Nations. What the International did was to emphasise that the League as constituted could not solve any of the European problems, and perhaps the most vital difference between the old Labour policy and the new is on the right of the League to make war. Whereas in 1934 we had given the League full unfettered discretion to make war, the original Labour policy laid this down as one of its fundamental objections to the League. On this issue they said:

> . . . This struggle against militarism is not in contradiction to the collaboration of the proletariats in the League of Nations. The working classes cannot, in the interests of peace, consider with

hostility or indifference the organisation of the League of Nations as created by the Treaty of Versailles, *but it is their duty to proclaim its insufficiency and defects, the worst of which is the recognition, in Art.* 12, *of the right to make war*. . . . (Italics mine.)

Whilst repudiating the right of the League to make war, the Labour Party of that day also laid the blame for the collapse of economic life in Europe at the door of the League, which we are now asked to support without reserve.

A manifesto was issued by the Party in 1920 explaining the causes of the economic paralysis. They were as follows:

(1) The fall in productive power and output due to exhaustion and destruction by war and a political reconstruction of Europe which has ignored economic realities.

(2) Financial chaos due to the reckless financial policy imposed upon all the countries of Europe during the war, and the absence of belief in Europe's future security.

(3) The consequent collapse of the machinery of exchange and international trade.

(4) The economic terms of the Peace Treaties.

At the annual Conference of 1921 another resolution was carried unanimously demanding the revision of the Peace Treaties, and at the same Conference a resolution was also unanimously passed condemning any alliance between France and Britain. At the Conference of 1922 Mr. R. C. Wallhead, Chairman of the Independent Labour Party, submitted a resolution in favour of the Socialist and Labour Parties of all nations agreeing to oppose any war entered into by any Government, whatever the ostensible object of the war. Mr. Tom Kennedy, M.P. for Kirkcaldy, submitted on behalf of the Social Democratic Federation an amendment to the resolution that Labour and Socialist Parties should be free to support any nation forced by armed aggression to defend its independence or its democratic institutions. On the amendment being put it was defeated by 3,231,000 votes to 1294. The resolution was adopted.

Thus it will be seen that in 1922 the Party's attitude was to oppose any war entered into by any Government, whatever the ostensible object. But in 1934, when the Party attitude became the 'duty unflinchingly to support our Government in all the risks and consequences of fulfilling its duty to take

part in collective action against a peace-breaker,' we were told it was not a new policy. That resolution of 1922 was the official policy of the whole party the moment it had been carried by the vote of the delegates. The resolution was never rescinded. In 1923 the annual Conference devoted considerable attention to the action of France in invading the Ruhr. On January 25, 1933, a joint meeting of the General Council of the Trade Unions Congress and the National Executive of the Labour Party issued a manifesto in the following terms:

> . . . The General Council of the British Trade Unions Congress and the Executive Committee of the British Labour Party express the solidarity of British Labour with the working population of the Ruhr *in their resentment of the invasion of the* Ruhr, which is calculated to bring about the economic enslavement of the German people and the political dismemberment of their country. . . .

I need not quote the whole manifesto, as the first paragraph interprets the spirit of the whole. It was sent to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations and to the members of the Council of the League, but the League to which we are blindly committed to-day raised not one finger to prevent the 'economic enslavement of the German people.'

It is true that our enthusiasm for a complete revision of the Treaty of Versailles cooled down considerably in the year 1924. Labour was then in office. But from then until 1934 nobody had dared to place sanctions on the Agenda of the Conference as part of official Labour policy. In 1929 we issued our election manifesto dealing with international peace, but the word sanctions finds no place there. The manifesto said:

> . . . Labour stands for Arbitration and Disarmament. It will accept the general Act of Arbitration, Conciliation and Judicial Settlement approved by the League. A drastic reduction of armaments is long overdue. Labour welcomes the initiative of the United States. It will press for the speedy completion of the Disarmament Treaty and the convocation of a General Disarmament Conference. . . .

Not one word there, it will be noticed, calling upon the workers of Britain to give unflinching support to our Government. Indeed with unfailing regularity a resolution of some

form or other was unanimously passed at all Conferences urging resistance to all wars. That of 1926, moved by Mr. Ponsonby, now Lord Ponsonby, calling upon the workers to make clear to their Governments that they would meet any threat of war by organised general resistance, was typical of the rest. It was not until 1933 that the young men of Geneva began to get a footing in the Party. Unusual phrases for Labour Conferences began to creep into speeches, and whilst the fact that there were poverty and slums in Britain would have come as news to these young men, there was nothing they did not know about Geneva. Labour and Trade Union leaders, who neither knew nor cared anything about Geneva, began to be impressed by the knowledge of the new men as they recited word for word all the articles of the Geneva decalogue. But in 1933 there was only confusion of thought on these questions, and this confusion manifested itself in the delegates voting for a resolution condemning the futility of the League and cheering to the echo a speech made by Mr. Henderson committing us to the League all on the same forenoon. Until that day the minds of delegates faithfully reflected the policy of 1921, so far as the League was concerned. They took the same view of the League as many Nonconformists do of the Church of England—you did not openly denounce it, but as a means of salvation it left a lot to be desired. The reports of the 1933 Conference must be read to be believed, and as the new policy, which we were told was not a new policy, dates from that time, all Labour supporters should read them again. If they do they will find that on Wednesday morning, October 4, 1933, Sir Charles Trevelyan moved a resolution the salient points of which were:

. . This Conference views with the most grave disquiet the steady drift of the international situation towards war; the continued failure of Governments assembled at Geneva to check developments in this direction; and the manifest determination of Governments individually to retain and to strengthen their armaments, a policy which, if not checked, by itself makes war a certainty; places on record its conviction that the working class of any country has no quarrel with the working class of another country and extends to our fellow-workers abroad the expression of our good will and fraternity, and, believing that as the British Labour Party is now by far the largest and most powerful working-

class party both nationally and internationally, it should take the lead in formulating proposals for securing the fullest co-operation between all sections of the Labour Movement. . . .

The resolution further asked the Conference:

. . . To pledge itself to take no part in war and to resist it with the whole force of the Labour Movement and to seek consultation forthwith with the Trade Union and Co-operative Movements with a view to deciding and announcing to the country what steps, including a general strike, are to be taken to organise the opposition of the organised working-class movement in the event of war or threat of war, and urges the National Joint bodies to make immediate approaches to endeavour to secure international action by the workers on the same lines. . . .

In the course of his speech, Sir Charles openly derided the League. He said:

. . . The great instrument for keeping the peace, the League of Nations, some day will be the machinery for international safety, but it will be when hearts are different and when Governments are different. We have got to develop it as a Party as far as we can, but from the League of Nations there is no final safety now. The League of Nations is worked by feeble and sceptical Governments like our own, or by Governments that openly deride world peace, like Italy and Germany. If our Government would not use the League of Nations to try to check Japan, have we any belief at all that it would itself be checked if it embroiled itself with other nations? . . .

Sir Charles, needless to say, was loudly cheered. In that debate two speakers praised the resolution but regretted that Sir Charles had not moved the thing they had in mind, which, as it happens, was totally different to that resolution.

Mr. Noel Baker said:

. . . If I have one difference with the authors of the resolution it is that I regret they did not base it on the Kellogg Pact and the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Kellogg Pact and the Covenant of the League of Nations make for the Governments and the capitalists of the world that very renunciation which we are calling upon our Trade Union comrades to make to-day. . . .

. . . we know that if a Socialist Foreign Minister came back to

You will note that Sir Charles, in moving his resolution, had emphasised that from the Socialist standpoint the League had not and could not be worked, and provided no final safety. Mr. Baker, in supporting the resolution, said it had worked and would work, provided you had one Socialist Minister on it. Dr. Dalton, on the other hand, said the resolution did not go far enough for him, and again, although supporting the resolution, he had hoped it would be something totally and entirely different. Sir Charles Trevelyan had asked the Conference, 'To pledge itself to take no part in war and to resist it with the whole force of the Labour Movement.' Dr. Dalton said:

> . . . My only criticism of the drafting would be that the resolution does not carry us perhaps quite far enough, that it does not commit us to the economic and financial boycott of any war-mongering State—Hitler, or any other person who may disturb the peace and murder the workers of the world. . . .

This, whilst differing completely from Sir Charles Trevelyan's purpose, is still a long way from unflinching support of Mr. Neville Chamberlain. In any case the resolution pledging resistance to all wars and urging the organised workers of the world to rely on their own strength rather than on the capitalist League of Nations, even with one Socialist on the Council, was carried unanimously. All that was on the Wednesday morning. At noon, Mr. Henderson was called upon to speak, and devoted his entire speech to showing that every Labour principle was already embodied in the Covenant of the League. He made it plain that he did not believe the organised workers of the world could ensure peace. He said:

> . . But this is not the place to discuss in detail the means of making the League serve our ends better. I merely wish to draw attention to the fact that the League is the only international political instrument through which Governments can organise peace. Moreover, experience has shown that the League is a powerful instrument which the Labour Government can use successfully. Great Britain has such powerful influence at Geneva that any lead which we give will be followed by others. Then the machinery and obligations of the League are so constructed as to favour the kind of policies in which we believe. The League is a machine

geared for policies of world organisation, not for policies of international anarchy. . . .

By the time he sat down the resolution just passed by the Conference calling on the Conference, 'To pledge itself to take no part in war and to resist it with the whole force of the Labour Movement' was torn to tatters, but the delegates cheered Mr. Henderson even more vociferously than they had cheered Sir Charles Trevelyan. Nevertheless, Sir Charles' resolution was now the official policy of the Party, and Mr. Henderson's speech was not. Obviously something had to be done about it. As Mr. Henderson said, 'we were the alternative Government,' and it might have been awkward if the Labour Government had one policy and the Party one quite different, although in view of past records there seemed *no apparent reason why this should cause embarrassment.* The explanation may be that foreign affairs are different. At any rate the move to replace Sir Charles' policy by something quite different began at once. Mr. Walter Citrine, now Sir Walter, was the first objector in public. Mr. Citrine, judging from his speeches abroad in July of this year, is moved less by the horror and desolation of war than by the inconvenience of a general strike. On November 5, 1933, Mr. Citrine said:

. . . It is no use assuming that the Trade Union Movement can be used on any and every occasion when war broke out in some remote part of the world.

A general strike, under our present law, is illegal, and it would be folly to attempt to resort to this method in the way we are exhorted to do from some quarters. . . .

Yet Sir Walter, speaking in Paris in July this year, said:

. . . We all realised what a great responsibility we were taking, as it may lead to war; but all agreed that, in view of the present circumstances, we had better run the risk of war when the Spanish Republic still exists than be finally drifted into war when it is too late to interfere. . . .

Which would seem to imply that Sir Walter much prefers a legal war to an illegal general strike.

The foreign experts had been at work, and by September 1934 Labour's Peace and War Policy was public property, but this time the first body to decide for or against the policy was

not the Labour Party itself, but the Trade Union Congress. The document, like all Labour electioneering documents, appeared designed to please everybody. For the first time in history the tenets of Karl Marx and Lord Robert Cecil were reconciled in one composite statement. There was the reference to Capitalism being the root cause of war, there was also the implicit belief that you could prevent war without doing anything to affect the root causes. There were the usual attacks on the National Government for its failure to work for peace. One paragraph said:

> . . . In this country the 'National' Government has a few members who desire feebly to make something of the League, others who have no policy, and a determined minority, rapidly gaining the upper hand because they know what they want, who believe in international anarchy, with its concomitants, the 'Balance of Power,' a new race in armaments, and ultimately another World War. . . .

It was claimed, too, that the British Government wielded great influence at Geneva, but as ours was a war-mongering Government this seemed no good reason for supporting the League. On this point the document said:

> . . . Labour's foreign policy is based on the collective Peace system. The collective Peace system means the League of Nations plus such co-operation between the League and non-Member States as may be established either on the Pact of Paris or other treaties or by other means, Labour's policy is directed to developing the collective system in such a way as to make it a sure guarantee of Peace. . . .

But the document, whilst believing that this National Government was pursuing a policy which would ultimately lead to war, and holding such influence at Geneva as to make its war-mongering policy successful, became worthy of trust in another paragraph. This paragraph says:

> . . . Labour is emphatically opposed to any form of aggressive war, but we recognise that there might be circumstances under which the Government of Great Britain might have to use its military and naval forces in support of the League in restraining an aggressor nation which declined to submit to the authority of the League and which flagrantly used military measures in defiance of its pledged word. . . .

From that the transition was easy to the most vital paragraph of all, the one which says that when this 'war-mongering' Government decides to enforce sanctions, it is the duty of Britain's workers to:

> . . . support our Government in all the risks and consequences of fulfilling its duty to take part in collective action against a peace-breaker. . . .

It is fair to say, however, that a condition was laid down as to the giving of unflinching support to the Government, as the document laid it down that it was our duty to insist on our Government ceasing to pursue a policy which was bound to lead to war. The difficulty, of course, was that the document could not define how we were to insist. The general strike was ruled out, because of psychological and other difficulties, and even the question of handling munitions presented the apparently insuperable difficulty of defining what were and what were not munitions. Apart from these, the only two effective methods of stopping the mad career of a Government bent on war, the Labour Movement was at liberty to insist by any other means that the Government should pursue a peace policy and not a war one.

Nevertheless, this document was accepted with but little opposition, and is now the official policy of the Labour Party. Mr. Henderson returned once more to Geneva, still convinced by his experts that the League of Nations, as he himself said: 'Is a powerful instrument which the Labour Government can use successfully. . . .'

He had laboured with untiring zeal to get the League, not to abolish war, but merely to agree on a reduction in armaments. Not even the need for economy in all countries could persuade a reduction in expenditure. Mr. Henderson returned a broken man, but the experts still continue to tell us that the League is the sure hope for Peace. Whilst telling us that Mr. Eden cannot be trusted to see justice done to the workers of Warwick, and that justice can only be secured by electing a Labour M.P. in his place, by some curious transformation the same Mr. Eden will see justice done to the workers of Germany, France, Bolivia, or any other country we choose to name. By the same process of reasoning we had expelled Mr. Harry Pollitt from the Labour Party because

he took his orders from Mr. Litvinoff, and had welcomed Mr. Litvinoff himself to Geneva.

When the Conference which decided we should go to war each time the League of Nations felt so disposed had ended, I travelled back to London with an official of the Labour Party. Naturally we discussed the decision and, as he was in favour of it, I said, 'You will understand that this means you must now support armaments,' but he could not see at all that giving unflinching support to the Government implied that. Well, it is now the policy of the Labour Party. We are pledged to give unflinching support to the Government in the new policy, but to show it is not a new policy we stick to the old one of being against armaments. If this were merely a matter for Conference debates, no harm would be done, but since 1933 the new policy has had disastrous effects. The Party which was pledged to secure justice for Germany is now decidedly anti-German. That breaks through now with dangerous regularity. The first glimpse of it came in the speech of Dr. Dalton at Hastings in 1933, when he talked of Hitler as a menace to peace. But Hitler had done nothing in foreign policy in 1933 that we had not advised should be done. He had come to power pledged to carry out the terms of the many Labour resolutions demanding justice for Germany. He had ruthlessly suppressed all opinion which prevented him giving effect to his mandate from the electors of Germany. Whereas the Labour Party and the Trade Unions are satisfied to prevent Communists who disagree with them from attending as delegates to the various Conferences, Hitler had placed them in concentration camps. If necessary, we would do the same. At present disaffiliation serves the purpose.

This anti-German feeling, at first confined to a few experts in the Party, has now spread to thousands of decent people who sincerely believe Germany is the enemy. The reasoning is quite simple. They say the League stands for peace, and all those who do not believe in the League stand for war. Yet the remarkable thing is that, whilst the Party leaders are creating the illusion that Germany is responsible for the present tension in Europe, in Parliament, according to the traditions of the political game, they are throwing all the blame on the National Government. When the Disarmament

Conference was finally shown to be abortive, the Parliamentary leaders did not blame Germany. They tabled a resolution in the House of Commons in the following terms:

> . . . That this House regrets that the strong desire of the country for international agreement on disarmament has not been reflected in the policy pursued by His Majesty's Government at the Disarmament Conference, and, realising the growing opinion in favour of the total disarmament of all nations throughout the world, this House calls upon the Government to submit to the Conference proposals for:
>
> (*a*) the complete abandonment of all air bombing;
>
> (*b*) the general abolition of all weapons at present forbidden to Germany by the Treaty of Versailles, namely, tanks, heavy artillery, capital ships, aircraft carriers, submarines, and all naval and military aircraft. . . .

We are losing votes at the by-elections, and there is no doubt at all our foreign policy is one of the chief causes. If it was designed to catch the millions of League of Nations Union supporters, it has failed in its purpose. These millions may weigh the issues at an election as to which Party is most likely to pursue peace. Equally they may ask themselves which Government is most likely to preserve their property, and whilst they probably would like to vote Labour on the first issue, the evidence appears to be that they vote National on the second. Certainly the eleven million peace balloters are not yet Labour supporters. It may well be asked why trade union delegates agreed to such a stupid and dangerous foreign policy. The only answer I can give is a simple one, and, therefore, will not be acceptable to the experts. The answer is that only a tiny fraction of trade union delegates trouble about foreign affairs. Of necessity their work and interests lie in the home field, and when the experts produce a policy it is accepted sometimes from sheer boredom. The remarkable thing is that the people who oppose the new policy are precisely those who were judged to be right after the tragedy of 1914–18. Let us hope we will be spared the necessity of proving by blood that they are still right. Perhaps through sheer loss of votes the Party may again decide, as they did in 1921, that the historic mission of the working class movement is not to give unflinching support to this Government in Britain or to its prototypes at Geneva. But

whatever we decide for the future we ought to be honest about it. The Party programme adopted in 1934 explicitly states that Britain may be attacked by a predatory power. When that has been conceded it is useless to wait until we are attacked. We should be prepared now. If, as Dr. Dalton states, this predatory power is Germany, we ought to cease each week-end blaming poor Sir John Simon, because his actions at Geneva in 1933 have produced the present tension in Europe. If, on the other hand, Sir John Simon and the National Government are to blame for the war spirit in Europe, we should cease each week-end to talk of the menace of the Fascist powers.

Since the foregoing was written the Parliamentary Labour Party has been faced with a dilemma of its own creation. Many who supported the 1934 policy, in the belief that it was not a new policy, quite naturally feel that the Party must still oppose armaments. Mr. Herbert Morrison, who supported the 1934 policy, wants to vote against the estimates until he knows whether the armaments are for collective peace or for aggression. Nobody can tell him that except the National Government, which alone knows the facts.

Dr. Dalton, being largely responsible for the 1934 policy 'giving unflinching support to our Government' when engaged in the usual righteous war, decided that support could best be given by remaining neutral. As a means of getting votes and popularity, neutrality has never been a success. Pilate tried it once and failed badly. So long as the 1934 policy remains, the Labour Party cannot remain neutral. It is committed to armaments. Perhaps the muddle created by the experts will be all for good. Perhaps the working-class common sense, which made the Party, will reassert itself, and draft a policy based on truth rather than on vote catching. If we do that we will realise once again that putting Britain right is a full-time job, and that in foreign affairs at least 80 per cent. of the population of all countries are working class like ourselves, and that neither they nor we want war. The foreign policy which the working class of all countries can really understand is that laid down to me in a Highland shepherd's cottage—'Let them that make the wars fight them.'

JOHN SCANLON.

THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF THE PORTUGUESE 'NEW STATE'

By William C. Atkinson

The Portuguese 'Estado Novo' came into being, as so many more *régimes* in the Peninsula, by military *pronunciamiento*. On May 28, 1926, an army rising, followed by a march on Lisbon, spelt the end of the sixteen-year republic, and over its obsequies none were found to mourn. Since that date there has been a progressive development from army rule, through a 'dictatorship of professors,' to a constitutional State that seeks more and more to bring the nation at large into the partnership.

The interest of the chapter is not confined to Portugal. There are deeply-grained differences between that country and Spain, but they do not obscure a basic Peninsular unity, and especially is this true in the political tradition. Factors of national temperament above all have dictated an almost identical course to the Liberal experiment in both countries down the nineteenth century. Spain has a more pronounced penchant for civil war, due chiefly to the complications of regionalism. This apart, the sorry history of democracy shows but little divergence as one crosses and recrosses a largely arbitrary frontier. The problems are the same, the pitfalls are the same, the whipping-boys that can be invoked to cloak those pitfalls are the same. Spain's record in her second republic differs chiefly from that of the first in having ended more disastrously still. Portugal's record in the sixteen years of her republican experiment includes sixteen revolutions, forty-three Cabinets and complete financial chaos. It demonstrated convincingly the bankruptcy of Liberalism, and the word is now anathema on Portuguese lips. The Liberal creed, universally desirable in principle, rests on assumptions that, until their validity has been demonstrated, are apt to prove fatal; and such validity has never been demonstrated in the Peninsula.

The achievement by Portugal of a degree of order, stability and progress never known before, that has lasted for over a decade and shows every promise of lasting for many more, thus adds to its intrinsic importance in an unsettled Europe the value of a pointer for Spain too. There may be several ways out of the morass for that unhappy country. Some think there may be only one. Portugal has been quick to learn from her neighbour's tragic mistakes, as well as from her own, and has incorporated that wisdom in her new political structure. It would be one more mistake, and equally tragic, were Spain to close its mind to the Portuguese experience. Much of the Spanish tragedy can be seen so clearly as a vain charging, in the name of a dogmatic ideology, against the stone wall of fact.

The fabric of the 'New State' rests on certain basic principles born of a keen sense of reality, which means here the nature of the people it has to govern. Its Constitution, unlike the Spanish one of 1931, is no revivalist document professing to create a new heaven and a new earth, a mosaic of ideas and ideals pierced together from half the world's charters, and unrelated in consequence to the deep unchanging nature of men and things at home. It is a cautious relating of Portuguese qualities and defects to specifically Portuguese potentialities. The deliberateness of its promulgation, after eight years of dictatorship—it was approved by national plebiscite in March 1934 and amended in points of detail a year later—is part of that caution, and the result is a document that can only be called illiberal in the sense that it subordinates individual freedom to the common good. Its doctrinal essence finds expression in the so-called 'Ten Commandments' (or rather articles) of the 'New State.' They deserve quotation.

(1) The 'New State' is the synthesis of whatever is lasting in the genuine traditions of the nation and whatever is new in its most advanced ideals. It is the ethical, social and political vanguard of the nation.

(2) It is the pledge of the nation's independence and unity, of the stability of its organic forces, of the fruitful alliance of all its creative energies.

(3) No one class in society controls it; it subordinates all classes to the higher ideal of national interest.

(4) It repudiates the ideal of 'Authority without Liberty' equally with that of 'Liberty without Authority.' It takes its stand on authority and specific liberties as compatible and mutually necessary factors.

(5) The individual has his place in society as a member of natural groups, the family, the guild or corporation, the municipality, etc., and as such he enjoys all necessary rights. The 'New State' is concerned, not with the abstract Rights of Man, but with the concrete liberties of men.

(6) Without a strong Executive no State can be strong. Parliamentarism subjected the Government to the tyranny of a political assembly largely conditioned by irresponsible and selfish party aims. The 'New State' ensures that the State shall be strong by providing for the security, independence and continuity of its rulers.

(7) In the 'New State' national representation is not a matter of passing political thought. It is genuinely representative because it is effected through real and permanent organisations, the family, the guild or corporation, the municipality, etc.

(8) Every Portuguese has a right to the freedom and dignity of life. Nevertheless, before anything else, the right of Portugal to that same freedom and dignity must be upheld by everyone. The common good supersedes, since it includes, the individual good.

(9) The 'New State' seeks to reinstate Portugal in her historic greatness, in the plenitude of her own civilisation as a great empire. It desires to make Portugal one of the greatest spiritual forces in the world to-day.

(10) Its enemies are the enemies of the nation. In the service of the nation—that is, of order, of the common good and of equity—force may and should be used, for it is employed in the legitimate defence of the nation.

Articles 4 and 10 are the answer to the various charges of tyranny and obscurantism brought against the *régime*. If the latter makes a bold claim in identifying the *régime* with the nation, it is to be remembered, not only that the record of eleven years of fruitful service to the common weal, and not to any party or sectional interests, largely justifies it, but, further, that the basic indictment of all previous *régimes* in the Peninsula has been precisely that they never were so

identified. Had the Second Spanish Republic, for example, set out to be a republic for Spaniards and not merely for republicans, its course would have been very different. Granted the integrity necessary to guarantee such identity, the exercise of authority in its defence clearly follows. 'It is a lesser harm,' to quote one of Salazar's *obiter dicta*, 'to forbid criticism than to forgo obedience.'

But it is to Articles 5 and 7 that most significance attaches. The former marks clearly the gulf fixed between the 'New State' and Communism, the supreme bugbear of modern Portugal. The whole Portuguese attitude to the Spanish Civil War springs from its conception of the Government side as Communists *en bloc*. In recent months it has allowed the regimentation of its manhood, in the Portuguese Youth Movement and Portuguese Legion, avowedly to combat Communist views, and it loses no opportunity of underlining the incompatibility of individualism as a political creed with ordered government. The individual as such has no rights in Portugal. As a citizen he has, but only in virtue of a clearly defined social contract. Hence the emphasis given to the natural, therefore persisting, therefore responsible groupings of man in society.

This line of thought may easily be pursued to extremes, as in Italy and Germany, and Portugal has suffered from being labelled as Fascist. The label is incorrect. Authoritarian Portugal unquestionably is; totalitarian she is not. The State is an instrument, not an end. It recognises moral and ethical values of a validity and permanence far out-reaching its own, and the apotheosis of the Fascist and the Nazi States, that is their most objectionable feature to the Liberal mind, has here no place.

Among such higher values—Salazar calls them basic dogmas—is the family. Communism and the Spanish Republic have sought to weaken the family structure as an outworn tradition. Nazism and Fascism have sought to degrade it to the rank of a mere instrument of State purpose. To the 'New State' it ranks, like religion, high among the 'genuine traditions of the nation,' and the Spanish experience has shown that one may not strike at such with impunity. *Régimes* come and go; family and faith remain. On such permanent values the *régime* that seeks to survive must

obviously build, and Article 7 is thus the basic cleavage between the 'New State' and the old. The party system, that Salazar is confident he has scotched for good, pursued politics as a game and left the people out of account: irresponsibility was its hall-mark. The new unitary *régime* is the final integration of the responsible and permanent nuclei of the nation. As this sinks or swims, so will they, and immediate and ultimate interests coincide.

This respect for and defence of the family is oft reiterated. The third section of Part I. of the Constitution, entitled 'The Fundamental Guarantees,' is given up to it as 'the first basis of social education, discipline and harmony and the backbone of the political order.' There the State undertakes to protect maternity, to regulate taxation according to family needs, and to do its utmost in defence of manners and morals. Heads of families elect the district councils, which in their turn elect municipal and provincial councils and are duly represented in the Corporative Chamber. The family leaven works throughout.

The National Assembly, or Lower Chamber, consists of ninety deputies (three of the present Chamber are women), elected by direct suffrage on a four-year mandate. The electoral roll, which at the census of 1934 numbered slightly under half a million, comprises male citizens, of age or enfranchised, who can read and write or who, if unable to do so, pay at least 100 escudos (some 18*s.*) a year in respect of certain property or professional taxes, and of female citizens, likewise of age or enfranchised, who have received a secondary or higher education. There is, further, a six months' residential qualification. Electors, that is to say, must give some proof, however elemental, of responsibility, based either on grounds of intelligence or of having interests at stake.

The Assembly meets for three months annually, but may be convoked exceptionally, as it may be dissolved, by presidential decree. Among its functions are the making and interpretation of laws (with one important exception: it may not initiate any legislation that would entail new burdens on the Exchequer), approval of the budget, and the defence of the Constitution. It may refuse to ratify emergency decrees promulgated by the Government, but it cannot overthrow the Government (*cf.* Article 6 above), which derives its mandate

from the President of the Republic, himself elected by direct suffrage for a period of seven years.

This Chamber may thus be seen as a modified concession to democratic tradition in that it concedes popular representation without any particular guarantee of competence or disinterestedness. Bitter experience has shown that any such concession in the Peninsula needs adequate safeguards. To many it seemed that the Spanish Republic took the first step towards inevitable suicide when it abolished from the draft Constitution the proposals for a Senate. No check on the vagaries of the Cortes remained, and passion, prejudice and partisanship in due course set the pace to the abyss. In Portugal the safeguard is the Corporative Chamber.

The 'New State' by definition is a corporative republic, and this Second Chamber, representative of all aspects of the administrative, moral, cultural and economic life of the nation, is its bulwark. In all there are twenty-four sections, ranging from fishing to the Press, from tourism to the fine arts. Many of these branches of national activity are not as yet organised in the corporative sense: in the interim they are represented in the Chamber by nominees of a corporative council. The Chamber sits concurrently with the Assembly, and functions in specialised sections meeting *in camera*. Its primary task is to discuss and report on all proposals of law, whether initiated by the Government or by the Assembly, before the latter may begin discussion thereon. The Minister or Ministers affected by the proposal, and the member of the Assembly responsible for broaching it, are entitled to be present.

The Corporative Chamber is the major hope of the 'New State.' If Portugal succeeds, as seems probable, in turning over the new leaf that Spain thought but failed to turn in 1931, if, further, the *régime* escapes, as again seems probable, the fate that ultimately befell the Right dictatorship of 1923–30 in Spain, the explanation will probably be found to reside here. The strength of the British political system, as of any democracy, resides less in its Legislature than in its Civil Service. Every weakening of this throws increased responsibility on the Legislature. With us the danger lies rather in the opposite direction, but neither Spain nor Portugal has ever been famous for a tradition of disinterested

competence in its Civil Service. While this was the chief part of the spoils of victory in the party game it could not be otherwise. The electoral triumph of the Popular Front in Spain in February 1936 was followed immediately by the dismissal of over a thousand municipal employees in the capital alone.

The Portuguese Constitution forbids the public functionary to have any share in party politics, but the Corporative Chamber goes much farther towards redressing the pernicious tradition of a century. It signifies that, for the first time in the Peninsula, government has been accepted as a science reserved to the specialist, not as an art reserved to the *dilettante*. Primo de Rivera was a benevolent general who got things done, but who often failed to bring into responsibility those most directly concerned and most competent in questions of national welfare. The charge lies as heavily on his opponents as on himself. They included most of Spain's intellectuals. In the end they brought him down, and they have since reaped the harvest. The 'New State' has definitely got, if not all the intellectuals, at least the responsible intellectuals of the country behind it.

The 'New State' accepts responsibility for the rational ordering of the economic life of the nation, not by direct interference in every direction—for the stimulation of private enterprise and initiative follows directly on its creed that the nation must, in the long run, work out its own salvation—but by encouraging large-scale co-operation between all cognate interests, especially between capital and labour, by official approval of collective contracts, and by the vetoing of all exploitation of elements unable to defend themselves. Agriculture, on which the bulk of the population depends for its livelihood, is a case in point. The peasant and the agricultural labourer are excluded from the province of the Statute of National Labour, given the impossibility of standardising conditions throughout the country. Instead their interests are entrusted to *casas do povo*, or village institutes—one to each parish. All heads of families and males over eighteen are members of the local institute, while every landowner is under obligation to become a patron and to contribute regularly to its funds. These are implemented from State and other administrative sources. The institute, managed by a com-

mittee of two patrons and one member, exists to help the peasant in his every problem of toil and leisure, facilitating loans, technical advice, marketing, insurance, and coming forward on all the hundred and one aspects of rural existence that the individual peasant is unable to envisage. They are the channel of approach to authority, and are represented ultimately in the Corporative Chamber.

The President's duties and prerogatives are not dissimilar to those devolving on the President of the Spanish Republic, but again Portugal has learnt by experience. In the matter of dissolving the National Assembly the reader's memory will be fresh of how the exercise of that duty in Spain made Alcalá Zamora the butt and eventually the victim of party rivalries. The President in Portugal is responsible only to the nation, which he represents: no vote or decision of the Assembly can touch his acts or functions. This safeguard on the one hand has its necessary complement on the other in the Council of State, consisting of the Prime Minister, the Presidents of the Assembly, the Corporative Chamber and the Supreme Court, the Attorney-General, and five representatives of public life chosen for life by the Chief of State himself. In every major decision the President must take advice from the Council of State, and his acts must further be countersigned by the Prime Minister and his colleagues most directly concerned. For the withdrawal of confidence from the Government, however, the President is alone responsible. It is on this alone that a Government can fall; its mandate has no other limit. The exclusion of the Assembly from all intervention here, if it throws a heavy onus on the integrity of Government and President alike, represents the final blow struck at the careerism and irresponsibility of party politics as the Peninsula has known them.

Admiration of the Spanish Constitution of 1931 was tempered by one important consideration. Elaborated in haste, it could not hope to avoid reflecting many of the animosities of the moment, and a consciousness of such bias became explicit straightway in the difficulties it set in the path of revision. A Cortes that signed its own death warrant in the act of modification was under strong temptation to make shift with the Constitution as it stood, and it soon became, in fact, notorious to all observers, from the President downwards,

both that revision was imperative and that no Cortes under the party system was prepared to pay the price. The 'New State' has avoided this sin of original pride by enacting that its Constitution shall be revised by the Assembly every ten years. Should two-thirds of the Assembly be in favour, revision may take place after five years. In an emergency the President may further invest a newly elected Assembly with the charge, having previously consulted with the Council of State and given express indication of the points at issue. Finally, that the Assembly should from the beginning profess responsibility for the charter it was to defend, the first to be elected was itself given, and duly exercised, constituent powers.

In spite of its Constitution and its two Chambers, Portugal retains many of the attributes of a dictatorship; but it is dictatorship with a difference. Its Premier is nothing if not honest, and just as he recognises moral limitations to power, so he admits freely that dictatorship in itself is no solution of political problems and must renounce any claim to perpetuity. It need not be tyrannical, it may guarantee the basic rights of the individual in the highest degree compatible with the common good more competently than many a so-called Liberal *régime*. It still remains an absolute power imposed arbitrarily from above, and leaves the fate of the many dependent on the moral calibre and competence of a few.

As an era of transition, and only as such—*pace* Germany and Italy—it is justified. Its main task, after the restoration of order and the initiation of prosperity, is thus the eradication of those national defects that impelled its advent. To make the Portuguese as a people politically conscious, and to base that consciousness not on a Utopian creed of individualism—the rock on which Spain has foundered—but on a wedding of rights and obligations, on a personal and collective sense of responsibility, such is the inspiration behind the whole idea of 'corporativism' and the reason why the Government will permit anything rather than a resurgence of the egocentric party spirit. Growth in political stature is necessarily slow, and the problem must dominate the second decade of the dictatorship. On its success will depend whether or not there shall be a third.

William C. Atkinson.

STRAWS WHICH SHOW

By Arnold Lunn

Happy is the man who knows the value of research.—Euripides

I.

I was recently asked to talk to a group of undergraduates at the University of London. In the course of my remarks I quoted from Andrew Smith's book *I Was a Soviet Worker*. Smith was an ardent Communist who gave his life savings to the Communist Party and set sail from America for the Promised Land. After working for three years in Soviet Russia he returned to tell his fellow Communists that Russia treats her workers worse than capitalist countries treat their dogs.

When I had finished, a young Communist arose and put a question.

'Are you aware,' he asked, 'that Smith is a Trotskyite?'

I asked him if he could produce any evidence in support of this theory. He could produce no evidence. Smith, he replied, must be a Trotskyite because he had dared to criticise Soviet Russia.

I suggested that the point at issue was not whether Smith was a Trotskyite but whether Smith's statements could be disproved. This shocked him.

A subsequent speaker made an interesting point which weakened the force of an argument which I had used, thus illustrating the fact that a lecturer who invites questions seldom leaves the lecture-hall without acquiring information. As I came out of the room in which I had been talking I found the young Communist surrounded by a group of friends to whom he was indignantly denouncing my bourgeois ideology. He snarled at me as I approached and said: 'Anyhow, that man at the back of the hall stumped you with his question.'

But why 'stumped'? The man at the back of the hall had told me something which I did not know. I cannot see

why I should resent acquiring information. At forty-nine one is, of course, less perturbed than at twenty-two by the discovery that one is not infallible, and more grateful to those who add to one's small stock of knowledge. All of which I tried to explain, but without effect.

This young Communist was a characteristic product of an age in which the flight from reason is developing into a rout. He was not interested in truth except in so far as truth could be exploited in the interests of Communism. Facts were only of value in so far as they fitted into his particular creed.

In the concluding paragraphs of that entertaining book *The Testament of Joad*, Mr. Joad satirises not only himself but the prevailing tendency of this age which my young Communist friend exemplified in his attitude. After analysing the Rhine experiments in telepathy Mr. Joad explains that the new facts discovered by Rhine fit very conveniently into the Joadian philosophy. 'The fit is perfect, but then if they had not fitted I should not have been disposed to attach much importance to them.'

The literal translation of the Greek word *zetesis* is 'seeking,' and a philosophy of life is crystallised in this word, that eager curiosity which is characteristically Hellenic. There is little of this Greek spirit in the modern world. Slogans and labels are our modern substitutes for intellectual curiosity. Smith is a Trotskyite. So much for Smith. No need to read his book or to meet his arguments. Russian Smiths are liquidated by bullets, American Smiths by labels. Words which should stimulate thought are degenerating into labels to save people from the necessity of thinking. And no word is more useful for this soporific purpose than 'Fascist.'

If you object to dictatorship in Russia, you are a Fascist. If you criticise certain aspects of democracy in England, you are a Fascist. If you disapprove of that *régime* of terror which followed the institution of the Popular Front in Spain, you are a Fascist. If you hope for friendlier relations with Italy, if you resent the mischievous activities of our pacifist war-mongers, if you are not prepared for your son to die for Geneva, you are a Fascist.

And if you are a Fascist nobody need bother any further with your views or your arguments.

Perhaps the most popular thought-saving labels are the

words 'progressive' and 'reactionary.' No labels could be sillier. If I have taken the wrong turning, it is foolish to progress any further in the wrong direction. On the contrary, I should react towards the crossroads where I went wrong. Roosevelt is often described as a progressive. On the contrary, he is a reactionary, reacting from the great heresy of economic Liberalism, the heresy that moral values must be subordinated to economic law. He is reacting to the mediæval view that economics should be subordinate to human welfare.

Labels are valuable in so far as they help to clarify thought, pernicious in so far as they are accepted as substitutes for thought. To paste such labels as 'Fascist,' 'Communist,' or 'Democratic' over the map of Europe is a silly waste of time. Never has Europe been more interesting to those who make some effort to understand the springs of political action. '*Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas.*' Intellectual curiosity makes for happiness, intellectual incuriosity for boredom. Russia, Italy, and Germany are laboratories where experiments are being carried out which will change the face of the world, and few of those who talk so glibly of Fascism or Communism seem concerned to discover what is happening inside these laboratories.

I do not know which is the more tiresome, uncritical abuse of Communism by rich people who fear, and are right to fear, that Communism will make them poorer, or the uncritical praise of Communism by the poor who believe, and who are mistaken in believing, that Communism will make them richer. Among those who are noisiest in their denunciation of Communism or loudest in their praise, how few have read Marx, and how few could, if challenged, give a summary of what Marx meant by dialectical materialism? And yet surely some knowledge of the philosophy, economics and history of Communism should be regarded as an integral part of a modern education. The literature for which Communism is responsible is absorbingly interesting, ranging as it does from the theoretical appreciations and criticisms by writers such as Strachey and Dawson, Laski and Berdyaev, Trotsky and Gurian, to accounts of first-hand experience from authors such as Hindus, Andrew Smith, Pares, Lyall, Wicksteed, E. M. Delafield, and many others.

Communism owes its vitality to its gospel of deliverance or the dispossessed. 'Thou hast put down the mighty from heir seats and hast exalted the humble and meek.' Those vords have crystallised the inspiration behind all revolutions, nd certainly Communism in its earlier phases seemed to romise a new dignity and a new status to the common man. But even those who believe, as I do, that Russia is to-day governed by a clique of terrified terrorists, and that the lot of he common man is far worse in modern Russia than in Tsarist Russia, are not absolved by this belief from the intel-ectual duty of attempting to understand one of the most nteresting experiments in the modern world. Russia, as Pro-essor Laski somewhere remarks, is the most exciting country n modern Europe, so exciting that Professor Laski is well dvised to stay where he is.

But Russia is not the only country in which interesting xperiments are being made. Germany has something to teach is, and yet when our Ambassador in Berlin hinted in his naugural speech that he had something to learn from Ger-nany, certain members on both sides of the House of Commons exploded with noisy indignation, and repudiated vith scorn the suggestion that 'our great democracy' had nything to learn from dictators, excepting always, of course, rom Russian dictators.

I was recently asked to talk to a group of young under-graduates who will shortly be teaching in secondary and board chools. Before the lecture began the chairman explained to ne that my audience, however much they might differ on minor oints, were all progressives. He did not, of course, think it necessary to explain in which direction they were progressing.

In the course of my remarks I mentioned Fascism. 'I uppose everybody here agrees that the working man has an nfinitely better time under Stalin than under Mussolini?' Those present nodded their heads in solemn assent. They eemed agreeably surprised to discover that I was so well nformed.

'It will be interesting,' I continued, 'to know exactly on vhat facts you base that view. Can anybody here give me the verage wages of workmen in Russia and Italy respectively, nd the average ratio of wages paid to managers and to workers espectively in Italy and in Russia?'

I looked round hopefully.

Silence.

'And, of course, I am sure,' I continued, 'that in giving your verdict you have taken into consideration how the status of the workers has been affected by the institution of labour courts in Italy. No doubt you could tell me offhand how many of the workers have succeeded in their appeals to those courts against their employers.'

In the course of an informal conversation after the lecture I soon discovered that every one of those present was an ardent supporter of the Valencia Government. I asked them what were their objections to the manifestoes of the Carlists and the Phalangists in which these groups have defined a social policy far more revolutionary than the policy of the British Labour Party. They were unaware that any such manifestoes had been published. All they knew was that Franco is a Fascist (which he is not), and has risen in rebellion against a Government which they imagine to be democratic. But to these young people the education of British youth will be entrusted, and it is their salaries which you and I, dear reader, will have to pay.

'History,' said Dionysius of Halicarnassus, 'is philosophy teaching by example.' But our progressives seem to think that history is propaganda teaching by slogans.

I had been invited by these young people to address them on religion in public schools. The secretary of their society had read, it appears, the symposium on 'Public School Religion' which I edited, and to which the Headmasters of Eton and Westminster and others had contributed their views. I was more sanguine when I edited that symposium than I am to-day on the possibility of a religious revival in education. No such revival is possible until we recover our sense of conviction that Christianity is not only a way of life but is a complex of creed, code and culture. The first problem is to convince ourselves that accurate thinking is as important in religion as strong feeling, and that Christianity is an affair not only of the emotions but of the mind. In the mediæval universities the study of philosophy preceded the study of theology. In the Middle Ages it was considered useless to study theology until you had learned to distinguish between straight and crooked thinking. And the burden of my

address to these young people was that the decline of religion in our schools was primarily due to a decline in intellectual integrity.

When I sat down a young man rose and said: 'But surely religion has nothing to do with reason; it is a question of faith.'

This remark did not surprise me, for I have ceased to be surprised by the prevailing ignorance of Christianity in a country which still professes to be Christian. I quoted St. Thomas Aquinas's statement that reason must have the dominating place in life, and added that faith would be irrational unless the reasons for Christianity were far stronger than any objections which could be brought against it.

This pleased nobody. A lady student rose and said: 'Surely the essence of Christianity is summed up in the words of St. Paul, "If any man will do his will he shall know of the doctrine".'

Christ said this, not St. Paul. If God hung for three hours on the Cross, it is surely His will that we should make some effort to discover the reason for this strange condescension. God wills that we should not only behave as He would have us behave, but believe as He would have us believe. If God became man to teach truths necessary to our salvation, He wills that we should use the brains which He gave us to discover the truths which Christ taught.

It is easier to discover what God wills in the matter of belief than to do what God wills in the matter of conduct. The lady who quoted from St. John was voicing a very general view, the view that correct behaviour is easy, but correct belief impossible. A complacent assumption, for the saints of God, who found it easy to believe what God proposes for our belief, boggled at the immense difficulty of doing God's Will. If the young people whom I was addressing were all saints, I for one would not worry if they were slightly shaky in their theology.

Christianity is an historical religion, and the Protestantism which formed the English mind insisted on the fact that God became man to reveal not only a code but a creed, not only a way of life but truths necessary to salvation. Calvin insisted on this. Wesley insisted on this. The great Anglican divines Hooker, 'Analogy' Butler, Pusey, Paley, Lightfoot,

and Gore have insisted on this. But Protestantism to-day is in danger of losing all sense of intellectual sin. The Oxford Groups are so preoccupied with the sins of the flesh that they ignore the sins of the intellect. Among these sins wilful laziness is not the least serious. The rising generation has not examined the evidence for Christianity, and found it wanting; it has complacently assumed that a creed which still makes converts among men of outstanding intellectual achievement can be dismissed as unworthy of examination.

I asked these young people whether they would agree that nothing could be more illiberal than to reject without examination the historic religion which has formed the mind of Europe. Nobody disputed this statement.

'I assume,' I continued, 'that many, perhaps most, of you are not Christians. But I should be very surprised if any of the sceptics who are present could summarise the arguments whereby Christians defend the belief in God and the belief in the Resurrection, and could explain why these arguments have failed to convince them.'

This invitation met with no response.

These young people are the typical product of an education which has no place for Christian apologetics in its scheme, and which does not even allow young people to suspect the existence of a Christian philosophy. We have not repudiated Christianity in England, but we treat it as irrelevant and unimportant. English education is based on the implicit premise that it is more important for a boy to know when Queen Anne died than for him to discover why Christ rose from the dead. We have accepted with uncritical faith the greatest of heresies, that it does not matter what a man believes so long as he behaves, and we are unmoved by the evidence which suggests that men cease to behave when they cease to believe. We are losing our respect for truth, but we forget that truth has its claims apart from the social consequences of truth. The events of the first Easter Sunday belong to history, and if it be important to know what happened at Waterloo, it is equally important to know what happened in a garden near Jerusalem on the first Easter Sunday, even if the social and ethical consequences of that happening were of no importance.

Christianity is something more than a useful adjunct to

'house spirit.' A young friend of mine summed up his experience of public school religion. 'At Eton,' he said, 'they told me that Christianity would help me to be good. I did not particularly want to be good, so I was not interested in Christianity. Some years later I discovered that Christianity was true, and from the fact of its truth certain inconvenient conclusions followed, among others that I ought to try to be good.'

My own experiences at school were not dissimilar. The bishop who confirmed me remarked that I should meet young men at the university who did not believe in God. 'As I was coming up the hill to-day,' he continued, 'I heard a bird sing. . . . Tell them that.' I did not tell them that, for the bishop's bird had given wings to doubts, and I was an agnostic before I left school.

A few years later I met a brilliant barrister. 'I am not a Christian,' he said, 'but if I were offered the choice between two briefs, the first to defend and the second to attack the Resurrection, I should prefer the former brief. It is an easier case to defend.'

At that time I was an enlightened young agnostic, and I was shocked that so intelligent a man should make so preposterous a statement, but his casual remark raised an uneasy doubt in my mind, sufficient to make me read a book which I picked up by chance, Professor Salmon's *Introduction to the New Testament*. Modern research has not shaken the main conclusions of this classic work.

The book was absorbingly interesting. I discovered two things. First, that of all literary problems that had come my way, the problem of the authorship and dates of the New Testament books was by far the most exciting. Secondly, that of all historical mysteries in whose solution I had been interested, none was more fascinating than the mystery of the disappearance of Christ's body from the tomb. The disciples preached the Resurrection in Jerusalem within forty days of the Crucifixion. Why did not the Jews produce the body of the criminal whom they had executed? I explored every natural explanation of this mystery, and fell back finally on the only solution which satisfied me, the supernatural solution.

Christianity is not only a creed and a code, but also a culture. The young people to whom I was talking were the

products of that culture. The English speech has been profoundly influenced by the noblest translation of the noblest literature in the world—the 'Authorised' Version of the Bible; but a knowledge of the Bible is disappearing from the English-speaking world. English secular literature is the product of Christianity. Shakespeare is an infinitely greater dramatist than Æschylus because the mind of Shakespeare was formed by a religion infinitely nobler than the religion of the Greeks. Socrates has much in common with Samuel Johnson, the same trenchant common-sense, the same hatred of crooked thinking; but Johnson was a greater man than Socrates, and his contempt for shams was humanised by humility, the finest flower of the Christian faith, which the Greeks despised almost as much as they disapproved of *hubris*, in some sense its opposite. The hard edges of the Socratic dialogues are never softened by compassion for folly. Chaucer and Shakespeare, Dryden and Johnson, Dickens and Browning are a Christian heritage, but the rising generation have no understanding of and no sympathy for Christianity, to which they owe the greatest of English classics.

II.

The tendencies which I have been discussing in this article are far more pronounced in the United States than in England. One of the ablest of American university presidents, Professor Robert Maynard Hutchins, of Chicago University, summed up in a memorable book, *No Friendly Voice*, the unanchored hopelessness of a generation with no intellectual substitute for the Christianity which it has rejected.

'We are in despair,' he writes, 'because the keys which were to open the gates of heaven have let us into a larger but more oppressive prison-house. We thought those keys were found in the free intelligence of man. They have failed us. To what can we now appeal? One answer comes from the undiluted animalism of the last works of D. H. Lawrence, the emotionalism of the demagogues, Hitler's scream, "We think with our blood." Man is satisfied that he has weighed reason and found it wanting, and turns now to passion.'

Professor Hutchins horrified the progressives by suggesting a return to Thomist philosophy. Mediæval education, he *insisted, had an integrating principle, the Greek philosophy of Aristotle reinterpreted by the scholastics. Professor Hutchins is a Protestant, and he did not, of course, suggest* that America should return to Thomist theology. Cultured Americans were impressed by his book, but American Babbits met his suggestion with shrill screams of protest. They were outraged by the fact that a Protestant professor had dared to hint that America had anything to learn from mediæval monks.

Nor would these exasperated Babbits have been impressed by the fact that Thomism has been warmly praised by Professor A. N. Whitehead, F.R.S., for they have never heard of Professor Whitehead though he is one of the most distinguished of modern mathematicians.

'The greatest contribution of mediævalism,' writes Professor Whitehead, 'to the formation of the scientific movement was the inexpugnable belief that every detailed occurrence can be correlated with its antecedents in a perfectly definite manner exemplifying general principles. . . . The faith in the possibility of science generated antecedently to the development of modern scientific theory is an unconscious derivative from mediæval theology.'

At Harvard Professor Hutchins's remarks met with a sympathetic response, and Dr. Gilson received a warm welcome and an honorary degree for his lectures on mediæval philosophy, lectures which attracted an ever-increasing number of listeners.

III.

Let me conclude with a few positive suggestions.

We must begin by eradicating the greatest of all heresies, 'It does not matter what a man believes so long as he behaves.' Truth has its claims apart from the social consequences of truth.

Professor Gilson's success at Harvard proves that it is easy to arouse the interest of the young in religion if you can convince them that religion has an intellectual basis. Young men of to-day are unanchored. Humanism has failed, and Huxley's *Brave New World* is the epitaph on a generation that

tried to substitute science for religion. The modern sceptic is the most thorough of all sceptics, for he has begun to doubt the validity of doubt. If we had the courage to exploit the disillusions of the rationalists, we might yet provoke a return to reason.

The difficulties are immense, for the modern world is infected with the great heresy of personalism. We have ceased to believe in impersonal truth. 'The effect of the new psychology,' writes Mr. Joad, 'is destructive of good talk and inimical to fruitful discussion. Owing to the influence of psycho-analysis there prevails in modern society a refusal to discuss any view on its merits. Objective truth being regarded as unobtainable, what alone is thought interesting are the reasons which lead men to formulate their particular brand of error.'

Now the new psychology, if it invalidates Christianity, must certainly refute the new psychology itself. If the reasons advanced by a man in support of his beliefs are nothing more than a *post hoc* invention to justify beliefs already imposed upon him by his environment, heredity and sex, this must surely apply not only to Christianity but also to Freudianism. If the only information of value about Christianity is the information derived from psycho-analysing a Christian, the only useful facts about Freudianism are those which we discover when we psycho-analyse Dr. Freud.

The philosophy of Freudianism is the ultimate form of scepticism, and deprives both science and philosophy of all rational basis. One of the great difficulties of the Christian in the modern world is that people have been taught to regard Christianity as a case of wish-fulfilment. We believe in immortality because it is pleasanter to believe in survival than in extinction. But a belief is not necessarily false because it is pleasant. A hungry man's mouth waters at the sight of beef, but a cow is not a figment created by wish-fulfilment. Puritanism has changed its attack from century to century. Sex, wine, meat and art have all been condemned In our age Puritanism is concentrating its artillery on the happiness which God has prepared for those who love the truths which God has revealed.

I am not so foolish as to assert that intellectualism is enough. Christianity appeals not only to philosophers but

to the simple and the unlearned. The saint is the greatest argument for the Church, but those of us who are not saints can at least be intellectually honest.

'You can convert the modern world in one of two ways,' said a priest who was giving a retreat to his fellow-priests, 'by being saintly or by being eloquent. I advise you, gentlemen, to concentrate on being eloquent.'

St. Thomas Aquinas was a great intellect and a great saint. In the great ages of Christianity reason was not despised. We need every weapon to combat modern paganism, the sanctity of the saint, the charity of Christ-like men and women, the intellect of the philosopher and the dialectic of the controversialist.

ARNOLD LUNN.

REFORM OF THE CALENDAR

By A. Atkinson

Little progress has been made at Geneva during the past few years with the reform of the calendar, a question which was first taken up by the League of Nations in 1923. It will be recalled that the conference fixed to take place in November 1935 came to nothing, owing to the unexpected death of the chairman on the eve of the sessions and the subsequent decision of the Council of the League to make some reforms in the organisation of the transit section which had the matter in hand. During the last session of the Assembly in September 1936 it appeared that no chairman had as yet been appointed, and the matter was again postponed. Recently, however, a resolution of the International Labour Conference was passed urging the League to resume consideration of the subject. When this has been presented to the Council it is confidently hoped that they will instruct the transit section to proceed with the conference without further delay.[1]

The number of reformed calendars originally submitted to the League was 185; many of the changes proposed, however, were small and some fantastic: there remain now only two awaiting consideration, and if at the spring session the conference should decide in favour of one of these a great impetus to the movement in favour of calendrical reform must surely result.

The subject, it is claimed, has now become one of international importance. This being so, and because the proposals for reform began with the advocacy of a fixed date for Easter, it may be convenient to take this as a starting-

[1] This resolution, together with a report (C 34, 1937, VIII), has now been presented to the Council, who have ordered the resumption of the discussions at an early date prior to convening a diplomatic conference representing nations in and out of the League.

point; a chronological approach befits the theme. The whole trouble arose from the fact that the Julian Calendar, which dated from 45 B.C., and on which the ecclesiastical calendar was based, presupposed that the solar year was equal to 365¼ days. This was too long by eleven minutes and fourteen seconds. During the lapse of centuries the date of the spring equinox fell earlier and earlier in the year, and it had long been manifest that the calendar moon and the moon of the heavens no longer coincided. By 1582 the equinox had retrograded from March 25, the date on which it fell when the Julian Calendar was introduced, to March 11. The new moons were obviously occurring before the dates marked by the Golden Numbers in the ecclesiastical calendar. In other words, when the calendar marked March 21 the real equinox had been passed by ten days. Thus Easter was celebrated too late, and in time would have been kept one, two, or three months after the astronomical date.

Gregory determined to give *éclat* to his reign by undertaking a reform too long delayed. The Pope's aim was to restore the equinox to March 21, the date on which it fell at the time of the Council of Nicæa in 325. In this he was advised by Lilius the astronomer of Naples and by Clavius the mathematician. It is the tables of Clavius which are still in use. Ten days were omitted from the calendar, and October 5, 1582, was reckoned as October 15. The change was promulgated in a Bull, '*Inter gravissimas*,' of February 24, 1582. Thus occurred the '*annus confusionis*,' for the omission of these ten days has been the cause of numerous mistakes on the part of historians, since they have frequently forgotten that the days October 5–15, 1582, never existed. Clavius rejected the Golden Numbers which had failed and substituted another set of numbers called 'epacts.' These had been known before the Gregorian reform, though not in use officially; they give the age of the moon at the beginning of the year. The calendar moon was disassociated by Clavius from the moon of the heavens. It is thus a purely artificial moon and is best regarded as independent of celestial phenomena, for the astronomical moon may differ one, two, or even three days from the moon of the calendar. The complexity of the calculation was enhanced by the

desire to prevent the concurrence of Easter with the Jewish Passover, which Christian prejudice after the early centuries would not tolerate. Gregory's reforms were adopted at once by Catholic countries, but it was more than a century before their example was followed by most of Protestant Europe.

England, with mistrust of anything of Papal origin, did not follow suit until 1751. By this time the inconvenience of having a different time system from the rest of the world could no longer be ignored. It fell, strangely enough, to the lot of Lord Chesterfield to second the introduction of the Bill for the adoption of the Gregorian Calendar in the House of Lords. Chesterfield's Bill enacted that the legal year 1752 should begin on January 1 instead of March 25, and that September 14 should follow September 2; but the prejudice against anything of Papal origin was still so strong that the method of calculating by the Golden Numbers instead of by epacts was retained. The only difference is that the Golden Numbers now indicate the full moons instead of the new moons, as was the case in the old Roman Calendar. The Golden Numbers have still to be shifted at the centurial years It is unfortunate that the opportunity of revising the tables and rules and substituting the method of calculation by the epact number was missed on the occasion of the revision of the Prayer Book in 1927. For, abstruse and cumbersome as the chronological apparatus is, the tables afford only some partial explanations: a fuller understanding of the matter must be sought in other works of authority, which, for the most part, are written in foreign tongues and are not easily come by [2]

In May 1922 the International Astronomical Union declared in favour of the stabilisation of Easter, and the League of Nations, as already mentioned, took up the subject in 1923. Many chambers of commerce, trade union congresses, and other influential organisations have passed resolutions stressing the need of reform. It is, however, the attitude of the Vatican which especially demands detailed consideration. In 1896 M. M. Foerster, director of the

[2] The leading authority is the monumental work of the Benedictine fathers who have specialised in calendrical matters—*L'art de vérifier les dates* *Lalande Astronomie* (tome ii).

Basle Observatory, addressed a comprehensive series of questions to many influential scientific, political, and religious persons on the subject of a fixed Easter. Rampolla, Secretary of State to Leo XIII., replied on the Pope's behalf, under date May 6, 1897, as follows[3]:

> If we had to consider the reforms proposed solely as a question of social order the project would certainly merit a favourable approach. But the Church must also regard the matter from the standpoint of tradition and the connexion which the Easter Festival bears to the death and resurrection of the Saviour. Above all, the Holy See must avoid any danger of introducing into the Christian world grave divisions as the result of change. At any time if this danger can be avoided, and if there were a universal demand for the stabilisation of Easter owing to the growth of public opinion enlightened by men of science, the initiative in a reform of this sort could then be considered by the Holy See in a General Council.

Pius XI. made a similar response through the Papal Nuncio at Berne, Mgr. Maglione, to the League of Nations on March 7, 1924:

> The Holy See notes with satisfaction that the Society of Nations has expressly recognised that the question of calendrical reform, particularly because it affects the feast of Easter, is emphatically a religious question, and that any alterations, even though they raise no question of dogma, would necessitate a departure from long-established traditions from which it would be neither legitimate nor desirable to depart without grave reasons of universal concern. Moreover, the Holy See finds no sufficient reason to modify the constant tradition of the Church in fixing the ecclesiastical feasts, and particularly the feast of Easter, a tradition handed down from a venerable antiquity, and sanctioned from ancient times by councils. Therefore, if it were shown that the general welfare requires some change in these traditions the Holy See could not examine the question except upon the advice of an Ecumenical Council.

To this the League has made reply that 'the common good calls for the stabilisation of movable feasts.' During a debate in the House of Lords on March 4, 1936, Lord Desborough referred to a mission of inquiry which had visited Rome in the summer of 1935 to inquire more particularly into the attitude of the Vatican. The mission was headed by the Right Rev. Dom Fernand Cabrol, Abbot of Farnborough. They presented to the Pope a memorial on behalf

[3] We have translated these letters from the French text given by the Abbé Chauve-Bertrand in his recently published work—*La question de Pâques et du Calendrier. Les Œuvres Françaises* (Paris, pp. 213, 214).

of the National Calendar Association and its associate organisations for calendar reform in the United States, France, Germany, Canada, and South America. The mission reported their conclusion 'that the subject of calendar reform is viewed by the Vatican as a whole, and the question of Easter stabilisation cannot be detached from the question of general reform.'

In England the Easter Act was passed in 1928, which provides for the stabilisation of Easter by fixing it on the Sunday following the second Sunday in April. Easter would thus fall on a date from April 9 to April 15, whereas the present permissible limits are from March 22 to April 25. In the House of Commons on December 20, 1934, the Home Secretary stated, in reply to a question:

> His Majesty's Government, after carefully and sympathetically considering the matter in all its aspects, has decided, in view of the difficulty of securing international agreement, to take no further action at the present time to bring into operation the Easter Act of 1928.

It is thus evident that the Easter Act must be considered as dead, and that the stabilisation of Easter can only be brought about as a part of the general reform of the calendar. The ecclesiastical authorities of the Anglican Church and many Protestant Churches in all parts of the world have expressed approval of a general reform, and the Ecumenical Patriarch of the Greek Orthodox Church has also given a qualified assent provided that other nations fall into line.

The inconveniences of the present calendar are so manifest that it is remarkable that it has remained unreformed for so long. Every year the whole almanack is completely changed. Neither the months, the quarters, nor the half-years are comparable with one another. A month may consist of 28, 29, 30 or 31 days. The first quarter of the year contains 90 days, the second quarter 91, and the two last quarters 92 days; one half-year is three days longer than the other. The year is not exactly divisible into weeks; dates, therefore, never fall on the same days from year to year. The same month in different years may contain four Sundays or five. In consecutive months the number of working days always varies. Sometimes there are fifty-two, sometimes fifty-three pay-days, sometimes two Easters, in the fiscal year, and payments of interest, dividends and rents, and currency of bills of exchange and the term of legal contracts,

are greatly complicated by the want of a fixed year. The banks have to use very elaborate special tables in order to make accurate daily calculations in current accounts, and the work of accountants, auditors and Treasury officials is unnecessarily magnified by the universal irregularity.[4] Accurate statistics are now essential for intelligent social planning; indeed, without them the nature of human society could never become known. In trade and commerce, in meteorology, medicine, sociology and economics, statistics are required, and an increased uniformity in the calculations is desirable.

Moved by these considerations, calendrical reformers desire to establish a perpetual calendar—that is to say, one in which every year begins on the same day, which, it is suggested, shall be Sunday, and in which the same date in every year shall fall on the same day. But the reformers differ as to the best manner in which this may be achieved. They fall into two groups, who may be divided into supporters of a year of equal quarters, and a year of equal months. Under the first of these systems every quarter will consist of 91 days, and every quarter and every half-year will begin on the same day. The first month of every quarter will consist of 31 days, the remaining two of 30 days each. The first day of every year and of every quarter will be Sunday; of the second month in every quarter Wednesday, of the third month Friday. Every month will have 26 weekdays. The proposals of those who advocate a year of equal months of 28 days each are more drastic and will necessitate the introduction of an additional month, which it is proposed to insert between June and July—to be called 'Sol.' It will be seen that under both these schemes there are thus accounted for only 364 days in each year; it will thus be necessary to intercalate an extra day at the end of the year. This cannot, of course, be taken out of the solar year, but it will not be part of any week. The special name proposed for this 'blank' day is 'New Year's Eve' or simply 'Year Day.' In leap years an additional day, 'Leap Year Day,' must also be intercalated, which may most suitably be placed at the end of the half-year to follow June 30.

[4] This summary is taken from *Dates and Days*, issued by the Rational Calendar Association, 38 Parliament Street, London, S.W 1.

It is the introduction of these 'blank' days which has caused trouble to the Christian Churches as well as to the Jews, because the continuity of the Sunday will be broken—that is to say, there will be at the end of each year a period of eight days before Sabbath or Sunday will occur. The difficulty was felt by the late Cardinal Mercier, who posed two questions to the Holy See. He asked: (1) Whether it were permissible for Catholics to discuss the question of a new basis for the celebration of Easter (2) Whether the introduction of 'blank' days might be introduced into the week. Mgr. Piacenza, writing in the *Ephemerides Liturgica* (an important Roman review) on July 15, 1918, reports the answer: that such discussion was neither '*per se incongruum neque prohibitum*,' but that the Church did not allow seven days of continuous labour. It is suggested that this objection may be met by reduplicating the Sunday—that is, by extending it over 48 hours at the end of the year, and again in the middle of the year in leap years.

It is regrettable that the day of rest is not the same for Jew and Christian; but it is to be feared that nothing can be done to meet the objections of the Jews, who from religious motives desire to maintain their constantly varying and cumbersome time system. Their objections must, we fear, be disregarded. The advantages of the first scheme, that of equal quarters, are obvious. It is preferred by astronomers and also by the Churches because it leads to less interference with the ecclesiastical festivals than the plan of thirteen months of equal length. Were it introduced, fixtures will always fall on the same date if the day is fixed and on the same day if the date is fixed. Christmas Day, for example, will always fall on a Monday and August Bank Holiday will always fall on August 6. Quarterly statistics will be exactly comparable when every quarter contains 91 days. Equal quarters will simplify the tasks of accountants and bankers. All anniversaries will fall on the same day of the week. Law, school and university terms will be standardised, railway and other time-tables will be stabilised. There are, however, many, especially in the United States, who favour the alternative scheme—the year of thirteen months [5]

[5] The organisation of this group is the International Fixed Calendar League, 1 Regent Street, London, S.W. 1, which issues much literature

Under this scheme every month will be like February in a common year when it begins on a Sunday; the week will begin and end with the month. It is said by the mercantile fraternity that statistics based on a quarterly or half-yearly comparison are inadequate and too late to safeguard against impending changes in the markets. The month, it is urged, is more frequently used than the quarter for a standard of comparison. The thirteen periods—that is, months of 28 days—are already in use in some Government departments, railway, tramway, and omnibus companies; and the same plan has been adopted by building societies, trades unions, and manufacturers in various countries.

Such are the varying proposals which we have endeavoured to make plain. So far the League of Nations has held the balance impartially between them. It remains to be seen whether those who favour the year of equal quarters can show such a growth of public opinion in favour of their system as to induce the Assembly of the League to recommend it to the nations for general adoption.

It is evident that a good deal of propaganda work remains to be done before the multitude realise the amount of time and money wasted by the inconveniences and irregularities of the present calendar. This is, after all, a human device, which, except for the length of the day and the length of the year, is not astronomically determined. Changes have been made before and can be made again so soon as the public is convinced of the advantages to be gained by reform. Assuredly there is no reason why we should continue to employ an almanack derived from Egyptian priests, Julius Cæsar, and mediæval Pontiffs with primitive knowledge, when it is found to be inconvenient and obsolete. It is objected by those who are opponents of all reform that such an alteration in the calendar will cause another *annus confusionis* compared with which the inconvenience occasioned by Gregory's reforms was trifling. It is more probable, however, that the public will rapidly become used to the change, as they have done in the case of summer-time. Especially will this be assured if the alteration is made in a year when January 1 falls on a Sunday, as it will in 1939.

A. ATKINSON.

WALKS AND TALKS

By Sir Arnold Wilson, M.P.

I sat at breakfast with an aged Canon of the Church of England on my way to Parliament. Before us was the daily paper describing attempts to create alarm on the borders of Northern Ireland. 'I am sorry for De Valera,' said he: 'the IRA have done it, but they have failed to make it a DIES IRAE.' 'That is the grandest of hymns,' said I, 'and we sing it perhaps to the oldest of tunes. I wonder how old it is?'

'It is pre-Christian,' he replied, 'based on a verse of the first chapter of Zephaniah, which begins in the Vulgate with "*dies irae, dies illa*": the next begins "*dies tubae et clangoris*," which is much the same as "*tuba mirum spargens sonum*".'

It was my turn. 'Do you know,' I remarked lightly, 'that the very words *Sinn Fein*, as used to-day, come from the Bible in Erse? They are found in I. Esdras vi. 70–71.'

> It is not for us and you to build together an house unto the Lord our God. *We ourselves alone* will build.

'I remember the passage,' said the Canon: 'the people of Palestine wanted to help the Jews to rebuild the Temple in Jerusalem, but the Jews would have none of it and got into trouble in consequence. History seems to be repeating itself—as usual'; and he turned to another column of *The Times* in confirmation. Then he pointed to another item of news. 'And this,' he concluded, 'reminds me that—also in the Vulgate (Gen. ii. 23)—Eve is called "*virago*." I wonder what meaning Jerome attached to the word.'

* * * * *

Two things struck me after perusing with care the proceedings of the representatives of the Christian Churches

(other than the oldest and largest) at Oxford and Edinburgh and the relative correspondence in *The Times*. The first was the absence of any reference at Oxford to the great Papal Encyclicals dealing with the Christian attitude towards social and economic questions. The second was the apparent tendency, at Edinburgh, to equate Christian doctrine with a body of ethical principles common to all or most religions, and acceptable to men with none, and to reduce our *Credo* to a vague Deism. How many really believe in a Life to come, in the truth of the Atonement, the reality of Redemption? In what essentials does twentieth-century Christianity in England differ from other religions in its outlook on secular problems? To these questions, sincerely asked, I have found no answer.

I wondered whether our philosophy has changed in many respects since man began to speculate on his relation to the Cosmos. I turned to an anthology of citations from authentic documents, 4000 years old, given me by a distinguished Assyriologist and hitherto unpublished. They seem worthy of a wider audience than the great folios in which they are entombed almost as deeply as their authors, and I reproduce them here.

I reached unto life, I passed maturity; I turn this way and that—evil it is, yea evil. My ill fortune increased, right I found not. I cried to my god but he vouchsafed me not his face; I prayed to my goddess, but she raised not her head. The seer by divination understood not my plight, and the interpreter of dreams expounded not my judgment. To the soothsayer I went, but he opened not my ear, and the enchanter with his magic conjured not the wrath against me. Whence are the perversities everywhere? For I looked back and it was nought but persecution and distress.

. . . . .

What seems to man good is evil to God, and what is bad in man's heart is good before his God. Who knoweth the will of the gods in heaven, who understandeth the counsel of the god? Where have foolish men learnt the way of God? He that lived yesterday is dead to-day, soon is he sorrowful, suddenly is he cast down. This moment he singeth a song of joy; one step further and he lamenteth like a mourner. Their cheer changeth like day and night; if they be hungry they are like unto a dead body, but if they be full they set themselves up like their God. In prosperity they talk of ascending

into heaven, but if they come to misfortune they speak of going down to hell.

(From the story of the 'Babylonian Job,' entitled 'I will praise the Lord of Wisdom,' preserved in a copy of the seventh century B.C.)

. . . .

MASTER. Hark'ee, slave!

SLAVE. Yes, Sir, yes.

MASTER. I will love a woman.

SLAVE. Yes, love, Sir, love; a man that loves woman forgets pain and sorrow.

MASTER. No, slave, I will not love a woman

SLAVE. Love not, Sir, love not, woman is a pitfall, woman is a sharp dagger of iron that cuts a man's throat

. .

MASTER. Hark'ee, slave!

SLAVE. Yes, Sir, yes.

MASTER. Bring me straightway water for my hands, give it me, I will make an offering to my god.

SLAVE. Offer, Sir, offer; he that sacrifices to his god has joy of heart, for he gives loan upon loan

MASTER. No, slave, now will I not make offering to my god.

SLAVE. Do not, Sir, do not, thou shalt teach the god to follow thee like a dog [*i e*, for his food].

. . . .

MASTER. Hark'ee, slave!

SLAVE. Yes, Sir, yes.

MASTER. Behold, I will do good to my country.

SLAVE. Do so, Sir, do so; he that does a good deed for his country, his benefit is in the reckoning of the god Marduk.

MASTER. No, slave, I will do no good to my country.

SLAVE. Do not, Sir, do not. Go up on the ancient mounds and walk about them, behold the skulls of the latter and of the former—where is the knave, where is the benefactor?

. . . . .

MASTER. Hark'ee, slave!

SLAVE. Yes, Sir, yes.

MASTER. Now therefore, what is good?

SLAVE. To break my neck and thy neck, to cast us into the river, that is good. Who is so tall that he could attain unto heaven? Who so broad that he could embrace the whole earth?

MASTER. No, slave, but I will slay thee, and make thee go before me.

SLAVE. So shall my lord have three days to be alive after my death !

(From a dialogue upon the indifference of human conduct, preserved in a copy of the eighth—seventh century B.C.)

. . . . .

The strong man is the wise, the possessor of prudence, but if thy belly rumbles thou art an offender against God. The heart of God is distant as the midst of heaven, his strength is heavy upon them, but men understand it not. All the work of the Creator's hands together is but a breath. The offspring of a prince hath altogether the pre-eminence, but even the first-born son of a footstool is humble; the sleep of the common man's child is ever enough. The fool begetteth a son to stand in the front, but the strong and courageous (beget) one whose name is called second. . . . They exalt the word of the great who hath learned to slay, but humble the weak that hath done no offence; they bear witness for the wicked unto whom righteousness is an abomination, but they cast out the righteous who seeketh after the will of God; they fill with precious things him whose name is 'robber,' but the violent empty him whose food is scanty; they confirm the victorious, whose assembly is sinful, but they destroy the poor, they overthrow the weak.

(From the Wisdom of Baltarua, preserved on tablets of the seventh century B.C.)

The Miseries of Old Age.

Old age has come, dotage has descended, feebleness has arrived, childishness is renewed. . . . The eyes are shrunken, the ears are deaf, and strength diminishes for the weary of heart. The mouth is silent and does not speak. The heart is forgetful and does not remember yesterday. The bones are painful through long service. Good has become evil. All taste has departed. That which old age does to a man is evil in everything.

(From the 'Instruction' of the sage Ptah-hotep, *c.* 2000 B.C. or earlier.)

The Wickedness of the World.

To whom do I speak to-day?
Brothers are evil,
Friends of to-day are not loving.

. . . .

To whom do I speak to-day?
None remembereth the past.
None at this moment doeth good to him that hath done it.

. . . .

To whom do I speak to-day?
There are no righteous.
The land is given over to workers of iniquity.

. . . .

To whom do I speak to-day?
Sin is smiting the land,
It hath no end.

(From the 'Dispute with his Soul of one who is weary of life,'[1] *c.* 2000 B.C.)

The Unfaithfulness of Friends.

Trust not a brother, know not a friend, make not for thyself intimates—there is no satisfaction therein. When thou sleepest guard thine own heart, for a man has no supporters in the day of adversity.

The Uselessness of a Tomb and Burial Rites.

If thou recallest burial—it is grief of heart, it is the bringing of tears, making a man sorrowful, it is the taking of a man from his house and casting him upon the hill. Never again shalt thou go up to behold the sun. Those who built in granite stone, who fashioned halls in a pyramid adorned with goodly work, when the builders have become gods[2] their offering-tables are empty, and they are even as the weary ones who die upon the canal-bank without a survivor, the flood has seized its end of them, and likewise the heat of the sun, and the fish at the water's edge converse with them.

(From the 'Instruction' of King Amenemhēt I. to his son, *c.* 2000 B.C.)

. . . . .

Death is the End of all Things.

Well is it with this good prince, the goodly destiny has come.
Bodies have passed away and others taken their place since the time of the forefathers.
The gods[3] who were aforetime rest in their pyramids, likewise the noble dead, buried in their pyramids.

[1] Not an ancient title, but one given to this composition by modern scholars.
[2] *I.e.*, died.
[3] The kings of old

They who built houses, their habitations are no more, what has been done with them?

. . . . .

I have heard the words of Imhotep[4] and Hardedef[4] . . . but what are their habitations now? Their walls are ruined, their habitations are no more, as though they had never been. No one comes from thence to tell us how they fare, to tell us what they need, to console (?) our heart until we also go to the place whither they have gone.

Be glad of heart, . . . follow thy heart's desire as long as thou livest. Put myrrh upon thy head, clothe thyself with fine linen. . . . Increase yet more thy delights, let not thy heart grow faint . . . and vex not thy heart, until that day[5] of lamentation comes to thee. For Still-of-heart[6] does not hear their lamentation. . . .

(From a harper's song, sung at funeral banquets, *c.* 2000 B.C.)

* * * * *

In an idle moment on an August afternoon I took from my shelves a tiny 16mo. pamphlet of 1702 dedicated by an anonymous author to Joseph Scaliger and entitled *The Parliament of Criticks—a Banter upon the Criticks of the Age.* It concludes with a decree, enacted by the Senate, Cicero and Plautus being Consuls, in the presence of Varro Terence and Tacitus, 'that the Criticks are both useful and necessary in these difficult times of furious controversy.' But not all of them are competent; therefore no person under 25 shall presume to assume the office, nor dotards over 70. Such persons, and others unfit to criticise, shall be excluded by censors, as shall be those who make use of conjectures or guesses; against whom the existing laws against fortune-tellers are to be invoked. Litigious critics are, for the third offence, to be made to fight it out in a Bear-garden. Those who are known to be 'Jack of Both Sides and True to Neither' are to be sent to Bedlam to be cured by the whip, if the disease be in their blood, or to be transported for life to Utopia.

The banter is light-hearted and was doubtless salutary: we shall do well to regard recent occurrences in Europe in the same spirit. When in 1919 and 1920 critics of British policy and British administration in Iraq were vocal both in England

[4] Famous sages of old [5] *I e.*, the day of death.
[6] A name of Osiris, god of the dead

and Cairo, instead of preventing the Arab public from reading what they were saying, I caused even the most baseless and most malicious nonsense that had appeared to be reprinted, with a brief commentary in parallel columns. The effect was to create an impression of indifference and an appearance of strength and to immunise the public to the effects of criticism, not all of which were without substance.

Even during the war we did not conceal British defeats. The result was that, after a time, the recital of local failures ceased to create interest: men became convinced that the *régime* was invincible. That would certainly be the logical deduction to draw from a perusal of the reports for the past ten years of the prophets of doom telegraphed to London from some of the world's capitals. I find it hard to believe that the *régime* in Moscow, Rome, Berlin, Tokyo, Turkey, Persia and Poland, to name only a few countries where censors are supreme, is not now so strong as to be almost wholly immune from foreign infections.

Schadenfreude—pleasure in the misfortunes of others—is a German word, but it is a universal failing, and the news value of paragraphs describing the straits of a Government and its lack of success is greater by far than reports of growing strength and of hopeful results of new experiments. The prevalent practice of rewriting foreign news telegrams, and providing spicy captions for which the correspondents have no sort of responsibility, tends to distort the picture and arouses the justified resentment of the country whose troubles or agonies are made to subserve commercial ends. When the head-lines and cartoons, as has frequently been the case in certain journals in this country, include abusive references to the heads of foreign States, the resentment aroused is often bitter. As Plutarch observed in his *Life of Timoleon*:

> Most men resent contemptuous words more than unjust action. The latter they impute to the exigencies of war, the former to the effects of hatred or malignity.

The offence of '*scandalum magnatum*'—'slander of great men'—was, until 1887, punishable without proof of special damage as being likely to endanger public peace.[7] There have been occasions during the past ten years when this old law,

[7] It was successfully invoked against Titus Oates in 1684.

which dates from Edward I., had it not been repealed, might with advantage have been invoked.

These observations are not intended in any way to justify the compulsory withdrawal of correspondents now in progress between Germany and Great Britain. *The Times* correspondent in Riga has for many years past furnished information as to events in Soviet Russia which he was not free to send from Moscow: it will not be difficult for *The Times* to maintain its German news service from some other centre than Berlin, and it is not likely to be less censorious than in the past. The reasons which induced the Home Office, under an ex-Foreign Secretary, to withdraw permits from certain German journalists were doubtless adequate, the consequences doubtless foreseen, but they are not the less lamentable. I cannot, for myself, unreservedly accept the principle laid down by Mr. Eden, that 'What matters to us is not the way a Government governs at home, but the way it conducts itself abroad. That is the only thing upon which international relations can rest.' [8]

It is the basis of the League of Nations, but the 'Society of Nations,' as the French call it, cannot travel far on that road. Yet it is a far better maxim than that of President Coolidge, that 'the person and property of a citizen are part of the domain of the State, even when abroad.' The treatment of Press correspondents is an internal matter, which must not be allowed to darken, though it will not lighten, the path which nations must tread together.

* * * * *

I heard from Belfast of the resentment—anger would not be too strong a word—aroused by the references, and still more the head-lines, in some English papers, to attempts to make trouble on the border between the Free State and Northern Ireland on the occasion of Their Majesties' visit. So far as anyone in Belfast was concerned, nothing could have been more pleasurable or successful; but the first that my friends heard when they turned on the wireless to hear the news from Broadcasting House, London, W.1, was the announcement, in sepulchral tones, that 'a number of outrages had marked the visit.'

[8] *House of Commons Debates*, July 19, 1937, col. 1817, in reply to an interruption.

I suppose it is impossible for those who prepare news bulletins to be unaffected by the atmosphere in which they live, and the turbid stream of ill-selected 'news' in which they have to swim, keeping their heads above water as best they can; but it is a pity, nevertheless, that the news of events in our own country cannot be seen in a truer perspective. It is necessary, I suppose, for the B.B.C. to depend upon existing news agencies for their raw material, but the responsibility for providing emphasis, and using the filter, is theirs. The reference of Isaiah (xiii. 21) to Babel, 'full of doleful creatures . . . a joy of wild asses,' reminded Gray,[*] the poet, of Cambridge in his day. The B.B.C. should have a care lest their modern Tower of Babel awake like memories.

* * * * *

In his brilliant address to a gathering of great lawyers at the Hague, Lord Macmillan referred to the French saying, '*tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner.*' My impression is that this is, like *blanc-mange*, an English saying. What Madame de Stäel actually said was, '*Tout comprendre rend très indulgent*' (*Corinne*, xviii. 5). Many such aphorisms in current use turn out on inquiry to have lost some of their original virtue, or to have no authority. No Roman author wrote '*divide et impera.*' It was first printed in this form by Coke (*Inst.*, iv., 1, p. 35). Machiavelli wrote '*divide ut regnes*'; Bacon (1615) advised James I. to '*separa et impera.*' '*Quos Deus vult perdere prius dementat*' is not a quotation from the classics; it is an emendation of a translation by Joseph Barnes, Fellow of Emmanuel College, in his edition (1694) of Euripides, or perhaps of a yet earlier translation (1660) of the same fragment by another Englishman (James Dupont). Proverbial sayings, like slogans, are substitutes for argument, or even for thought, and their origins deserve occasional study. In this connexion *The Oxford Dictionary of Proverbs*, already reviewed in these columns, deserves a place on the shelf of every library.

* * * * *

I had an hour to wait in Carlisle on my way back from addressing a political meeting in Cumberland. Two soldiers on short leave joined me in taking a cup of tea in the refresh-

[*] Sydney, *England and the English*, vol ii, p. 98.

ment-room at midnight. They had been in London the day before Mr. Hore-Belisha had broadcasted his anxiously awaited announcement. They had read in the *Star* that soldiers would get a rise of a shilling a day, and were grievously disappointed to find that this was no part of the scheme. The statement, including a close estimate of cost, was so circumstantial that it had raised high hopes, and the reaction when it turned out to have no foundation was, they told me, bitter. The talk turned on recruiting. Would they, I asked, try to get recruits, and draw the bonus of, I think, 4*s.* 6*d.* for each one accepted? 'It's worth trying,' said one. 'No,' said the other: 'don't touch it; it's Judas money. If you have a pal and think you can do him a good turn by getting him to join up, take him along. If he likes it, he'll be grateful; if he doesn't, and knows you've taken money, he'll not forgive you, and he'll be right.' The argument seemed unanswerable. They were both content with army life and had no complaints except that, after two years, they were getting less pay than young men of their age, with no greater qualifications, who had joined the Air Force.

ARNOLD WILSON.

THE

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THE

NINETEENTH CENTURY *AND AFTER*

No. DCCXXVIII—October 1937

SHANGHAI AND THE GENEVA SYSTEM

By Douglas Jerrold

The present situation at Shanghai, with the grim possibility it affords of a war spreading across the whole of Asia, is yet another instalment of the price we have to pay for the attempt to set up what is known as the Geneva system as the regulating principle in international affairs. Yet there is a great danger that we shall draw the wrong lessons. Already we are being told that if the League had acted in the Manchukuo dispute this further incursion of the Japanese armies would never have taken place; that the League has failed, not from its inherent weakness, but because it was afraid to use its limitless power to enforce its views.

The world's growing disorder is the greater, not the less, for being unaccompanied by the formalities of war. Indeed, the absence of these formalities, the determination of the great Powers to pretend that the fact of war cannot exist because the formalities have not been complied with, or because one

of the parties does not, in the eyes of the lawyers, even exist, is adding every day to the risks of world-wide conflagration. There are in Europe, Asia and Africa, and in each case in the very heart of the danger zone, Governments well established, and in two cases at least secure, which are not recognised as existing. The Italian African Empire, the Spanish Nationalist Government, and the Sino-Japanese Empire of Manchukuo are facts, just as surely as Poland is a fact, or the British Empire in India or the Union of South Africa. We are apt, indeed, to forget how recent are the frontiers even of our own dominions and how unbroken the series of territorial readjustments even in Europe itself. The Great War was exceptional in its scale and in the opportunity it provided for the simultaneous adjustment of frontiers and the creation of new states. But if we take Europe, not in 1919, but in 1914, how many states were there whose frontiers went back even a hundred years? An analysis of the history of nation-states since the fifteenth century shows that the average period of stability for any nation is less than fifty years. It is also necessary to realise that this infinite capacity of the European system for adjustment and readjustment, for the alternate sub-division and aggregation of national territories, was the salvation of Europe from the dawn of the epoch of nationalism to the war of 1914.

The old empires collapsed in turn, and buried their high civilisation in their own ruins, not because they lacked the power to govern or to unify, but because they never found a formula sufficiently elastic to enable a fresh balance to be struck from age to age between the claims of race and the need for government, between the right to freedom and the need for order. Once this is realised, we can begin to understand how the Geneva system, not as intended, but as recently interpreted and on one ill-fated occasion actually applied, is a retrograde, not a forward, movement. And in two vital respects. In so far as in 1918 the Powers adopted race as the sole criterion of national independence, they undermined the unique and sublime conception of European nationality, which was in its very essence not a concession to the claims of race but a compromise between the claims of race and the claims of government. In so far as the Powers subsequently proclaimed the frontiers of nation-states not merely inviolable

by force but unalterable except by their own consent, which could be indefinitely withheld, they destroyed at its very foundation the European system, by depriving it of its principle of development. They created, albeit inadvertently, as I shall show, a situation in which the changes and adaptations necessary to the health of any system could only be effected by a challenge to the system itself. Europe, in other words, turned its back on the historical process and endeavoured to become a theocracy, destined, in so far as it succeeded, to the swift decline which is the natural and inescapable doom of theocracies.

The parchment bonds by which it was proposed to achieve these strange but fatal ends were, of course, inadequate to the task. But the result has been to leave a yawning chasm between the world as the lawyers see it and the world as it is. This has led not merely to a technical but to an actual anarchy, which has brought us to the point where we are being asked in the name of peace, and even, absurdly enough, of progress, to substitute steel for parchment bonds, and enforce what is foolishly called 'the rule of law' with a ruthless and bloodthirsty severity. Before examining how sane and responsible statesmen have been led to this disastrous point in the arguments of history it is worth while examining briefly the two arguments which lead very many of the public to sympathise, at least in theory, with the ambitions of those politicians who wish to recreate an armed League for the governance of the world.

The first argument—which has, I believe, the greatest appeal, if only to the subconscious mind—is the wholly fantastic argument from evolution. The argument is so absurd that it is difficult even to postulate it, but it runs something like this. The world has been evolving slowly from the family as the largest social unit through the tribal and city-state to the nation-state. The desire to 'get together,' the desire for a larger unity, is the underlying force which energises the historical process. To-day, in our infinite wisdom, we understand this fully for the first time, and we can assist, and indeed materially hasten, the process by our own actions. Every day and in every way we are getting bigger and better. The craze for communal life, for crowds, for vast amalgamations of businesses, is all part of the urge

towards a new and all-embracing unity of creeds, classes and races. It is all Progress, and nothing we can do can arrest it, for Progress is a Law of Nature. Shall we not, therefore, be wise and far-sighted to assist it?

It is, of course, unnecessary to tell the readers of *The Nineteenth Century* that this is a farrago of nonsense, but it reflects a considerable volume of popular sentiment, and few indeed are those who can resist playing with this sentiment, at least on the political platform. Moreover, nonsense though it is, it is the kind of nonsense which it is hardest to answer, for reasons which the propagandists have discovered. The big lie is much harder to dispose of than the small lie. If you exaggerate the execution of 20 people during a civil war into a massacre of 200 people you will be easily answered by a recital of the facts. People will feel it quite credible that in the anger and dismay arising from a number of executions (however justifiable) exaggerated reports should get into circulation, and they will readily agree that the numbers have been in fact grossly exaggerated. But if you announce a massacre of 10,000 people when there has been no shooting at all, people simply refuse to believe a denial. There must, they say, be something, and something pretty substantial, behind such a story.

So with the idea of historical evolution towards one great society. Actually, of course, the historical process is centrifugal, not centripetal. It is, like other evolutionary tendencies, from the simple to the complex, not from the complex to the simple. Culture arises not from unification but from an ever-increasing diversity, and from the clash of diversities. Civilisation left to itself is, as Rivers said and proved, a watch that runs down. Colonisation and conquest, absorption, sub-division and reintegration are the normal and natural methods by which the political framework is kept in relationship with the ebb and flow of civilisation, of energy and ability. There is no need to pursue here the fascinating inquiry as to the causes of these periodical flowerings of nations and races, the periodical harvests of energy and genius —now here, now there—which have given a name and colour to so many different epochs. All that we can say with confidence is that these things have always happened, as they are happening in our own time; that no race or nation holds the

front of the scene for ever, or is for ever banished from it. Some are corrupted by power; some energised by poverty; climatic and economic changes play their part and, even more surely, religious enthusiasms and revivals. Finally and most evidently, it is not in the vast loosely organised empires of race but in the small highly-developed nation-states of mixed race that the highest civilisation has always been developed. These fundamental laws of history must be forced somehow into the foreground of the general consciousness if much is not to be uselessly sacrificed on the altar of an illusion.

The other argument which infects the public mind with a subconscious sympathy with the aims of the new Genevan system concerns settlement by peaceful means. People see in the League an analogy with the government of their own state, and in quarrels between nations an analogy with disputes between capital and labour at home. These disputes, when men are wise, are settled between the two parties; when men are unwise or unjust, the State settles them, and, if necessary, throws its weight decisively into the scales to enforce its settlement. The error in this argument is simpler to expose. The precise fact which determines the boundaries of a nation-state is the size of the area over which there is a realised common interest. Directly you go outside that area, the 'Government' not only does not but cannot settle anything except by force. By insisting, for instance, on the right of the English Government to settle disputes in the Irish Free State, you would not prevent disputes there; you would merely ensure that every dispute there was settled only by war. In other words, the analogy so popular on the platform and in the Press is false, and its popularity is creating a public opinion ignorant of the realities of our situation. Since we are to-day largely governed by public opinion, this ignorance is dangerous and must be dispelled.

To make people understand that it is as a direct consequence of the Genevan system that the world is on the brink of war is indeed a hard task, so long is the start which its advocates have had in the matter of propaganda. The Genevan system has for years called itself a 'peace system,' and thus the inference for simple-minded people was that those who opposed it were the enemies of peace. It is to-day specifically linked with the cause of democracy, though why

an organisation whose main supports are Kemal Ataturk, Stalin, and the Third International should enjoy such popularity among democrats is obscure. Finally, it stands for the rule of law, a principle which is in hard fact directly opposed to the principle of democracy, but which is nevertheless extremely popular, as a phrase, in democratic circles.

The correct approach to the task of creating an intelligent public opinion on the League issue is, I believe, to make people familiar first with the history of the drafting of the Covenant. It was originally neither as a peace system nor as a war system that the Genevan experiment was recommended to us. When we were first asked to support the League, the plea put forward for it was that it was a powerful piece of *political machinery for reducing the risks of war*; it was a characteristic liberal device; it interposed, between the first emergence of a cause of dispute and the final arbitrament of war, a tangle of political machinery; the Council and the Assembly were to meet; commissions were to be appointed; witnesses were to be called; reports were to be issued; finally, and in any event, no recourse was to be had to arms within three months of the issue of the Council's recommendations. It was assumed as axiomatic that this machinery, providing as it did for innumerable meetings of professional politicians before recourse could legally be had to hostilities, was foolproof. The highest wisdom must inevitably be the result of an indefinite series of discussions among an indefinite number of politicians lasting an indefinite length of time. The three months' delay interposed between the issue of the Council's 'recommendations' for settling the dispute and their rejection by the aggrieved party was, on reflection, a humorous touch. If the recommendation was nebulous, biassed, or worthless, why not reject it at once? If it was clear, wise and impartial, why not accept it at once? Cynics say to-day that this three months' provision was a stroke of genius on the part of the draftsmen of the Covenant; that they realised that no recommendation would ever be acceptable by both parties, but that they also realised that no Government driven to war could possibly wait three months while the enemy perfected his preparations and searched for allies. By inserting the three-months clause the League ensured, we are told, that every war which arose would be a war in defiance of the

Covenant, and the Genevan system would thus be exempted from blame for the consequences it provoked.

This theory is ingenious, but not, I fear, true. Underlying those clauses of the Covenant which embody what Sir Alfred Zimmern in his brilliant analysis calls ' the Hague idea ' (the idea of inquiry followed by conciliation) is the notion that full and free discussion, given enough freedom and enough fulness, was a cure for all political differences. The three-months interval was merely a precaution to provide, in the last resort, for still more discussion. And even if this naïve faith were not shared by all the Powers, it was reckoned far wiser to pretend to share it than to vote for the alternative proposals discussed. It was these *rejected* proposals which would have built the League round the now famous Article X., which is now alleged (wrongly) to guarantee the frontiers of all states.

This article reads to-day as follows (the italics are mine):

> ARTICLE X. The Members of the League *undertake to respect and preserve* as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression and in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council *shall advise upon* the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled

For reasons which I shall later make clear, we must bear in mind, together with the text of Article X., the text of Article XIX.:

> ARTICLE XIX. The Assembly *may from time to time advise* the reconsideration by Members of the League of Treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world.

It is not generally known that the opposition to the proposal to build the League round Article X. was led by England at the Peace Conference. Still less is it known that the Article in its present form was only accepted by Great Britain because the word ' guarantee ' was omitted, and because it was held not to be mandatory but to leave every nation free to take or to refuse to take the advice of the Council in the event of aggression. In this the British

delegates were opposed by the American, who wanted a stronger Article X., with, however, provisions for peaceful change when changed circumstances made such changes just. The text of the American draft was as follows:

> The contracting Powers unite in several guarantees to each other of their territorial integrity and political independence, subject, however, to such territorial modifications, if any, as may become necessary in the future by reason of changes in the present racial conditions and aspirations, pursuant to the principle of self-determination, and as shall also be regarded by three-fourths of the delegates as necessary and proper for the welfare of the peoples concerned; recognising also that all territorial changes involve equitable compensation and that the peace of the world is superior in importance and interests to questions of boundary.[1]

But no one, not even M. Clemenceau, contemplated a mandatory Article X. without the revision proposals of the American draft. Article X., if it is to be mandatory, must obviously be partnered by a mandatory Article XIX. The fact that Article XIX. is permissive is proof positive of the intentions of the draftsmen in the matter of Article X.

The significance of the debates on Article X. and of the rejection of the American draft is to-day greater than ever, for the American draft which was rejected represents, with the exception of a rather similar effort made by the Italian delegation, the only attempt ever made to make the Covenant an acceptable basis for the rule of law. The present text of Article X. (admittedly ambiguous) and of Article XIX. (which is anything but ambiguous) was not intended either to outlaw war or to make action against an aggressor compulsory. Still less was it intended to enshrine and apply to the international sphere the democratic principle of the majority vote; on the contrary, the League Covenant specifically insisted on the principle, within the League Council, of the Liberum Veto, the principle which for centuries had reduced the Polish Diet to futility. It was, however, attempted at one time by President Wilson and by the Italian delegation to lay down at least the foundations of a system of public law for the nations of the world. It was our determination to resist this proposal, and to leave our hands

[1] See Sir Alfred Zimmern's *The League of Nations and the Rule of Law*, 1918–1935 (Macmillan, 1936).

free, which led to the ambiguous Article X. and the inoperative Article XIX. from which so many tragedies have arisen.

The next stage in the argument was the Kellogg Pact, of which the important articles are the following:

(1) The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and to renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another.

(2) The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means.

This Pact was never linked up with the Covenant and cannot be read in conjunction with it. It is discreditable, but not curious, that in recent years no reference has been made in the English Liberal Press to the Kellogg Pact. The use of military sanctions, so often advocated by Liberals, by a group of League states against a member nation is, of course, a clear and unqualified breach of the Kellogg Pact. Its terms are without reservation, and for a very good reason. The Covenant legalised war, and even invested it, in the eyes of those who mistake the results of the intrigues and wrangles of Versailles for the dictates of morality, with moral sanctions. Had the Pact laid an embargo on war 'otherwise than permitted by the Covenant' it would have been a meaningless document. It was not intended to be anything of the kind. It was intended to put an end to power politics. Nor can quibblers argue that because military sanctions are not war they do not come within the scope of the Pact, for the Pact uses the term 'except by pacific means' in place of the more usual expression. It is, indeed, equally clear that economic sanctions may themselves be a breach of the Pact, being not necessarily, or even probably, in the category of 'pacific means.'

It would be absurd to suggest that the Pact morally disentitles a member of the League to the remedies which the Covenant affords against an aggressive state. The morality of any action depends on the laws of God, and only in a strictly limited and secondary way on what an embarrassed politician may have been induced to sign as part of a political

bargain in different circumstances. It is, however, perfectly obvious that the Kellogg Pact is either a pious declaration of intention to be read as such, or it is a binding pledge, in which case it is binding, in its own words, in regard to conflicts 'of whatever nature or of whatever origin.' In other words, if we take the view (in our opinion quite untenable) that these documents, the Covenant and the Pact, have a sanction in morals, we are no more entitled to make ourselves an exception to the Pact in the matter of military sanctions than Italy was entitled to make herself an exception to the Covenant in the matter of her use of force less than three months after the Council's Report on the Abyssinian dispute.

The plain fact is that the attempt by Mr. Kellogg and Monsieur Briand to introduce a positive principle of public law into the Genevan system introduced so much as to stultify the whole system at one blow. It delegalised war, but in so doing it delegalised the whole of the rest of the Covenant. Nothing, in effect, was left but an inviolable *status quo* to be modified only by consent. This suited the French, and to some extent ourselves, though we were careful to include such reservations as made our own signature meaningless [2] (despite a characteristic plea from the international lawyers that our signature to the Pact itself renders our reservations meaningless, which may be good law but is certainly bad sense). It suited very few other people, however, and since the signature of the Pact England, Germany, Italy, Abyssinia, Bolivia, Paraguay, Russia, China, and Japan have all employed force, or the threat of force, to influence the outcome of disputes with other states, while all the nations which have debated the use of military sanctions have contemplated measures 'other than pacific.'

There are those who will at this point get impatient and who will express their impatience in these terms. France and ourselves, they will say, have in fact kept the peace; we have not resorted to war; we have kept our engagements. Italy, Japan, and Germany have not. The rest is pure technicality. We are 'the good companions' of international politics; the other Powers are the rogue elephants

[2] His Majesty's Government in Great Britain 'accept the new treaty upon the distinct understanding that it does not prejudice their freedom of action' in respect of 'certain regions of the world, the welfare and integrity of which constitutes a special and vital interest'

who must be chained. This objection has much less force than appears, particularly in regard to Germany and Japan. We have not objected to the actions of Germany in the Rhineland and of Japan in China (on the occasion of the invasion of Manchukuo) on moral or even on political grounds, but on purely legalistic grounds. We frankly admitted in both cases that the *status quo* was illogical and inadmissible. We complained, not of the objects sought by these Powers, but of the manner in which they sought them. Our complaints, in other words, were technical, and the moral justification of our technical complaints can only be tested by our own observance of technicalities. Yet we forced economic sanctions on the League by a majority vote, in defiance of the plain interpretation of the Covenant, and backed up our actions by a new interpretation of that document, under which a breach of Article X. placed all the members of the League automatically at war with the aggressor. It was perfectly well known to all the Governments of Europe that the British Government had refused, at Versailles, to accept the mandatory word 'guarantee' in the article and that we had not then regarded the article in its final form as depriving any member of freedom of action. It was equally obvious that if the new interpretation of the article was correct, it must have been correct at the time of the Vilna dispute and at the time of the Manchurian dispute. We chose to assert this interpretation, which was new and surprising, only when we had shown the world that we considered our own interests threatened. When, at the eleventh hour, we felt it desirable to make a gesture of fair-mindedness, we could do no better than to make an undefined offer of sharing the economic resources of undeveloped countries. This offer may have been sincere, but, seeing that the Italians themselves had asked for a pledge to this effect to be inserted in the Covenant, and that we had refused even to discuss it, and that we had again blocked the same proposal when made by the Italians at Geneva in 1926, our gesture could hardly have been accepted at its face value by Signor Mussolini.

The plain fact is that Article X., if more than a pious expression of opinion, is not compatible either with the rest of the Covenant or with that national sovereignty which the

rest of the Covenant implies and acknowledges. If, moreover, Article X. is mandatory, it is indefensible unless and until Article XIX. (regarding the revision of treaties and of frontiers), which was deliberately separated from Article X. at the insistence of the British and French delegates at Versailles, is also mandatory. Without a mandatory Article XIX., Article X. as now interpreted means the rule of law without any provision for amending the law. This is the technique, not of democracy, not of limited monarchy, not even of absolute monarchy, but of theocracy. For it must be noted that Article XIX. as drafted makes any changes in the *status quo* not merely improbable but impossible, since universal consent is necessary. There is not even behind this article the possibility of effecting changes by force, since no sanctions can be applied to a state which refuses its consent to change, even if the whole of the League be unanimous as against that state.

The rule of law in common parlance means, of course, the exact opposite of what would be set up if we accepted the now official view of the meaning of Article X. of the Covenant, and if we succeeded in imposing our view on the world. We mean, on our domestic political platforms, by the 'rule of law' the right to make changes in the law by majority vote and to insist on such changes being accepted if they are made in a customary and conventional way. We say that we have no need in this country of revolutions and rebellions because we are free to legislate, and because the changes made by legislation are accepted by the people since they have the right to make further changes if the experiment fails. It is a piece of gross and cynical dishonesty to recommend the Geneva system to the British public on the ground that it means 'the rule of law' when in fact it means setting up a system exactly and precisely the opposite to that which we describe as the rule of law in our own country. If we had here the rule of law as we wish to apply it at Geneva, we should have only a Statute-book, the police and the Army; we should have to obey the laws we had, or be shot. And if to such a Constitution a clause were appended saying that a subject who had a grievance against the Government could bring it before the Government, and that any class which had a grievance against any other class

could bring it to the notice of the representatives of that class, and that the grievance would be attended to if the authors of the grievance agreed, should we be greatly reassured?

Of course, until the rearmament of Germany and the renascence of Italy no one in England would have ventured to suggest that we should regard the League as an armed organisation for defending the existing distribution of territory and resources among the Great Powers. We entered the League honestly with the hope of assisting its development into a political instrument for effective conciliation. It was recommended to us at the start precisely as an instrument for securing a peaceful revision by diplomatic pressure of the very treaties whose provisions we are now told are sacrosanct. So far, however, from securing amendment of the treaties, the League even failed to secure the fulfilment of the one clause in the treaties which was in Germany's interest—the clause relating to disarmament. This was not our fault, perhaps, but we should have seen the inevitable consequences. Perhaps we did. In any case, we have done our best to bring them about. The League is to-day in ruins, and for no purpose. If we had destroyed the League in our efforts for justice, we could at least regard our handiwork with complacency. Instead, we first watched its disintegration, and then proceeded to use the form, when the substance was gone, in order to enforce against the Powers who had lost the peace the instrument which we had planned to use as their safeguard. And all this out of sheer inadvertence. We had changed our views about the Powers who lost the peace, and the instrument of the League, and of Article X., seemed too good to be overlooked. After all, we say, treaties are treaties; covenants are covenants; and when they work out so well for us, does that do more than prove that God, as always, is a good Englishman?

That, I believe, represents the view of the average Englishman to-day about the League, and I for one should not quarrel so bitterly with his view were it not that it will lead us inevitably to war. However great we may be, or deserve to be, we cannot arrest the process of history. We are asking the world to accept the present situation as permanent for all time. To evade this issue by saying that we are ready

to amend it by consent is merely dishonest. If a nation has only to refuse to change its policy or its boundaries in order to retain them—and that is the position under the League to-day—there can be no peaceful change. We can only hope for peaceful changes, as opposed to changes by force or the threat of force, by rebuilding the League on the sound foundations of commonly accepted principles, and in this way substituting morality for politics as the basis of its decisions. In this way a majority decision will have that sanction which alone is binding on the consciences of free men. This involves one of two things. You must either start with an omnicompetent League limited to the Powers who genuinely agree on all questions of political principle, or with a universal League limited in its jurisdiction to those matters about which its members are agreed. On the one basis, progress will consist of the gradual adherence to the League of more and more states ; on the other, of the gradual increase of the number of matters over which the League has jurisdiction.

Our belief that, being ourselves tired and no longer energetic, we can construct a system of law to defend our power and dominion for all time against the forces of change is vain and dishonourable. Only by making our own contribution to the changing pattern of history can we ensure that the pattern will contain us within the framework. We can make our contribution by an act of will or by an act of resignation, but we must be responsible partners in the historical process if we are, as a world Power, to continue to exist. If we wish to stand by the League, our task is to make the League an effective agent for just change. On no other terms has it a future. But if we decide on this policy, we must realise at the outset that an effective agent for just change must first of all, as a pre-requisite, be universally regarded as disinterested. In our lifetime the League will never be so regarded. Its record is too bad. It will only regain the world's confidence very gradually. For this reason it is evident that the path of progress lies not with the omnicompetent League with a limited membership—for such a League would to-day only be the old Triple Entente in a new guise, and would provoke a counter-league—but with the universal League limited in its scope and responsibilities.

This may seem a dull end to a noble adventure, but the answer to that lies here. The adventure ceased to be noble when we began saying 'peace' when we meant 'war.' An armed League to defend the territories of France, Russia and ourselves, who between us own more than three-fifths of the world's surface, is not a noble adventure, but a rather ignominious intrigue. A League of receivers turned policemen would arguably be practical, but it would certainly not be regarded as noble if its first aim were to secure a legal title for its own dubiously acquired assets, and its second to make its own consent a condition to the acquisition of similar assets by anyone else.

If there is a moral quality in democracy, in toleration and in liberty, we can only pride ourselves on possessing it if we really withhold the hand of friendship from all those who lack these qualities. We cannot make friends of one dictator and denounce the others for their dictatorship. We taught the whole world during the last century that freedom means the freedom of those we dislike as well as of those we like; that rights are absolute, and that justice is impartial. Then we practised what we preached. To-day we do not. We use law and morality as the tools of our political trade, but we only appeal to them when it suits us. The result is that the other nations do the same, and the world is divided into two camps of self-righteous people hurling moral imprecations at each other—sometimes with a complete sincerity, more often with a transparent hypocrisy.

The plain lesson is that we can defend the *status quo* in Europe or Asia on every conceivable ground except those of morality and law. You cannot suddenly invest the acquisitions of power-politics with the sanction of morality, or condemn the principles of power-politics without condemning the title-deeds which descend from these principles. These things may be hard to learn, but the world has got to learn them if the foundations of a new world order are to be laid otherwise than in blood.

The task of Toryism in the new age is to insist above all on a consistent logic. Toryism is applied sociology. It is not based on deductions from hastily assumed generalities, but on observed facts of human behaviour. These observed facts tell us that the need of the world is for peace and order,

and the major political problem is to provide them without denying the opportunity for free change. Any fool can preserve the superficial appearances of peace and order by force, until someone brings greater force against him. But as at home, so abroad, there must be some self-regulating principle to combine the realities of peace and order with the possibilities of change. That principle must be founded on the laws of God, and not on the laws of man. We ourselves have known four invasions and three conquests. Isolated, we should be to-day where the Abyssinians are, or the tribes of the North-West Frontier. Who are we to arrest the process of history and to seek to turn the world into a museum of static and isolated cultures condemned to slow but inevitable decay? Is Italy to remain for ever crowded and poor and Abyssinnia lawless and under-populated because a lawyer compromised over a draft in a treaty in 1919? And if we shift our ground and say that the Italians are not good colonisers, let us remember that the Pope said the same of the English in the sixteenth century. Spain was then the colonising nation; then the Dutch; then ourselves; and then the French. Nations, like individuals, have their exits and their entrances. This is the economy of Nature. One succeeds another as heir to the task of the pioneer. The curve of fertility points the finger of destiny. That, too, is the lesson of sociology.

Which brings us back to the present situation in Shanghai. The present conflict arises, as so many wars have arisen from the dawn of history, from the proximity of a vast empire in confusion with a small, vigorous and highly organised state suffering from the pressure of population. No power on earth could ever have solved this problem by consent. No power on earth could ever have solved it at all without redrawing the map of Asia, and that is a power which Asia will never concede to Europe, any more than Europe would concede it to Asia in regard to the frontiers of the European states. Yet similar problems have been settled in past times without a world war. If the signatories to the Nine-Power Pact had made a pact of interference instead of one of non-interference, peace and rough justice might long since have reigned from Turkestan to the Pacific. Unfortunately, the shadow of Article XIX. hung over the Washington Con-

ference; there must be no positive action for peace and justice, or even in defence of the barest decencies of civilisation. At the same time the shadow of the dubious and ill-drafted Article X. sent China away contented to resume her endless civil wars. Her frontiers were secure. She could do what she liked within them.

That may have been the lesson to be drawn from the Covenant. It was not, and never will be, the lesson of history.

DOUGLAS JERROLD.

THE FUTURE OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN

By E. M. Gull

Previous articles in the *Nineteenth Century and After* have given readers a good working knowledge of much of the background of the undeclared war between China and Japan. This article, accordingly, will discuss the question whether Japan's aims are attainable and what their consequences are likely to be for China, Japan itself, and other countries with interests in the Pacific.

Last summer, when I described a nine months' study of the situation in Japan, Manchuria and China made in 1935, Japan's plans were in several respects conjectural. Nobody, for example, could say how far she was prepared to go in the use of force, conjecture being rendered all the more uncertain by doubt as to whether China was prepared, or able, to resist militarily. Few people shared my view that China would resort to arms, and I did not profess to be able to define the limits of her submissiveness. This latter element of doubt has now been removed, while if in some ways Japan's aims may still be said to be doubtful they are plain enough for practical purposes.

Thus her Premier, Prince Konoe, has stated that 'Japan's best course is to beat China to her knees, so that she will no longer have any spirit to fight.' Similarly, the War Minister, General Sugiyama, has said that 'if China plans protracted hostilities the Japanese army will never bury the hatchet until it has dealt drastic punishment to the Chinese troops and deprived them of their fighting spirit and their anti-Japanese activities.' The Foreign Minister, Mr. Hirota, has said that 'we should take up a resolute attitude and compel China to mend her ways. . . . The basic policy of the Japanese Government aims at the stabilisation of the East through conciliation and co-operation between Japan, Manchukuo

and China for their common prosperity and well-being. Since China, ignoring our true motives, has mobilised her vast armies against us, we cannot do otherwise than to counter the mobilisation by force of arm.' The Finance Minister, Mr. Kaya, has said that North China is to be made a 'bright zone' for Japan, Manchukuo and China. A short but accurate interpretation of these latter statements is available in a telegram from the Tokyo correspondent of *The Times*, despatched on September 5, in which he stated that Japan aims at 'harmonizing Japan, Manchukuo and China into a political and economic *bloc*, of which she will be the protector and overlord.'

As China has preferred to fight rather than acquiesce in this purpose, its attainability depends in the first instance upon military and naval factors, and the moral and material conditions with which they are associated. In discussing them it is simplest to deal with some of the moral factors first. It may, I think, be claimed that China has already done enough to disprove what three months ago was a widespread belief—namely, that she was neither united nor patriotic enough to fight the Japanese If this claim were based solely on the resistance offered, up to the time of writing, by China's best troops it would be open to the criticism that history furnishes many examples of similar stubbornness and courage inspired neither by political unity nor patriotism. In days gone by battles were often fought bravely and successfully by mercenaries. But the assertion is based also upon three other facts—first, that military resistance was not decided on until most of the leaders of many parties or cliques had been consulted; secondly, that the decision was the result of considerations of precisely the same kind as those which would actuate Great Britain or any other European country—as reference to Chiang Kai-shek's delimitation of China's submissiveness will show; and, thirdly, that it was taken in clear realisation of the military and naval superiority of Japan. When I was in China in 1935 men in close touch with the Central Government talked in terms of losing all China north-east of a line drawn roughly diagonally from Sianfu to Foochow, and I was told in a specially reliable quarter that plans had been made to meet the likelihood of having to transfer the centre of administration from Nanking to

Chêngtu, the capital of Szechuan province on the Upper Yangtze. In the light of these facts it seems reasonable to affirm that, as far as moral conditions alone are concerned, China is by no means ill equipped for the struggle upon which she has entered. In practice, however, moral conditions cannot be isolated from material facts, and we must return to this point when we have considered the latter.

Let us glance first at those in respect of which China is strong. As far as sheer man-power goes, she has immense reserves. As far as physical geography is concerned, her armies have almost illimitable room for retreat, and unsurpassed natural fastnesses. In a year of good harvests she can live off her own, the value of this fact being enhanced by a standard of life which enables her people to beat the Japanese wherever the two are thrown into competition on terms governed by climate and food. We soon come, however, to conditions in respect of which China is relatively weak. The arsenals at Taiyuanfu, Sianfu, Kunghsien (Honan), Nanchang, Canton, Chêngtu and Yunnanfu cannot supply her with munitions in adequate quantities—the first may have been captured by the time this is published—while she began the struggle relatively deficient in supplies of aeroplanes, anti-aircraft and other guns, tanks and other essential equipment. She has practically no navy, and the moment Japan claims belligerent rights she will be unable to rely on sea-borne military supplies. These facts diminish considerably the military significance of her huge reserves of man-power. Moreover, her principal revenue, the customs, depends almost entirely upon the volume and value of her sea-borne foreign and domestic trade, the land-borne portion of the former being negligible, and that of domestic riverine trade, supervised by the customs, comparatively small. The sea-borne trade is subject, on the one hand, to the exigencies of the military situation—as has been shown by accumulations of cargo at Hongkong and elsewhere; on the other, to Japanese interpretation of what constitutes 'peaceful' commerce, and the dislocations which it is already occasioning. In any event, if the principal ports were captured, Japan would not need to stop trade in order to diminish revenue. She would be in a position to withhold import and other duties from the Chinese Government, though such a

step would probably occasion diplomatic friction which she might prefer to avoid. The next most important revenue, the taxation of salt, is derived as to 21 per cent. from North China and Shantung: as to another 30 per cent., from the Huai River area, and that of Shanghai, Nanking and Chekiang. Japan's ability to control these portions of the salt revenue is dependent, accordingly, upon the success of her armies' which would have to be completely successful in order to enable her to control the remaining portion, derived from Central and Southern China. The same remarks apply to the third most important revenue, known as 'consolidated' taxes on rolled tobacco, flour, cotton yarn, matches and cement. On the other hand, over such portions of China's financial resources as are represented by her holdings of foreign currencies, estimated to be not less than £40,000,000, and of silver sent for safe-keeping to Hongkong, regarding which no confidently quotable figure is available, the Japanese can exercise no control. In other words, they can exercise no control over part of the basis of China's credit. Nor can they control remittances from Chinese abroad.

On the whole, however, apart from such help as Russia may give, the supply of material resources necessary to enable China to maintain her armies is a relatively restricted one. It should be realised, however, that Russian help may greatly improve this situation. But if it does, it may well affect an already delicate situation in Europe. Conversely, developments, at the time of writing unforeseeable, in Europe might affect the whole outlook in the Far East. In either case the clearest analysis would then become incoherent.

To turn to Japanese resources, which must be more briefly considered. An outstanding military fact is that owing to her blunder in provoking major hostilities at Shanghai, three, possibly four, Japanese divisions are engaged there. Five are required to ensure peace in Manchuria and six are in North China, where some of them will shortly be occupied with China's so-called 'Red' armies, reported to be amongst her best. In other words, of Japan's peace establishment at the most three divisions are, at the time of writing, disengaged. However, behind them is the man-power for many more, and the resources required to maintain them are adequate, provided no derangements are occasioned

by such developments as those just indicated. Application of America's Neutrality Act would subject Japan to financial and shipping difficulties arising out of its 'cash and carry' clause, but, subject to expert opinion upon this highly technical point, my description 'adequate' may be allowed to stand. Most people would say that morally and psychologically Japan is better equipped than China. But just as most people have erred in underestimating China's moral resources, so too do they, in my opinion, err in overestimating Japan's. The Japanese, magnificently courageous, are emotional and impulsive also and, where we prefer fortitude, commit *harakiri*. At all events, a consideration to which insufficient weight appears to have been given is that, morally speaking, Japan is much more heavily involved than China, and quite differently. China entered the struggle in the conviction that it was better to be defeated in the field than to yield without fighting. Few who have recently been in China, and are able to enter into its spirit through the door of its written language, will dispute this. Defeat, accordingly, will not demoralise, though it may utterly disorganise, her—quite a different thing. On the contrary, defeat will be the making of her not less certainly, though after a very much longer period of time, than victory. Quite otherwise is it with Japan. She began the conflict in overweaning confidence, a confidence which has been growing without test or check ever since her defeat of Russia thirty odd years ago. Prolonged resistance by China will be psychologically staggering, while anything short of complete victory in the field will approximate in its effects to defeat. Japan's social and political order is by no means without weak spots, though space is insufficient to detail them, and the degree of strain which they can bear is open to more doubt than is usually expressed.

However, unless China finds means of replenishing her military supplies, her resistance is unlikely to be prolonged to the stage at which these weak spots would be tested to breaking point. They are more likely to give way after than during the conflict. Indeed, China's resistance may be short-lived. For her political order, though it comprehends elements much older than Japan's, is in its present form new, professedly transitional, and for those reasons alone weak.

Furthermore, it is dependent, to an extent that is dangerous in the face of such an emergency as the present one, upon the capacities and prestige of a single individual, Chiang Kai-shek—whence the narrow escape of the British Ambassador, Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen, and those who were travelling with him on August 26. To say, as some do, that Chiang Kai-shek is the Dictator of China is to ignore many historical and contemporary facts. On the other hand, the growth and organisation of the present Chinese Government have been so closely associated with his military genius and diplomatic capacity that without his control China's cohesion would be much weaker than it is. Again, China's social order, from which much of Japan's is derived, though not intrinsically perhaps more in need of repair than hers, involves a vastly greater area and a vastly greater population, so that its weaknesses, which have been repeatedly enhanced by gigantic physical calamities, are more numerous and handicapping.

It is to these and the military and economic facts described above that the judgment expressed in the fourth paragraph of this article upon China's moral equipment must be related. And, that relationship established, it seems logical to conclude that, failing extraneous help on a considerable scale, the resistance which China's armies are offering to Japan can be overcome, or at all events reduced to the point at which China has to choose between peace and guerilla warfare. A peace made before she is psychologically ready for it, or the institution of guerilla warfare, are both likely to be followed, especially in the latter case, by political and administrative decentralisation indistinguishable, as far as services at present co-ordinated are concerned, from disintegration, except in this vital respect, that the nationalistic spirit of hundreds of millions of Chinese would be stronger than it has ever been in modern times. To this extent Japan's aims are attainable, *and to this extent must they be attained* before she can claim victory and be regarded in China, or—which is less important—in other countries, as having won.

But if that is true, the following opinions are tenable. The Japanese Premier is probably right in warning his people—and it is interesting to observe how soon he has thought it advisable to do so—that the struggle will take a long time. To make that phrase more precise involves

guess-work, which seems scarcely worth while. Neither in the event of a draw, China's surrender at discretion, nor her complete defeat followed by disorganisation, will the Japanese get co-operation in the degree essential to the constitution of an economic *bloc* that will pay its way. The rebellions which are said already to have occurred in Manchuria suggest that even in that part of the proposed *bloc* the prospect of dividends has become less good than it was. In any circumstances other than the improbable event of China's outright victory North China's raw materials may fall under Japan's control, the maintenance of which, however, will occasion perpetual friction and endless difficulties. So, too, will their utilisation by such Japanese industries as may be established on the spot, for the requisite capital for them, in so far as it comes from Chinese sources, will give its subscribers influence inimical to that of Japanese subscribers. Disappointing, too, is likely to be the nature of the demand for Japanese manufactures resulting from the sale of the raw materials. Upon goods markedly cheaper than similar goods obtainable elsewhere the proceeds of such sales will naturally be spent, provided that local industries do not manufacture them more cheaply still. But for manufactures not thus differentiated demand will tend to seek satisfaction in non-Japanese quarters. And that tendency will display itself, not in North China only, but in the rest of the country too, and amongst all Chinese resident abroad. To the extent that the country is left without an effective, centralised administration outright boycott will have to be suppressed locally by the Japanese themselves. On the other hand, to the extent that such centralised administration possesses effectiveness it will be hard to browbeat. In the light of these considerations it seems reasonable to conclude that the second and major part of Japan's programme, as defined by the Tokyo correspondent of *The Times* and endorsed by myself, is unattainable.

If that is so, what conclusions are to be drawn as to the effects of the struggle (*a*) on Japan, (*b*) on other countries? The chief seem to be these. As regards Japan, military success less in degree than that indicated above—success, that is to say, which leaves China with reduced but intact forces and the sense of having done better than she expected—would quickly wear through the disguise in which it would be

presented to the Japanese public and be recognised as failure. With such recognition would come disillusion, and with that in turn anti-military reactions, increasing in strength as economic disillusionment supervened. The latter will certainly be experienced whether the degree of victory necessary to maintain the prestige of the army is won or not, and eventually will be the more acute in the former case. For in that event not only will the army wish to maintain its anti-Russian corridor in North China, notwithstanding the additional amount that that would add to the huge financial cost of the struggle, but it will be obliged to hold itself in readiness to enforce 'co-operation' on the part of 'pro-Japanese' Chinese administrators installed at the capital (not improbably Pei-p'ing reinstated as Pei-ching, anglicised Peking, possibly, but on the whole improbably, under the Emperor P'u-Yi) and at other centres. In either case, though less quickly in the former, the weak spots in Japan's fabric—in regard to which the reader, if discriminating, may be referred to Miss Freda Utley's *Japan's Feet of Clay*—are likely to generate developments of a disturbing, possibly revolutionary, kind.

As regards other countries, Great Britain and Holland and the United States will have Time on their side in the task of computing their requisite degrees of economic and naval strength. But while Time is doing its work, probably in a leisurely way, Japan will retain Pratas Islands and probably Hainan and thus be astride the Singapore-Hongkong route, the British Empire's naval strength will have to be relentlessly increased, irrespective of America's, if we are meanwhile to feel secure in the possession of Hongkong, communications in the Pacific, and the retention of rights of a variety of kinds in China. Our market there, and America's, is likely to remain disturbed and flaccid for some time, both the length of time and the degree of disturbance depending upon the nature and extent of the political and administrative disorganisation by which the struggle is followed. If China is not defeated in the sense indicated above, recovery will naturally be much quicker than it will be if she is. Britain, the United States, and the other countries with which Japan competes will derive advantage from China's preference for non-Japanese goods, but this may be offset for a time, more

particularly in North China, by the control which Japan, if China is defeated, will in varying degrees establish and for a period be able, with diminishing success, to maintain. One of the purposes and effects of such control would be in some instances to reverse, in others to deflect, the recent tendency of the Chinese market to prefer capital to consumption goods. In any event Russia's influence, against which Japan professes to be defending East Asia, will probably increase in China: in the event of a loss of prestige by the Japanese army it will increase in Japan. For in international affairs, as in those of individuals, misfortune makes strange bedfellows. All things considered, I should think twice, if not three times, before rejecting the idea of paying a stiff price in Europe for freedom of action in the near future in the Far East. Of the issues represented by the League of Nations, the Nine-Power Treaty and the Kellogg Pact nothing has been said, for the sufficient reason that they cannot be reviewed competently in so short an article. Moreover, it is clear that neither those instruments nor the League exercise any restraint over Japan.

E. M. GULL.

PEKING HAS BEEN CONQUERED BEFORE

By F. L. Dean

On August 8 last a brigade of 3000 Japanese soldiers in full war kit, under the command of Major-General Torashino Kawabe, entered the gates of Peking to take formal possession of the city. Upon the gaping Chinese population Japanese airplanes dropped leaflets explaining the event :

> The Japanese army has driven out your evil rulers and their evil armies and will keep them out. Although the Nanking Government is prepared to wage a destructive war, do not be afraid. The Japanese army will protect you.

Thus, in 1937, history re-enacted with modern variations a drama older than the walls of that ancient city : the conquest of Peking by alien forces

It is a startling fact that during the past thousand years Peking has known only three centuries of native rule. Except in the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644) and during the twenty-six years of the republic, Peking, under half a dozen different names, has been a foreign capital ever since the founder of the later Tsin Dynasty gave it in 936 A.D., with fifteen other districts of the north and annual tribute of 300,000 pieces of silk, to Khitan nomads from the steppes of Asia. Peking was then only a small provincial city of Pei P'ing (' The Northern Plains '). The Khitans rebuilt and fortified it as their capital. From the Khitans' name the Russians called this part of North China ' Kitai,' which Persian travellers translated to the West as ' Cathay.' Early in the twelfth century the Khitans were driven out of China by the Kin, a sister tribe of nomads from whom descended the modern Manchus. The Kin captured Peking in 1118, but did not rebuild it until 1151. Not satisfied with their conquest of the Northern Plains, they made continual efforts to conquer all China, and by 1127 they had succeeded in driving the

Sung Emperor and his court south of the Yellow River. The Kin ruled North China until they, in turn, softened by Chinese culture, were driven out by another barbarian tribe.

The Mongols, under the leadership of Genghis Khan, had, during the late twelfth century and the early thirteenth, become the dominating force in north-eastern Asia. Amalgamated of the many warring clans conquered by Genghis Khan, their army is said to have been a marvel of organisation and discipline. While the Kin harried the Chinese, the Mongols made swift, cruel raids upon the land of the Kin. By the summer of 1214 the tents of the Mongol army surrounded the wall of Peking. The Kin begged a truce, and the Kin Emperor gave his daughter in marriage to Genghis Khan. But peace did not last, and in 1215 the Mongols swept southward again. The Kin Emperor fled with his court and his armies, and Genghis Khan took Peking. The scene that day must have been more terrifying in appearance, if not in portent, than the grim, mechanical entry of Japanese troops last August—khaki-clad, steel-helmeted, armed with rifles and escorted by airplanes. The Mongol warriors on shaggy ponies, riding furiously with short stirrups, brandishing lances and wildly hallooing, galloped pell-mell through the gates intent on personal plunder and killing, heedless of children crushed under the ponies' hooves. Arrows carried at the belt were their long-distance weapons; for armour they wore short jackets of tanned hide arranged in rows overlapping like roof tiles.

Victory accomplished, Genghis Khan went back to the steppes, leaving a viceroy in charge of North China. It was Kublai Khan, grandson of Genghis, who subdued the whole Chinese Empire and made Peking the capital of the new dynasty (Yuan) in 1264. He changed the name of the city to *Khan-beligh* ('City of the Great Khan'), which Marco Polo made known to Europe as *Kanbalu*—a city of fabulous splendour. This was the first time that Peking had ever been the capital of the Chinese Empire, and it was under Mongol rule.

But the next conquerors were Chinese. A native uprising in the 1360's succeeded in turning out the Mongols—weakened now by a century of urban life and the refinements

of the ancient civilisation they had espoused. In 1368 General Hung Wu, the peasant who had led the revolution, was invested with the imperial yellow as first Emperor of the Ming (' The Bright ') Dynasty, which endured for 276 years. In the reign of Hung Wu, Kanbalu was deposed from its eminence as capital and was renamed *Pei P'ingfu* (' Prefecture of the Northern Plains '). Twelve years later, when the Emperor's son Yuen Lo, under the title ' Prince of Yen,' became viceroy of Pei P'ingfu, the name of the city was changed to Peking, meaning ' Northern Capital ' in distinction from Nan, ' Southern '-king, which was the imperial capital. This was the first time that Peking had ever been a city of national importance under Chinese rule, and the first time in a period of 983 years that it had been under Chinese rule at all.

When Yuen Lo ascended the throne in 1403 he decreed that Peking should be made the capital of the empire, and soon afterward he set about erecting palaces, temples, and pagodas that should out-rival those his royal father had built at Nanking. Some of the temples extant to-day on the outskirts of Peking, including the Great Bell Temple, date from his reign. How much he did toward reconstructing the wall of the Inner City is not clear. The records suggest that it stands now much as Kublai Khan left it, except that the gate towers were added in 1436: ' Hitherto the city had followed the old style of the Yuan (Mongol) Dynasty; at the renewal under Yuen Lo no gate towers had been constructed.' In 1543 the circumference of the city was enlarged by a new portion of wall built to enclose the suburb that had grown up outside the south gate.

In 1644 the Ming Dynasty came to a tragic end, and with it ended Chinese rule in China until the revolution of 1911. Once again the invaders came from the north-east —a tribe of Tungusic Tartars called Manchus, descendants of the Kin. An old volume giving a lively contemporary account of their conquest of China has come into my possession.[1] It was:

First writ in *Spanish*, by *Señor Palafox*, Bishop of Osma in *Spain*, and in the year 1639 Consecrated Bishop of *Puebla de los Santos*, or

[1] In all essentials this history agrees with other reliable records of that period

Tlaxcala in *Mexico*, and by *Philip* the Fourth constituted Vice-Roy of *Mexico*; where from time to time he received information from the *Philippine Isles* of all the eminent Transactions which happened in the Revolution of the *Chinese* Empire to the *Tartars*. Out of which Memorials (he saith himself) he compiled this History, which after his Decease was found in Manuscript amongst his Papers, and by his Kinsman *Don Bernardo de Palafox* given at *Madrid* to a *French* Gentleman, *Mr. Bertier*; who . . . at his return to *Paris*, engaged *Monsieur Colle* to publish it in *French*, which he did the last year. This *French* translation I [2] received from a friend, whose Authority prevailed with me to copy after a Copy, being assured that in all probability the *Spanish* original would not be divulged.

It was 'rendred English' and printed in London by W. Godbid, and sold by M. Pitt at the 'White Hart,' in Little Britain, in 1671. Señor Palafox, who writes as vividly as though he had been an eye-witness of the events in his *History of the Conquest of China by the Tartars*, probably got his 'Relations' and 'Memorials' from Spanish monks living in China. The Ming Dynasty had been favourable to foreign missionaries, and before the year 1600 Jesuits, Dominicans, and Franciscans from several European countries had established themselves in Peking and in other parts of China. Our author complains of 'the necessity, in relating several passages, to make use of these terms: *In all likelihood, in all appearance, most probably* &c., for the Instructions out of which this Narrative was compiled, came to me in Letters and loose Memorials, which were sent out of *China* during the Troubles: and doubtless the great Confusions, in which the whole State was involved, was the occasion that the Informations came so brief and disordered.'

'It was in the year 1640,' begins Señor Palafox, 'when two rebels at the same time revolted against their Lawful Soveraign; one of them was called *Ly*, the other *Cham*. . . .' The English translator has amplified this simple statement by 'information gleaned from other authors,' particularly from Arnoldus Montanus, 'the latest Writer of China, lately Englished by Mr. Ogilby.' Out of Montanus, then, he gets the story that leads up to Señor Palafox's tale of Ly and Cham: the rebellion that preceded the Manchu

[2] The English translator, who is not named, but who (in a printer's note) is referred to as 'the person of Honour who gave himself the trouble of rendring the foregoing History into English.'

conquest of China was begun (says Montanus) by the mountaineers of Szechuan province and was seconded by the inhabitants of Kweichow.

In the interim a great Famine happened, occasioned by an unheard of number of Locusts And now a new rebellion is raised in *Xensi* and *Xantung*, which took its rise from the discontents of the people, the Emperor Xunchen [3] out of covetousness [4] imposing as high Taxes upon his Subjects as he did formerly in fruitful, flourishing times · the money all mispent, and the Souldiers not paid. Whereupon the number of the Mutineers daily increased, and being by Plunder and Rapine enriched, they now plot against the whole Empire.

But, continues Montanus, the generals who commanded the insurgents, 'growing jealous one of the other, they fall into parties amongst themselves, and then into open War, where in several battels, all the Generals were slain but two, *viz.* *Licungz* [5] and *Changien*, by our Author called *Ly* [5] and *Cham* . ' After quoting Diocletian on the treachery of kings' counsellors, Señor Palafox proceeds with his story of Ly and Cham, who 'in a very little time, by force of arms, make themselves Masters of Five Provinces.' Whereupon *Ly*, not willing to share further glories with his colleague, caused *Cham* to be murdered and himself to be crowned and 'took upon him the Title of the Emperor of *China*.' Meantime the Manchus (Tartars), waiting their chance, watched, from beyond the Great Wall, the gradual dissolution of the Chinese Empire.

But the Manchu prince [6] 'had solemnly sworn peace with the Royal Family of China . . . and therefore he could not resolve with himself, as great Idolator as he was, to violate that Oath . . . : a great Example to those who boast of the true Religion, and yet swear and promise without regarding

[3] Williams, in *The Middle Kingdom*, names the last Ming Emperor *Hwai-tsung*

[4] Señor Palafox, staunch royalist, represents Xunchen (whom he sometimes calls *Zunchin*) as the innocent, virtuous victim of unworthy counsellors. This author's interpretations of Chinese character are deeply coloured by Spanish romanticism. Montanus seems to be a realist acquainted with the Chinese people

[5] Known to later historians as Li Tsz-ching

[6] Translator's note . 'I must out of *Montanus* let you know, that he was not the *Cham*, or Emperour of the *Tartars*, but only a petty Prince amongst them, whose Grandfather was the first of his Family, who was advanced to that dignity by the consent of the inhabitants of his Country, which was only a small Province in *Tartary*, called *Muncheu*'

the performance of either their Oaths or Promises.' Therefore the Tartar prince only 'kept himself in readiness to take advantage of all occasions which might be beneficial to him'!

The Chinese traitor Ly, not content with his five provinces, determined to attack Peking, kill the Ming Emperor Xunchen, and himself don the imperial yellow robe. But, recollecting that, 'besides the vast extent of *Pequin*, it was very well fortified, and in time of peace was guarded with 80000 of the Emperour's best Souldiers,' Ly decided that victory would not be easy. 'The Imperial Palace alone is above two miles in circumference, and defended with two or three Walls, with their Ditches and Bulwarks, which are all distinct the one from another, and which cannot be taken but separately one after the other.' Disheartened by these difficulties, Ly determined to try strategy instead of force. He began by bribing several of the 'grandees,' chief among them the eunuchs of the Imperial Palace, 'who were then very potent and considerable in the Court.' With their assistance Ly

> sent into the Imperial City of *Pequin* several of his most trusty and valiant Commanders disguised like Merchants, with Instructions to keep open shop, and to expose on sale several rich Merchandises. These counterfeit Merchants were never suspected to be great Commanders and their Apprentices and Servants choice Souldiers. It concerned them though to mind their Trade, for upon that depended the purchase of the greatest Empire in the world. . . . Those in the City and Court who kept intelligence with the Tyrant failed not to lessen the Guards and to weaken the Strength of the place as much as lay in their power. Thus in a little time the Treason broke out all of a sudden, to the great Disorder and Astonishment (as may easily be imagined) of all the Inhabitants who were not privy to the Conspiracy. . . . Ly presently appeared and found the Gates of the Town open, and his men victorious in the Conquest of this great City, before he could attaque it!

While a loyal guard was defending the Imperial Palace, the Emperor

> considered how speedily to dispose both of his Royal Family and Person, which was in the most Tragical manner that ever Histories related: He had but one only Daughter, very young, which till now had been the Hope and Desire of the Empire . . . her Throat was cut by her own Father, and that at her own supplication, that

she might not see her Honour and illustrious Rank become a shameful prey to a Tyrant and Traytor. After this horrid Execution, the Emperour with his hands yet reeking with the bloud of his Daughter, went into the Garden of the Palace, accompanied with his Legitimate Spouse, the Empress. He abandoned six other Wives, who had each of them the Title of Queen, thirty others who were the most Illustrious Ladies of the Empire, and three thousand others of lesser Quality It is very difficult for the Soul of Man, let it be never so great and compassionate, when it is oppressed with such a tumult of Griefs at once, to extend its care to each particular Concern . . He went to die, deprived of all comfort but a very doleful one, which was, that he yet had it in his power to be his own Executioner The Fountains, Flowers, Groves, Birds, and a great variety of living Creatures, which were the pleasant Recreations of this Delicious place, were now no longer the Divertisement of this Prince Here was nothing now but Grief and Sorrow. .

This Prince being very pensive and solicitous how to prevent greater Disgraces yet, went together with those who accompanied him towards a little Grove, at the Entrance to which he stopp'd; and then the Empress guessing at his Design, approached to him, and giving him her last Embraces, she . . . quit forever an Empire and an Emperour . . and then she entered all alone into the Grove, and with a Cord hanged her self upon one of the Trees. A dreadful Spectacle, which might make even those who were more senseless than the Trees, lament so direful a death of so great an Empress. . . Presently after, the Emperour went and placed himself near his wife, whom he saw hanging upon a Tree. . . . Then, poor Prince, he asked a little Wine of one of the Lords which attended him, not that he was a Lover of Wine, for on the contrary he was the most sober and moderate in his pleasures of all the Princes which ever governed that Empire. And as for Women, he was so chaste towards them that he never frequented his *Seralio*; which gave occasion to all his Subjects to give him a Title, which signifies, *The Chaste Prince*, or one who never goes to the *Seralio*: It was not therefore for the love he had to Wine, that he asked for it; but he only desired a little to refresh and revive his Spirits, which were sunk and oppressed. And doubtless he had need of great Vigour to put in execution the Action he designed . . he untied his Hair, and presently with his own hands he hanged himself upon a Tree near to that on which the Empress remain'd strangled. . . .

The Emperour of *China* remained thus hanging on a Tree, the Prince who was the Idol of his people, at the very name of whom Millions of men trembled; the Sovereign of above a hundred

Millions of Subjects; the Monarch of a Kingdom as spatious as all Europe; he who counted his Souldiers by Millions and his Tributes by hundred of Millions. Finally, the potent Emperour of the great Empire of *China* is hanged upon a Tree, and his Royal Consort, the Empress, upon another near him. What a weighty Load did the Trunks of these Trees support! But of what weight had it need be to make the great men upon earth duly weigh what is all this terrible and ambitious Grandeur which in so few moments passes from the height of the Felicities of this Life to an Abyss of Misery! This unhappy Monarch finished his Reign at the age of 32 years, or according as some say, at 35. But a few years to have said he lived, but fewer to say that he reigned, if compared with his Predecessors; for his Grandfather *Vanlie*[7] ruled over *China* near fifty years, and *Zunchin* lived but thirty five . . . the last Emperour of this Race, whom the *Spanish* Relation calls the *Don Rodrigue* of *China*.

So ended the native House of Ming that had reigned ove the united Chinese Empire for 276 years.

Ly, the usurper, profited but a short while by hi treacheries. One of the late Emperor Zunchin's generals Wu San-kwei (whom our author calls *Usangué*), 'did mos passionately desire some opportunity to revenge both th death of his Master and of his Father, who was a gre Officer in the Emperor of *China*'s Court and was put to deat by the Tyrant.' Believing that no force in China was powerf enough to overcome Ly, General Wu San-kwei, who regiment guarded the northern frontier along the Gre Wall, invited the Manchus (Tartars) to become his allies, ar

he gave them entrance through that part of the Wall which w committed to his Guard. Without all dispute this was a mc pernicious resolution, and such as could only tend to the compleati of the entire ruine of the whole State. In all appearance t *Usangué* was more intent upon revenging his private quarrel th successfully to serve his Countrey. . . . The inhabitants of As (comments Señor Palafox) 'do, whenever they judge themsel injured, right themselves by revenge. It being the general pract of all Asia for an injured person to retaliate upon his Advers . . . and I wish to God, that only these people sought to ri themselves by revenge and violence. . . . This inconside Proffer and Demand of *Usangué* was most acceptable to the *Tarta Court*, being it was that great advantage to their Interest, which t

[7] By later historians called *Wanlieh*

had so long coveted. And they judged to be thus called in, was a full acknowledgment of their Right, and that now there remained nothing but taking possession, to make themselves the Lawful Masters. The *Tartars* thought this would exempt them from all just reproach of either invading or surprising the *Chineses* . . . and yet these people, who had all this regard to Justice, are *Barbarians*. Our Politicians of Europe, who have so little, are Civiliz'd, that is to say, persons instructed in all the Duties of Humane and Civil Society. . . .

The *Tartars* having now made sufficient provision of all the necessaries for their Expedition, they entered into *China* by that part of the Wall, through which the General *Usanguè* had opened them a passage. . . . It was in the year 1643 that the *Tartars* made this irruption into *China*, neither the Day nor the Moneth is set down; but it may very well be supposed that it was towards the latter end of that year; for the Relation saith, that in the space of three years and some odd Moneths that vast Empire was entirely conquered, and that the last of all the Towns which submitted to the *Tartarian* yoke, was *Canton*, of which the *Tartar* possessed himself in the beginning of January, 1847. Neither is the number of the Forces which went into this Expedition very certainly known; we only know that their Number both of Horse and Foot was almost incredible. They divided their Army into several distinct Bodies of Foot and Horse, some of a hundred, some of two hundred thousand men, which at first did very much incommode one another, for some of them advanced, plundered, and subdued that part of the Countrey which was designed the Prey and Conquest of others. . . . The *Cham of Tartary* . . . was called *Xunchi*, and was not above 10 or 12 years old.[8] . . . This young Monarch resolved to pass into *China* at the head of his Army . . . accompanied with three of his Unkles, who supported this young Prince, & serv'd him with Valour and Loyalty. . . .

The War in a short time extended it self into the Province of *Pequin*, the Capital City whereof had for the last Ages been always the Seat of the Court of the Emperours of *China*, and there the Tyrant had established himself, and drawn to him all the Grandees of his Party. But the Fame and Success of the *Tartars* quickly displaced him. . . Thus, though in some few places the *Chineses* were so obstinate as not to submit to a Forreign Power, and in others made some show of resistance, yet generally they all presently yielded themselves up to the strongest, and few or none did firmly adhere to the Tyrant. . . .

The Tyrant had in *Pequin* a very gallant and numerous Army,

[8] Some historians give his age as six.

who were very well paid. . . . But this Usurper being but a cowardly Traiter, and all his Souldiers so many treacherous Villains, their huffing Vapours quickly vanished. . . . Ly knew there was no safety for him so near his Enemy; for as it would be rashness to run the hazard of a Battel, so the danger was equal, to stay and expect his Enemy, and to think to defend himself, being blocked up in the City of *Pequin*, therefore he resolved to retreat, and to abandon his Capital City as soon as the Enemy was within three days journey from it. The Tyrant, before he discamped, discharged some of his Choler upon the people, and executed most horrible Cruelties in the City . . . presently he took his flight, and carried along with him the Treasure of all the Emperours of *China*: but he was not so loaded with Riches, as with the execration of the People, which have eterniz'd his Memory amongst the *Chineses* as the most detestable Villain which ever breath'd

The *Tartars* presently appeared before the Walls of the City of *Pequin*, and made their entrance without any resistance; but assoon as they perceived that the Tyrant had made his Escape, they made no stay, but instantly followed him; but it was not possible for them to overtake him; therefore the young *Xunchi* returned to *Pequin*, into which, assoon as he had made a most magnificant entrance, they judged it convenient with all expedition to declare him the absolute Monarch of all that *Golden Kingdom*; for so the *Tartars* call China.

So began the reign of the Manchus, called the Tsing, or 'Pure,' Dynasty.[9] In 1911 Chinese revolutionists drove them out of power and made Peking the capital of the republic. In 1928, when General Chiang Kai-shek removed the Government to Nanking, the name of Peking was changed from 'Northern Capital' to Peiping ('Northern Peace').

F. E. DEAN.

[9] The scion of this dynasty, Pu Yi, formerly known as 'The Boy Emperor' of China, now sits on the throne of Manchukuo under the protection and tutelage of his Japanese sponsors, who, it is said, intend to restore to him his ancestral Peking palaces —under the ægis of Japan

THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN FRANCE

By Sir Charles Petrie

The local elections in France are due to take place on October 10 and 17, and, as they are fought on party lines, the result will provide some means of ascertaining whether the electorate is still supporting the *Front Populaire*, or whether a reaction has set in against the latter and all its works. In these circumstances the voting may well prove to have an international significance, and in this connexion it cannot be forgotten that it was local elections which brought down the Spanish monarchy six years ago, with consequences that have since been felt from one end of Europe to the other.

On this side of the Channel attention has not unnaturally been concentrated upon the poor showing of the *Front Populaire* in the matter of finance, and one continually hears expressions of surprise that this has not discredited the coalition now in office. Those who take this view are inclined to forget that the second Socialist Administration of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, which was far weaker than the Governments of MM. Blum and Chautemps, lasted for over two years, and it was not until the eve of the crisis of 1931 that it became definitely unpopular. On the basis of the British analogy the *Front Populaire* has at least another twelve months to run, while it has certain other assets in its favour which were certainly not possessed by Mr. MacDonald and his colleagues.

For many years France appeared to be the only belligerent of the Great War that had emerged from the conflict with her national life substantially unchanged. The same statesmen as in pre-war days were at the helm, the economic structure was unaltered, and outside a small circle in Paris the institution of the family was what it had been for a century. While the rest of Europe, including Great Britain, was struggling to adapt itself to the changed circumstances of the post-war era,

France, in spite of her enormous sacrifice in blood and treasur pursued the even tenor of her way, and the outlook of th vast majority of her citizens continued to be that of the nine teenth century. The slump of 1929 was the first event to disturb this complacency, for it meant the serious curtailmen of that tourist traffic which had become one of the principal French industries; but far more alarming was the accession of Herr Hitler to power, and the consequent realisation of the fact that the Treaty of Versailles, which seemed to have restored to France the hegemony of Europe lost since 1870, was not worth the paper on which it was written. Taken in conjunction with the Stavisky scandals, these events completely revolutionised the outlook of the man in the street, and it was when he was most disquieted that the General Election took place in May of last year.

The most remarkable result of that election was the return of no less than eighty-two Communist deputies, and the weakening of the Centre to the profit of the extreme Right and the extreme Left. Europe was aghast, but the event was not so extraordinary as it appeared. In the first place, the vote was primarily against the 'old gang' of politicians, and the repeated financial scandals and studied indifference to social reform with which they had become associated in the popular mind. A marked feature of the elections was the defeat of deputies belonging to the liberal professions and the return of manual workers in their place. Then, again, the Communists adopted a moderate tone in contrast with their wild utterances on this side of the Channel, and they exploited to the full the French fear of Nazi Germany, which they represented as a stronghold of reaction and militarism. It was felt to be almost a patriotic act to vote Communist, and the Red leaders themselves were careful to perpetuate this illusion by the use of such slogans as '*Pour une France libre, forte et heureuse*.' Rarely has an electoral hook been more carefully or more appetisingly baited. Nor was this all, for the parties of the Centre and Right, where they were not completely discredited, were disunited, and unable to make any effective resistance. All the same, the extreme Right did gain a number of seats, and this may one day prove to have been extremely significant.

It has been estimated that the failure of the previous

Government's deflationist policy, combined with the moderation of the Communist spokesmen, may well have accounted for at least 3,000,000 of the 3,500,000 votes cast for Socialist and Communist candidates. The enormous advance in the Communist poll certainly did not mean that there was an equivalent number of convinced Communists in France. There were villages where the whole electorate voted Red and went to Mass next Sunday as usual. Many of these Communist voters have openly exclaimed, 'If the *Front Populaire* won't do anything for us, we'll vote for the Royalists next time,' thus showing to what extent their attitude was but a reaction against the old politicians. These simple workers and peasants knew little of the Bolshevism to which they were thus giving their support. When a Russian marshal visited the *pressoirs* of Rheims, the workpeople rushed forward to shake their 'comrade' by the hand, only, however, to be pushed back by the police on the demand of the outraged officer.

It must also be admitted, however reluctantly, that the *Front Populaire* has a good deal to the credit side of its account for what it has accomplished during its tenure of office. In the matter of social legislation France lagged far behind Great Britain, Germany and Italy, and M. Blum undoubtedly made up a good deal of leeway. It is a standing reproach to the politicians of the Centre that, in contrast with the English Conservative Party, they did so little for the well-being of their less fortunate fellow-countrymen, and in more than one of the larger centres of population, not least in Paris itself, the standard of working-class housing is a reproach to a civilised nation. Such being the case, it is not surprising that the masses are grateful to those who have considered them for the first time in the history of the Republic, and if the local elections go to the Left it will be in consequence of this feeling. The working man knows nothing of the niceties of high finance and foreign policy, but he realises that his present rulers have done something to make *fraternité* an accomplished fact, whereas their predecessors merely paid lip-service to it as an abstract principle. Unhappily, the appetite soon grows for that on which it feeds, and, like Oliver Twist, the French working classes began clamouring for more. They took the law into their own hands, occupied

[illegible], and by their refusal to work at the Paris Ex[illegible] rendered their country the laughing-stock of Europ[illegible] nature the French working man is far less reasonable th[illegible] opposite number in England, and he is generally le[illegible] knaves or poltroons. Time and time again in En[illegible] industrial history has some trusted trade union leader sw[illegible] the rank and file in favour of moderate counsels and a[illegible] from the extremists: in fact, our boasted national commo[illegible] sense is probably more evident among working men than i[illegible] any other class in the community. In France the reverse is the case. The led are easily hypnotised by catchwords, while the so-called leaders are content to dance to the piping of the agitator. In the intransigence of the *Confédération Générale du Travail* (C.G.T.) lies one of the chief dangers that threatens France at the present time.

The consequence has been a financial crisis of the first magnitude. Faced with the prospect of ever-increasing taxation and stringent regulations to win the favour of the clients of the *Front Populaire*, capital has fled the country, and confidence will not be restored by a soothing word dropped every now and then by one of the more moderate members of the Cabinet. As the famous Baron Louis, who restored the French finances after the Revolution, once observed to his sovereign, 'You make good politics, and I will make good finance.' The history of the last twelve months in France, as of the years 1929–31 in Great Britain, has proved that Socialism and Capitalism are impossible bedfellows, for the latter is dependent upon public confidence, which the former automatically destroys. The question of the moment in France is which of the two systems is to survive.

Unfortunately, the crisis cannot be solved in the same manner as was the similar one in Great Britain six years ago. There is no King who stands above the strife of parties, and although the President, M. Lebrun, is universally respected, he does not enjoy the prestige of a George V. Furthermore, although there is nothing in the Constitution to prevent a dissolution of the Chamber before its four years' mandate has expired, such a step would be a breach of constitutional convention, and would be regarded as tantamount to a *coup d'état*. The general situation would have to appear a great deal more desperate than it does to-day before even a bare majority of

orate would approve of such action on the part of esident. The consent of the Senate, too, would be ary, and that body, having brought down the Blum inistration, is very chary of anything that might be con- ed into an attack on the *Front Populaire*, for fear that it ight thus unloose a storm which would result in its own destruction. One of the chief obstacles in the path of those who wish to restore the finances of France is the lack of realisation on the part of most Frenchmen that there is anything specially the matter with them.

In foreign affairs the *Front Populaire* has been extremely unlucky and singularly maladroit, and it is probably in this field, rather than in that of finance, that the real danger for it lies. It was hardly in office before it had to abandon Sanctions against Italy, with the resulting diminution of the national prestige, and then came the Spanish Civil War. There is plenty of evidence to prove that most of the Ministers would have liked to support Valencia against General Franco, but that would have meant a breach with London, which was too great a risk to run even in the cause of international Socialism. Accordingly, France proceeded to make the worst of both worlds by helping the Spanish Reds unofficially, while at the same time holding up her hands in horror at the aid given to the Nationalists by Rome and Berlin. This did not deceive anybody, and only earned those responsible for such an attitude the contempt of both parties in Spain, and of all honest men in the rest of Europe.

The Franco-Soviet Pact was inherited, if welcomed, by M. Blum, and a *damnosa hereditas* it has proved in spite of its popularity with the victorious majority. In foreign policy France has never been very particular about the company she kept since the days when Francis I. allied himself with the Sultan, and Richelieu, Cardinal though he was, supported Gustavus Adolphus against the German Catholics: yet, however questionable these alliances may have been on ethical grounds, they undeniably furthered the interests of France. No such argument can be put forward on behalf of the Soviet Pact. The ink was hardly dry upon it before two of France's oldest friends, Belgium and Yugoslavia, made it quite clear that this was the end so far as they were concerned. Then Rome and Berlin, temporarily at any rate,

buried the Austrian hatchet, and a Nazi-Fascist *bloc* came into existence reaching from the Kiel Canal to Sicily, thus undoing the good that had been done by the Franco-Italian Agreement of January 1935. Above all, the Soviet Pact has alarmed that very section of British opinion which was most friendly to France. All this might have mattered but little had the new ally proved of real worth, whereas Russia would appear to be a political and military factor of declining importance. A nation which makes a habit of shooting its best generals, and of which the Government is so insecure that hardly a day goes by without the discovery of some new plot for its violent overthrow, can hardly be regarded as a satisfactory friend in need. Furthermore, the repeated blood-baths in which the present rulers of Russia are continually indulging have alienated civilised opinion to such an extent that some of the odium incurred by M. Stalin naturally falls on those, such as the French, who are associated with him. The only practical result of the Franco-Soviet Pact is that France is to-day more dangerously isolated in Europe than she has been for a generation.

In the case of French politics analysis is always easier than prophecy, and this was never more true than at the present time; nevertheless, there are certain indications which merit consideration. The first of these is that even after the fall of M. Blum the *Front Populaire* is more united than its opponents. It was its admirable discipline which helped it to victory last year, and although the Communists and most of the Socialists regard M. Chautemps as too moderate, they realise that they must hang together if they are not to hang separately. Such being the case, the same discipline is likely to be manifested at the local elections this month. The Radical-Socialists are admittedly unhappy, and if by any chance the coming elections show a swing to the Right they will break with their present allies: if, on the contrary, the electors vote *Front Populaire*, the Radical-Socialists will make the best of it. At the same time there are limits beyond which neither they nor the majority of the Socialists will go, and France is as unlikely to become Communist on the Moscow pattern as Fascist or Nazi on the Italian or German. There are many people in Paris, well qualified to express an opinion, who believe that out of the coalition which at present governs France there will in

due course emerge something like the British Labour Party before 1931, with the Communists to the Left of it. This is an interesting speculation, and such a development would certainly be to the benefit of France, but as yet there is little sign of it. The C.G.T. will have to submit to a good deal of self-discipline first, and it will have to produce leaders who have some higher conception of leadership than merely being pushed on from behind. The British Labour Party, for better or for worse, stands by itself in the modern world, and it is not easy to imagine a counterpart to it being created in Paris.

However this may be, it is impossible to resist the conclusion that the chief strength of the *Front Populaire* lies in the divisions and weakness of its opponents. The Centre and Right are a pitiful spectacle, and it is no exaggeration to say that if their leaders spent half the time attacking the Left that they devote to intriguing against one another the outlook for France would be very different. The old Republican politicians, whose names appeared in Cabinet after Cabinet from the days of M. Clemenceau to those of M. Laval, are generals without an army: some unexpected turn of fortune's wheel may place them for a few brief months in office once again, but they have no real backing in the country, except among the more elderly *bourgeois* fearful for their money-bags. Whatever else the last General Election may have done, it broke the spell so far as the professional politician was concerned. The ultimate consequences of this are as yet hidden, but on the Right, as on the Left, new ideas are being ventilated, and in due course that will mean the rise of new men—certainly not before it was time.

To pass from the general to the particular: during the last few years the *Croix de Feu* has figured somewhat prominently in the columns of the British Press, and its leader, Colonel de la Rocque, has come to be regarded as a potential dictator of the Italian or German type. As a result of the law suppressing all semi-military organisations, the *Croix de Feu* has now become the *Parti Social Français*, or P.S.F. as it is more usually termed, under the same leadership. In either form far too much importance would seem to have been attached to it both in France and abroad. Colonel de la Rocque is not the man to head a popular movement, as those who have come

o contact with him would be the first to admit. He is a or speaker, is very secretive, and refuses to co-operate with ose who largely share his views but are not prepared to nit that he has a divine mandate to govern France. The pression one gets to-day is that the P.S.F. has lost ground adily during the past nine months, while its continued stence and its leader's quarrels with the other groups of Centre and Right have proved of immense help to the *ont Populaire.* In some circles an even more sinister erpretation has been put upon its activities in recent crises, : it is difficult to obtain any definite information of a first-id nature on this point.

The hope of the French moderates is far more likely to M. Jacques Doriot, who is well on the way to becoming Joseph Chamberlain of his country. He has come from extreme Left, for he was until lately an active Communist, l he only ceased membership of that party when he realised t it had no other object in France than to further the aims Russia. M. Doriot is a born orator, but, unlike so many akers of the first rank, he can adapt himself to his audience, l there is always a solid foundation of reasoned argument his speeches. As might be supposed, he is anathema to former associates, and he has become the object of a npaign of persecution almost without precedent even in nch political history. Trumped-up charges have been ented to deprive him of his seat in the Chamber and of the yoralty of Saint Denis, where his administration had ought a veritable revolution in social conditions, and the -election there was marked by official interference on what y almost be described as a Spanish scale. It is often stated t M. Doriot and his *Parti Populaire Français* (P.P.F.) are cist, which is by no means the case. All over Europe s the policy of the Socialists and Communists to seek to credit their opponents by labelling them Fascists, and ticularly is this so in France. On the contrary, the P.P.F. ids for the restoration of those liberties which a succession weak Governments has allowed to become imperilled—is to say, freedom of speech, freedom of work, freedom education, and freedom of the Press. It is true that Doriot favours a reorganisation of the State on a corpora-basis, but there is nothing exceptionable in that, for not

only is it in accordance with old French traditions, but in modern times it has been preached by Georges Sorel, to whom Signor Mussolini owes so much. Unlike Colonel de la Rocque, the leader of the P.P.F. is quite ready to collaborate with those who will work with him, and his party organisation is very far from being a 'one-man show.' It is true that he is often reproached with having once been a Communist, but that gives him an enormous advantage over men like Colonel de la Rocque, who have little political experience, and to the younger generation it appears an asset rather than a handicap, for it means that he knows his opponents and their tactics.

There is another organisation of the Right which looms large in the British Press, and that is the *Action Française*. Associated as it is with men of the brilliance of M. Léon Daudet and of the learning of M. Charles Maurras, it can never be negligible, but although monarchies may have been overthrown by leading articles, they have not so far been restored by this means. Indeed, it is at least an arguable proposition that the *Action Française* has done the Royalist cause more harm than good, and it is to be noted that the French Royal Family has now its own organ, the *Courrier Royal*. The *Action Française* (the paper has the same name as the organisation) is widely read because of its sparkling, if scurrilous, attacks on prominent politicians, but as an effective force the movement has ceased to count. After all, it has been in existence for thirty years, and France is still a republic.

It is difficult for a foreigner not to feel that there is an atmosphere of unreality about French politics. The electorate seems hypnotised with names which have lost their original meaning. A Republican of the Left, for example, holds views which we should associate with 'die-hard' Conservatism, but he will foam at the mouth if it is suggested that he has any sympathy with the Royalists; yet on many points the Comte de Paris would almost qualify for membership of the *Front Populaire*. The younger generation realise this divorce between theory and fact; but politics in France is an old man's game, and they have not yet succeeded in making their opinions heard to any marked extent. Nor is this all, for it is difficult to secure a hearing among the babel of voices that are raised at every election; for instance, in

one place of 6000 inhabitants which returned a single member there were in May of last year no less than 111 aspirants for parliamentary honours.

It is a misfortune that French foreign policy should be to so large an extent under the influence of domestic politics. In the days of the Weimar Republic in Germany it was the Right that was always suspicious of what might happen on the other side of the Rhine, but now it is the Left that is most vocal in the expression of fear of the German danger. The explanation, needless to say, is that the *Front Populaire* wishes to use the national suspicion of Germany to crush National Socialism: if Germany were a Communist Power she could, like Russia, be armed to the teeth for all the present French Government would care. On the other hand, the Right, ultra-nationalist as it is in many ways, is now in favour of a direct settlement with Germany, probably on the basis of a Four-Power Pact in which Great Britain and Italy would also participate. In the past France has always been actuated by purely material considerations which it has been relatively easy to estimate in advance, but now that the Quai d'Orsay is being influenced by ideological conceptions, it is difficult to foreshadow its line of action, except in so far as this may be dictated by the overmastering fear of offending London, and so becoming isolated in Western Europe.

Behind all the rivalries of parties and individuals at the Palais Bourbon and elsewhere public opinion as a whole is undoubtedly alarmed on the score of security, and this concern has deepened considerably during the past eighteen months. Since Louis XIV. placed his grandson on the throne of Spain the French have, save during the Napoleonic era, been accustomed to regard the Pyrenees as the one frontier which need give them no concern, and the Mediterranean as their back-door. To-day all that is changed, and in the event of war with Germany they see themselves attacked in the flank across the Alps, and in the rear over the Pyrenees, while the line of communication with North Africa seems every day to become more insecure. When one reflects that at the beginning of the Great War no less than 30,000 Algerian natives were already enrolled in the *Tirailleurs* and *Spahis*, and that before it ended another 155,000 had joined the colours (75,000 by free enlistment and 80,000 by conscription).

it is easy to understand why France is so anxious over the recent sinking of vessels in the Mediterranean. It is true that diametrically opposed policies are advocated to restore the situation to the south and east, but the problem itself is the preoccupation of all thinking Frenchmen, irrespective of party.

Security for France lies in the abrogation of the Soviet Pact, and an understanding with Germany and Italy, but there is little chance of her present rulers adopting any such policy, and it remains to be seen whether the ordinary elector has yet realised the dangers to which the *Front Populaire* is exposing him. If he has not, then it is to be feared that the state of France will be worse before it can be better.

CHARLES PETRIE.

OSBERN THE CRUSADER

By Sir Evelyn Howell, K.C.I.E., C.S.I.

Most of us are, I suppose, aware that October 21 is Trafalgar day, and could, at a pinch, recall some echoes of the magnificent rhetoric which Shakespeare puts into the mouth of King Henry V. as he marched to the field of Agincourt. If you remember, Agincourt was fought on the feast of Crispin Crispian, which falls on October 25. I have to tell of a third great event, whose anniversary might fitly be celebrated on the same two dates, a famous victory that rang through all Christendom and Islam, and the credit of it was largely due to a handful of our own countrymen. This was the siege and capture of Lisbon from the Moors in 1147 A.D. by an unofficially organised expedition, whose members claimed to be Crusaders on their way to the Holy Land. In their ranks were Germans from Cologne and other parts of the Rhineland, Flemings, Bretons, and some other Continentals. There was also a strong Anglo-Norman contingent from the eastern counties of England, from Kent, London and Southampton, and a small body of Scots. The total strength is believed to have been about 13,000 men.

Considering how long ago all this happened and how rare the accomplishment of writing then was, we are lucky to have a full account of the progress of events written obviously soon after the fall of the city by someone who had been present throughout and taken part in the fighting. His story is told in the Latin of the period, a medium of which the writer seems to have had fluent but ungrammatical command. He was certainly either of Norman or English blood, and probably a cleric. His narrative seems to have been an official report addressed to some ecclesiastical superior, perhaps one of those who helped to raise and furnish forth the expedition, and was no doubt preserved for the first 400 years of its existence in some monastic library. On the dis-

solution it passed into the possession of Matthew Parker, the first Protestant Archbishop of Canterbury, and was by him bequeathed, together with many others (a priceless collection), to his old college—Corpus Christi—at Cambridge, where it still is.[1] The author is generally known to scholars as 'Osbern the English Crusader,' on the strength of his opening sentence. And though it is really not clear whether Osbern was the name of the writer or of the person to whom he was writing, we may agree to follow their example. Nothing more is known of him or his correspondent from other sources.

The expedition, to the number of 164 ships, assembled at Dartmouth. It was marshalled in three divisions. Those who came from within the bounds of the Roman Empire were led by Arnold of Arschott, nephew of Duke Godfrey. Christian de Gistell commanded the men of Flanders and adjacent regions. The remainder, who included Bretons and Scots besides Normans and English, were under four constables. These were Hervey de Glanville, who led the men of Norfolk and Suffolk; Simon of Dover, under whom were all the ships of Kent; Andrew of London, with the London contingent; and Saher de Arcelles, in charge of the rest. On Friday, May 23, the fleet set sail. Five days later they sighted some of the peaks of the Pyrenees, and the sea began to grow rough. The same evening a storm came up and the fleet was scattered. A dreadful night ensued, but with morning the sea abated a little and Osbern's ship with a few companions was able to make the harbour of San Salvador, which David identifies with Gozon, some miles from Ovieto. Thence they made their way down the coast from one estuary to another, until finally on the afternoon of a day in the fore part of June they entered the mouth of the Douro and cast anchor before Oporto, which was their rendezvous. Here they were joined by the rest of the expedition.

Osbern notes that Porto had been recovered from the

[1] It was first published in 1861 at the instance of the Portuguese Government and edited for the Lisbon Academy of Sciences by Alexandre Herculano, the Portuguese historian There have been several subsequent editions, of which the most recent are those of Dr José Augusto de Oliveira, with translation into Portuguese, and of Charles Wendell David, an American scholar, with translation into English To these and all others concerned I take this opportunity of making my acknowledgments.

Moors eighty years before. Since then the warfare of the Crescent and the Cross had been incessant throughout the Iberian peninsula. The Christians had slowly gained ground, but with great difficulty, and the issue was still uncertain. In the throes of the struggle the future kingdom of Portugal had been born. Affonzo I., son of Henry of Burgundy, a statesman and a warrior, but crafty and treacherous, had set up as an independent monarch only three or four years before, but his claim had not been recognised by Castile, and the advancement of his pretensions had only made his position the more precarious. By a bold stroke a few weeks before the arrival of the ships in Oporto, he had seized the fortress of Santarem. Santarem is a place of a strategic value recognised since Roman times. It stands on the north bank of the Tagus about 50 miles upstream of Lisbon, and commands the lowest point at which the river can easily be crossed or has even yet been bridged.

After the capture of Santarem the king had darted back to Oporto, presumably to get news of the expedition, which can scarcely have been organised without his knowledge and consent. As soon as he heard of it, ten days before Osbern's arrival in Oporto, he went south again, leaving Peter Pitoes, Bishop of Oporto, to receive the strangers and see that they had 'good cheap of wine and other delights.' Charged with a letter from the king, in which Affonzo disclosed his wish to enlist the co-operation of the northerners in his plans against the Moors in Lisbon, the bishop formally received a deputation from the expedition at the city gate and read them out the king's letter. The deputation, having heard what the king had to say, deferred their answer till next day, so that they might communicate the terms of the royal message to their comrades on board the ships. Next day very early in the morning they all came ashore and, the church not being big enough to hold them, assembled on a hill top in a place called 'The Bishop's Cemetery,' where the bishop received them and delivered them a long address in Latin.

Bishop Peter's discourse was a dexterous performance. He had to find out whether his hearers were primarily pirates or Crusaders, and, by a simultaneous appeal to their better and their worse natures, to switch them off the delivery of the

Holy Sepulchre and on to the capture of Lisbon. He pointed out that the same infidels were polluting both places by their presence, and urged, quoting St. Ambrose, that what mattered was not whether a man had been to Jerusalem or not, but how he behaved on his way there and back. Meanwhile Lisbon was close at hand, while Jerusalem was a long way off, and since they could serve God just as well in one place as the other, why should they not try their fortune at the nearer? If so, and if they should take Lisbon, as with the blessing of God and the support of the king they well might, they would find the king a liberal paymaster, in so far as the resources of the royal treasury admitted. Meanwhile they could take the preacher and anyone else they chose as hostages.

The Crusaders agreed to proceed to Lisbon, and ten days later they sailed, taking the bishop with them, and the Archbishop of Braga. All went well until they reached the mouth of the Tagus, on the second day, when they were struck by a squall. Some of the smaller ships were sunk and their crews drowned. The remainder held on, and as they entered the estuary their hearts were cheered by a sign from heaven. They saw a battle of clouds in the sky, contending in formation like armies. At length the white clouds, which came from the same direction as themselves, obtained the mastery and drove the black clouds before them in flight towards Lisbon, leaving nothing but clear blue sky in their wake, so that those who beheld were fain to exclaim: 'Our cloud has conquered. God is with us. The power of the enemy is broken. They are confounded, because the Lord hath scattered them.' At the same time the storm ceased and the tossing was at an end, as of course it would be, when once they had rounded the point. But Osbern was no seaman.

By the afternoon they were opposite Lisbon, of which Osbern proceeds to give some account. He describes it as situate on the north bank of the Tagus estuary and mentions the belief that its name, which he spells DULYXIBONA, is derived from its having been founded by Ulysses. This, like much of his description, is borrowed from Solinus and of no value and little interest. His topography however makes it clear that the Moorish citadel was the modern Castello de São Jorge, so called indeed because it was the English who took it from the Moors. It crowns the highest of the many

hills over which the modern town has spread. From this citadel, Osbern says, in his time two curtain walls ran down the south slope of the hill to the banks of the Tagus, where they were linked by a third wall along the foreshore, thus enclosing what he calls the city. In these walls were numerous towers and gates, of which he mentions one, the Iron Gate. Outside the city walls again were suburbs both on the west and on the east side, intersected by narrow steep lanes cut down into the rock, and every quarter of these suburbs might be regarded as a well-fortified castle, so great were the difficulties of access.

The population, including the suburbs, amounted at normal times to 70,000 families of taxpayers, besides those who enjoyed exemption from all imposts. But at the time of the siege, so the victors were informed by no less an authority than the Moorish *alcayde* (governor) after the surrender, it contained 154,000 men besides women and children, the numbers being swollen by the presence of many refugees from Santarem and the leading citizens of Cintra, Almada and Palmella, the ring fortresses adjacent to Lisbon. But for all they were so many, arms could not be found for more than 15,000, and these they took it in turns to don and wear in the field according to a roster made out by the *alcayde*.

The place, says Osbern, was rich and populous beyond belief, and its buildings so close packed that nowhere except in the market-place could a street more than 7 feet wide be found. The cause which he, apparently in all good faith, ascribes for this extreme populousness of Lisbon was that no rules of religion of any kind were there enforced, but every man was a law unto himself. Consequently all the most depraved members of the human race flowed into the place, 'as into a sink, and made it a nursery of lust and filthiness.'

On June 28 the first landing was effected without opposition. A chance encounter followed, which resulted in the Moors being driven back to a gate in the wall overlooking the western suburb. No leader was present, and those who had gained this advantage sent back for orders. They received directions from Saher de Arcelles, who feared an ambush, to withdraw. They protested, and Saher went up to the scene of action. Having seen the ground, he changed his mind and gave orders for the occupation of a ridge

commanding the suburb and distant about a javelin cast from the city wall. Some confusion seems to have ensued, and in the end only two tents, that of Hervey de Glanville and Saher's own, were pitched, in which, says Osbern, 'thirty-nine of us clad in our coats of mail passed an anxious night.' In the morning reinforcements arrived from the ships. Many more tents were pitched, and everybody pretended that the summons had not reached him the evening before! The two bishops then went off to fetch the king, who had been warned of the prospective arrival of the expedition. The king came over with them to the newly-pitched camp, and on his approach the whole disorderly throng—these are Osbern's own words—poured out to meet him. His Majesty asked who were their leaders and whether any of them had been given authority to answer for the whole. In reply he was informed who the leaders were and told that, though these had not yet indeed been vested with such plenary authority as he had in mind, this could be done when his proposals had been put forward, as an Indian frontier political would say, 'in open *jirga*.' The king replied to the effect that his allies must not expect overmuch in the way of worldly reward from a monarch who found it difficult to guard even his own life and the lives of his subjects from Moorish aggression. He would do everything in his power to satisfy their expectations, but he felt that his best chance of making a successful appeal lay in addressing himself to their piety rather than to their hopes of pecuniary profit. Meanwhile, 'that we may not be interrupted by the clamours of your peoples,' let delegates be chosen with whom the whole matter could be quietly discussed and definite terms of agreement drawn up, which could afterwards be ratified by general consent 'for the profit of God.'

I find the scene easy to picture. It must have been very like a *jirga* with the tribesmen on the North-West Frontier of India, and what followed is exactly what would happen amongst Afridis or Mahsuds. The Crusaders rushed apart to consider their answer to the king, and a long and largely irrelevant discussion ensued. They adjourned for lunch, and when they came together again accusations of ill-faith were bandied to and fro. The Flemings declared in favour of acceding to the king's wishes and staying where they were.

They accordingly withdrew and went off with the other Continentals to pitch their camp on a hill to the east, *i.e.* upstream, of the city. The Anglo-Normans and the mixed pack of Saher de Arcelles were left wrangling, but were at length brought into line by an effective speech delivered by Hervey de Glanville. He pleaded so well that when he had finished tears of joy stood on every cheek and the air rang with shouts of ' God help us '—the Crusaders' battle cry.

The delegates from each nation were then speedily chosen, and with the help of the archbishop, the bishops, and the other clergy a pact with the king was drawn up. The king agreed that in the event of the capture of the city it should belong to the Franks, wholly and solely, with all its contents, as also should all the prisoners and their ransom money. The city was not to be handed over to the king until the Crusaders had sacked it according to their pleasure, and after being so handed over it and its lands were to be parcelled out among the victors by the king, as he thought fit, to be held ' according to the most honourable customs and liberties of the Franks,' the king retaining only the appellate rights of an overlord. Besides all this, the ships and goods of those who joined the king in his siege of Lisbon and their heirs for ever were to be exempt from all dues. Each party agreed to give the other twenty hostages.

All things having been thus settled, it might have been expected that they would get to business. But not at all. It was next unanimously agreed to summon the garrison formally ' so that we might seem only to be attacking them against our own will.' A meeting under flag of truce was arranged and a deputation, consisting of the Archbishop of Braga and Bishop Peter of Oporto with a few Crusaders, was sent forward to treat. These stood below the walls while the *alcayde* and the chief men of the city came out above, as in an Elizabethan stage direction, to hear what they had to say.

The negotiation was a mere formality and naturally nothing came of it. So plans were laid for a siege. The king with all his own forces pitched his camp on a hill to the north of the fort, about 500 paces from the ridge already occupied by the Anglo-Norman contingent. Next morning, while the constables and other leaders were in the king's camp handing over the hostages and taking other

necessary measures, the Anglo-Norman slingers opened a galling fire at long range upon the defenders. This drew out a sally in force by the Moors, which was met by Norman and English men-at-arms in steadily growing numbers, and the affair grew into a pitched battle, which resulted after nightfall in the capture of the western suburb by the Anglo-Normans under the direction of Saher de Arcelles. He and his victorious men-at-arms with a picked force of archers and others lay that night in the Moorish cemetery and watched the houses of the captured suburb burning. At daybreak the Moors made a counter-attack, but with the help of men sent by the king and reinforcements from the Anglo-Norman camp this was repulsed and the suburb definitely occupied with the cemetery as its key position. This unpremeditated success really determined the issue of the siege. For large stores of grain and pulse were found in subterranean granaries in the suburb, and it was by famine that the Moors were in the end subdued.

Although they had occupied the Moorish cemetery in such haphazard fashion, the Anglo-Norman constables had sufficient control to make proper arrangements for its defence. It was held every night by a force of 500 men, and the turn of each 500 came round on the tenth night. This gives the total strength of the contingent as 4500 men-at-arms besides archers, slingers, sailors and attendants. In such a force it might have been difficult to keep these arrangements going, if the necessity for them had not been clear to all concerned. The Moors were therefore to some extent playing into the Crusaders' hands by making a series of determined counter-attacks on the cemetery position. These caused heavy casualties on both sides, but were uniformly unsuccessful. After about a fortnight they were discontinued. The besiegers then had leisure to make two of those military engines which were such a remarkable feature of mediæval siege warfare. They also dedicated two churches, one on each side of the city, for the disposal of their dead—an indication that they meant to see the business through. But they gave also other and more spectacular proof of their determination in the two great movable towers which the Continentals on one side and the Anglo-Normans on the other were now constructing. The former had a battering-ram in its lower

storey. The latter had no ram, but was higher and more massive than the other. By August 15 the towers were ready and were advanced towards the walls. They proved a dismal failure. The Continentals' tower was indeed brought up to the wall. But it was set on fire and burnt before the ram could be drawn back even once to deliver its first blow. The English tower stuck fast in the sand at some distance from the wall. There it was knocked to pieces by the defenders' slings and catapults, and after four days' struggle, in which the attackers lost heavily, was also burnt. A 'black week' followed in which nothing was done.

An opportune occurrence served to dispel the depression. A number of letters written by the besieged in Arabic, which Osbern calls Chaldæan, were intercepted. These were somehow translated, and Osbern gives one as a specimen. It is addressed to the King of Evora and implores his assistance before it should be too late, and before the fall of Lisbon, which for lack of food could not much longer be prevented, should expose Evora in turn to the like danger. A few days later a corpse was found in the Tagus, and on the body of the drowned man a letter. It ran as follows:

> 'The King of the people of Evora to the people of Lisbon greeting and the hope that they may escape enslavement. I have long ago given pledges to the King of the Portugals and I cannot break my word by waging war on him or on his people. For the rest, look to it yourselves Procure your own salvation with your own money, lest that which ought to have been for your salvation should prove to be your undoing Fare ye well. Give something good to this our messenger.'

Siege operations were now vigorously pressed on and attempts were made to undermine the wall both on the east and on the west side. The Anglo-Norman mine on the west side was speedily discovered by the Moors, and after many days had been wasted in unnecessary fighting to protect the workers the attempt was abandoned. The Anglo-Normans then turned their attention to the construction of another tower and, to distract the garrison, kept up an incessant bombardment from two Balearic slings which they erected—one on the foreshore, manned by sailors, and one on higher ground opposite the Iron Gate, manned by men-at-arms and their messmates. They were formed into parties 100 strong, which took turns to man and work the slings, and were thus

able, Osbern says, to maintain a fire of 500 stones an hour for ten hours a day.

By the middle of October both the Continentals' mine and the Anglo-Norman tower were approaching completion. The tower was slightly smaller than its predecessor, but still of great height. The mine, which was directed against the wall of the citadel, above the city, was also on the grand scale. It was worked on a front of 40 cubits and had five adits. The roofs of the galleries were carefully propped up with timber and the floors piled high with combustibles. On the night of October 15 fire was set to it, and before cock-crow next morning about 200 feet of the wall fell in with a resounding crash. The Continentals rushed forward to the breach with a mighty shout expecting to walk in without difficulty. But they were met by a most stubborn resistance and driven back. A long struggle ensued in which the Moors had the advantage. The Normans and English, thinking to do their allies a good turn by taking their places as they retired, then came up under arms to press the attack on a wearied enemy. But they were received with such a storm of abuse by the German and Flemish leaders, who told them to go and look after their own engines and not seek to take advantage of a path into the citadel made neither by them nor for them, that they retired to their own camp, and for a day or two nothing more was done.

The tower was now ready. It was covered over with a mantlet of plaited osiers and oxhides, to protect it from fire and stones, and word was given for the attack to be made on the following Sunday, October 19. Every available man from the ships was set on to plait more osiers and prepare other anti-fire defences. The archbishop was summoned to give his blessing on those who advanced, and on the appointed morning the Anglo-Norman contingent assembled and prayers were offered. Holy water was sprinkled on those about to expose their persons to risk of life and limb, and 'a certain priest' (who may very well have been Osbern himself), holding a piece of the true cross in his hands, addressed the warriors in a most stirring harangue, the whole of which, of course, is duly recorded.

When he had made an end of speaking, all present fell upon their faces, groaning, weeping, and confessing their

sins. Having received the blessing and been marked wi the sign of the cross, they sprang to their feet and, rushin to the tower, advanced it a considerable distance towards th walls. They encountered such a hail of projectiles that they could get no further that day. Next morning (October 20) they moved their wooden tower towards the tower of masonry which stood at the corner of the city walls, at the point where the curtain wall descending from the citadel met the flanking wall along the foreshore. Here, in anticipation of attack at this point, the whole strength of the defence had been concentrated. Perceiving this, the assailants deflected the advance of their tower and proceeded to drag it past the corner to a point near the Iron Gate already mentioned, which stood (and still stands) a little back from the river bank on rising ground. At this point they got their wooden tower within 8 feet of the wall and were able to take in reverse the corner tower, which appears to have been built like a shell giving protection on the outer side only. By nightfall the corner tower and the portion of the wall adjoining it had been cleared of the enemy, and the Crusaders retired to camp to get a little rest, leaving to defend their tower 100 of their own men-at-arms and an equal number of Portuguese, with a force of slingers and archers and some light-armed youths. The tide was rising, and in the first watch of the night the tower and its garrison were cut off. The Moors perceived this and made a strong attack upon it by a force of men-at-arms issuing from the Iron Gate. At the same time another force reoccupied the corner tower and wall. Large stores of pitch and tow and oil were already collected there, and quantities of these were lit and heaped upon the siege tower under cover of a heavy fire of stones. Between the siege tower and the wall had been placed a penthouse [2] of plaited osiers manned by seven lads from Ipswich, whose duty it was to wheel their shelter behind the tower. These now greatly distinguished themselves by removing burning matter from the siege tower and its undercarriage. Others dug themselves holes beneath the siege tower, from which from time to time they rushed out and hurled away the

[2] '*Tugurium vimineum quod vulgo cattus waliscus dicitur*' (Osbern, p 141, v.) David translates this 'a penthouse of plaited osiers, which is commonly called a Welsh Cat.' Why 'Welsh' I have been unable to discover, though the term 'cat' for this type of penthouse seems from the *O E D* to have been in current use then and for long after

fire balls. Others again in the upper storeys of the siege tower poured buckets of water over the hides and osiers with which its sides were protected and kept them wet. The men-at-arms drawn up in formation kept the attack from the Iron Gate at bay. So through the watches of the night the defence of the siege tower was maintained by the Crusaders until the tide fell. Shortly after daybreak (October 21) it rose again, and again cut off the siege tower. The Moors then redoubled their previous efforts, and the battle of the day raged even more furiously than the battle of the night. The Portuguese took panic and, 'either being wounded or pretending to be so,' found themselves a passage through the waters, and all ran away except six. At length the tide began to abate and the Moorish assaults to weaken. The men-at-arms and others who had been in the siege tower for two days and one night enduring an almost intolerable strain came out and were relieved by others.

In the afternoon the Anglo-Norman forces returned to the assault. The siege tower was pushed forward until only 4 feet separated it from the wall, and they began to advance the drawbridges on which men could get across on to the top of the wall. The sight of this was too much for the Moors. They threw down their weapons and, raising their hands in supplication, begged for an armistice at least until the morrow. A man known as Ferdinand the Captive, to represent the king, and Hervey de Glanville were sent forward to treat, and the terms of an armistice were drawn up, for the observance of which the Moors gave five hostages. These were duly handed over and received by Ferdinand and Hervey in the first watch and were taken off to the king's camp to be made over to him. But no sooner did the Anglo-Norman rank and file hear of what had been done than they were filled with fury, because 'they thought that the king, as was his nature, would achieve their betrayal through the hostages.' Very early in the morning (October 22) the Norman constables, having invited their colleagues and other leaders to join them, went with some elders to the king's camp 'to find out what scheme the crafty rascals there had made against them.' Everybody was angry. Even the leaders were losing control of their tempers. They were not alone in this respect. While they were away an indignation meeting had been

summoned in the Anglo-Norman camp. It was attended by 'our sailors and other fools like them,' and the flame of their wrath had been fanned by a scoundrelly priest from Bristol, afterwards convicted of theft, who delivered a most insidious harangue. Beginning mildly, like Mark Antony, he ruffled them up to sudden mutiny. The meeting broke up in wild disorder. About 400 men, sword in hand, were rushing through the camp calling out for Hervey, and shouting 'Down with the villain. Death to the traitor.' In the open space between the two camps the two parties met, and it seemed at first as if there must be bloodshed. But Hervey, with Osbern at his side, was still in the king's camp, and in his absence certain of the elders were able in some measure to pacify the insurgents, so that all began to put their heads together more amicably and consider the next move. Meanwhile, the hostages, having got wind of what was up, very naturally sought to exploit the situation to their own advantage. They went back on the terms of their earlier declaration and stated that it was to the king, and no one else, that they had surrendered; as for the Crusaders, they had rather die than come to any agreement with such foul, faithless, wicked and cruel men, who did not even know how to spare their own lords. Filled with shame at these reproaches, the Crusaders returned and resumed their discussions with the king and the hostages. All through the day the interminable wrangle lasted. The hostages said that if their *alcayde*, with his daughter and her husband and all his possessions and the rest of the citizens, with what was left to each of his store of provender, were suffered to depart, the city would be surrendered. The Normans and English, who had borne the brunt of the fighting, were for accepting this offer. The Germans and Flemings, 'always greedy,' were for giving nothing at all to the enemy. They were at length and with great difficulty persuaded to consent that the *alcayde* alone might be allowed to keep his store of food and all his other goods, save only a certain Arab mare, that was his, on which the Count of Arschott had set his heart. To this the hostages, supported by the king, would not agree. The Normans and English, already annoyed at the stickling over the Arab mare, declared that they had had enough of it. They were for returning the hostages and resuming the fight next morning.

The Continentals then threatened to carry off the hostages by force out of the king's camp and sent a message to their fellows, who began to pour out under arms from the gates of their own camp. Everywhere was shouting and the clatter of arms. The Normans and English, having warned the king of this new danger, drew themselves up with the king's retainers to defend his camp on its eastern side. Christian, the leader of the Flemings, and the Count of Arschott with great difficulty persuaded their men to forego the appeal to arms and returned to the presence of the king. By this time the royal temper had also become frayed and Affonso turned upon them roundly. He would rather, he said, keep his honour intact than take Lisbon, and he would give over the siege next day sooner than have anything more to do with such allies. All parties having thus exploded in turn, a compromise was reached before night compelled them to disperse. It was agreed that all the leaders of the Crusaders should next morning renew their oath of fidelity to the king, for as long as they should remain in his dominions, on behalf of themselves and their respective followers, and that the Moors should be held to their offer made on the previous day to surrender the city on the terms stated. One hundred and forty men-at-arms from the Anglo-Norman-camp and 160 from the Continentals' camp were to be detailed to take possession of the citadel; the Moors were then to bring into the citadel all their money and other valuables and make oath that they had no more. When everything had been deposited in the citadel, the Crusaders were to search the city, and if any property of value were to be found in any man's house the owner of that house was to be put to death. The rest should be suffered to depart in peace. Next morning (October 23) the two contingents of selected men-at-arms duly paraded and advanced to the gate of the citadel, which was opened to them. The Germans and Flemings, 'having thought out an ingenious argument,' the nature of which Osbern does not disclose, somehow secured precedence for their own men and entered first.[3]

Their bad faith was at once apparent; for more than

[3] It seems clear that they were allowed 160 men in the picked force, as against the 140 Anglo-Normans, because of their numerical preponderance, and for the same reason had the prior right of entr

200 of them slipped through the gate behind the men-at-arms, and many more made their way into the citadel through the breach, which was now undefended. On the Anglo-Norman side there was no such indecency. Led by the archbishop and the other bishops, and advancing behind the standard of the cross and accompanied by the king, their constables and elders at the head of the picked force made a solemn entry. The cross was placed on the highest point of the battlements while the clergy sang a 'Te Deum.' Meanwhile the Germans and Flemings had seen so much to inflame their innate cupidity that they forgot all their oaths and promises and were neither to hold nor to bind. They ran this way and that collecting booty, breaking down doors, entering the Moors' harems, attacking the men and molesting the women, and slinking away with things which ought to have been put into the common stock. They even cut the throat of the '*episcopus civitatis*,'[4] who was a very old man, laid hands on the *alcayde* himself, and plundered everything that was in his house. The Count of Arschott with his own hands seized the Arab mare and refused to give her up.

Order was restored only by the exemplary conduct of the Normans and English. Preferring to keep their word unbroken and their hands unstained by illicit booty, their men-at-arms remained quietly seated in the place assigned to them. The contrast between this conduct and the behaviour of their own followers so affected Christian and the Count of Arschott (who however still kept the mare), that they were able to recall themselves and their men to a more fitting attitude and to secure the return into joint stock of a great deal that had been improperly carried off. The rest of the city was then thoroughly and systematically searched by the two factions and the booty equitably and peaceably divided, after which the Moors were allowed to go. It was on October 21 that the armistice had been arranged. The exodus began on October 25. When Lisbon had fallen, Cintra was handed over and Palmella abandoned by the Moors. 'The name of the Franks was magnified throughout all parts of the Peninsula, and great fear came upon all the Moors to whom the tale of these doings was told.'

EVELYN HOWELL.

[4] Most editors think that this must have been the Bishop of the Mozarabs—

GERMAN EDUCATION IN 1936

By Professor Lancelot Forster

When a coal fire in a grate is dying after having been plentifully fed with fuel, it may be dealt with in three different ways. We may attack the crusted part on the top, using the poker to divide the mass and so encourage the flames to consume the unburnt cinders. There will be considerable activity for a time, but very soon the upper levels will knit together again and the situation will be no better than it was before. We may thrust the poker into the middle bars, and after stirring vigorously we will again get a revived glow, but it will soon subside. The most effective way of dealing with the situation is to attend to the lower bars. If these are cleared and ample space provided for the inflow of air, then the middle and upper levels, being plentifully supplied with oxygen, will glow brightly and the fire will be revived.

So it is with the nation. When there is reached a state of crystallisation with crusted conservatism on top, it is not possible to end the stagnation by attending merely to the top section, nor even to the middle layer. The only hope lies in dealing with those who are at the entrance gate, as it were, of the State. Nations have generally recognised this principle, especially in the last century when national self-consciousness became such an important factor in international affairs. It was Fichte in his addresses to the University of Berlin in 1806 who demanded a scheme of education for Germany that would build up a united Germany, a Germany that would never again be so weak as to crumble before its enemy. Austerlitz and Jena, where Napoleon inflicted such crushing defeats on the Prussians and the Austrians, provoked this demand for a reorganised and revivified State, and so paved the way, sixty years later, for Sedan. The future of the State, said Fichte, lay in the hands

of the schoolmaster. In 1798 Pestalozzi had proved by his experiment at Stanz, in Switzerland, that social improvement could only come through education. Denmark too, after suffering national loss through alliance with Napoleon, and later through German aggression in 1864, decided to revive the national spirit by national education. 'We must strengthen what lies within,' says Dalgas, 'in compensation for what we have lost without.'

In modern times we get the same idea expressly stated by the revolutionaries in Mexico. The very corner-stone of the new social order is the ideal that, through education, the Mexican can and will be redeemed. '*Educar es redimir.*' To educate is to redeem. The school is the agency for the social and economic reforms which the people have demanded. It seems, however, that the strongest, the most compelling force in national regeneration is defeat in war and consequent fear of defeat in a future war. A proud nation—and every nation is proud—will not take any risk, but every precaution that is known, in order to establish its authority in the world of politics, industry and commerce. While the urgent demand for higher economic standards may exercise a great influence on Governments in regard to education, a more urgent motive is provided by fear of one's enemies. The requirement of the State to-day is a youth sufficiently intelligent, imbued with the right national spirit, ready and willing to defend his country with determination and courage when the emergency arises. The other advantages of education are merely incidental to that main purpose. No nation to-day dare neglect education, if it wishes to survive.

The policy, then, which follows from defeat is based on the lessons which that defeat plainly teaches. In 1914 Germany was the best educated of all nations. It was generally agreed that her scientists and scholars were the most painstaking and industrious in Europe. Her scientific and intellectual triumphs in medicine, chemistry, philosophy and theology were recognised by the rest of the world. Such high attainment could only be founded on an excellent school system. There could be no question about that, and yet, in spite of these high standards and this splendid technical knowledge and equipment, Germany had to yield to her conquerors in 1918.

The deduction made was that the crumbling of the army and navy was due to the absence of, or at least a deficiency of, the will to conquer because the social structure did not make each feel that the State mattered to him personally. Russia gave way first in the great struggle because the masses who were fighting were not greatly interested in Russia. It was not their country, but rather the possession of a privileged group which abused its authority. Austria to a lesser degree was in a similar plight. As national security, then, is the first law of nations, there must be an efficient educational system which produces men sufficiently intelligent to make use of modern weapons; but, unless there is a sense of justice within the State, this education, while rendering service to the State in one direction, might be of disservice to the State in another if it awakens in the citizen a sense of his inequality or the smallness of his stake in the national life. Hence the demand for the Totalitarian State. Socialism from this point of view is not for economic betterment, but is a military necessity. Education is not, and never can be, the dominating force in government; it is subordinate to the political system which it must serve, as Aristotle pointed out in his *Politics*. The character, therefore, of the educational scheme must depend on the aims and ideals prevailing in regard to the State.

Germany's first aim, then, is to intensify the national spirit, which, she feels, has been sacrificed in previous schemes of education. In the past, she realises, she has been inspired by a wrong motive, and serving a false ideal—namely, the service of humanity based on the assumption that men of all nations are, if not actually, then potentially, equal and of the same mental structure.

Οὐ δεῖ νομίζειν διαφέρειν ἄνθρωπον ἀνθρώπου

says a Greek writer; but apparently it is not so. Just as the individual differences between man and man are greater and more important than their similarities, so still more are the racial and national differences important, and no system of education can be efficient which ignores these national differences. Nations consist of men and women rooted in a certain traditional soil, and for their growth and nurture a particular kind of treatment is necessary if the finest fruit is

to be obtained. Moselle wine cannot be produced in Bordeaux, nor can true Stilton cheese be made outside England.

It was by ignoring the deeper emotions of the existence of the heart and confining their attention to the head that German teachers for two centuries delayed the emergence of a true, strong German spirit. Emphasis in the past has been on the intellect or on the reason, that which unifies the world ; now the education must emphasise the emotions, which divide the world, perhaps, and yet enrich it by making the national contribution to the world of culture more distinctive and nationally significant.

If this conception of social life, then, is accepted, it necessarily follows that those elements and forces which hitherto have dominated German culture must be eliminated. Hitler has said that Nazism is not for export. It has a special national flavour and is unsuited to any but German soil. On the other hand, it must be allowed to flourish there and not be thwarted by alien forces, which neutralise or retard its growth. In the Jewish race the Germans see just this internationalising force. It is not that the Jews individually are objectionable, but that their loyalties lie beyond the confines of Germany and to that extent weaken the Germanic spirit. Their interests are world interests, not German interests. They stand for a world culture through the supremacy of the intellect, as against the new German ideal of a national culture through the refinement of the emotions, the strengthening of the will and the development of the body. Such people, then, can have neither part nor lot in German education.

A second force which aims at international fellowship and good will is the Catholic Church, which bases its appeal on the fundamental need of man for God. Difficulties have arisen here, since again its loyalties lie over the borders of Germany to an authority which may interfere with the intensification of the German spirit. According to the new German ideal, religion must serve the national ends, and this means that everyone must be a good German first, whatever else he may be after that. Education and his religion must minister to that primary aim. It is also interesting to note that the famous schools in Germany known as the gymnasia, where Latin and Greek studies are so efficiently

pursued, are in danger of being eclipsed. These schools have won more than a national reputation because of their high standards in classical scholarship, but for that very reason they are to be reduced in number at least, and in many cases the curriculum will be modified. The Greek spirit is not the Germanic spirit. The culture of the former is the moulding force of Europe; but Germany wishes to be Germany, and not a colourless part of Europe. The Greeks emphasised the intellect and distrusted the emotions. They aimed at a cold classical efficiency, whereas Germany wants a warm, passionate zeal expressing itself in loyalty to the State and a readiness to defend it. The Greek system had value when it concerned itself with a selected few, but the situation is different when the whole nation has to be educated. All possess feelings and a body, but few possess intellect of a high order through which the mind can be approached.

Another sphere in which modern Germany proposes to make changes is the higher ranks of the university, where so much time and thought have been devoted to the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. These great scientists and scholars, by their careful researches, have enriched the world, but neglected Germany. While a certain proportion may be dedicated to this service, the numbers will be, and are, being greatly restricted. It is stated that of the 7000 teachers on the staffs of the twenty-three universities 1300 have been dismissed or forcibly retired, many others have been pensioned at their own wish, and some have withdrawn into private life. The total reduction of staff amounts to 35 per cent., but this is paralleled in the student body, which has been cut down from 90,000 to 54,000—a reduction of 40 per cent. Even so, it must be remembered that Germany will have as many students in the university as England has. According to recent statistics, the position is as follows. England has one full-time undergraduate in the university for every 1013 persons in the population; Italy, one in 808; Germany, one in 604; Holland, one in 579; France, one in 480; Switzerland, one in 387; the United States, one in 125. The reduction in numbers, therefore, is partly a return to pre-war conditions, partly due to excess of supply of graduates and unemployment, and finally to divert mental effort into other channels. But the passion for a Germanic

outlook reveals itself even in the realm of science, which one hitherto has thought of as detached from, and independent of, national features. Thus the distinguished physicist Lenard in the preface to his book *Deutsche Physik* says:

> German Physics? one asks. I might rather have said Aryan Physics; or the Physics of the Nordic species of man; Physics of those who have fathomed the depth of Reality, seekers after Truth; and Physics of the very founders of science But it will be replied that Physics is and remains international. It is false. In reality science, like every other human product, is raised and conditioned by blood.

We see, then, that the universities, which in Germany even more than in England have been nurseries of scientists and scholars, have been invaded by this separatist spirit, which must be used to isolate Germany from the rest of the world in order that a strong united front may be presented to other nations who are seeking to realise an impossible ideal, according to the German view.

It is for this reason that the teaching and philosophy of Pestalozzi are now accepted, with the emphasis on the warm family hearth as the ideal pattern for education rather than on the colder system propounded by Herbert. It was the latter who proclaimed the doctrine which Confucius had enunciated before him. Men at birth are equal. It is nurture that makes them different. All, according to Herbert's theory, come into the world endowed with mind-stuff. It is of uniform quality and without direction from within. Instincts and emotions do not count in this philosophy, for everything depends on the sort of knowledge and the manner of its presentation from without. 'The matter taught,' said Herbert, 'is the vital thing.' The teacher is but the instrument for conveying this knowledge to the mind. '*Nihil in animo quod non prius erat in sensu*' is the keynote of this school of thought.

But youth does not wish to be instructed only: it wishes to be led; and, as the modern German educationists say, if the teachers will not become the leaders of youth, then the leaders of youth must become the teachers. German education, then, is getting away from the formality of the schoolroom, with its emphasis on the three R's and instruction which leaves children cold and disinterested. Hence external organisations are becoming almost as important as the school

itself in fashioning the German citizen of to-morrow. Thus the Hitler Youth organisation comprises boys of fourteen to eighteen years of age. The *Jungvolk* includes boys from the age of ten to fourteen; and there are parallel organisations for girls up to the age of twenty-one—namely, the *Bund Deutscher Mädchen* and the *Jungmädel*, for girls from ten to fifteen. It is agreed that Saturdays and one night in the week shall be devoted to these youth activities, and Sundays shall belong entirely to the parents and the family, the rest of the time being given to school work. The teacher is the appointed leader of his class; but a more natural leadership has to be won in the Youth movement, based, not on intellectual superiority, but on those qualities of iniative, enterprise and achievement by which the group is compelled to acknowledge that leadership. It is therefore a valuable field of discovery in that respect, for it too often happens that those who are placed in authority in the formal way are failures because they are not natural leaders thrown up by the sheer force of their character and achievement.

Though less attention is being paid to the cultivation of the intellect, and more to the deepening of the national spirit, the cult of physical fitness is perhaps the most outstanding of Germany's aims in modern education. It was in keeping with this that Berlin was the scene of the recent world Olympic Games. Of this phase of Greek life Germany wholly approves. The Germans are getting to the stage pictured by Samuel Butler in Erewhon where ill-health was regarded as a punishable offence. 'In our eyes,' says Adolf Hitler, 'the German youth of the future must be slim and strong, as fast as a greyhound, as tough as leather and as hard as Krupp steel.' Here is the change of emphasis specially marked. 'The English,' says Lord Haldane, 'are a race peculiarly adapted to identify life with sport. Germany until recently might well have been termed a nation which identified life with knowledge.' Germany intends that this description shall not be true in the future.

It is not only in the Youth movement that bodily fitness is proclaimed as the basic need but also in the labour camps, which every youth at the age of eighteen, after leaving the secondary school, must attend. This regulation applies to the young women as well as to the young men. The latter

are engaged upon works of public utility, such as river conservancy, road making, and reafforestation, while the former help in farm work, in cleaning, washing and cooking, or in gathering in the crops when they are ready. This naturally follows from the activities of the Hitler *Jugend*, where the young people are encouraged to walk, to assemble in youth hostels, sing the national songs, perform physical exercises in the early morning of an exacting kind under the leadership of one of their number, as well as learn some useful, practical work. It may, of course, be argued that the motive lying behind such a movement is the efficiency of the army, which every youth must enter and serve in for two years, but every nation is paying attention to this side of education. Lloyd George said that a first-class nation could not be based on a C3 population. Dr. L. P. Jacks is advocating the improvement of the physical side of English education. Russia, too, is concentrating on the health and physical fitness of her youth. Again, no nation dare neglect this work because of its importance in national defence.

The higher education of women in Germany is being restricted to those of exceptional ability. It is believed that the sphere of women is the home, and that their chief interests should be *Kinder*, *Kuchen* and *Kirsche*. This is not intended to mean any degradation of the sex, but rather an enhancement of it. It is felt that as the home is the nursery of Germany's future citizens, it is pre-eminently the duty of the women to make it as efficient as it possibly can be. It requires a training of no mean order, and, so far from it being a menial task, it is one that requires qualities of mind, body and spirit which women alone possess. It is they alone who can provide the sympathy and affection which every child requires for true growth. If this is combined with an intelligent understanding of what the home signifies in the social scheme, then the dignity and value of the home will be enhanced. Women will realise that their part in the life of the nation is not inferior in quality to that of the men, but only different in kind.

It is in the home that the real German spirit takes root and where the child acquires the character that will cling to him through life, for it is in the first seven years of life that every child is mentally and morally formed. It is then that

he is making his first contacts with the world, and receiving his first and deepest impressions. It is said that few men have risen to greatness without the ennobling influence of a good mother. So far, then, are the Germans from lowering the status of women, they can conscientiously claim that they are raising it, for the home is an essential unit in this scheme of deepening the true German spirit.

This, of course, is in striking contrast with Bolshevist Russia, where the home is not regarded in the same light, and where the women are treated in precisely the same way as the men. Child-bearing involves a temporary withdrawal from the ordinary economic life, but otherwise the women enter into the same activities as the men. One sees them in charge of a steam-roller, for example, or driving a tramcar. They are on point duty in the main streets of Moscow. They are engaged as bricklayers, as well as engineers, or as captains and officers of merchant ships. They are dentists, doctors and lawyers, and share the same civic rights as the men.

Yet one feels that the object in both cases is the same. Germany seems to say that her citizens will be imbued with the right spirit, and that they will acquire such a love for hearth and home that they will be prepared to defend it to the last man. The Russians, on the other hand, feel that their State will be stronger if the women in an emergency can do the work of the men. The factories will be kept going, the sources of supply will be efficiently staffed, and production will hardly suffer while the maximum number of men are released for military service; for though women will play a part in the next war, the greater burden must be borne by the men. The one nation is relying on material resources, while the other is depending on intangible but no less powerful spiritual forces, the object in both cases being the security of the State.

In Germany there are the *Kindergarten* schools for children from the age of two and a half until the age is reached for entering the primary school, but they are only for those who cannot get care and education in the family. These schools are in charge of specially qualified mistresses whose ability is certified by the State. But the *Grundschule* is the uniform first stage in the education of all German children,

who must attend from the age of six to the age of ten. There are no expensive preparatory schools to which children can be sent, for that would be contrary to the German policy of State Socialism, which aims at uniting and consolidating the nation, and not dividing it. The aim of the *Grundschule* is to develop the child's natural aptitudes, and so foster in all pupils the ability and knowledge which form the groundwork of any education which looks beyond the mere requirements of the school itself.

At the age of ten the majority of the pupils pass into the *Volkschule*. The stated aim of the work of the *Volkschule* is to imbue the class as a whole with a consciousness of its German nationality while at the same time developing the individuality of the pupil. The curriculum is framed in accordance with these two aims. The education so provided does not attempt to develop the faculty of memory, nor that of logical reasoning, but is based on the independent activity of the children themselves. Under the guidance of the teacher knowledge is not merely transmitted, but is discovered by means of observation and independent experiment. Physical drill is included because it steels body and character and encourages voluntary obedience, self-control and efficiency.

The subjects taught include religion, German history and civics, geography and history of the child's home town or district, geography, biology, arithmetic, geometry, drawing, singing, gymnastics and, in the case of girls, needlework. The aim of the biology, geography and history course is to introduce the pupil to the fundamental questions of ethnology, heredity, racial hygiene and genealogical study. When circumstances permit, these studies are supplemented by manual work for the boys and domestic economy for the girls. The actual work of the school is largely adapted to the special requirements of the district in which it is situated. Attendance at the *Volkschule* is compulsory unless the pupil enters the intermediate or higher school on leaving the *Grundschule*. After the *Volkschule*, if the youth enters commerce or industry and is apprenticed, he is compelled by law to attend the vocational school for six to eight hours per week, and the employer must make provision for his attendance. His work in the school will have relation to his occupation, and its object

will be to make him more efficient in his craft. He is not free from such instruction till the age of eighteen. Besides giving technical instruction in the different trades, these schools also supplement the pupils' knowledge and abilities by introducing them to the science of economics, commerce and general citizenship.

In accordance with a Government decree, the state of neglect into which the agricultural vocational schools had fallen in a number of provinces is now being repaired. In accordance with the orders of the Minister of Education, the country continuation school is being energetically revived in order to give to the German peasant, whose cultural welfare was seriously neglected before the National Socialist revolution, the most important advantages education can offer. The recent regulations issued in connexion with these schools stipulate that attendance shall be compulsory for two years. Following this course, technical instruction is to be had in the agricultural school.

Such, then, is in broad outline the scheme of education for the mass of German citizens. After the *Grundschule*, however, a parent who can afford it may send his child to a middle school (*Mittelschule*), which is a six-year course, the first three years being general and cultural, the remaining three being devoted to specialised work. The objective of these schools is the intermediate qualifying certificate, which leads to the various types of secondary school.

If one asks the German on what principle he is basing his new education policy, he will say partly on experience, and partly on the English educational system. For the first time he is taking the pupil outside the doors of the class-room, the laboratory and the library, and introducing him to life in the open air. Just as England encourages outside agencies such as Boy Scouts, Girl Guides, Boys' Brigades and Cadet Corps to supplement the work of the school, so Germany is officially encouraging such organisations as the Hitler *Jugend* to deal with the boys and girls when they are away from the class-room, for it is believed that such training is invaluable.

Likewise they see that the most characteristic note of education in England is the public school, whose distinguishing mark is the vast open space reserved for games. The

ɔoys have generally hated knowledge for its own sake, but ılways loved the cricket pitch and the football field with ·eal passion. The hero of the school in England is not the ,tudious individual—always referred to contemptuously as the swot '—but the athlete who makes a century in cricket, ɔr scores tries in football. 'Too much time cannot be levoted to games' was the resolution passed by a large najority by one public school debating society. 'I would ather be W. G. Grace,' said a schoolmaster, 'than the uthor of Wordsworth's poems.' 'On the playing-fields of Ɛton the Battle of Waterloo was won' is an accepted saying; vhether it was really said is immaterial. It is taken to express truth. In these schools there is an intensive training hrough the living-in system, through the games, through he sharing of a common tradition, and through the examples ›f distinguished past scholars. It has been said:

> We want to introduce something of that spirit into Germany: our chools have had none of it. We have confined our efforts to purely ıtellectual pursuits and neglected the ideal of social service, of the ɛam spirit, of opportunities for discovering leaders; we have not ·ained and strengthened the will, nor appealed to the emotions and ɛntiments as you have done. We have emphasised the abstract studies ıd neglected the real intimate issues in life which make a people one ı spirit.

When the Reformation took place in England the great ublic schools still remained part of the nation, for the .hurch was established. These schools still continued to ɛceive the boys from the best families, for they still formed art of the national tradition, though that had been modified om the religious standpoint. When Beaumont challenged .ton to a cricket match many years ago, the secretary wrote ack and asked who Beaumont were. 'Beaumont is, what .ton used to be, a school for Catholic gentlemen,' was the ıtting reply. In Germany, however, when the nation for ıe most part followed Luther and accepted the reformed ith, the boarding schools did not transfer their allegiance. hey remained Catholic, but ceased to be used by the nation ; a whole. Germany therefore lost her source of supply ›r the higher positions, men were no longer forthcoming, ıd residential schools ceased to play a part in German lucational life. Germany now realises the tremendous part

such schools can play in furnishing the nation's leaders in law, in public administration, in military matters and in diplomacy.

The German Government, then, has established the National State Boarding Schools—or rather, increased the number of boarding schools by five under this title. These will be placed in Bavaria, Saxony, Anhalt and Wurtemburg. 'If,' a report states, 'it is also taken into consideration that the so-called *auf Bauschulen* have received exceptional promotion, it will prove that the National Socialist Government attributes greater importance to boarding school education than did the Weimar Government.'

One naturally asks whether the true spirit of the English public school can be transferred into Germany. It may be copied in form; but—as a certain German educationist I met said—what is distinctively German cannot be transplanted, and, presumably, what is characteristically English cannot be transplanted either. The English schools are independent units, each with its own special personality, as it were. They have each their own separate council, and are not dictated to by any outside authority, which, it is feared, and rightly so, would draw off the energy and kill the spontaneity which distinguishes them. They are vigorous and self-reliant as institutions because of this freedom. They serve the highest ideals but of their own free will. The Government does not control the policy, nor the entry of the pupils. The headmaster is supreme in these matters. The State schools in Germany, or the '*National politischen Erziehungsanstalten*' as they are called, can never develop the same natural and free spirit that finds expression in the English school. Such a higher authority would be fatal to the life of the English school; for authority springs from below and from within in English life, and is not imposed from above nor from without. The secret is to develop a system by which such a discipline may arise; but perhaps it cannot be cultivated: it is inherent in the English character and part of the genius of the race. It applies not only to these schools, but marks all government in England.

England has emphasised the playing-field while Germany has laid stress on the gymnasium, and therein lies a great difference. The one demands active and spontaneous co-

operation; it is a replica of English life in general, for it requires a strong opposition to bring out the highest and best qualities of a team. It allows individual achievement of the highest kind in reaching a goal on behalf of the side. It gives purpose to the physical activity of such a nature as to afford satisfaction to the players who register a victory, suffer a defeat, or make a draw. The discussion that follows a hard-fought game is healthy and constructive. Mind and body are fully and healthily employed while the game lasts. In comparison with this, the work in the gymnasium is almost mechanical, however scientific it may be in producing uniform development. The initiative is taken away from the individual members and belongs to one person—the leader. In an English youth hostel the guests prefer a football to a parallel bar, or to ordinary mass physical training such as prevails in Germany. In the one case the autonomy of the individual is preserved, for he voluntarily puts himself under a set of rules and plays according to them; in the other, it is taken away and the order is given by the leader. This would seem to illustrate the difference generally between the German outlook and the English.

An important change has been made in the training of teachers in Germany, for she recognises that all schemes and reforms are but castles in the air if they are not grounded upon the training of the teacher. The German Government has set about this task in real earnest and founded *Hochschule für Lehrerbildung*, or training colleges for teachers. Such institutions have been established in Bavaria, Wurtemburg and Braunschweig, and these will take their place side by side with the eleven similar colleges in Prussia. A further eight will be opened before the end of this year. Whoever intends to become a teacher in Germany in future must enter a training college after the completion of his secondary school course, and, of course, after his six months' service in the labour camp. Only after he has been initiated into the theory and practice of teaching by this year of training can he make the decision as to whether he will spend a further year at the training college, and so qualify for the elementary schools, or whether he will leave the training college and proceed to the university for a three years' course of study and on graduation become a teacher

in a secondary school. This reform has a two-fold object. First of all it is meant to bridge the gap between the elementary school teacher and the secondary. It is felt that any social cleavage here should disappear in the interests of national unity and harmony; but another aim is to remove the serious flaw in the old method, which lay in the fact that the secondary school teacher had his first opportunity of practically testing his vocational abilities for teaching only after four or five years of university study. In future during this first year at the training college he will be able to discover whether teaching is his vocation or not. The Government is also providing courses for those already in the profession, both in summer schools and in camps, for the purpose of acquainting them with the new aims of National Socialist education.

As far as education is concerned—and it is a vital concern in Germany to-day—those who are opposed to the German system think there is too much propaganda; that too much time is devoted to inculcating the doctrine of Aryan superiority; and they fear that such exaggerated self-esteem will lead to contempt for other nations. School history, for example, may minister to national and racial pride and produce a state of Narcissism, except that this new Narcissus, instead of being beautiful and rooted in self-admiration, may become a terrible menace to others. Germany has given the reasons for the changes she has made. She has come out of the League of Nations—out of the family, as it were—like Italy and Japan, because she wishes to reassert her individuality, even though this can only be achieved at the cost of the individual citizen's individuality. She feels that the greatest contribution she can make to world civilisation will follow from being true to herself, and not in being like others. She aims at independence as a nation, and feels this can best be secured by having sturdy and vigorous sons, trained in the will to serve because they are imbued with the true spirit of Germania. It is this doctrine to which modern educational developments give expression.

LANCELOT FORSTER.

ENGLAND AFTER EXILE

By Donald Cowie

I had special reasons for returning to England after seven years in New Zealand, else I would not have been so foolish as to leave the Dominion, which is a very beautiful country with a high material standard of living. Perhaps if I deal with these reasons consecutively, in rough order of their importance, they will provide (as they are put to the test of reality) the basis for an interim report of English impressions.

First, I came home because I wanted to remain an Englishman. The fact must be faced that a few generations of residence overseas have caused certain sections of the British race to develop what might be described as extra-English characteristics. The degree of development varies, according to manner of settlement, climate, and distance of the country concerned from the parental Old World. But the fact is noticeable enough, and contains a warning to the canny visitor. Unless he wishes to become differentiated too, then he must not stay over-long. At least, that was my feeling. I wanted to remain an Englishman, therefore planned to return to England as soon as I felt retention of British characteristics was in danger. But what were the particular differences between Colonials and their English cousins that I expected to find on my return? And have I found them?

Since he is the descendant of pioneers, who had to build their new homes with their bare hands, the Colonial tends to be something of a materialist. Most of the important things in his life are either black or white; half-tones do not concern him. As English mists are rare in the New World, so the Colonial is correspondingly hard-defined, so that one may convince him by logical argument, but rarely by any other means. One misses the typically English genius for settling a controversy by compromise, and finds that this Colonial characteristic is responsible for different kinds of

speech, clothing, architecture, art, literature, and social relationships. I came home last year to escape the influence of these. And have I been successful? That is a question I find it difficult to answer as yet, but I must say that already my fellow-Englishmen seem more irrational, irresolute, and hazy-minded than I had bargained for. This may mean that my residence overseas has made me somewhat of a Colonial myself; but there is no doubt that my principal impression during the last year has been of English indefiniteness. The professed Conservative is a Socialist under his Anthony Eden hat; the poet of to-day is the stockbroker of to-morrow. Clerks in offices have immaculate clothes and manners, but peers in palaces talk and dress like tramps. Compromise is certainly one of the most popular words in the English dictionary, but is it no more than a synonym for irresponsibility? There are aspects of the Englishman's philosophy that already make me want to shake the Englishman until he shouts.

Overseas I learnt to respect the power of plain speech. I was told at first that I must not mind it; and at first I did mind it, but realised at last its virtue and power of saving pain. If a Colonial speaks without undue deference to the man who would be, in England, his social superior, it is not because the Colonial is fundamentally irreverent, but just because he realises that the superiority of the other generally resides in some extraneous circumstance, and not in his essential personality. So I have found it painful since my return to England to observe the contact of class and class, and also to trace how the deferences and pomposities extend to the arts and sciences, even to the business community.

Then I wanted to return to England because I felt that the Dominion where I lived lacked historical background. The towns and cities, the customs and tendencies were all too raw. I found myself reading books like Mr. Morton's, that I might not forget England was old. As I remembered that when I had had the chance in youth to visit those ruined castles, storeyed byways, founts of tradition, I had neglected the chance, so I resolved that when I returned no anxious tourist's enthusiasm should overtake mine. Perhaps I should not have been so sanguine. Frankly I must record that the ancient monuments of my overseas imagination,

pregnant then with romantic possibilities, have near at hand deteriorated into little more than incongruous black stone among modern buildings and garish traffic-lights; always they have seemed to be garish with guide-books and plastered with picture-postcards. There has been no satisfaction in them at all—only a shame that they should be exploited so callously for the sake of my innocent kind. But for one dispensation I have soon returned to living in the present without further thought for an ineffective past. That dispensation is the solid appearance of England after overseas sham. Public buildings here do not have stone façades superimposed upon wooden frames. Experts are genuinely so, and not mere proselytes of the second-hand. Oxford accents are cultivated rather than assumed. Music is not all canned. Real books are published only a few yards down the street, and laden museums, libraries, galleries, and exhibitions gape for appreciation. Thus one can feel that what one is doing is not an isolated labour, but part of a definite scheme.

At the other side of the world communication with Europe could be effected only by means of books, journals, cables, broadcasts, and prattling visitors. Great events were always six weeks old; international crises echoed mildly. One was living on the slow rim of a wheel, far from the faster hub. And it is true that a year of England has brought me face to face with greater issues than my overseas home had ever known. That I have gained any considerable extension of knowledge or increase in understanding by this proximity remains to be proved. But I have certainly worked with a new zest in the realisation that history is always just round the corner, and not a lifetime away.

Yet again, I returned to England in search of what the newspapers tactfully call human-interest. Living in a town of 100,000 inhabitants, in a country of no more than 1,500,000, which is yet larger than England, Scotland and Wales combined, one soon grows tired of studying the same faces, analysing the same human types. And here I have been wholly justified in my hopes; even bewildered at the variety of their consummation. I have already discovered that a morning by the Round Pond, an afternoon in a suburb, or an evening in a seaside hotel, is worth a month of Colonial Sundays. Despite the spread of industrial standardisation,

the English are still, thank goodness, a race of individualists. A politician is recognisable in the Dominions a mile away, but in England he may look like anything from an acrobat to an aquarium-keeper. The man who walks the streets of London clad in leather shorts is no more than an incidental part of a varied scene, but in the Dominions he would be hounded to earth by the yelps of the conventional. The artist does find existence difficult in a society where expressions, clothes, hair-cuts and philosophies are all the same. Thus it is possible to use one's English acquaintances for æsthetic purposes, whereas friends in the Dominions could be used for business purposes only. I return from the crowded West End streets with a blurred, kaleidoscopic impression of curious faces, that sooner or later resolves itself into many clearly defined portraits of personality.

One's cherished preconceptions are the laughing-stock of experience. It was painfully apparent in New Zealand that British politics had suffered several bloodless revolutions since 1928, the last year I knew my native land. During that time a great slump had favoured the formation of a National Government by a Labour Prime Minister; the old Liberal Party had been finally divided; and the Conservative Party had sponsored several measures of practical State Socialism. Above all, a new terminology had been invented to label movements and tendencies, so that, from the other side of the world, the British political scene had completely changed. It was apparent (from New Zealand) that British political opinion since 1928 had foremostly been shuffled from its older Conservative, Liberal and Labour positions into two new categories, called, for short, Right and Left. Thinkers of the Right evidently had ultra-Conservative views, believed in Fascism, and favoured the creation of a totalitarian or autocratic State; while adherents to the Left seemingly were confirmed Radicals, wanted Communism, and favoured the creation of a totalitarian or autocratic State. The cult of democracy, as exemplified in the British system of parliamentary government, was forever dead; and the uneasy present was no more than a breathing-space before one or other of the rival doctrines was triumphant in Westminster.

Moreover, it seemed that the very personnel of British politics had changed during those fatal absentee years. In

place of the old professional parliamentarians and party hacks had emerged a new body of legislators, of which a group of writers, artists, and students with rooms in Bloomsbury was the brain and soul. We read books on Communism by men like Mr. Middleton Murry and Mr. John Strachey. We gazed at the signatures of people like Mr. Aldous Huxley, Mr. Bertrand Russell, Mr. Beverley Nichols and Miss Vera Brittain at the foot of pacifist manifestoes. Even Mr. J. B. Priestley had 'gone all political,' in the words of a disappointed admirer of the author of *The Good Companions*, who had just picked up *English Journey*. In the past men of letters and masters of arts had avoided the political arena; now they were at one with the demagogues; and heaven only knew what would be the outcome!

The prospects were disturbing. With such revolutions at the heart of our system, anything might happen to the defenceless extremities. New Zealand was just recovering from a serious slump, and, if the trade route to Britain were affected by international conflict promoted by ideological schisms, her main source of income would once again be threatened. The Italo-Abyssinian war encouraged us to draw uncomfortable deductions from maps of the Red Sea, the Suez Canal, and the Mediterranean, though little Australian and almost no New Zealand shipping uses or need use that route. Coincidentally, a rattling of sabres in Japan, accompanied by a flooding of our markets with her cheap goods, accentuated our feeling of vulnerability. There appeared to be no comfort for us in Britain. It was obvious from the public remarks of Britain's spokesmen that they had neither settled policy nor political confidence. But the other side, with its continual talk of embracing Moscow and abandoning *us*, was worse still. Political individualism, in which we had believed so passionately, seemed to be dead; the rule of the civil servant was finally in its place. Even Mr. Baldwin did not seem to mind handing over whole sections of the country's private economy to bureaucratic boards and corporations. It appeared that modern British Governments had resolved to raise up the lowly with the one hand and cast down the mighty with the other, but without first considering whether such a course was entirely in the best interests of the lowly and mighty as a whole. Stupendous

taxation was yearly imposed to pay for augmented social services. The very men who had made England—by which we meant the men who had won her battles, displayed her character, and multiplied her wealth—were those who suffered most from direct governmental control, taxation, and interference. Soft doctrines were sapping at the foundations of our pride.

That was the overseas view, and it remained intact until the homebound ship had finally left New Zealand on the horizon. On the ship were many talkative fellow-passengers, and doubt rose up from them. The Australian squatter, who said his country would naturally stand by Britain, if only because his country could not as yet live without Britain; the young gentleman from Birmingham, who said that in the district where he worked Communists were still popularly regarded as funny men from Russia with beards and bombs; the German girl, who said that most Germans distrusted the British, who wanted both to have their imperialistic cake and eat it; the Jewish refugees from Germany, who said they had left the Fatherland of their own accord, because there was no more good business to be done there; the middle-aged gentleman, who said he was a Philosophical Anarchist, but who despaired of converting London's carnivorous millions; the Canadian politician, who said politics in Canada were directed from New York in terms of London—these casual talkers prepared the way for better things. But the process was attenuated, and not entirely concluded by the time I had landed in London, so at first there was no hesitation in proclaiming a distorted view. 'But of course you people of the Right don't need to be told that.' Or, 'Anyone of Left sympathies will probably dispute this argument.' And at first I was dismayed to be received with bland smiles or uncomprehending stares. I was answered politely, it is true, but so politely that I hastened to the final rock-bottom of disillusionment or reassurance.

For British politics have not changed, and that overseas view was an isolation-bred chimera. The British political scene, I have discovered to my discomfort, is no different to-day from what it was in 1928, or, for that matter, in 1688. There are those who are content with peaceful, evolutionary progress, and there are those who have vague ideas of rapid

revolution. The former class, as ever, comprises the majority of Englishmen. The latter class consists of an extremely loud-voiced but politically insignificant minority. To label these divisions as Right and Left is merely to flatter the insignificant minority. I had expected to find Englishmen ranged up in two great groups, both flaunting political creeds that, in their essentials, involved a complete denial of the rights of the individual and the erection of a social order of a kind banished finally from these islands many centuries ago. I have found Englishmen, as ever, going quietly about their work and play, voting Conservative one year and Liberal-Labour the next, occasionally pausing to guy the cranks and dispense extraordinary charity to their dependants, but hardly ever bothering to weigh the *pros* and *cons* of ideological theory.

Certainly strange new doctrines have had their exponents in those public places that, like the reserves made in Africa for extinction-threatened fauna, are hallowed resorts of the hopeless. But such doctrines have not percolated beyond these humorous confines. I have put this to the test by sounding ripe old Tories, who have promptly informed me that the British democratic system is the sheet-anchor of British liberty; and by interrogating hard-working Labour leaders, who have assured me at once that the British workman never has had and never will have any time for 'Russian trash.' Admittedly I have listened to interminable conversations among very young men and women and older adolescents upon such subjects as Poverty Amid Plenty and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat; but an old gentleman who sat down beside me in the Gardens one day finally settled my mind.

The trouble with those youngsters is that they don't know their history [he said] Like all children, they think that everything they discover is a new discovery. Don't you realise that England has always had her political buffoons? I venture to state that if you were transported back in Mr. Wells's *Time Machine* to the Middle Ages you would find political society composed of very much the same ingredients as it is to-day. But the lot of the masses of the people is far better to-day than ever it was in the past. Goodness gracious, there's no serious discontent in Britain at present. Therefore the youngsters and cranks have to content themselves discussing abstract theories, and propounding doctrines that are harmless just because they are divorced irrevocably

from the facts of political life. One hundred years ago they might have had something to bite on. But now their teeth are soft from disuse.

These wise words, which will infuriate the very young men and the older adolescents, cannot be gainsaid. Even literary judgment must be reversed. Have not the writers of every age had political ambition? Messrs. Murry, Strachey, Huxley, Russell, Nichols, Priestley, Waugh, and Wyndham Lewis might have startled an ignorant world by dragging politics into their otherwise excellent books, but the world would not have been so startled had it turned again to the equally excellent works of such venerable literary artists as Messrs. Chaucer, Shakespeare, Milton, Defoe, Pope, Swift, Johnson, Goldsmith, Macaulay, Wordsworth, and Shelley, Dickens, Reade, Eliot, Kingsley, Kipling, Wells, Galsworthy, and Masefield. These classic writers also turned their pens aside to political disputation. Wherefore, then, can wonder batten upon the puny efforts of the present day?

To begin this article I gave some light and general impressions of the English scene after absence. I described how certain aspects of life in the homeland had mildly disappointed me. Then I went on to deal with a great illusion and its wholesale destruction. Looking back over what I have written, I cannot help feeling that the last is the most important part of the work. In touch with reality I have discovered that the fundamentals of British policy have not changed; that, in spite of the incessant writing and talking of the perennial revolutionary few, Continental notions of political behaviour have made no serious impression upon the masses of the people; that the Englishman is still a Conservative at heart, even when he is voting Labour; and that England is therefore a safer place for democracy than I had hoped.

Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose. Thus I have learnt my platitudinous lesson. Henceforward values must be immutable. Jargon and propaganda and dire prophecy shall no longer overcast reason. I am Home.

DONALD COWIE.

THE CHILDHOOD OF AN IRISHMAN

By Patrick Kavanagh

I.

When I was about two years old I was lying one evening in the onion-box that had been converted into a cradle. I looked up and saw for the first time the sticky black oak couples of our thatched roof. If I didn't see stars it was because my child-observation was at fault, for the blackbirds had pecked holes in the thatch to the very bone in places. The blackbird was a great enemy of old thatch, and in his search after the little red worms in the decayed straw would stop at nothing. At three or four o'clock of a summer's morning he would begin his attack and by six, narrow sunbeam ribbons, like wedding festoonery in peasant homes, would be stretched from roof to floor, or, as happened more often, spitting rain would startle the sleeping faces of children and old folk in their beds, and indeed father used to tell of a wet night when he had to hold an umbrella over himself and my mother in their bed.

This house where I was born was a traditional Irish cabin on the edge of a bog, wedge-shaped to trick the western winds. It was surrounded on three sides by a neighbour's field, which was inconvenient, as unless we were on good terms with the owner—which we were not—the back could not be thatched except by hanging a ladder across. It had a tiny back window—about a foot square—but through this window, it appears, we were not entitled to let in legal daylight. Once upon a time an owner of the field had built a cock of hay against the window, thereby leaving the occupants of the house in the plight of Diogenes when Alexander the Great cast his shadow on the bung-hole of the Sage's tub.

The bog over which my young eyes strayed, and through which I often waded in the search for ducks that laid abroad,

was a twenty-acres waste from which the peat had long been cut; in some of its clear pools greedy pike survived, but only the eels could be said to have security of tenure. Beautiful blue and white and pink flowers grew on the bog, and more magical flowers I have not seen since; they were exciting as a poem and had a different beauty for my changing moods.

Around our house there stood little hills all tilled and tame; yellow flame-blossoms of the whin-made bonfires all over the landscape. The whin was as persistent and as fertile as sin and disease. The sunny side of the hills was good soil and boasted some tall thorn trees, but the black side facing the north was crabbed and poverty-stricken and grew only stunted blackthorns and sorrel plants. There were no trees to speak of except the poplar and the sally; here and there a cranky old elm which had survived the crying of a cold kitchen spread about his trunk and tried to look a forest. From the tops of the little hills there spread a view right back to the days of Saint Patrick and the Druids. Slieve Gullion to the north, fifteen miles distant, to the west the bewitched hills and forths of Donaghmoyne, eastward one could see the distillery chimney of Dundalk sending up its prosperous smoke, or, on a very bright day, one could see the sun-dazzled tide coming in at Annagassan. To the south stood the Hill of Mullacrew—where once was held a fair as famous as Donnybrook, with as many cracked skulls to its credit.

The name of my birth-place was Mucker; some of the natives wanted to change it to Summerhill, which would have been worse. All who could do so without risking the loss of their scant mail cut 'Mucker' out of their postal address altogether. The natives of the place were known far and near as Muckers, which in after years was rhymed obscenely by corner-boys. The name was a corrupted Gaelic word, signifying a place where pigs bred in abundance. Long before my arrival there was much æsthetic heart-aching among the folk who had to put up with, and up in, such a pig-named townland. In spite of all this the townland stuck to its title, and it was in Mucker I was born.

Astrologers anxious to read my stars have now and then queried the hour and date of my birth. I always gave them somebody else's stars to read, so that the horoscope might not put me out of humour with my dreams. But to those who

may desire to cast for me my horoscope now I will say: my stars are events in time, things that happened and could not have happened to one born in the sixteenth century. The date of my birth is cut on the tablets of common existence.

My part of Ireland had a poet at one time, a poor ragged fellow whom no respectable person would be seen talking to. But he left doors open as he passed. The peasant folk knew the lore and strange knowledge of God and Greece that they didn't know they knew. From the lips of simple old women I heard phrases of whimsical prophecy and exciting twists of language that would delight the heart of a wheelbarrow or a modernist poet.

Though little fields and scraping poverty do not lead to grand flaring passions, there was plenty of fire and an amount of vicious neighbourly hatred to keep us awake. Most of the neighbours had at one time or another gone to law with one and other, chiefly for trespass. 'Show me good fences and I'll show you good neighbours,' was a saying we had. The fences in Mucker were bad stone ditches that a lame duck could cross. Each person was keeping up spite to at least two of its neighbours. We had two families that we didn't care a great deal for, though in the end everybody got too lazy for hating.

My father was a shoemaker in the good days when a pair of shop boots was an insult to any decent man's feet. He was a small, lively, intelligent man and had a reputation for learning among the people—almost as great as the schoolmaster. He played the melodion till he was forty and then got married. His passion for music was strong, and even after his marriage he found crevices in among his cares in which to play. He was fond of reading, but—peace to his soul —he never really got beyond the stage of *Tit-Bits* and *Answers*. I am sorry when I think of all the creations of the mind that he could have enjoyed. Like all the other people, he didn't know that there were more poets than Thomas Moore.

My father loved me and I loved him, but he didn't like my day-dreaming way of living. He said I'd end my days in the workhouse if I didn't change my gait of going.

Like Solomon, he was a firm believer in the virtue-giving qualities of the rod, except that he used a strap, and many's the flogging I got from him, most of which I deserved, for I

had none or very few of the qualities that go into the making of a perfect child. I was a bit of a lazybones, a bit of a liar and a bit of a rogue. 'Let me at him,' my father would say; 'let me at him till I knock the daylight out of him'; but he wouldn't be very well pleased if he was let at me. As our kitchen was his cobbler's shop, there was always someone to stand between me and my father's anger. I was only afraid of him when he had his spectacles on. He is dead a good many years now, yet as I write these words I know he is beside me encouraging me to go in and win to be a great writer. I can see him smiling and he isn't wearing his spectacles.

My mother was a simple peasant woman, twenty years younger than my father. She was without any schooling, but she was shrewd and could calculate in mental figures better than a lot of scholars could with pen and paper.

In our house the two most important subjects were the saying of the Rosary and the making of money. Ours was a united house; there was only one purse, let it be full or empty. In other houses the man held to what he could make from cattle and corn, while the wife would have to support the kitchen from the proceeds of eggs and butter. Everybody was poor and proud. My parents didn't know anything to be proud of, so they just carried on. All the small farmers had in income was the price of a calf every twelve months. We had no land, but into our house came what is known as the 'dropping shilling'; my parents were great experts in making the hens lay in winter. The hens of the neighbours only laid when the birds in the bushes were laying and the price was at its lowest.

My father wrote the history of his family for me on a sheet of foolscap.

'I want you to have the story from one that wouldn't tell you a lie,' he said. Because I knew I had the story written down I scarcely read it. I put it in what I thought was a safe place—in the bottom of a white jug that was only kept for show. One day when my father was dead a month, I looked in the jug and it was empty. My sisters had cleaned out my priceless treasure.

I was filled with grief, as I never now could have a copy.

* * * * *

All my early memories are evening memories, close to bedtime. The haze of years is kind to sharp jutting stones. I was in my mother's arms clinging with my small hands to the security of her shoulder. I saw into a far mysterious place that I long associated with Wordsworth's 'Ode to Immortality.' I believed for many years that I looked back into the world of the angels. And perhaps I had; but, examined in the light of honest reality, what I had really seen was the secret side of a cupboard. It was a sort of press which only opened one door, and the end of the most accessible top shelf was filled with rent receipts and curtain-rings and such like.

Not very long ago I have looked into that same cupboard where it lies in an outhouse discarded, and the rent receipts are still there, a good deal yellower than they were and mouse-eaten at their corners, and the curtain-rings are there too, though the rusty base metal has eaten away most of the brass veneer. Of such is the Land of the Immortals.

An old white-whiskered man stood on the laneway outside our house. As I ran in to tell, I heard the gate open and his footsteps following. He came in.

'Ah, Garret dear, you're as welcome as the flowers of May,' my mother said, running to meet him.

My father looked up from the boot he was stitching. His welcome wasn't showy ever, but there is no doubt that he was glad to see Garret back again. Garret Plunket, he was one of the journeymen shoemakers who worked for my father off and on as he travelled the roads of Ireland, sampling the porter of the pubs. and the black bread and tea of the workhouses and gaols. For the journeymen shoemakers were men who took life as it came, and it sometimes came hard. Garret was one of the most lovable of them all: he looked more like a priest than a tramp; he had an air of gentility, and even in drink carried himself with unaffected nobility.

'And where have you been since we last had a sight of you?' my mother asked.

Garret, who was sipping a mug of tea, turned round on his stool.

'Where was I?' he said; 'aye, that's the question, where was I?'

'Were you down seeing Tumelty?' my father inquired. It was a professional query.

'Tumelty has a man working,' Garret said. 'Dan The Butt is with him.'

Tumelty was a shoemaker and Dan The Butt was a journeyman.

Garret called me to him. 'When are they going to put trousers on you?' he asked.

My mother laughed and said: 'When he knows how to loose his buttons.'

I felt ashamed. I was then wearing petticoats, over which hung one of the most winsome remembrances of my childhood—the pink bib. The pink bib was a flowery cotton overall of which I was terribly proud. I wore it by the bog-side and it blended with the pink bog-flowers, so perfectly that one could hardly pick out of the pattern the floral design that was me.

When Garret had finished his tea he went to one of the spare cobbler's seats and started unwrapping the bundle of tools which I hadn't noticed before. They were wrapped in his cobbler's apron. Hammer, knife, awl, etc., he picked them out gingerly and laid them in a row on the seat. My father didn't tell him he needed a cobbler, but Garret didn't mind that. A poor man doesn't wait for a royal invitation. At any rate, my father wasn't that kind of man. If a cobbler came he told him straight if he hadn't work for him. There wasn't much romantic glamour about the business; it was a case of bread and butter, though cobblers no more than other people live on bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth from the mouth of God.

The western sun, without regard for the laws of men, peeped through our small back window.

'The sun never comes in that window save one month in the year,' my father said. It must have been midsummer then, for the sun passed our little window completely before he went behind Rocksavage Hills. Garret put on his basil apron that was holed and knife-scarred and sat down to work. Then he began to fumble in his waistcoat pocket as though looking for something important.

'What's the bother?' my father said.

'Where I put my specs is a mystery to me,' he said.

'*Think of where you last were sure you had them,*' said my mother, trying to be helpful.

'Think, think, think,' he repeated, almost exasperated.

I had my back turned, and as I was keeping very quiet it aroused suspicion.

'What is this blackguard doing here?' my mother said, coming close to me.

I was fitting on Garret's spectacles; they had fallen out of his pocket while he was having tea. Neither Garret nor my father took my trick in good part; to take a tool off a cobbler's seat was one of the most serious offences known to the trade. My father and Garret sewed and hammered and talked—dry practical talk, good bony talk of kips and uppers and toecaps. Sometimes it turned romantic or political.

'Paddy Hanlen is getting married next week,' my father said.

'Poor Paddy!' Garret sighed.

'Do you think Ireland will get Home Rule?' my mother said in a sort of lofty appeal to Garret, the profound traveller.

Garret was pulling hard at a waxed-end and didn't notice. He was grunting too, and I often heard my father say that grunting was half ease.

Customers came in—some with basketfuls of old brogues and some with them hanging on their shoulders.

'Let us have a look at the hard cases,' said my father, spilling the contents of a basket without ceremony on the floor. He ran through them very quickly, then gathered all into the basket and made to go out the door with the basket of boots.

'Where the divil are you taking the boots to?' the customer shouted.

'To the deepest bog-hole I can find,' my father said as he ran close to the bog.

'For God's sake, James, don't drown the boots!' my mother called. He returned with the boots.

'Do you know,' he told the customer, 'a man wouldn't make salt for his praties mending boots like yours? You may thank herself here that I didn't give them the bog-hole.'

For weeks and weeks after his arrival, each evening Garret

would take me with him for his limb-stretching stroll across the hills and he would point out to me all the places around for miles and their history: away over in Armagh the village of Forkhill, where they kept a good pint, and Dundalk, that had a distillery, two breweries and a gaol.

'Were you ever in Dundalk Gaol?' I asked.

'I was,' he replied, 'and it's a bad one.'

'Is it indeed?' I commented.

'You were nearly as well working for a farmer,' he said. 'Dundalk Gaol is the worst in the world.'

And he pointed out to me the Hill of Slane, though he made no mention of the fire Saint Patrick lighted there.

'I was never in an unluckier spot than Slane,' he declared. 'A month without the option of a fine I got.'

Garret would surprise a person in the habit of taking a book by the cover. Such a one would say that Garret was a saint and a mystic and poet, yet he was none of these things, but a plain Philistine with a kind heart and a prophet's beard.

It is still evening time, but dark now it is the winter of the year.

I was going to bed, and as I stood in my naked innocence I noticed that my skin was spotted and I felt sick. The measles were going on their rounds and the smell of burned whisky and boiled nettles was in every house. At that very moment my father began to play at the melodion in the kitchen and he sang with it

A starry night for a ramble,
  Through the flowery dell.
Beneath the bush and the bramble,
  Kiss but never tell.

From that day 'A Starry Night' became for me the greatest song in the world: whenever I sing it or hear it sung I am back again in childhood, where my father is playing the melodion and my skin is measles-spotted.

* * * * *

I was sent to school at four. I didn't want to go, for I had heard stories of Miss Cassidy, the principal teacher, and the assistant, Miss Meegin. Once I had caught a glimpse of Miss Cassidy walking to her school, and I didn't ever want to see her again. She had a bundle of yellow canes, with crooks

on them, under her arm, and she looked like a girl that could use them for all they were worth. She was a big woman with a heavy, coarse face, and across her round, massive shoulders she wore a small red shawl. In winter she wore heavy hob-nailed boots of my father's making. She liked my father because he wouldn't object no matter how hard she used the cane on any of his children. She didn't like our neighbour John Gorman. 'Gorman,' she said, 'beats his children with a straw.' Miss Cassidy was around fourteen stone in weight and about five feet eight in height. The assistant mistress, Miss Meegin, was thin and wiry. I heard enough about her to make me want to go to America.

'Miss Meegin,' Barney Maguire said once, 'she could cut cowld iron with her tongue!' Barney was my friend: he put nicknames on the teachers and advised me not to go to school. He called Miss Cassidy 'Sally' and Miss Meegin 'Cutty.'

'Sally and Cutty will rise welts on ye, Paddy,' he told me; 'the schoolin' is no good for anybody that has to make a livin' at worm-cuttin'.'

I liked Barney very much for these words as well as for the fairy-tales he told me. I have good reason to remember the first day I went to school. I am always good at creating a first impression, and afterwards going flat.

One of my sisters dragged me into the school. I was wearing the pink bib. I was put sitting on a seat near the door till such time as Miss Cassidy could come to me. A little girl beside me spilled ink over my hands. When Miss Cassidy came along and saw my hands she went into the tantrums. 'Go outside at once and wash your filthy hands,' she commanded.

There was a pail of water outside the door which I knew nothing of. What I had was a vague notion of water being under a railway bridge somewhere. I found the bridge but not the water, so I sat down in a cranny among slaty stones and spat on my fingers. When I didn't return to the school, and couldn't be found outside it, there was a great commotion. My sister Mary was hurried home after me.

'Of course he went home, the little rat!' Miss Cassidy said.

The assistant mistress agreed with her. I wasn't at home,

and my mother and father were nearly frantic as they made for the school.

In the meantime all the boys and girls had been turned out as sleuth-hounds. I was discovered at the end of a half-hour by two big boys. I heard them prancing down the railway slope on the farther side of the bridge. I peeped around the corner and withdrew my nose quickly again. I thought I saw one of the boys look under a whinbush.

'Where in the name of Moses did the cobbler's gossoon go?' one asked the other. 'The fairies must have taken him,' said the other.

'What will the Kavanagh say?'

I put my nose round the corner again, but didn't withdraw it in time. They eyed me.

'Did you spot anything?' the tallest boy queried.

'The little bastard,' the other fellow replied, 'trying to play hide and seek!' They were very proud of their capture. As they led me down towards the school gate I saw my mother facing up to Miss Cassidy. Miss Cassidy was shivering in her shoes and my mother wasn't using very lady-like language.

'They'll tear the livers out of other,' one of my warders said.

'It'll be worth watching this,' said the other.

There was no fight after all. My discovery settled the whole thing. Miss Cassidy wept and my parents didn't try to stop her, I think. Miss Cassidy was past her prime when I went to school; she had taught some of the fathers and mothers of my companions. I was rather a bright pupil, though my brightness didn't save me from the cane. Seven or eight hard slaps on each hand was a common thing, and on top of that maybe a bonus of a box on the ear or—it is quite true—an ungracious kick on the behind.

Miss Meegin didn't ever use the boot on us; she depended entirely on the cane, and she could put sting into her blow.

The most important subject in the curriculum was the catechism; at cramming children with religion our teachers had few equals. For weeks before a religious examination nothing was taught but the catechism, which same had the result of nearly driving all orthodox piety out of me for ever. Once when the religious examination came round I let down my teachers disgracefully. They expected a lot from me, too,

and had me perched in the middle of the front desk right beside the crucifix on the priest-examiner's breast.

'What is a publican?' he asked me.

'A man that keeps a pub.,' I answered. He laughed a priestly laugh and expected everyone to join with him.

Miss Cassidy and the assistant mistress didn't laugh; they were furious. Three or four girls giddily put up their hands.

'Well, what is a publican, you?' he said, pointing to one of the girls.

'A tax-gatherer,' she answered proudly. Miss Cassidy was released from her agony. She shook her fist at me from behind the priest. 'You'll get it, you'll get it,' that shaking fist said.

The priest didn't compliment the girl; I think he thought my answer best; it was more up-to-date, anyway.

'The only thing you're good for, Patrick Kavanagh, is a bit of arithmetic,' she declared as she spat on her hand and balanced the cane.

Miss Cassidy hadn't an ear for music. Miss Meegin did the singing lessons, though she had no knowledge of tonic sol-fa or the technique of the business. She gave us the music of a song by singing it and we picked it up that way. Along the walls during the singing lesson stood a row of non-singers —the Crows, they were called. I pitied the Crows for one thing. At the end of the school-day, just before we got out, all the singers sang a hymn—the same hymn always:

Hail, Queen of Heaven!
The ocean star,
Guide of the wanderer
Here below.
Thrown on life's surge,
We claim thy care.
Save us from peril
And from woe.
Mother of Christ,
Star of the Sea,
Pray for the wanderer,
Pray for me.

It had a lovely air. I am sure that Queen has prayed for me and has guided my wanderings. No matter how poor I have been, I have had a song and a prayer, 'A Starry Night' and 'Hail, Queen of Heaven!'

When I had discarded the pink bib and had been let into the secrets of trousers and their buttons, I soon showed what I could do in the business of clothes destruction. My mother was a careful and thrifty woman and she kept the holes patched—patch on top of patch of every shade and pattern, till I had a coat as many-coloured as Joseph. There travelled a beggar around our place in those days whose wearables rivalled mine in their improvised melodies. Myles Courtney was the beggar's name. Miss Cassidy thought it would be a good joke to call me Myles Courtney. My father heard of it; he wasn't pleased. To put a nickname on a person in Ireland was ever the most terrible weapon in use. The old poets did it and the names never came unstuck for seven generations. My father accosted Miss Cassidy on her way to school. She went down on her two knees to my father and cried for mercy, which was forthcoming. The name wasn't well gummed on the back and I lost it.

Miss Cassidy wore a heavy black frieze cloak during the winter. The nap had hardened a good deal, so that the texture of the black cloak resembled a board well tarred. It was a good waterproof and would keep out a year's rain. One wet morning when we were all a good deal older the black cloak was hanging a-drying on a pair of high stools by the fire. Around the cloak, trying to dry our wet skins, we, the five members of the top class, stood. We were enveloped in the mist that was rising from the black cloak like the mist from a dank horse-pond on an evening in July. Miss Cassidy herself was teaching in the lower end of the school those pupils who had already dried themselves; we were the last batch.

'Oh, look!' one of the girls in our class exclaimed. We all looked towards the exclamation mark.

'Ha, ha, ha; he, he, he!' the laughter burst from us like sun through fog.

'Oh, isn't it great?' someone else said.

'What will she say when she sees it?'

'There'll be fun.'

'Ha, ha, ha; he, he, he!'

The truth is, Miss Cassidy's beautiful black cloak was on fire and a hole was spreading from its centre, slowly spreading outwards. Miss Cassidy was at the bottom of the schoolroom: she must have been teaching the catechism; no other

subject would have shut her senses off from some inkling of this disaster. We now and then gave a look from the cloak to its owner. She hadn't noticed or sensed anything, though there was a fine flavour of burning wool in the place. She heard our laughter.

'I'll be up with you in a minute,' she said, without turning round, 'and I'll make it salty for . . .; no, it's not the Fourth Commandment, missy. What is the Fourth Commandment? What are you children laughing at?' she cried, turning her attention, but not her eyes, towards us.

'My God! Is it my cloak?' she moaned as the tragic truth dawned on her at last and she came running up.

'My cloak! My God!' she moaned again, this time reversing the order of preference. The cloak was all but fire-proof; though the flames had had it in their grip for almost ten minutes, only a hole about three feet in diameter was burned in its back.

'My cloak! My God!' she kept repeating. She didn't give us the cane: the thing was too serious for that; this was something on which an endless feud might be based.

If God appeared to Moses in a burning bush, a merry pagan god surely appeared to us in Miss Cassidy's burning cloak.

PATRICK KAVANAGH.

(*To be continued.*)

THE INFLUENCE OF OVID

By W. B. Sedgwick

To us in the twentieth century it seems as if no other Latin poet could claim to have exercised a spell at all comparable to Virgil's on the Western mind. Yet great as has been the influence of Virgil for the last two thousand years, for at least half that time it has probably been equalled, if not surpassed, by that of one who is now almost universally regarded as immeasurably his inferior—poor neglected Ovid.

We are not, however, here concerned with the barren question of comparative merits, nor even, except in a secondary degree, with the rehabilitation of Ovid's reputation. But it is pertinent to our inquiry to ask by virtue of what qualities each of the two poets maintained, or failed to maintain, his ascendency over men's minds. There can be no doubt, in looking back over the last two thousand years, that through all vicissitudes of taste Virgil has always appealed to men as the poet of Imperial Rome. But in other ways his appeal has not been so constant. Tennyson apostrophises him as ' Thou majestic in thy sadness At the doubtful doom of human kind ' and ' Wielder of the stateliest measure Ever moulded by the lips of man ' ; and it is probably of these two aspects that most people now first think at the mention of Virgil's name.

But, subject possibly to some slight qualification, both these aspects may be said to be discoveries of the nineteenth century. Milton's blank verse shows indeed that he must have studied and appreciated the Virgilian hexameter, but it may be doubted whether it was generally realised before the nineteenth century that Virgil's versification was noticeably superior to Ovid's, say, or Lucan's. Likewise the romantic element in Virgil, his subdued tones, his ' pathetic half-lines,' which so affected Newman, had in previous ages passed virtually unnoticed.

The position of Virgil in the *Divine Comedy* has distorted our vision of his position in the Middle Ages generally. But Virgil's presence in the *Divine Comedy* is largely accidental; to Dante's plan Virgil was necessary not only as the singer of Imperial Rome, but as Virgil the explorer of the underworld, Virgil the prophet and theologian. To others in the Middle Ages, Virgil was no doubt all this, but, generally speaking, the less so as their minds fell the more beneath the level of Dante's.

Even before the Middle Ages Virgil had become a quarry for grammarians and lexicographers, the pabulum of rhetoricians and scholiasts. If we would estimate his position as a poet pure and simple we must turn from the dry compilations of Macrobius and Nonius, the (to us) strangely unappreciative commentaries of Servius and Donatus and the fantastic dreams of Fulgentius, to the testimonies of those for whom the magic of Virgil was unabated indeed, but alas! now a seductive Siren-song, one of the illusive and transitory pleasures of the world—to the great Christian saints, Jerome and Augustine. For Virgil's reputation as poet proper through the Middle Ages this was the beginning of the end. He was saved for ordinary minds only as the unconscious prophet of the Messiah, the pagan who, drawing inspiration from the Sibyl, had announced the imminent advent of the Virgin, the Child, and the Golden Age. Except for a few stray voices from the Carolingian Age, mostly Teutonic, we hear singularly little in the earlier Middle Ages which shows any close study, much less appreciation, of the *Aeneid* (the device of the Pastoral was too useful to ignore), considering Virgil's enormous prestige, now beginning to be increased by his reputation as a magician. The great mediæval scholar, Traube, indeed speaks of an *aetas Vergiliana*, followed by an *aetas Horatiana* (which, however, ignored the *Odes!*); but compared with the *aetas Ovidiana* which came flooding in with the eleventh century, these were little more than ripples on the stream of literature.

We must pass rapidly over Virgil in Renaissance and later times. As the unquestioned prince of Latin poets he certainly lost nothing in reputation at the Renaissance—indeed he was now exalted at the expense of Homer—but little or nothing was written which shows such appreciation of his finer qualities as we find, for instance, in Tennyson's ode, or

almost any English or French criticism of note in the nineteenth century.[1] We need not wonder at this. There is in Virgil an essential strain of romance (his Celtic inheritance, the followers of Renan assure us), which was not likely to appeal to the neo-Classical school or their Renaissance predecessors: and other characteristic beauties of Virgil, particularly his exquisite manipulation of language and rhythm, required a minute and loving study such as those spacious times were hardly prepared to give.

In Ovid, on the contrary, the virtues lie on the surface. The hastiest reader (Ovid saw to that only too well) is not likely to pass over his ingenious utilisation of every rhetorical device, the inexhaustible play of his fancy, and his light and graceful touch as a story-teller. He had the defects of his qualities; the ancients (and indeed Ovid himself) knew that well enough—*nimis amator ingenii sui*, says Quintilian—but they continued to admire and imitate him, not only in poetry, but in the schools of declamation. Augustus, it is true, after banishing him, tried to ban his works; but in vain. Cestius, a contemporary, complains that he flooded [2] the whole generation with his epigrams (*sententiae*). A poet on his tombstone is described as *poeta Ovidianus*. Verses from his amatory poems have been found scratched on walls at Pompeii. His poems, like Virgil's *Eclogues*, were turned into 'pantomimes' and danced on the Stage. But he seems to have escaped Virgil's fate of becoming a school book in his lifetime.

Later Latin poets were Ovidians almost to a man. Statius, Lucan, Seneca, Valerius Flaccus and Claudian are all steeped in Ovidian technique. It is in fact only by the wholesale appropriation of tools from Ovid's workshop that they are able to erect their (externally at least) imposing edifices at all. The estimable and unreadable Silius Italicus is the sole pathetic example of the thoroughgoing Virgilian. The fact is any clever young man can imitate Ovid, but it takes a poet to imitate Virgil.

[1] In Germany, and in a less degree elsewhere, this century saw a reaction against Virgil in favour of Homer. France on the whole remained true to Virgil, as we might expect. But in England not only Homer but Lucretius was in many quarters preferred to Virgil. This was largely due to the influence of H. A. J. Munro, whose edition of Lucretius was the noblest monument of English scholarship of the whole century. His controversy with Conington, the hardly less admirable editor of Virgil, on this subject still makes excellent reading.

[2] *or* tainted?—*implevit*.

Ovid continued to be widely popular throughout the classical age, but as he offered little scope for the erudition of grammarians and commentators, the evidence must be sought in allusions and imitations rather than in anything corresponding to the erudite (and otherwise) Virgilian literature previously mentioned. We have no scholia except to that *tour de force* of obscurity, the *Ibis*. Ovid is ignored by scholars like Aulus Gellius and Nonius, who are full of Virgilian lore.

With the advent of Christian poetry about the fourth century, and the decay of the classical tradition, the domination of Ovid received a temporary check, although he was still much studied and imitated—while certain passages, such as the descriptions of Creation and Deucalion's flood in the *Metamorphoses*, were much too useful to be passed over by the numerous composers of Biblical epics. In the Dark Ages all classical literature suffered an eclipse. When we emerge into the Carolingian twilight we find Virgil and Horace on the whole more popular than Ovid—although it is interesting to find the poet Moduin at the academy of Charlemagne masquerading under the pseudonym of Naso. It is with the tremendous impetus given to the study of Ovid by that revival of learning and passionate devotion to the writing of Latin poetry, which began in the eleventh century, probably at first in isolated monastic centres, but soon in regular schools with an established tradition, that we really enter on the Second Ovidian Age.[3]

For anyone who has not studied the enormous volume of Latin poetry of the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries, not easily available when not reprinted in the two hundred odd volumes of Migne's *Patrologia Latina*, and then often so ill-edited as to be unintelligible, it is difficult to realise the extent to which the influence of Ovid permeates the literature of the time. A detailed examination of the mediæval text-books of Latin verse-composition recently edited by M. Faral would perhaps be the readiest way to bring home to a modern reader the domination of Ovid in the schools.

Taking as typical the earliest and perhaps the most influential of these treatises, the *Ars Versificatoria* of Matthew of Vendôme, we find that Ovid is the accepted model for

[3] In the catalogues of monastic libraries we find that MSS of Ovid become common in Germany about 800, in France about 1000, and in England about 1100

metre, rhetoric, description and narrative alike. Virgil is quoted some 30 times, Statius 27 (his *Silvae* were then unknown), Lucan 40, Ovid about 60.[4] Matthew's practice corresponds to his precept. His poems, which had an astonishing vogue, are not only full of Ovidian imitations, but, even on scriptural subjects, are Ovidian in conception, style and spirit. This applies to nearly all Latin poetry of the time.

It was mostly about this time (the twelfth century) that the large body of Ovidian apocrypha sprang up—much of it actually under Ovid's name, more still simply exercises on Ovidian themes. The practice of writing fresh *Heroides* (epistles of mythological heroines to their lovers—Oenone to Paris, Dido to Aeneas, Penelope to Ulysses, etc.) began in Ovid's lifetime, so that it is now uncertain which of the number are really by Ovid—a striking example of how his style lent itself to imitation. From towards the end of the eleventh century, however, it seems almost as if every budding poet was expected to show his powers by writing a new Ovidian poem. The amount of such poetry must have been prodigious; almost every fresh publication of mediæval Latin poetry provides new specimens. Those who could not imitate read, studied and taught Ovid. In spite of subjects which to us seem most unsuitable, his works were assiduously read in schools. They were allegorised, moralised, abridged and commented on—we even hear of an *Ovidius in usum nonnarum*—till finally, in the fifteenth century, it was discovered that the *Metamorphoses* was really an alchemical allegory (*Le Grand Olympe* of Nic. Valois)!

It may be said that in any case the influence of Ovid on this Latin poetry has a purely academic interest. Can these dry bones live? Had they any influence on the vernacular poetry, now in its green and lusty youth? It is one of the great services of Professor Faral to have shown how the French poetry of the time continually drew on Latin sources, gaining inspiration from Ovid, both directly and indirectly, through his mediæval imitators and the precepts of the

[4] Of the Virgilian quotations 14 are from the *Eclogues* (easily favourites in the Middle Ages), and 14 or 15 from the *Aeneid* Of the Ovidian there are 12 from the *Metamorphoses*, 10 from the *Ars Amandi*, 10 from the *Heroides*, 7 from the *Ex Ponto*, 6 from the *Remedia*, 5 from the *Tristia* We may note that Horace's Odes are only once quoted, and that wrongly.

schools.[5] This French courtly poetry in turn inspired al vernacular courtly poetry of Western Europe, and it is no more than the truth to say that in this way the influence of Ovid affected the whole course of European poetry.

For English literature we luckily have the essay on Ovid of Mr. S. G. Owen in 'English Literature and the Classics.' Mr. Owen examines in detail the poetry of Chaucer and Gower. He is concerned chiefly with the stories taken from Ovid,[6] but Ovid's influence is not less great on their treatment and style. If Chaucer is the greatest of English story-tellers, he is so largely because he went to school with Ovid—not just taking his themes from him, but basing his whole technique on him and his mediæval followers. M. Legouis has recently insisted that Chaucer's art, outlook and poetical ancestry are essentially French. This is undoubtedly the case, and, if so, it indicates yet another channel through which Ovid's influence flowed into the main current of English literature. Down to the Renaissance the influence of Ovid can hardly be overestimated.

Nor was his influence confined to the Western world. Like Virgil, and unlike any other Latin poet, he was imitated by a Greek epic poet, the fifth-century Quintus Smyrnaeus—Tennyson's Quintus Calaber. More fortunate than Virgil, he even attracted the attention of the Byzantine Greeks, who, as a rule, chose to ignore Latin literature, and to live on the memory of their past glories—especially after the great schism of the Western and Eastern Churches. The two favourite works, the *Metamorphoses* and *Heroides*, were translated into Greek prose somewhere about 1300 by the monk Planudes, more familiar to us as the compiler of the last Greek Anthology. The date and choice seem to suggest the influence of the *aetas Ovidiana*. But, like Virgil, Ovid lived on, not only in the veneration of the learned, but more than any other ancient author except possibly Cicero, in the memory and imagination of the unlettered—and still lives to-day in the neighbourhood of his birthplace Sulmona, in connexion with Ciciarone d'Arpino.[7]

[5] *Les Sources latines des Contes et Romans courtois*, 1913 *Les Arts Poetiques du XIIe et du XIIIe Siècle*, 1923, Paris, Champion

[6] See especially the *House of Fame*, the *Legend of Good Women* and the Manciple's Tale. Gower's debt is still greater.

[7] A de Nino, *Ovidio nella tradizione popolare di Sulmona*, Casalbordino, 1886

A strange story is told of a lost book of Ovid, which came into the hands of a general of Napoleon's at Sulmona, and later disappeared; while as a set-off to the well-known mediæval legends of Virgil (some of which in certain versions are fathered on Ovid) we may quote one of the many told of Ovid. Two students visited the poet's tomb in the hope of eliciting some words of wisdom from his spirit. The first asked what was his best line: a voice replied

> Virtus est licitis abstinuisse bonis.

The second asked what was his worst: the voice replied

> Omne juvans statuit Jupiter esse bonum

Both students then offered to pray for the repose of the poet's soul. But the voice replied

> Nolo Pater Noster. carpe, viator, iter [8]

The position of Ovid in Elizabethan literature has been illustrated by Mr. Owen, so that it is not necessary to go over the whole ground again; but one or two points may be noticed. If there is anything in Virgil which rivalled in popularity the favourite themes of Ovid, it is the story of Dido. Yet when Chaucer in the *Legend of Good Women* tells the story, he cannot refrain from adding Dido's letter to Aeneas from the *Heroides*—and so spoiling the climax. Similarly in Shakespeare's lines in the *Merchant of Venice*

> In such a night
> Stood Dido with a willow in her hand
> Upon the wild sea-banks, and waved her love
> To come again to Carthage

what strikes us is not so much the lack of any distinct reference to Virgil (this particular episode is, of course, completely at variance with the Virgilian tradition), but the totally un-Virgilian spirit of the whole. In fact it is reasonable to suppose that Shakespeare could not have been thinking of Virgil's text at all. The passage seems, indeed, more in keeping with the Ovidian invention of a last despairing letter sent by the 'unhappy Dido' before she determines on death.[9]

[8] Cf. Sandys' *History of Classical Scholarship*, Vol I (2nd Ed), p 640 The quotations are altered from *Heroides* xvii, 98 and iv, 133

[9] Surely no student of Virgil could ever have referred to Baptista Mantuanus as the 'good old Mantuan,' as Shakespeare does.

(We note that Lorenzo's other classical references are to Ovidian stories.)

Shakespeare's knowledge of the classics, or at least his use of them, has been vastly exaggerated. He was no reader of books, Latin or other. Of all classical poets Ovid was the only one who can be said to have exercised any considerable influence on him, and one may well doubt whether even Ovid was much read by him after his school days, except in Golding's fine version, of which the influence has often been pointed out.[10] The Ovidian spirit of the early Shakespeare of *Venus and Adonis*, *Lucrece*, and the 'sugared sonnets' (and, we may add, of the early plays) is sufficiently obvious, and was recognised by Meres in a well-known passage of *Palladis Tamia*. It is not unlikely that the grave-scene in *Romeo and Juliet* owes something to the catastrophe of Ovid's *Pyramus and Thisbe*; while Zielinski has suggested that Cleopatra's farewell to Antony contains echoes of Dido's epistle to Aeneas.

The influence of Ovid on Spenser was not inconsiderable. Drayton's *Heroical Epistles* are avowedly modelled on the *Heroides*. Other Elizabeth imitators and translators are enumerated by Mr. Owen: here it will suffice to mention Shirley's *Contention of Ajax and Ulysses* (for the armour of Achilles), which contains some fine rhetoric—besides the familiar lyric 'The glories of our blood and state'—closely modelled on the thirteenth book of the *Metamorphoses*.

There is perhaps no more striking example of the influence of Ovid then the story of Pyramus and Thisbe. When Shakespeare in the *Midsummer Night's Dream* wished to give Bottom's company the most hackneyed subject he could think of for their tragedy, his choice fell on this story. Yet Ovid, contrary to his usual custom, goes out of his way to tell us the story in his day was a novelty—*volgaris fabula non est*: and, as a matter of fact, we find it in no other classical author, nor does it again appear till about A.D. 1100. From that time, however, it probably excelled in popularity any other story of classical mythology. Besides numerous Latin versions, we have translations and adaptations in nearly every European vernacular. From literature it seems to have passed into the

[10] Mr Owen shows that Shakespeare has made use of every one of the fifteen books of the *Metamorphoses*

possession of the unlettered, so that Shakespeare could appropriately put it in the repertory of his 'base mechanicals.' But he made noble amends when he transferred it to the climax of Romeo and Juliet.

Habent sua fata libelli. It is strange that the 'good natured' story of Baucis and Philemon, on the contrary, attracted little attention till Dryden inserted it in his *Fables* and Swift followed with his charming adaptation: to the musician it has been familiarised by Gounod's setting, while Hawthorne's playful fancy has made it a nursery classic. This again was a little-known local legend from Southern Asia Minor. It is almost, if not quite, unknown outside the pages of Ovid. Yet it was the memory of this very story in that very spot which caused the inhabitants of Lystra to assume that the coming of Paul and Barnabas was a second visitation of Mercury and Jupiter—hence the hastily prepared sacrifice. They were not going to be caught napping a second time.

There is one further point of considerable interest which seems hitherto never to have been brought out. One of the chief formative influences on Elizabethan tragedy, as is well known, was Senecan tragedy. (This applies still more to French tragedy, but we cannot go into that here.) Greek drama was almost unknown—it is strange that Marlowe, Chapman, and Jonson, who presumably did know it, chose to make no use of it—and so it was left for Seneca to provide a much-needed model of orderly construction and pointed dialogue. The individual results, mostly of the type of Kyd's *Spanish Tragedy*, were not, as a rule, particularly happy, and deserved Shakespeare's satire in *Hamlet*; but the experience was necessary and on the whole salutary to our adolescent drama.

Now where did Seneca find *his* models—he did not originate the style? Not in Greek tragedy, nor in that of its early Roman imitators, but in the new rhetorical tragedy. Of this by far the most splendid and influential example was Ovid's one tragedy, the *Medea*, of which Quintilian says that it shows what Ovid could have achieved if he had been willing to curb his luxuriance The kinship of Seneca with Ovid is unmistakable—there is the same exaggerated pointedness, the same conciseness of detail combined with profusion in general, the same restless rhetorical ingenuity. Yet the result

was by no means all bad. It is the fashion now to decry Seneca's tragedies and emphasise his faults, but the present writer, at least, found them decidedly vigorous, stimulating and powerfully expressed. They no doubt encouraged the Elizabethan taste for violence—if it needed any encouraging—but nearly all that is best (apart from the sheer poetry) in our early drama can be traced back through Seneca ultimately to Ovid.

Ovid's influence (through Seneca) on French drama has been glanced at; not less was his direct influence on the splendid Italian epic of the Renaissance. But for an equally striking illustration of Ovid's popularity at the Renaissance we may turn for a moment from literature to painting. The facility of technique then attained was accompanied by a wider choice of subjects, which should give scope for the display of rich colouring, splendid architecture, romantic background and the voluptuous charm of nude or classically draped figures—suitable decorations for the palaces of aristocratic patrons, lay or clerical, whose taste was for the most part frankly pagan. Hence a great impetus was given to mythological painting, first chiefly in the Venetian school, later spreading to most of the *cinquecentisti*. There was no need to seek far afield for subjects: Ovid offered an inexhaustible choice—there are over two hundred stories in the *Metamorphoses* alone—and apart from the variety of subjects, his treatment of mythology, by its rich colouring, play of fancy and love of picturesque detail and dramatic moments, was admirably adapted to artistic treatment not only in painting but in sculpture as well.

We now come to Restoration times and the great name of John Dryden. In the preface to *Annus Mirabilis*, speaking of the stories of Myrrha, Byblis and Althea in the *Metamorphoses*, Dryden roundly declares that Ovid has 'touched these tender strokes more delicately than Virgil could' (in his treatment of Dido). In the preface to the *Fables* he tells how he began with the twelfth book of the *Metamorphoses* for its story of the Trojan war, and was insensibly led on to translate large portions of the rest of the poem, and thence to Chaucer who 'in many things resembled him, and that with no disadvantage on the side of the modern author.' The detailed comparison of the two which follows ranks among the very happiest

achievements of this great critic. In his championship of Chaucer he may seem to have done something less than justice to Ovid, but, on the whole, his judgments are full of penetrating insight and critically tempered enthusiasm. The majority of the *Fables* are from Ovid, and show that the old poet's hand had not lost its cunning; but he did not live to enjoy his well-merited success.

Probably Dryden's *Fables* are not much read to-day, but most lovers of literature will be familiar with Gay's Ovidian *Acis and Galatea*—if only through Handel's music, with its magnificently apposite setting of Polyphemus' rollicking and truly cyclopean love-ditty 'O ruddier than the cherry.' Gay might have gone to Virgil or Theocritus for this song, but like Ovid he saw that what was wanted was a touch of burlesque in keeping with the monstrous shepherd's hundred-holed pipe. (Incidentally Ovid, Gay, and Handel alike seem to have thought that Polyphemus could sing and accompany himself on the pipes at the same time.)

It would be possible to carry the story further by an enumeration of the sporadic imitations and borrowings from Ovid in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but the story would be disconnected, except perhaps for the lighter French verse of the eighteenth century. Ovid's vogue came to an end somewhere round 1700—it is hard to say why; but the Augustans liked ponderousness, and Ovid is anything but ponderous: they liked moralising, if only of the easy-going Horatian type, but Ovid is no moralist: they professed interest in the 'study of mankind,' but they were not much interested in the study of womankind, where they might have learnt something from Ovid—Pope's *Elegy on an Unfortunate Woman* perhaps owes something to this source.

In the nineteenth century the case is somewhat different. If in the past Ovid's popularity had been partly due to his defects, it is equally true that now his unpopularity was partly due to his merits. If he had been obscure like Persius, or difficult like Lucretius, or archaic like Plautus, or turgid like Lucan, he would not have lacked readers. Instead we find in him perfect ease and simplicity, qualities to which we have long been unaccustomed in poetry; and so Ovid lost his public.

Still he has had his day. It is probable that no single

poet of any age or country has exercised so far-reaching an influence; and now, after two centuries of comparative neglect, there are signs that he is coming into his own again. There is not likely to be another *aetas Ovidiana*, but that Ovid is once more beginning to attract attention may be seen from three very different works of our own time—Professor Slater's vast critical compilation on the *Metamorphoses*, Professor E. K. Rand's *Ovid and his Influence*, and Professor Gilbert Murray's appreciation of Ovid in his *Essays and Addresses*. Ovid is not yet played out, by any means.

W. B. SEDGWICK.

BOOKS RECEIVED

The Poems of Jonathan Swift, edited by Harold Williams: in three volumes (Clarendon Press, 60*s*.).

We hardly know which to congratulate most, the Oxford Press or the editor they have chosen to edit the most uneditable of English writers. Ten years has barely sufficed to give the literary world a piece of scholarship redolent of the spacious days of Queen Victoria. During the past ten years some dozen books have been issued about Swift without really piercing the tangles and knots which surround both the disputed facts and the misunderstood psychology of the great Dean. America has been particularly active, but both France and Switzerland have had their say. It has remained for a Cambridge man employing the Oxford Press to show the world how to edit the English classics and in the process to sift the corpus of Swift's poetry to the bones. Henceforth we shall know what previous readers and writers did not know: exactly the poems which Swift did write and those which he did not. That in itself is a great achievement, and one achieved only with a painstaking process which had gone out of fashion and a grim determination to leave no stone unturned. We may say that Mr. Williams has done more, for he has shifted and bolted the very gravel in his search for the actual proofs of Swift's handiwork. Here is a book that will never have to be done again unless untold and unimaginable treasures turn up actually in Swift's script.

Swift's poetry is as important in the study of the Master as the Sonnets are in the life and soul of Shakespeare. In his prose Swift revealed his mind, but his heart in all its tenderness and ferocity can only be deciphered from his poems. Hence the enormous value of this work. Mr. Williams has cut out the Apocrypha—that is, the 150 supposed pieces which have been attributed to Swift—leaving us with the 250 genuine. The Apocrypha of Swift was particularly lavish

and evil-smelling, because for a century any anonymous epigram or ballad that wished for circulation announced itself as by D * * * * r S * * * t. Mr. Williams admits that Pope was Swift's superior in verse, but 'his standing was within the circle of the Augustan poets and in prose his range was far beyond their compass.' No doubt his poetic vesture was too close for him, and, though it was never transfigured, it often was broken and torn to pieces in such terrible utterances as his poem on the Day of Judgment or on the Legion Club. Imagine an Aeschylus going insane in the effort to write verse for the cultured eighteenth century!

If Swift began writing like Cowley, 'it is Cowley with a sombre power.' Mr. Williams lays his genius 'in the succession of Samuel Butler.' The real importance of his poetry was that he used it to sharpen his daily pen and that 'no part of his writing is as complete an autobiography and no part of his writing so calls for annotation.' What little he wrote of Satire remains the most unequalled part of his contribution to the language. 'No verse satire in English, or in any language pierces, wounds and scarifies like that of Swift. There was no warding off the thrust whether the attack was personal directed at Nottingham, Richard Tighe, Lord Allen or Bettesworth, or general against the ministry.'

Realising this, one is indignant that 'Swift's verse has been shabbily treated by his editors,' but this is a reproach which is now majestically rolled away. It is interesting that as Mr. Williams arises from his studies, in which he must have become more deeply cognisant of Swift than any since Swift's actual contemporaries, he cannot help comparing him to the one other Englishman of his time whose shadow streaks history as greatly. 'Swift like Marlborough is not easily explicable. Each was an enigma to his contemporaries: and each has left to succeeding generations unsolved problems of life and character.' Macaulay, brilliant and superficial, was thrown out by the chiaroscuro of both the General and the Satirist. Only slow and unrelenting scholarship in our own times since the war in each case has enabled the cloak to be drawn from those two, who were unconquerable and unchallengeable in their particular fields.

SHANE LESLIE.

Index to Statutory Definitions. Prepared in the Office of Parliamentary Counsel (Stationery Office, 1936, 10*s*. net).

This invaluable work of reference, which replaces an earlier edition, now long out of date and out of print, is uniform in size, binding and type with the *Chronological Tables* and *Index to the Statutes in Force* which, annually revised to date, is published at 25*s*. for two volumes containing 2750 pages, whereas the volume before us, at 10*s*. for 300 pages, is proportionately more than three times as dear. It is worth the money this year, but will not be worth it in a few years' time, for an index that is not up to date is unsatisfying. It should be revised and reissued annually, like the volumes above referred to, to which it is a useful companion Now that it has been so well begun in the office of the Parliamentary Counsel it might perhaps be continued by the editor of the Statute-book. Issued annually, and printed from standing type, it could be priced cheaper, and would be invaluable.

A careful study of the contents suggests that the Interpretation Act, 1889 (which should have been, for completeness' sake, printed as a preface or appendix), should be replaced as soon as may be by a new Act, which would include many definitions here inserted and would help to shorten the Statute-book by many pages each year. The scheme of the book as a whole is, however, open to criticism. Let us take the definition of the word 'COUNTY'; the book refers us to s. 6 of the Contagious Diseases (Animals) Act, 1869—which was in fact repealed and replaced by the similar Act of 1878, to s. 7 of which we are likewise referred for a definition of 'county.' But these Acts were both wiped out by the similar Act of 1894, which is not mentioned, no definition of 'county' being found therein, presumably because of the passing in 1888 of a Local Government Act.

The omission of the regnal year is an inconvenience. We are referred to the Telegraph Act of 1868 for a definition of 'undertaking'; but in which of the two Acts passed in this year, one of 31 & 32 Vict. and the other of 32 & 33 Vict., shall we find it?

'Constituency' is defined in the Representation of the People Act, 1918, s. 41 (1), c. 64. Is it c. 64 of 7 & 8 Geo. 5, or of 8 & 9 Geo. 5?

So long as Parliament clings to anachronistic ways of which this is a sample, using antiquity as a cloak for indolence, publications such as this cannot but follow suit.

The volume excludes definitions included in private Acts of Parliament by local authorities and statutory bodies, and definitions relating solely to Scotland and Ireland. There are surely good grounds for including Scottish and Irish specialities in the form of

an appendix; and a proper index to the first-named category of definitions is badly needed. The bulk of local legislation exceeds that of public Acts: much of it empowers local bodies to impose heavy penalties for an immense variety of petty offences (the Surrey County Council Act of 1935 created twenty-six new statutory offences). It badly needs overhauling, and I suspect that an index of definitions in such Acts would reveal many surprising anachronisms.

Scottish Agriculture. 25th Report (for 1936) of the Department of Agriculture for Scotland (Stationery Office, 1937, 2*s*.).

We hear much of the importance of milk as food, but the way of the reformer is hard. We learn from this Report (p. 22) that 300,000 children in Scotland received milk at half price or less in 1936, as compared with 350,000 in 1935, owing to 'the novelty of the scheme having worn off and to the loss of taste for milk by some of the children.' To ascertain the demand for milk at reduced prices for schoolchildren during the summer holidays, the Scottish Board established four milk centres in Glasgow for the supply of Grade A (T.T.) milk at the price of ½*d.* per one-third of a pint to all children who consumed it on the premises. While there was a satisfactory demand during the early stages of the experiment, the number of children taking advantage of these facilities declined from 8060 in the first week to 935 in the last week of the experiment.

So much for the expenditure of over £22,000 in two years on publicity and propaganda. It is doubtful whether more milk would have been drunk by the children had the supply been free of all cost.

ARNOLD WILSON.

WALKS AND TALKS

A Visit to Spain

By Sir Arnold Wilson, M.P.

The visitor to Spain to-day who follows Wellington's route crosses the frontier at Hendaye where the British Embassy is housed less than 100 yards from the dividing bridge, as if its occupants, like the ghosts beyond the Styx, were looking longingly across the stream '*tendebantque manus ripae ulterioris amore.*' He need go but a few kilometres further, to Irun, to see with his own eyes the ravages of the disease which attacked Spain fifteen months ago at a moment when her powers of resistance had been enfeebled by the latest of a long series of events the historical significance of which has yet to be assessed.[1] Here he will see the gaunt frame of tenements and mansions, churches and public buildings, which were burned, not, for the most part, by local inhabitants, nor by autonomist Basques, but by an International Brigade, working on lines prescribed by their Moscow-trained leaders as best calculated to inspire terror and strike despair into men's hearts, or by Anarchists, who have survived here as nowhere else. Here was no resistance to be encountered, no military objective to be attained; the perpetrators had little difficulty in finding shelter in French territory.

A little further south is San Sebastian, the southernmost outpost of cosmopolitan and pleasure-seeking Europe. It suffered little from fire, but not a few of its leading inhabitants were murdered in cold blood. It is prosperous now; officers and men (for whom an admirable institute exists—a happy blend of Y.M.C.A. and Casino) on leave from the various fronts, wounded and invalids, rub shoulders with newspaper correspondents and *rastaquères*. It was near here that the aged

[1] See Professor Allison Peers, 'Pendulum over Spain,' *Nineteenth Century and After*, September 1936.

Argentine ambassador, a figure worthy of the Court of the Third Empire, replied to a Communist demand for the surrender of two *falangistas* who were in his house by showing himself with an arm round each, saying, 'If you shoot them, you will shoot me.' The road to Bilbao follows the coast line for some miles before turning inland into the Basque country—fertile, prosperous, and mountainous, as beautiful as any part of Spain, with a population as versatile, as hardy and, at bottom, as peaceable as any in the Peninsula. The Basque is an aboriginal Spaniard, just as the Welsh are aboriginal 'Brittish,' as they used to be called in Acts of Parliament: they are rightly proud of their institutions, but the genuine demand for independence or even for antonomy is not stronger than in Wales or Scotland, and for the same reasons. General Franco has, however, explicitly undertaken to accord responsible local government, here and elsewhere, so far as is consistent with the principle of a united or unitarian State. Separation or Federalism is not advocated by more than one man in ten: the vast majority are to-day on the side of the Nationalists, and their dialect is heard far more often in their trenches to-day than ever in those of Valencia.

The road inland is a superb piece of engineering and is everywhere in perfect order. Innumerable bridges, destroyed in order to delay the advance of General Franco's forces, have been, or are being, rebuilt, but it will be years before the losses caused by wilful and senseless incendiarism can be made good. The hatred of Christian emblems displayed by the International Brigade has to be seen to be believed. Village crosses, museum pieces dating from the twelfth century or earlier, lie in fragments; the walls of churches which the patriotism and piety of 600 years had saved from destruction alone remain to testify to the power of petrol. Arson is treated in Spain (as in Palestine to-day) as a capital crime; to describe those who suffer for this offence, or for murder, after judicial trial, as 'executed prisoners of war' is not merely misrepresentation but ignorance of the laws of war since the days of Grotius, as embodied in our *Manual of Military Law*. Guernica is off the main road; it has been the subject of so much discussion that I need only say that no one acquainted, as I am, with the effects of bombardment from the air can doubt that most if not all the material damage was

caused by wilful incendiarism—and such is the verdict of the inhabitants.

Bilbao is three hours by car from San Sebastian. The approach from the north lies through the pleasant suburb of Las Arenas; just before the Nationalist troops occupied Bilbao, not without bitter fighting—courage is displayed no less by gangsters than by policemen—scores of fine houses and villas were here destroyed by fire. Some of the residents, including a woman about to give birth to a child, perished in the flames: very many others, *felix opportunitate mortis*, were seized and shot because they were men of substance, or loyal to such men. Every bridge across the river which divides the city was blown up: four have already been repaired, but to replace one, of *bascule* construction, will take months. I saw a British ship leaving, laden with ore, and a German ship almost ready to sail: the rolling mills are at work again and conditions seem almost normal. Food is abundant and cheap.

I met here by chance a very recent graduate from one of our older universities who had fought his way with the *requêtés* into Bilbao as one of the rank and file. He had last seen the lounge of the great hotel where we stopped begrimed and 'hopping with fleas'—for it had housed Red militiamen; it is now resplendent with mirrors and furniture reminiscent of what Lady Oxford has termed 'the early North-German Lloyd style'—such is the power of recuperation and the strength of tradition of a commercial city which was wont to call itself 'little London.'

I heard something here of the vexed question of the children who were taken to England and elsewhere. The local authorities are ready to receive and care for them: nothing in local conditions justifies their retention in England, where the climate in winter is unlikely to suit them. The provision made for orphan or destitute children, whether their parents are with the Republican-Socialist-Communist forces or not, is, as I myself can testify from personal investigation, excellent and not inferior to anything that we have done. The sense of communal responsibility is strong in Spain: there are many orphans, for large families are the rule, but few are in orphanages.

My companions in Bilbao and in the Basque country

wore the large scarlet beret, which once denoted a Carlist and later a Liberal, and has, by a strange paradox, become the essential mark of those who are fighting 'the Reds': I saw many such in every village. We met with no black looks and no lack of courtesy. Party badges, the colours of Spain and the bundle of arrows, first used as part of the arms of Ferdinand and Isabella, are widely worn and the outstretched arm is a common salute, but Spaniards are easy-going folk, even at such a time, and there is no moral compulsion to display either.

The distance between Bilbao and Burgos can be covered comfortably in four hours, for the roads are in first-class condition, despite heavy traffic; much of the scenery is of great beauty, reminiscent rather of Persia at its best than of anything in Europe. There is the same contrast between the desert and the town, the same bare hills and alluvial plateaux, the same indications of scanty rainfall. I nowhere saw troops on the march, but we passed many in lorries and saw a number in the trains which, as there are eleven level crossings between Bilbao and Burgos, I had some opportunity of observing. There are great opportunities here and elsewhere for irrigation on a large scale: of the measures to this end initiated by Primo de Rivera less than one-eighth has been accomplished, for his Liberal successors disowned the schemes.

General Franco's headquarters are at Burgos, where I spent the night and part of one day and had some conversation with responsible officials. The aftermath of Nyon had aroused feelings, particularly against Great Britain, which were not less bitter because they did not find expression, as in Germany and Italy, in Press diatribes or in loudly voiced protests. The Press and the politicians, great and small, of the Continent have much to learn from nationalistic Spain in this regard. The scrupulous courtesy which, in common with other English visitors, I invariably met with in official circles, whilst it mitigated, could not conceal the feeling of pained surprise that England, of all countries, should have lent herself, in their eyes, to a policy which, whatever its theoretical merits and original intentions, was now unquestionably tending to prolong the civil war and would impose upon Nationalist Spain yet greater sacrifices of men and material.

I had not the honour of being received by General Franco for, contrary to expectation, he was due to leave for one of the fronts on the following morning. His burden is very heavy: but for the lamentable accidents which robbed the Nationalists of two other great leaders—Generals Mola and Sanjurjo—it would be easier to bear. On the other hand, as in Great Britain, the very fact that the head of the Government has assumed the responsibilities of office reluctantly, under the pressure not of ambition but of circumstances, adds to the confidence reposed in him by the public. He is no demagogue, and I use the word in no derogatory sense; his voice is seldom heard on the microphone. His public pronouncements differ but little from those of a British Viceroy or Prime Minister at a critical moment. He inspires Spaniards with sober confidence; the Moors hold him in enthusiastic reverence. His Government has 700,000 men under arms: it administers two-thirds of the area and population of Spain, not by force, but through the regular civil administration, which has not been suspended but only supplemented. In no area whence he has expelled the Communist-Socialist-Republican troops has any attempt been made to waylay military convoys or to hamper the administration. The normal life of the countryside has everywhere been resumed. Why, I was everywhere asked, should we refuse belligerent rights? Why do we refuse to recognise (as Professor H. A. Smith has pointed out in *The Times* of September 18) that lawlessness at sea is the ineluctable consequence of such a refusal. Our reluctance to envisage a Spain under German and Italian influence was understandable, but I was assured that such fears were unfounded. In no circumstances whatever would Nationalist Spain, traditionalist and patriotic, envisage or consent to accord to any foreign Power rights or immunities on Spanish soil or in the Spanish possessions, all of which are now behind General Franco.

Action provokes reaction: the Nationalist claim, amply documented, is that Spain sought external support only as a consequence of aid lent on a far more extensive scale to those who had seized power in Madrid, for ends and by means never for a moment contemplated by a bemused electorate. Madrid would long ago have been at peace and almost undamaged but for the International Brigade, which a non-

intervention policy did not hinder from proceeding to Barcelona from Paris and elsewhere. The first foreign aeroplanes to reach Madrid were French, the first tanks Russian.

Like Æneas of old (speaking of Dido), their cry is, '*Italiam non sponte sequor.*'

On the other hand, I was reminded that the Valencia Government had shown itself ready to use Spanish possessions as counters in the international game and had promised complete independence to the Moors. A leading Moroccan whom I met, elsewhere than in Spain, told me that the Moorist leaders had replied that they would never desert Franco, but that if he should fail the Valencia Government would discover that independence was not given but taken, and the French Government would realise that the Moroccans had not forgotten that they were once a nation. The border between Spanish and French Morocco existed not in men's hearts but on paper only, and not even Tangier would be unaffected should Monsieur Blum and his Soviet friends encompass Franco's downfall. Present troubles in Morocco, he concluded, will prove a mere rustling of the leaves in the breeze which presages a storm. 'You know the ways of Islam,' he concluded—for it was of Arabia that we had been speaking; 'you know that a war against "anti-God Christians" will unite many; Lyautey is dead and has no successors. There is fire beneath the ashes, and much to burn near-by.'

A French journalist with whom I made a chance contact discussed the effect on Portugal of a Red Spain, which he regarded as being beyond all question the only alternative to a Traditionalist and Nationalist Spain, whether totalitarian or monarchical. He had been recently in Lisbon; he had unbounded admiration for Señor Salazar, but was convinced that Portugal could not long withstand the ruthless and completely unscrupulous but clever propaganda of a Communist Spain—he had seen its dreadful effects in France. Infection would spread from Portugal to Portuguese colonies now tranquil, and would not stop there; the peace of Africa was bound up with the fate of the Iberian peninsula. He knew Spain and ridiculed the idea that it would be dominated by Italy or Germany, though debts of gratitude and honour could not be entirely ignored; men's memories were short—

a fact which accounted for most of the world's troubles to-day—a typically French generalisation.

Rapid progress is being made in the occupation of what is left of the Asturias. General Aranda's troops are opposed by the sturdiest fighters in the Peninsula—Asturian miners, unhappy by-products of industrialism, incurable revolutionaries, of whom Señor Largo Cabellero, now under a cloud in Valencia, is a typical example. There has been bitter fighting and victory will not be achieved without a struggle; but the real problem of pacification will be harder still, for the Asturians have much in common with Sinn Feiners in their most intractable moods. Moreover, many men are with them who have a long bill of cold-blooded murder to answer for before a judge. Executions in Bilbao were only about 150: there will be more in Gijon, but, seeing that *The Times* Correspondent has estimated that 50,000 non-combatants, at the lowest estimate, were slaughtered in Madrid and Barcelona, and as the total number of simple murders in the last fifteen months on the eastern side of Spain is put at 300,000, the prospect need not trouble our consciences, nor should we lift our hands too readily in pious horror, for murder campaigns have been not infrequent in the British Empire, and we have not flinched from dealing with them.

Half-way between Burgos and Salamanca lies Valladolid, where I paid my respects to the civil authorities and to Monsignor Henson, who has for many years been in charge of the English Catholic College there. He had nothing but praise for the present Government, under which, despite war conditions, the town was happier and better governed than at any time in the past five years. Before General Franco's troops had arrived an attempt had been made, and had almost succeeded, to burn down the college with its valuable library and old portraits. Such events were now things of the past.

Salamanca is the official headquarters of the civil Government: its fine buildings and the magnificent cathedrals atone for the rather featureless plain in which it stands. It has many lovely buildings, including a small 'palace' of the Duke of Alba, over the doors of which hangs a chain to show that a King of Spain once slept there, and the Fonseca

Palace, now the headquarters of the Irish College, with a noble mediæval library. I had the good fortune to meet some journalists, British and other, here, with whom I was able to talk freely. They felt their isolation from Paris, London and Berlin: papers arrived irregularly, and they had no means of judging the shifting currents and eddies set up by political storms elsewhere. Masaryk—a revolutionary of the good old days—had just died, and with him would be buried a political creed of which he was almost the last exponent. We spoke of the Nuremberg Congress which I had recently witnessed: could not some of the mystical respect for and devotion to work, as such, be grafted upon the deep-rooted old vines of other countries? There were few Germans in Nationalist Spain, and they mainly technicians, but they were held in high repute. The Irish Brigade were ill-led, but were fine soldiers and courageous: some had remained after their fellows had left. The Italians, whether on the Guadarama or the Santander front, had nothing to be ashamed of; but this was, at present, Spain's war, and all the difficulties experienced with mixed forces during the World War were present here in various forms. There was jealousy, too, between the Regulars, the *Requêtés*, and the *Falangistas*, not unlike the ill-feeling that had shown itself between Fascist and Regular units in Ethiopia, which did not, however, deprive Italy of the fruits of victory any more than the occasional rivalry between Regular and Australian divisions during the World War. The news from France was bad, but a reaction might be near; the French certainly seemed to be awakening to the nature of the forces at work in their midst and were thinking less of the menace of external foes.

I here met Señor Sangroniz, who carries great weight in the counsels of the Generalissimo: he was just recovering from a serious motor accident. He emphasised in conversation the discriminatory effect of the present régime against Nationalist Spain. Two-thirds of the whole country were behind Franco, yet they could not obtain recognition for their agents abroad. Their adherents—the vast majority of residents abroad—could not get passports from the consuls of Red Spain: their ships were handicapped. Whatever the intentions of France and Britain might be, the result was to

discriminate day by day in favour of the Communist element which now enjoyed undisputed predominance in Valencia.

At Salamanca arrangements were made for me to visit the Madrid front by way of the historic towns of Avila and Toledo. The road, though worn in some places by heavy military traffic, was good enough to enable us to maintain a high average speed. To the unpractised eye the soil seemed arid, but the crop, mainly a good hard, ' dry ' wheat, thrives with little rain, and the harvest this year has been exceptionally good, with the result that the price of food has not risen and is the lowest in Europe on this side of the front line and on the Barcelona-Valencia side the highest. The routine of village life seemed little affected by the war or by the absence of so many young men: the flocks of sheep and goats and the herds of cattle reminded me once more of Persia.

Avila has a long history and great charm, for its walls are intact and little restored. It suffered much before occupation by General Franco's forces, but in neither respect can it compare with Toledo, where we slept on our return from the Madrid front at Leganes, less than an hour's distance. This sector is not, like Huesca, Saragossa or Teruel, at present active: the trenches are within half a mile of Madrid and within 30 yards of the front-line trenches of Madrid's defenders. They are lightly held, but with strong forces in reserve: a graveyard with some hundreds of fresh graves near-by is the only evidence of past activity save for battered buildings and the sort of débris that is common to all wars. The men in the trenches were cheerful, like all good soldiers and, like all good Spaniards, inclined to be reckless. Their equipment was of the simplest and not all of the best quality, for most of it had been improvised; but the evening meal, which they were about to take, was really good—plenty of meat, vegetables and bread—and the men were at pains to take good care of their weapons. The officers looked a fine lot of men; the grizzled Commandant had learned his trade in Morocco against the very Moors who were now occupying the next lot of trenches, and some of them bore wounds, as he did, received in the last Riff war. The village where the reserves lay was full of Moors and Spanish Regulars, fraternising amiably, for nearly all Moors speak and many write Spanish. But for their distinctive dress they differ little in appearance

from Spaniards. I heard many stories of their courage, and of their personal devotion to General Franco. Those who affect to regard them as ' black troops ' should compare them with the Senegalese who are to be seen in such large numbers in France, and have, I believe, been used to quell riots in Paris.

I also met a young man, equally at home in London, Paris and Madrid, whose perilous task it was to talk, at various times from different points, to the occupants of the trenches opposite, telling them the latest home-truths, including current prices of foodstuffs at Salamanca and elsewhere, interspersed with a little good humour. This service has been fully organised and has helped to deplete the ranks of Madrid's defenders : I gathered that the counter-propaganda, whatever its merits, was never sufficiently attractive to induce desertions in the opposite direction.

Returning to Toledo, I visited the Alcazar next morning with Herr Timmermann's fine account of the siege (with an introduction by Yeats-Brown) in my pocket. Good as is his account, accurate in every detail, and written with a fine simplicity, it yet fails to convey to a reader who has not set foot in Toledo on how narrow a stage the whole epic was set. The Alcazar itself dates from Moorish times : the lower walls are of immense thickness, the upper storeys, built some fifty years ago with steel beams and hollow tile floors, were less solid. I was shown the cellars where the women and children lived and where a child was born. The women were given the chance, half-way through the siege, to leave, but refused. Three times mines were exploded beneath them, bringing down hundreds of tons of masonry : the survivors defended what was left ; they had little bread : without their horses they would have died of starvation, but would not have surrendered. The commandant, Colonel Moscardó, had ' grown old in the harness,' as Wellington wrote of one of his officers, but most of the garrison were quite young, as the inscriptions on the graves show. Some bodies were buried in the riding-school : when this could no longer be reached they were laid to rest in a great vault which held a little swimming-pool ; yet others were placed in niches and hidden from sight by loose piles of bricks. They have not been moved, but the bricks are set in mortar : it was felt to be a kind of sacrilege

to move them to hallowed ground, for the place had been consecrated by the very circumstances of their death. As I stood in that place Milton's lines came back to me :

> And, so sepúlchered, in such pomp dost lie
> That Kings, for such a tomb, would wish to die.

And I am sure that, for Kings of Spain, the phrase is no overstatement.

The young English *requêté* by my side was not less moved and suggested as an epitaph A. E. Housman's lines :

> Here dead lie we because we did not choose
> To live and shame the land from which we sprung
> Life, to be sure, is nothing much to lose,
> But young men think it is, and we were young

As we went out together into the sunlight we vowed that a tablet of homage, of English oak or stone, from Englishmen should, if possible, find a place on the wall when the anniversary of the relief of the citadel on September 27 is next celebrated.

A little War Museum has already been established: the relics of the siege include the telephone through which Colonel Moscardó was told by those who were investing the Alcazar that his son was in their power, and would be shot if the garrison did not surrender. By its side is the instrument through which his son heard his father's farewell and his injunction to die bravely with '*Viva España*' on his lips. His grave, I believe, is not known.

In Salamanca I was shown a letter, picked up in an abandoned billet, from a Red militiamen, who was a *matador*, a bullfighter, in private life, to a friend. It included, as an item of interest, a passage of which the following is a free translation :

> Me and my pals were given some priests to do in (*deducar*, as of a bull in the ring). I put my man through it with my stiletto in the back of his neck, just like a bull. The old swine kicked and struggled under me, and cried '*Viva Cristo Rey*' before he pegged out

Every Spaniard will admit that no race in Europe has been in the past, or still is, more careless of human life, whether their own or of another. Races, like individuals, have the defects of their qualities and the handicaps of ancestry and climate ; but it is very noteworthy that deliberate acts of wilful cruelty,

committed in cold blood over a period of many months, as part of a settled policy, not necessarily, or even probably that of the Valencia Government, but of those who pull the strings of the puppets, are not seriously alleged, much less proved, against General Franco's adherents. I will not seek to gratify morbid curiosity by printing here the testimony given me by an Englishman who, fighting for Franco, himself saw the multilated bodies of his comrades, previously taken prisoner by the militia forces of the Madrid Government, and satisfied himself that what had been done had been inflicted on living flesh. It is sufficient to say that his education, his experience and his upbringing give weight to his evidence. This poison has entered Spain, as it once entered Hungary, from Soviet Russia: whatever its origin, it is idle to deny its existence and vain to deplore it.

On the way back to Salamanca we visited the battlefield of Talavera: the hill on which Wellington watched the battle is marked with an obelisk. I would fain have spent some time there, but rain came down in torrents, and we took refuge for a space in the village of Santa Ollaya near-by and looked into the church, one of the finest in the diocese, with good fourteenth-century wall paintings. The Red militia had used it as a garage, breaking the wooden floor. They had smashed the stoup at the door, broken and defiled the Madonnas and Christs, put crowbars through a very fine old organ in the loft, and used the altar and reredos as firewood. Some pieces, ready for use, were left in a pile. It was, of course, only one of many hundreds so treated by the same set of men: the ornaments and furniture were doubtless of little intrinsic value. But all churches are not yet museums, and simple folk are less concerned with the intrinsic value of the contents of a place of worship than with their customary significance. They have a potential cash value to the despoilers: they can have none to the parishioners. The sight—often repeated—recalls Wordsworth's burning lines 130 years ago:

Indignation of a High-minded Spaniard

We can endure that He should waste our lands,
Despoil our temples, and by sword and flame
Return us to the dust from which we came;
Such food a Tyrant's appetite demands.

And we can brook the thought that by his hands
Spain may be overpowered, and he possess,
For his delight, a solemn wilderness
Where all the brave lie dead. But, when of bands
Which he will break for us he dares to speak,
Of benefits, and of a future day
When our enlightened minds shall bless his sway,
Then, the strained heart of fortitude proves weak;
Our groans, our blushes, our pale cheeks declare
That he has power to inflict what we lack strength to bear.

* * * * *

I had intended on leaving Salamanca (from Burgos to Marseilles by the Lufthansa line is only three hours) to go on to Barcelona, Valencia and Madrid. I expected that there might be some reluctance on either side to accept a visitor who might talk of what he had seen in one area to the authorities in the other; but the representative in London of General Franco raised no objection to my going to the other side before or after visiting Burgos: the Spanish Embassy courteously promised the necessary facilities to visit Valencia on my return to France from Burgos; and I made my arrangements accordingly, no easy matter, for all seats in the Stuttgart-Burgos-Lisbon 'plane are reserved weeks ahead. Two days before leaving Stuttgart I heard from the Spanish Embassy that, to their regret, the Department of Public Security had notified them that in no circumstances could they allow access to anyone who had been in 'rebel' territory, lest, I presume, he should, by unguarded conversation as to what he had seen, shatter some public illusions. I can think of no other explanation. I contrived, however, to meet in Paris a citizen of a South American State who had gone to Barcelona and Madrid to find out whether some of his relatives were alive, and had just returned. Of Madrid and Valencia he could say no more than can be read in *The Times*. Of Barcelona the account he gave was pitiable: the Communist International had assumed complete control; the P.O.U.M. Marxist leaders Nin and Garkhine had been murdered in gaol with many of their lieutenants, none of whom were now at liberty. The Socialist and Syndicalist groups had been virtually liquidated. Barcelona was in fact no longer under Spanish rule: Catalonia would likewise soon fall under the control of the Comintern. He believed

that the Catalonians would welcome General Franco as a deliverer and would revolt to-day were any leaders free to lead.

The sterling value of the peseta is higher in White than in Red Spain: yet the latter cannot lack gold; it has robbed the banks, it has emptied the safe deposits of private persons; it has exported great sums of gold; it has the mercury mines and the best orange groves. Franco has none of these advantages. I left my Hispano-American friend pondering over the many factors that give value to a paper currency, but not before he had told me that most of the South American States would recognise Franco to-morrow but for the presence, as refugees, in some of the embassies, of great numbers of Spaniards whose death warrant would be sealed by the withdrawal of ambassadors—a situation probably without parallel.

* * * * *

Here my narrative ends, not for lack of material, but of time. I offer no solution, and no opinion on matters of policy: it is Spain's misfortune, not her fault, that she is the pawn of others. Of one thing I am convinced: General Franco to-day represents a great majority of the Spanish people; his Spanish opponents in Valencia cannot do this, for they are no longer free agents; but Franco is free, and neither desires, nor will suffer, control, even by those Powers to whom he owes most. His foreign policy will not conflict with ours; Spain will never take part in a foreign war His domestic policy is not a defence of rank or privilege, but of popular rights and of the rights of all subject to the performance of those duties from which all rights are derived. No man in Spain, and no policy, is less likely to cause alarm to neighbours.

ARNOLD WILSON.

Communications should be addressed to the Editor of the NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER, 10 *&* 12 *Orange Street, Leicester Square, W.C.2.*

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THE

NINETEENTH CENTURY AND AFTER

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THE JAPANESE OUTLOOK AND FOREIGN INTERVENTION[1]

I.

By N. Skene Smith

Most Japanese are too busy or interested in modern developments to bother much about history. Yet even the poorest farmer under fifty years of age has been to a primary school and is likely to know something of Japan's past relations with Western Powers. Foreign intervention will not appeal to him. Those over fifty have felt the atmosphere of the days when the national slogan was 'Honour the Emperor, expel the barbarians,' and, while they are struck by the wonders of modern science, have sentimental attachments to ideas prevailing when Japan was developing along her own lines, regardless of what was happening in the rest of the world.

Western intervention in Japan has not a creditable history,

[1] Our October issue contained the latest of four articles by Mr F M Gull setting forth, broadly speaking, the case for China. The two articles here printed are written from points of view generally sympathetic to Japan.

nor has it proved sufficiently useful to warrant another attempt, without a previous careful study of the effects of past mistakes and a determination that they will not be repeated. Unfortunately, very few Western studies of the fundamentals of Japanese life and psychology have been made. The language barrier is terrific, and only very recently have steps been taken to overcome it. A feeling of horror at the 'frightfulness' of modern war waged between two nations who take few prisoners and have no particular regard for women is no substitute for a study of the facts. The League, *after* its stirring 'condemnation' of Japan, discovered that 'before it could pronounce on the question of Japan's aggression it must first be in possession of as impartial a statement of the facts as possible.' This article is an attempt to throw light on the somewhat confused Japanese outlook to-day, but we must first explain why the Japanese are determined not to rely on the help of other nations in settling their colossal problems.

Japan owes her modern organisation very largely to the trio of military organisers who appeared at the end of the sixteenth century, after the country had been ravaged by civil wars for several hundreds of years. The last of these was Tokugawa Iyeyasu. In the words of an old Japanese chronicler, Iyeyasu

> through his military virtues, subdued the whole of Japan. Every part of the country came under his influence, real peace was secured, righteousness was restored among all the inhabitants, relations between lords and retainers became re-established, and rewards and punishments were strictly controlled. So loyalty to masters and parents revived, the nation became rich and the warriors strong. Even the humble folk could watch over their family life and perform their daily work in safety, while sons and grandsons, high and low, could succeed to their true inheritance. Courtesy became general, Shinto, Confucian and Buddhist teachings spread, and numerous arts showed their lustre. Conduct became modest and benevolence penetrated the smallest actions of life. For the first time since the beginnings of this nation came full peace, such as was unknown either here or in China. We cannot sufficiently extol its merits.

This statement contains a few enthusiastic exaggerations, but is broadly true.

This peace was hardly achieved before Japan felt the disturbing effects of the early Christian missions who, on strong grounds, were suspected of being the vanguard of Western conquerors. Reports were also heard of the terrible religious warfare of Europe which would spread to a Christianised Japan. Although the Tokugawa owed much of their success to the use of Western-style fire-arms, they preferred for the future to limit their purchases of these and other products of science and closed the country to most foreign intercourse. For over 200 years there was 'full peace,' until, in the early nineteenth century, the growth of cities and commerce was generating internal forces threatening to burst the restrictions which had developed over the lives of the people.

The second foreign intervention came at this time, some eighty years ago, with the arrival of Perry with his 'Black Ships' and black threats of what would happen if Japan would not join the family of 'civilised' nations and open her doors to 'peaceful' trade. In the words of Professor Basil Chamberlain, that great student of Japan, 'To speak plainly, Perry triumphed by frightening the weak, ignorant, utterly unprepared, and insufficiently armed Japanese out of their senses.' Some ten years later, combined European and American fleets were bombarding the chief seaport on the south of the main island in return for 'violence' and 'insults' shown by certain independent Japanese groups to foreigners.

In a manner which astonished the world, Japan changed her centuries-old policy of isolation and determined to become strong, full of knowledge, completely prepared and armed. Her rapid advance quickly brought her into conflict with her unchanging neighbours, and at the end of the century she was fighting China, who was attempting to control Korea. After a few months of war, China, in 1895, recognised the independence of Korea and ceded to Japan the Liaotung Peninsula (part of Manchuria) and Formosa. The West intervened. Russia, France and Germany 'advised' Japan to hand back the peninsula so that the peace of the Far East might be preserved. Britain alone abstained from tendering this advice, and so earned the lasting gratitude of the Japanese. The advisers were soon active participants in the international scramble for Chinese territory. Russia, the chief

instigator of the note, naturally became the arch-enemy, and the Japanese became determined to recover what they considered had been taken in rightful conquest. The Japanese do not profess to be Christians, and the example of so-called Christian nations has not seemed to them morally superior to their own actions. Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904–5, though it gave her the South Manchurian Railway and the small Kwangtung Province, did not restore to her all she had lost. The memory of this fact lasted until the fighting in Manchuria in 1931.

One of the biggest causes of the internal explosion threatening in Japan before the arrival of Perry was the dissatisfaction of junior members of the *samurai* (soldiers, police and administrators) with their prospects of rising in the world. These men had a queer mixture of good and bad personal qualities. They were loyal, brave, energetic, in some ways exceptionally refined, and, in normal circumstances, of a kindly disposition. On the other hand, they were ambitious and even ruthless when they felt a moral urge to revenge or to advance the cause of their lord or faction. Under their leadership in military and, sometimes, commercial affairs Japan has reached her present position. It must be remembered that not only the outside world, but also the Japanese people—farmers, merchants and industrialists—have to cope with these forceful groups. There are two ways of removing their opposition to a proposal: an appeal to their better feelings, or to force, which must be sufficient to destroy them completely. Even if the Japanese people wished to rise against their military leaders they are not in a position to do so. China and Western countries, by ignoring the psychology of the Japanese masses, have played into the hands of the military and indissolubly united the people in the present conflict.

The *samurai* have limitless ambitions. No doubt they would like to see the whole world under Japanese influence. This does not, however, mean that they have plans for Asiatic conquest. For the *samurai* do not make detailed plans a long way ahead and, except in emergencies, quarrel among themselves. They act instinctively when they think the time is ripe. They become particularly impatient when progress is not visible and when the villages, from which most of their

troops come, are suffering. Like most Japanese, they have a profound distrust of business and political money-makers, of the power of foreign nations to help them, and of the administrative ability of the Chinese. They consider themselves of supreme importance to their country and are always on the look-out for emergencies which will justify their reforming actions. When they decide to strike, they seize all the power they can.

It was, therefore, not surprising that the military were profoundly dissatisfied with the Japanese situation between 1929 and 1931. There were numerous scandals in high political circles. Prices were falling fast and the outlook for the peasants was bleak. The Government had extreme faith in the efficacy of deflation and was bringing the country to the verge of revolution. Across the sea was Manchuria under a corrupt administration, and there seemed no possibility of agreement with China concerning its reform. Incident after incident occurred between Chinese and Japanese, culminating in the blowing up of the symbol of Japanese power in Manchuria, the South Manchurian Railway. Who placed the bomb nobody knows, but the army struck and was determined to get order out of growing chaos.

Then came the most disastrous intervention of all. Japan, in spite of her soldiers, had been a member and upholder of the League of Nations, which had admitted her without any study of her fundamental characteristics. Her Government and liberal thinkers had been glad to join. Although it was obviously impossible for her to relinquish completely her new powers in Manchuria, the League Commission was invited by her to come out and study conditions on the spot. The way was open for compromise, but first the agreement of the military had to be obtained. We must realise the atmosphere into which the Commission was thrust. The military were impatient with the whole business and expected to be shown the same deference as they received at home. To doubt the nobility of their sentiments was an even greater insult than that of doubting their word. Also, they could not forget that the chairman was an ex-governor of Indians. Even those people who were shocked at the impetuousness of the army were not anxious to be considered international outlaws.

And here comes in the peculiar Japanese conception of law. Law in Japan has for more than a millennium been a curious blend of rigid rule and allowance for discretionary compromise. The conception of *summum jus, summa injuria* still prevails. The Act may say 'So and so is to be done,' but it is considered only just and reasonable to hold the view that no written document can contain the whole truth and that the administrators must ensure that the law shall not be strictly followed if undue hardship is likely to be caused. In the old days the judges, if they were unwilling to impose a penalty for a technical breach of law, might deliberately allow a distortion of the evidence; hence, to many Japanese, the League, in expecting complete adherence to the letter of international agreements, signed several years previously, was showing itself most unreasonable and uncivilised, for obviously, if circumstances change, what constitutes right action must change. This view of law also brought with it something obnoxious to the ordinary Westerner, the censor or, more bluntly, the spy. These and the psychology of the military have made Japan unpopular in the West. Statesmen at Geneva and elsewhere ignore the fact that these qualities are not new. They existed when Japan was admitted to the League; had they been studied, their effects would have been anticipated.

The Japanese view of the 1931 trouble crystallised two years later, as follows: Even though the military may have been over-zealous, they could not have been expected to wait for the wheels of Geneva to remove the state of emergency then existing. China was not a single organised State and would have been incapable of enforcing any agreement into which she might enter. The Japanese were faced with attacks on their trading and political interests which extended throughout the whole of Manchuria. The Commission had produced hardly any evidence that the new régime was unpopular. Last, but not least, China could not be reconstructed with technical help alone; any satisfactory international intervention would at once conflict with the Nine-Power Treaty. The Japanese consider that facts have never disproved these arguments. The West has, however, assumed a long-term Japanese plan to swallow China. Japan has become a black sheep in the international family.

The notable success which rewarded her experiments in organising Chinese Governments under Japanese control only seem to make her more unpopular, as they contradict the prophecies of her judges, bent on recording the dismal failures they had foreseen. In their view, she could not bring peace and order in Manchuria: she could not supply capital for her developments there; the countryside was seething with revolt; her financial structure would quickly crash. On the other hand, her immensely strong powers of mass organisation and the fundamental kindliness of all classes of Japanese when their passions are not aroused were ignored. No appeal was made to their sentiment, though they are one of the most sentimental races in the world. Instead came sneers and protests, because Japan was considered responsible for the crash of the world's peace machinery which later allowed Italy to have her way in Abyssinia. Can we deny the truth of her words of resignation from the League? 'The League have attached greater importance to upholding inapplicable formulæ than to . . . the eradication of the sources of future conflict.'

I once heard an intelligent Chinese resident of Manchuria say to some Japanese friends, 'We are very grateful to you for what you are doing in Manchuria, but we do wish you would not be so superior.' That is the basic trouble—the *samurai* pose—not unknown to Eastern races in contact with British administrators. A Westerner would probably have added something about his hatred of cunning, which seems so prevalent among Japanese in China; but the Chinese no doubt takes this for granted in any administrator. Also, the Japanese would have retorted that he on his part finds Western people exceedingly cunning in practice. Pride and cunning notwithstanding, Japan has organised under her control Chinese Governments in Manchuria, Jehol, and now in North China. Already the South Manchurian Railway, which the Japanese are fond of comparing to the old East India Company, has decided to establish an Extraordinary North China Office for economic expansion, and plans are under way for a central banking organisation in North China, where the yuan and yen are now circulating side by side. Their task is stupendous and the possibilities of failure enormous. If they succeed, there must be an element of greatness in their character.

The present fighting was started as a direct result of the pull between the Nanking Government and Japan for control over the Hopei-Chahar administration. Japan, with her energies devoted to Manchuria, did not want her activities frustrated by an unfriendly neighbour educating itself in anti-Japanese or Marxian principles. Quite apart from the problems of Manchuria as a whole, there was Dairen, the leading trading port for North China, which would be adversely affected by any boycotts which might be imposed. With a stable Government in power the coalfields of Shansi might be developed and the whole area become a large source of supply and market for Japan, who for the past four years has been subject to a partial boycott in all the leading markets of the world.

Although Japanese publicists have followed the opinions of Western writers, who are for ever talking of her over-population, Japan's main need is not for a smaller population but for more markets. Many of the restrictions placed on Japanese goods by foreign countries were justifiable when the depreciation of the yen led to a huge flood of cheap exports which disorganised their industries. This justification passed some years ago, and it is natural that Japan is in no mood to argue before acting. She found herself exercising influence over the Hopei-Chahar régime and had great hopes of economic development in North China. She was even feeling less antagonistic to the prospect of British capital investment in the south, and Anglo-Japanese *rapprochement* was much in the air.

The tragedy of the whole situation was that just as Japan was concentrating on economic development, the Nanking Government found itself forced to bow to the anti-Japanese sentiment which had enabled it to grow in power. Even some Christian missionary journals were talking with admiration of the preparations for fighting Japan. It has been asked, 'Why, if Japan did not want war, did all the trouble occur before China was really ready for one?' This can be countered by the question, 'How is it that the war started at a time when Japan was becoming more conciliatory and, according to world opinion, was reaching the end of her economic tether?'

The situation in Peiping on the eve of the outbreak has

been graphically described by Mr. H. Vere Redman, of the American-owned *Japan Advertiser*. The atmosphere was calm, smuggling was almost at a standstill, the drug traffic was diminishing through the vigour of General Tashiro. Very few Japanese troops were in evidence. The situation 'had settled down to a fairly friendly process of bickering between the Japanese authorities and General Sung Cheh-Yuan to secure Sino-Japanese co-operation in the region.' General Sung was under pressure from Nanking, however, and the younger officers of the 29th army were obstructing any deal with the Japanese.

On July 7 came the incident. According to the report in Peiping, and not denied by a Chinese spokesman with whom I have discussed it, the Japanese troops on night manœuvres were fired upon by troops of the 29th army. A roll-call was taken and one man found missing. The Chinese commander was asked to help in the search. He refused. The Japanese troops rejoined their main body, who then shelled the town occupied by the Chinese. When the missing man turned up the shelling ceased. Negotiations were started the next day and Peiping was put under martial law. In Mr. Redman's words, 'local sentiment, while in no sense pro-Japanese, was not in favour of being made the scapegoat for heroics in Nanking.' The incident was followed by demands and counter-demands and by truces which the Japanese declare the Chinese to have broken.

On July 27 the Foreign Minister pointed out that Japan was following a policy of 'seeking a settlement on the spot and non-aggravation of the situation.' Early in August Chiang Kai-Shek laid down his four 'minimum conditions' for a settlement. These appeared so vague and far removed from the points at issue—namely, the refusal of Nanking, or the 29th army, to allow Sino-Japanese economic co-operation—that, in view of the huge movements of Chinese troops which had been taking place for several weeks, a major war became inevitable. Chinese patriots seemed deliberately to have invited the Japanese further into their vast territory, hoping that they could swallow them up later. They admit that neither the Japanese army nor Government wished for a large-scale war.

On August 13 hostilities broke out in Shanghai. The

official Japanese statement was that anti-Japanese sentiment in the city compelled the sending of marines and warships to protect the 30,000 Japanese residents there. Actually as far back as July 9 there were fears of anti-Japanese riots in Shanghai, but now their danger was greater owing to the massing of Chinese troops close by in violation, according to the Japanese, of the 1932 truce agreement. This agreement is said to have been confirmed in 1934, when it was agreed that the Chinese would give advance notice of their intention to cross the truce line. On August 20 the Premier said that the Shanghai outbreak had completely changed the situation and a general clash with China had to be envisaged. 'We are adopting the policy of punishing China in a positive manner. . . . In fundamental spirit, however, we have not changed at all.' The aim was not to acquire territory or make an enemy of the Chinese people, and the final objective was Sino-Japanese co-operation. Soon the Japanese claimed that they had obtained Chinese co-operation in keeping peace and order in Tientsin. By the end of the month the Tientsin Peace Maintenance Commission had taken over the telephones in the city and was busy eliminating anti-Japanese material from the school text-books. Pei-ping has now reverted to its position as 'northern capital,' Peking.

By September 5 the War Minister reported that Japan was advancing against troops 300,000 to 400,000 strong in the north and had successfully landed reinforcements in Shanghai. Since then there has been a steady advance in the north almost to the Yellow River, and much slower progress and more intense fighting round Shanghai. The incessant bombing of capital cities has shocked Western people. Whether it is against international law is not clear. Japan is fighting for her life. Defeat means the breakdown of her social system. China is fighting for the success of her first recent attempt at centralised government. Can the West helpfully intervene in the struggle? We have seen that her past experience would not lead her to hope for good results. Has the position changed to-day? But first let us glance at recent intervention between July 8 and the League's condemnation of October 6.

The most striking move has been the signing of the Sino-Soviet non-aggression pact. This, however, has had no

direct result except, perhaps, upon the willingness of Germany to grant manufacturing patents to Japan. In North China events have moved so rapidly, and foreign interests are so small, that there has been practically no intervention, apart from representations to both belligerents concerning the neutrality of concessions and some negotiations between Japanese and French and Italian commanders over the use of roads on the edge of concessions. In Shanghai there has been a series of requests and suggestions concerning the safety of concessions and warnings that claims would be made for compensation if damage were caused. Protests have been made to the Chinese for their bombing of the Settlement and United States ships and to the Japanese for their wounding of the British Ambassador and firing on an Embassy car. Until President Roosevelt's recent gesture —and it is no more than that—the United States Secretary of State had made three vague 'middle-course' statements of only academic interest. Then came the hearing of China's appeal to the League, the Japanese bombings and naval blockade, and the League's protest. After seventy years it was now the West's turn to cry 'Expel the barbarians.' The fifty-two condemning nations were certainly expressing their true feelings; having done so, they turned to study the facts.

The main fact is that two great nations, aggregating 500,000,000 people, are now at grips. How can they be stopped? Does the world wish to fight Japan? To defeat her they will have to butcher millions of her citizens with only temporary results. Economic sanctions will not stop her unless the world is willing and able to supply China with the kinds of arms of which they are depriving Japan. Are the Chinese troops completely blameless for the situation? What is to happen to those Chinese in charge of the northern administrations under Japan's influence? Are they completely wrong in their choice of side? Is the Nanking Government ready to develop the Manchurian provinces and run the North and South Manchurian Railways? After its forceful intervention, would the world open its markets to Japanese goods, the prices of which would have been driven still lower? Surely these questions show the impossibility of forcing China and Japan to love one another. They cannot be divorced, so they must quarrel. Even if she is

getting the worst of things now, China is old enough and big enough to protect herself later. Japan will have every inducement to be helpful. Sino-Japanese co-operation could and probably would greatly benefit China, if it were a combination of Japanese ambition and discipline with Chinese logical thought. The war has, perhaps, not yet caused as much suffering as one periodic collapse of the faulty Yellow River dykes. Outsiders should offer help and even perhaps protests, provided they are framed in such a way as to appeal to the best, instead of the worst, instincts of the people criticised.

As soon as peace comes, both North and South China will require capital for river improvement, roads and railways. Japan will need wider markets for her products. These are of a specialised nature and, on the whole, will do little harm to Western industries. In exchange, her demand for Western products can be built up over many decades. To understand these possibilities we must begin to study the whole social structures of China and Japan.

Briefly, then, Western intervention must avoid the religious imperialism of the early missionaries, the 'gunboat' policy of Perry, the 'advice' of Russia, and the 'judgments' of Geneva. It should offer, not demand; give instead of take. Offer both countries a fair international deal as soon as they stop their quarrels—a deal which is defined as far as possible in concrete form, in terms of capital investment and markets. Last, but not least, the West should undertake a large-scale study of the social life and thought of these two great nations, of their achievements in the past, their problems in the present, and their plans for the future. The 'Yellow Peril' is the general unwillingness of white races to study the so-called yellow peoples until a tragedy has occurred.

N. SKENE SMITH.

October 13, 1937.

NOTE. The day after I had written the last sentence of the article, I found that it expresses almost exactly the sentiments of General and Madame Chiang Kai-Shek in their recent book, *China at the Cross-Roads*, pp. 28–29.—N. S. S.

THE JAPANESE OUTLOOK AND FOREIGN INTERVENTION

II.

By William Drower

In the spring of this year a stir was occasioned in diplomatic circles by the announcement that Mr. Sato, Ambassador to Paris, had been chosen Foreign Minister of Japan. The move was rightly taken to mean that the rulers of Japan were conscious of a failure in the past with regard to China and had decided on a new line of approach to her. Mr. Sato entered office with a startling declaration which was more than a gesture; he had obviously determined to put through a programme which should revise the whole policy of Japan towards her neighbour and re-establish Sino-Japanese relations on a basis of mutual co-operation. His methods entailed a certain loss of face on the part of those in Japan who believed that in the sword lay the only solution; they involved an admission of past mistakes, and, above all, demanded an acknowledgment that the formulæ of some of Japan's leading statesmen to solve her urgent economic problems had been inadequate.

The experiment failed. It was hardly to be expected that Mr. Sato would have succeeded in convincing the army that his policy was the right one, but it is perhaps significant that he was allowed to say as much as he did. Recent happenings, at any rate, go to show that his attitude towards China was the only one which could have been assured of any degree of success, and that, when the present hostilities are over, Japan will have to return to a more generous frame of mind.

The struggle between Japan and China which has been raging for the past three months is no localised affair. It is monopolising the whole energy of both countries, and has in consequence been responsible for corresponding waste

and destruction. The Japanese forces in the north of China have made unexpected progress; the Chinese have been defeated on a scale which recalls the German Tannenberg campaign. Even those newspapers which are most sceptical of the strength of Japan admit that some five provinces of China may soon be under her control.

The war has aroused public opinion in this country against what is considered to be unwarranted harshness on the part of Japan's armed forces, and economic sanctions have been widely urged. Such suggestions appeal to the general public, for they offer an outlet for sentimental indignation without involving personal risk. Yet it is already clear that a commercial boycott or even a partial severance of trade relations with Japan could bring no good result, but would inevitably drive Japan still closer to those States of whose power we have already become aware, leaving a bitterness which might take many years to remove.

It is easy to criticise Japan's policy of recent years; it is easier still to criticise her present conduct. Let us never forget, however, that the army in Japan, supposing that section of the nation to have the upper hand at present, has a case, and that we have too often heard one-sided accounts of events in China. It is possible that the mental picture we have formed in all good faith may be incomplete or even distorted.

Recent books on China have tended to ignore the realities of life and government in that country. It is instructive to contrast typical notes on the China of thirty years ago with those of observers to-day, who would have us believe that the Chinese invented gunpowder in order to let off fire-crackers. Some sort of order has emerged from the long years of anarchy that followed the revolution of 1911, but there is little evidence of the emergence of new ideas of government potent enough to change the national outlook. The 'Land of the Dragon' has been known for centuries as the home of a conservatism fatal to all initiative. It will take more than a few years of Westernisation to effect any fundamental alteration in that outlook. No one, for instance, will seriously claim that the present Government of China has made much attempt to establish a democracy in those provinces over which it has a measure of control, or that it

has encouraged liberty of speech and of conscience. China has a parliament, but, as in Russia, there is but one party, and war lords still exist whose attitude to the Central Government is generally dubious. Only recently a prominent Socialist journal in this country attacked Chiang Kai-Shek and his clique on the ground that they were the 'most monstrous oppressors of the working class,' and had 'shot down tens of thousands of workers,' an allegation which contrasts sharply with the pictures drawn so many times in the past few weeks of the Generalissimo and his wife. The New Life movement bears as yet no resemblance at all to any democratic institution; it has done much to spread interest in gymnastics, but has busied itself for the most part with few problems of greater significance than smoking in the streets, or the exact length of a skirt. Although there has been, in the last two or three years, a vigorous movement to modernise the social services generally, this activity was fairly suspect of possessing military significance in preparation for some great struggle. Superstition, the product of thousands of years of toil and poverty and exposure to the elements, is as strong as ever, and has been manipulated as skilfully against Japan as it was against all 'foreign devils' at the time of the Boxer Rebellion.

By August of this year Japan considered that her position *vis-à-vis* China had become impossible. She was convinced that China was only awaiting the day when she would be strong enough, with the assistance of foreign capital, to deal Japan a decisive blow. For years every move of conciliation which had been made by Japan to allay the bad feeling between herself and her neighbour had been interpreted by the Chinese as a sign of weakness.

The intellectuals of the new republic became more and more filled with the arrogant conviction that Japan had overreached herself and was approaching a phase of social and economic disintegration, for the universities proved, only too often, to be fruitful fields for the seeds of a shallow and violent radicalism. Their students saw nothing but weakness in Japan's attitude on the question of Chinese tariff autonomy. They could not, or would not, believe that the pacific approaches of such statesmen as Baron Shidehara were any other manifestations than those of

timidity. Careful observers remarked at the beginning of this year that, unless the exuberance of the New China could in some way be curbed, she would rapidly be forced into a position in which all the benefits bestowed on her by the recent influx of foreign capital would be jeopardised.

Russia was regarded by many Chinese as a permanent ally, and there was a good deal of cynicism with regard to the campaign officially waged against Communism by Chiang Kai-Shek. Recent events have shown that this reliance was ill-judged, and that, in spite of the constant support given by the Comintern to Soviet movements in China, a Sino-Japanese struggle would not necessarily goad Soviet Russia to action. However, the fact that a few hours only separates the Soviet aerodromes on the mainland from the closely packed streets of Tokyo has served to keep Japanese anxiety at a high pitch.

Communism is and has been a very real menace to the Japanese. No Cabinet in recent years has been able to forget the constant downward pressure of economic factors upon the already desperately low standard of living. The bogey of 'dangerous thoughts' which might well develop into dangerous actions has largely been created by the fact that a vast number of graduates who pass out of the universities each year are unable to find employment in congenial occupations. The spectacle of two Chinese provinces under Soviet rule has been alarming enough, and Japan has not been able to forget that Chiang Kai-Shek was once a student in Moscow. In consequence any feeling of gratitude to the Generalissimo for the part played by him in opposing the Communists has been more than counterbalanced by the knowledge of his past change of face, and by the fact that he has used hatred of Japan and all her policies as his rallying cry.

This hostility, however, has not created in Japan so much a feeling of hatred for the Chinese people as a deep distrust of their rulers—so easily could it be used as a cloak to cover the venality and incompetence of the Chinese official. It is hardly to be expected that much confidence could have been felt in Chiang Kai-Shek when his troops were to be heard marching to the rhythmic shout of 'Down with Japan.' Frequently in the last few years the position of Japanese

nationals in China has been intolerable and, on occasions, dangerous. They and their families have been subject to abuse in the streets, and to social ostracism, while Chinese who continued to associate with them have been intimidated by anti-Japanese associations which enjoyed secret Government support. Posters daring Japan to do her worst fluttered from the doorways, violent pamphlets were handed round day after day. The boycott was a weapon whose effects were felt immediately; it did more than anything else to prejudice China in the minds of most Japanese. In the sixteen years following 1915 Japan suffered seven boycotts of her goods in the market which was at once the nearest and the most important to her. Every means was employed by the Chinese patriotic associations to ensure that the boycotts were effective. Merchants who dealt in Japanese goods were subjected to steady persecution, and in many cases found themselves and their shops the objects of violence. Cases are on record of Chinese merchants being executed, and their heads exposed to the public gaze, for no other reason than that they had maintained commercial relations with the hated 'dwarfs.'

Notwithstanding the character of this agitation, Japan as a whole was in sympathy with the aspirations of the Chinese to pull the shattered remnants of the old Chinese Empire into shape after so many years of upheaval and brigandry. Nevertheless, she could not feel that a Government which concentrated on a policy of revenge could advance the cause of peace and prosperity in the Far East. If national unity could be achieved only by hatred, it had best be deferred; some have said or felt as much in Europe.

Let us turn to the war itself. The initial skirmishes are, as in all wars, trivial. The Japanese claim that they were attacked at Liukouchiao; the Chinese that their men were suddenly fired upon as the first move in a carefully prepared campaign. At Shanghai it is equally difficult to allocate responsibility. The Chinese threatened the Japanese residents; the Japanese menaced the Chinese with their guns: from fear to anger and from anger to blows is but a short step in the Far East.

Apart from such technicalities it is common ground that

Japan has for some time been anxious to establish a more stable government, friendly to herself, in the northern provinces, and that China felt the time had come when her right of authority over these districts would have to be asserted or lost for ever. It is, however, on Shanghai that the eyes of Europe and America will be focussed for some time, for here they have fresh and great financial difficulties. If this international centre holds purely commercial significance for the West, it must be to Japan a testing-ground of her prestige, and she will take care, whatever the cost, to maintain this. It was in the streets of Chapei that the Chinese 19th Route Army made a stand in 1932 which surprised Japan and the world alike. Since that date it has been well known that the Chinese have been constructing defensive positions, and that Chiang Kai-Shek's best troops are stationed in or near Shanghai. On the other hand, it would be advantageous to the Japanese high command to keep the Chinese central troops occupied around the international city, while their own forces in the north could sweep on to victory. What makes it improbable, however, that Japan would willingly have risked a repetition of the events of 1932 is the vastly increased activity of foreign commerce in China since the world slump. Accordingly the Chinese have lost no opportunity to exploit the anxiety of all foreign interests, and thus to drive a wedge into the Anti-Comintern Agreement.

The outcry against Japan in this country has been humanitarian, and it has been sincere. The public resentment against Japan has its roots in pity and a sort of chivalrous sympathy with the weaker side among a people who in the 'nineties supported Armenians, by Exeter Hall meetings, against the Turks and, a few years later, Finns against Russians. Nevertheless, they could not go so far as to side with Boers and seldom questioned the need for British punitive expeditions in India and Africa. The Churches were foremost in demanding war, if need be, against Turkey as a treaty-breaker: the Albert Hall speech of the aged Primate, always quick to follow public opinion, was but an echo of the 'nineties, when, Conservatives being in power, Liberals were urging the need for warlike intervention. The Albert Hall meeting, though organised and paid for by a single newspaper, was a genuine expression of opinion. The

Japanese Government does not deny that many non-combatants have been killed in China. What it has repeatedly denied is that the bomber has been used as a means of crushing public morale by indiscriminate slaughter. Reports from China, so long as they are subject to the suspicion of personal associations, well known in the case of one correspondent, should be discounted considerably.

Japan remembers bitterly that it was her representatives at the Hague Conference in 1923 who opposed air bombing most vigorously and were outvoted by Great Britain and France; it was her delegates who heard with amazement Lord Londonderry's defence of the bombing aeroplane as a guardian of peace and friend of humanity (in Asia). She is not convinced that European Powers do not contemplate the use of bombing squadrons. It is no secret that this country has many bombers, and has developed great skill in their use. If Japan has been clumsy in the conduct of her operations, then China cannot escape blame; her aeroplanes at Shanghai killed hundreds. Whatever be the ethical merits of artillery and aeroplanes, it is reasonable to suppose that the effective use which has been made of bombers to destroy the communications of the Chinese will shorten the war considerably and thereby save life.

As to the results of the war, it seems extremely unlikely that a new State will spring up south of the Yellow River friendly to Japan and compliant with her wishes. A more probable consequence of the fighting will be the implanting of a deep-rooted hatred of Japan, and of contempt towards the other Powers who talked much and did little. Towards Great Britain China can feel little gratitude: our Press raised hopes of practical assistance against Japan in 1931. The visit of Sir Frederick Leith-Ross in 1936, as interpreted by the British Press, encouraged similar beliefs in responsible circles in China.

Public feeling in Japan, on the other hand, against both this country and the United States is undeniably bitter. Japanese leaders are now convinced that they cannot look to the Western democracies for any real sympathy or co-operation. They fear that Great Britain's future policy in the Far East—a sphere which holds no vital interest for her but is of supreme importance to Japan—will in general

be one of narrow opportunism. Japan bowed to the Powers over the question of Shantung in 1895, but learned that only by the methods of Admiral Perry and his gunboats could her place in the sun be secured. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance followed this defeat, and not even the most generous apologists of Britain can dispute the fact that we were the principal beneficiaries. During the Great War the Japanese remained scrupulously faithful to their obligations, broke off relations with Germany, eliminated her from the Far East, and guarded the flanks of Great Britain and France. Their reward came in 1922 when the British Government, by withdrawing from the alliance, showed that they preferred the 'good will' of the United States to an alliance with the young island Power in the Far East. This decision aroused a large section of the Japanese public to a sudden consciousness of the desperate situation with which they were faced. They felt that the greatest European Power in Asia had thrown them over, and was seeking allies against them, first in America, later in Soviet Russia. Japan's population was increasing year by year at a pace outstripping her capacity to provide for it; there had to be an expansion, either economic or political. The so-called democratic nations closed every avenue of economic escape. Great Britain and the United States, among others, who had demanded, as a matter of course, most-favoured-nation treatment in China and elsewhere in the world, refused to treat with Japan on this basis. Attempts made by the Japanese to reach other markets or to penetrate the barriers erected before them met with obstruction. To many Japanese military expansion seemed to be the only way to create for their country in the Far East a certain market for the goods on which she depends for her very existence. At the present time, unfortunately, the hateful suspicion is abroad that Britain's morality in the East has been that of the market-place, and that she has only been supporting China in the hope that the sick man might recover sufficiently to buy her goods and repay her loans.

What can we expect if we finally alienate Japan? The answer is, clearly, Nothing. A hostile Japan would entail a renewal of the Pacific arms race, a further costly strengthening of Singapore, and continued paralysis of our commercial enterprise in the Far East. If Japan threaten our interests

to-morrow, then we have but ourselves to blame for to-day and yesterday. China showed clearly in 1927 what her ultimate ambitions were with regard to those relics of mediævalism —foreign settlements. A victorious China would bring no consolation to our banks, nor olive branches to Archbishops. Japan has promised to respect our rights and our interests, and we have no immediate reason to doubt her sincerity. When the war is over it will be for us to convince Japan that we are willing to consider her plea for such a share of world trade as will afford an outlet to the energy and ambition of her people. Only then will a relief be given to that biological pressure which seeks an outlet to-day through a militarist policy.

WILLIAM DROWER.

ENGLAND AND FRANCE

We Must Unite or Perish

By Jacques Delebecque[1]

> What strikes me the most upon the whole is the difference of manners between them and us, from the greatest object to the least. There is not the smallest similitude in the twenty-four hours. It is obvious in every trifle.

Horace Walpole, in these words,[2] written from Paris, expressed an idea which has been so often repeated, so often insisted upon, since his day that it has now acquired the status of a commonplace; like many other commonplaces, it should not be allowed to pass without close scrutiny. On the whole, it may be taken for granted that Walpole's observation is not inexact. It is perfectly obvious that, to-day no less than in the past, Englishmen and Frenchmen differ in their habits, in their tastes, and frequently in their initial reactions to events exercising a profound influence on their lives. It is an easy enough thing to contrast, say, the apparent phlegm of the English, their tenacity, their sense of tradition, their disregard of logic, with the vivacity, the alleged levity, the love of novelty, and the respect for logic of the French. However, if we wish to get as near as possible to the truth in this matter, how much must we modify the conventional portrait of the average Englishman and the average Frenchman as they exist in popular imagination on either side of the Channel that divides the two countries! This portrait calls for so many fine corrective touches—touches which would alter it practically beyond recognition—that as it stands it is no better than the roughest of sketches.

We are too ready to see only the points of difference and

[1] Translated by Randolph Hughes.

[2] Letter to John Chute, October 3, 1765

contrast between the two great nations, all too long rivals and at last united in amity, and to neglect those other points, the importance of which is capital, in virtue of which they are truly at one. Have they not in common what, when all is said, may be regarded as the essential: the respect for human personality and human dignity, which to-day are so grievously flouted, and whose very existence is threatened? Are they not also havens, refuges of civilisation against a rising tide of barbarism, and is not this a privilege imposed on them by duties which they have not the right to refuse to meet? They have measured themselves against each other in conflict, and the noble blood shed in their encounters has not flowed in vain. From their collisions, there has resulted something more real and more lasting than one or other of those merely racial sympathies which, when brought to the test, generally prove to be quite illusory; there has resulted this much better thing, a mutual esteem reposing upon the sanctions of reason. Elective affinities are perhaps less fragile than instinctive affinities. In the two countries, after many misunderstandings, those sections of the population constituting the *élite*, if not the masses, have learned to know each other, and have finally discovered that, far from running counter one to the other, the genius of Great Britain and that of France are made to move together in a harmony wherein each receives completion from the other.

That is more than enough to outweigh the differences, both extrinsic and intrinsic, which, on the face of it, might seem to militate against perfect understanding between the two countries. For the sake of argument, however, and to concede as much as possible to the opponents of our thesis, let us admit that the differences are more profound than is actually the case. What would then follow? Simply this: that, in spite of the proverb (which, like many proverbs, should not be interpreted literally), birds need not be of a feather in order to flock together. (We might even, without excursion into paradox, say, on the strength of what we see every day in private life, that too much similarity between the two parties concerned is rather prejudicial than otherwise to domestic harmony.) However that may be, the question in any case is not of primary importance. What I maintain is that, whatever be the opinion held respecting similarity or

dissimilarity between the two nations, it is absolutely indispensable that they should stand together. That is the point I wish summarily to emphasise in this article, while taking cognisance of the chief objections to a union between France and England, and of the obstacles that must be surmounted—prejudices, age-long rancours, errors of judgment, selfish interests—if that union is to issue to the greatest advantage possible.

The late lamented Admiral Schwerer liked to relate how, on the evening of August 4, 1914—he was then second-in-command of the Naval General Staff—he was received, together with the officers attending him, by the First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr. Winston Churchill, with whom were a large General Staff and the heads of the departments under his jurisdiction. Everybody felt that the time was one of exceptional gravity. It was necessary to frame without delay measures facilitating the co-operation of the two allied fleets, and in particular, almost the whole of the French ships-of-war being concentrated in the Mediterranean, to decide what bases our vessels could make use of in those waters. After a few exchanges of opinion on matters in general, the discussion was narrowed down to the essential point. 'What do you need? What are you really asking for?' inquired Mr. Churchill. 'Malta,' was the unhesitating reply of the head of the French deputation. Then, for the space of a moment, a whole world of thoughts crossed the mind of the English Minister, and the French officers saw them rapidly reflected in his expressive eyes and on the mobile lines of his clever face. Malta, over which France and England had fought so long, Malta, on account of which the Peace of Amiens had been broken, Malta, the symbol of English supremacy in the Mediterranean—Malta thrown open, Malta offered to the nation which the most famous of English sailors said his fellow-countrymen should hate like the very devil! Strange indeed are the chances and changes of history! And it was the direct descendant of the victor of Blenheim, of the implacable enemy of the France of Louis XIV., who was destined to pronounce the decisive word, to make the gesture marking the reconciliation, the mutual trust, the alliance of the two countries in face of a danger that threatened them both. 'Malta,' slowly repeated the First Lord of the

Admiralty, 'Malta—use Malta just as freely as you would use Toulon,'[3]

If the minutes had been less precious, how those taking part in this historic conversation might have let their thoughts dwell in long retrospect on the clash of battles in which the two nations had striven one against the other! Crecy, Poitiers, Agincourt, the steel-clad knights of France falling beneath the shafts of the English bowmen, the great cavalry sweeps of the Black Prince, Bertrand Duguesclin winning back the land inch by inch, Henry V. at the Louvre, the siege of Orleans, Saint Joan of Arc burned as a witch in the old Market-place of Rouen—such are the chief tableaux that go to make the first act of this great drama. Then, after a long period full of intrigues and schemings of all kinds, in which quarrels alternate with reconciliations, we have the second Hundred Years' War, which, overt or veiled, lasts (save for a time after the Peace of Utrecht and during Walpole's administration) from the beginning of the eighteenth century to the opening years of the nineteenth: a war waged on land and on sea, a war regular and avowed or confined to the activities of privateersmen, a war in both hemispheres and under the most divers latitudes, a war in which the scene shifts from the plains of Flanders to the forests of the New World, from the rice-fields of Bengal to the plateaux of Castille, from the St. Lawrence and the Caribbean Sea to the Coromandel coast, a war in which the high-sounding names of Ramillies, Malplaquet, Fontenoy, Mahon, the Heights of Abraham, Aboukir, Trafalgar, Vittoria, Waterloo, evoke, in the midst of wild charges, of the roar of cannon and of the running fire of musketry, the forms, now passed into legend, of the brilliant horsemen of the Royal Household, of great ships of the line bursting into flames and sinking beneath the waves, of long lines of Red Coats falling back step by step and steadily reloading their rifles, of the Imperial Grenadiers with their tall bearskin caps. . . . In the foreground we see the great figures of the protagonists, Marlborough leading the charge and overthrown in the mellay, Marshal Saxe in the wicker basket drawn by his famous mule, Dupleix and Clive moving the princes of India hither and thither over their

[3] Mr Churchill confirms this story in vol. 1, chap x, of his great work *The World Crisis*

chessboard, Montcalm and Wolfe united in glory as in death, Nelson breathing his last on the dark 'tween-decks of the *Victory*, the Iron Duke, unmoved in the storm of battle, giving the order to Maitland's men, crouched in the corn, to rise and fire, the Emperor on horseback in the middle of the human redoubt formed by the square of the First Battalion of the Guard. . . .

Such and so many events cannot but leave a mark; and if it is possible to affirm to-day that, in so far as England and France are concerned, the fall of Napoleon brought to a close the long era of interminable strife, and that the prayer of our Renaissance poet has at last been fulfilled,[4] it is well to recall that many people, some of them of great distinction, found it hard to believe, in the middle of the nineteenth century, that such would ever be the case. Thirty-three years after Waterloo, a celebrated English novelist, speaking of the desire for revenge by which he believed the French were still animated, wrote the following significant words:

> They pant for an opportunity of revenging their humiliation; and if a contest, ending in a victory on their part, should ensue, elating them in their turn, and leaving its cursed legacy of hatred and rage behind to us, there is no end to the so-called glory and shame, and to the alternatives of successful and unsuccessful murder, in which two high-spirited nations might engage. Centuries hence, we Frenchmen and Englishmen might be boasting and killing each other still, carrying out the Devil's code of honour.[5]

Happily this melancholy prospect has not been borne out by subsequent events. All the same, between adversaries still under the stress of the centuries-old struggle, there subsisted for a long time a feeling of constraint, of embarrassment, of distrust, which frequently resulted in wounded susceptibilities, in outbursts of jealousy, in backhanded blows, in measures that were distinctly the opposite of friendly. Perhaps it was impossible that it should be otherwise. The French people, impressionable, highly-strung, extraordinarily sensitive, could

[4] Ils veulent que par vous la France et l'Angleterre
Changent en longue paix l'héréditaire guerre,
Qui a du père en fils si longuement duré
JOACHIM DU BELLAY, *Les Regrets*.
Through you (they wish) may France and England cease
From age-long war and live in age-long peace,
From war bequeathed by father unto son.

[5] *Vanity Fair*, chapter xxxii.

not forget the Market-place of Rouen nor the rock of St. Helena. For years and years—and I am not sure that this attitude has altogether disappeared [6]—the majority of Frenchmen, blindly and *a priori*, have attributed their setbacks and disappointments to the underhand dealings of what they are pleased to call 'perfidious Albion.' I am not ready to say that they have always been mistaken. It is no less a fact that the British Government and the British people have harboured, with regard to the French, a preconceived idea in which generalisation has been pushed to excess; and have had a tendency to consider nineteenth-century France as the '*enfant terrible*' of Europe, against whose sudden pranks it was simply elementary prudence to be on one's guard and to take as many precautionary measures as possible. Nor is there any doubt but that England has viewed with displeasure the colonial renascence of France, and that, in this domain at least, she has sought, more than once, to put a spoke into the wheels of French enterprise. On both sides there has been lack of understanding, on both sides there have been faults, on both sides there have been fits of bad temper, caused by grievances well-founded in some cases and purely imaginary in others. The result has been that, in the history of Anglo-French relations, there have been, following lulls in the political weather, sudden back-flashes and recurrent crises, the gravest of which was the last, that which happened in 1898 when the question of Fashoda divided the two countries; Fashoda was a practically unknown African swamp, but it was the key to the Nile, and for a time there were grounds for fearing that it might reawaken the old dormant hates and launch the two rivals into another bloody contest.

Fortunately the counsels of reason prevailed this time. It will always be to the credit of a few men, King Edward VII. and Lord Lansdowne on the one hand, and Delcassé and Paul Cambon on the other, that on the very morrow of Fashoda and of the Boer War (concerning which a whole section of French opinion, ignorant and ill-informed, burst out violently against England) they tenaciously strove to stem the current and to lay the foundations of an enduring agreement between

[6] *Cf* the extremely regrettable anti-English article published in *Gringoire* by M Henri Béraud, a writer of parts, during the crisis caused by the Italian invasion of Abyssinia.

the two countries. These able workers in the cause of peace understood that for the common good, for the common salvation, they must have the courage to disregard the deeply rooted prejudices of the English as well as of the French man in the street. First of all they engaged in a process of cutting up (agreement of April 8, 1904, whereby outstanding colonial differences were settled); then they gave their attention to the constructive process of sewing up again (foundation of the Entente Cordiale in the strict or diplomatic sense of that term).

Their work left much to be desired, it will be said. That is a point on which we can all agree. In order to prevent the German aggression and the catastrophe of 1914, it will further be urged, what was needed was, not a vague and ill-defined understanding, but a strict and formal alliance, which, leaving Germany in no doubt as to the intentions of England, would have caused the fomenters of war to pause and reflect, and consequently would have preserved Europe from the disasters that descended upon her. I am the last to gainsay such an objection. But, if we consider the limited amount of time at the disposal of the makers of the Entente Cordiale, and the number and the height of the obstacles that had to be surmounted before the desired understanding could be attained, we must admit that, after all, the structure so hastily thrown up has not failed to serve its purpose. The Entente Cordiale, under the irresistible pressure of circumstances that made a clean sweep of hesitations and predispositions to ill-will, finally become a real alliance, simply saved the two partners from death—at the price of terrible sacrifices, it is true. That it should have done this is surely something that must be counted to its credit.

Have England and France learned what they should have learned from the severe trial through which they passed in common, from the errors committed and the sufferings endured in the course of the Great War? Nations, I am well aware, are like individuals: they soon forget, to make provision for the future irks them, it is much more to their liking to live from day to day. But just because of that fact it is the duty of those who guide them to supply their deficiencies and to act for them, to remember the past and at the same time to look beyond the present and the immediate

future. Are English and French statesmen possessed of the conviction that the remedy for a situation even more dangerous than that of the years leading up to 1914 is the same as it was at that time: a union between the two countries, but closer than it was a quarter of a century ago by reason of the increase of the menace—a union which they should regard as the corner-stone of all their policies? If we could trust their speeches and their declarations we might feel that there was very little to disturb our peace of mind. But their acts—or their failure to act—are sometimes not of a nature to reassure us. It cannot be denied, of course, that their task is not always easy. The form of the constitutions they serve obliges them to attain their goal by roundabout ways, to give a direction to public opinion without letting it be felt that they are doing so. In this respect, the dictators—at least apparently—have a far easier game to play. However, even if the task were more arduous than it is, it would have to be undertaken and all other considerations would have to be subordinated to it. In face of what threatens us, everything else, to my mind, may be dismissed as of comparatively little importance.

There is no undoing the past, and we should let bygones be bygones. Let us agree to forget the grave mistakes that may be charged against the Governments of London and Paris since the end of the Great War, the bad Treaty of Versailles and the faulty manner in which it has been applied, the clumsy and blundering treatment meted out to Germany, the failure of the League of Nations, the failure of the Disarmament Conference, the utopias of the Pacifists and—a natural consequence of all this—the dangerous slackening of moral resolution of which we have so many illustrations to-day. History, when it judicially assesses responsibilities, will probably content itself with dismissing both England and France as having nothing to be said in their favour; and with registering the fact that they both allowed themselves to be seduced by the same mirage of illusions, that each sought to outdo the other in shutting its eyes to the light.[7] But, once again, time is short and we cannot afford

[7] 'If we have lost the Nelson touch,' as Mr Douglas Jerrold wittily observes, 'we have at least preserved his blind eye, perhaps the sole legacy of the days when Britannia ruled the waves.'

to waste it in recriminations. Let us be prosaically practic let us face facts without stopping to shed idle tears over l opportunities.

Our unhappy planet, in this autumn of 1937, may well compared to a region where muffled rumblings, sudd explosions and other signs of internal disorder make t inhabitants fear that there will shortly be an eruption or grand scale of the volcano towering up over their fields a their dwelling-places. Already there have been partial a preliminary eruptions: Spain and China are ablaze. T populations who have escaped so far will not be taken surprise when at last they are overwhelmed by the cataclysr they await its onset with a sort of fatalistic resignatic Some, robustly optimistic, vaguely hope that, in spite what has already happened, the volcanic activity will c down, and that it will be possible to lead a peaceful exister once again. Others, further removed from the danger the Americans in this case—are, on the contrary, in a mc pessimistic state of mind. Only, they expect that, ju because they are so far from the peril, they will not involved in the streams of lava and the clouds of ashes.[8]

My simile, like almost all similes, is not at all poir exact. War, unlike volcanic eruptions, is not a natu calamity, and it is within man's power to secure hims against it. It may be objected that, if it takes two parties make peace, the will of one party is enough to start a wa and of course there is no denying that. But even the bolde the most reckless, the most dare-devil of aggressors w think twice if he knows for certain that, once the struggle begun, he will come up against a barrier where the chanc are he will incur grave injury to life and limb. This barri which would ensure peace, or at all events considerab diminish the dangers of war, is, or rather ought to be, a clos indissoluble union between France and England on a footir of absolute equality; the two nations acting together strategic partnership, and each being heavily armed. Th union, it is unnecessary to add, would in no sense be excl

[8] 'Fear spreads throughout the world—fear of aggression, fear of revolutic fear of death. The people of America are rightly determined to keep that growi menace from our shores.'—PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, speech broadcast, September 1 1937.

sive, and would refuse no offers of collaboration, even if they came from our late enemies, provided the latter gave unequivocal proofs of their good will.

We are far, unhappily, from having attained this desideratum. In the Anglo-French defensive bulwark there are dangerous fissures. It will not be possible to make up for lost time in a day; Great Britain, in spite of the immense effort she is now making, has not yet an armour that may be regarded as satisfactory at all points. Nor can it be said that France has achieved perfection in this respect (this is not the place to go into details). Moreover, the common policy of the two countries has all too often created in observers an impression of hesitancy and even of an absence of healthy will-power. All too often it has stopped at half-hearted defensive gestures against menace, and has appeared to be afraid of taking the initiative. This is deplorable in a world where everything is in process of transformation, and where audacious dictators, heartened by success after success and little troubled by scruples, are led, no less by temperament than by the exigencies of their position, to move ever further along the line of aggrandisement. Nevertheless, even the present alliance between England and France, in spite of all its shortcomings, is something to be thankful for; combining the strength of the French army and that of the English Navy, and sustained by the financial and economic resources of the British Empire, it is an instrument of considerable power. This is realised by everybody in Europe, and especially by those who have to reckon with it in pursuance of their designs. Hence the various attempts on the part of Germany to detach the one of the partners from the other. Here again, *mutatis mutandis*, the present situation is singularly like that of the epoch preceding 1914, with the complicating difference that, enlightened by experience, Herr Hitler is a much more dexterous statesman than William II. ever showed himself to be. Hence also the intrigues of Soviet Russia, which, aiming at the destruction of modern society and at universal upheaval and overthrow, is doing its best to introduce itself as a third party into the alliance between the two nations upon whom depend the destinies of Western civilisation, and to vitiate and ruin this alliance, under the pretext of helping to consolidate and strengthen it.

But, however artful may be the devices threatening us from without, they are less dangerous for the stability and the permanence of Anglo-French fellowship than certain forces which are at work in our midst; I mean certain schemes, certain campaigns, overt or underhand, directed, in England as well as in France, against closer union between the two countries. Of all these campaigns the most formidable, to my mind—because it makes an appeal to an old tradition that is still deeply rooted—is that which pertinaciously urges the English people to withdraw into itself and cease to concern itself with the bickerings and quarrels of the Continent.

The fact of being insular not only gives a peculiar cast of mind to a people, it creates in that people, as it were, a second nature, different from that of peoples otherwise situated geographically. Since William of Orange, all the Governments which have associated England with Continental affairs have had to meet at home a stubborn and often a fierce opposition, which, more than once, has held up their activities if it has not paralysed them altogether. This is so well known that it is unnecessary to quote examples. Secure in his island, protected by the environing waters, and confident that his squadrons of battleships, exercising undisputed sway over the oceans of the world, ensured the freedom of his commerce and the continuity of his food supply, the average Englishman of the nineteenth century usually held fast to the idea of 'splendid isolation'; this idea issued from a firm belief in his own superiority, from an ignorance of and a sublime contempt for everything foreign, and from the conviction that a policy of 'no commitment,' which in reality is the policy of short-sightedness in its extremist form, represented the *nec plus ultra* of political foresight and wisdom. This point of view persisted right up to 1914, in spite of the growing German menace to the naval supremacy of England; and even at the eleventh hour, on the eve of the declaration of war, it resulted in friction and disagreement in the British Cabinet itself.

But to-day an island is no longer an island, or at least it has ceased to enjoy the privileges of one. This is a fact that the most obstinate critics, at the sight of squadrons of aeroplanes in the sky, cannot but admit. And so the theory of

'splendid isolation' has undergone modification, and has been made to square with contemporary realities. Those who still hold it recognise that England must be strongly armed—with the reservation that the armaments must be used for the defence of Britain and the Empire. As for Europe and the rest of the world, they say, let them get out of their difficulties as best they can or else stew in their juice; the English are not going to burn their fingers in that fire. This is the policy of Lord Beaverbrook, and he sets it forth in huge advertisements, occupying the space of three newspaper columns, in terms which unquestionably have the merit of being absolutely clear. It is well to reproduce a passage containing the essential article of his doctrine:

> We persist in our plea for the detachment of Britain from Continental quarrels; we put forward unremitting argument that Britain is not the outpost of Europe, but the heart of the British Empire; we point out that in reality this country now faces the Dominions and the United States in common interests, and no longer looks over the troubled lands beyond the English Channel

Such is—to quote the exact words of Lord Beaverbrook himself—'the ideal of splendid isolation.' It should not be forgotten that the *Daily Express* has a circulation of more than 2,400,000, and that it claims to be the greatest newspaper in the world.

Statements of such astounding simplicity as those just quoted cannot fail to work upon and mislead the 'man in the street,' who is not qualified to assess the worth of the so-called 'arguments' which these masters of propaganda serve up to him. All the more so as in these 'arguments' the true is cunningly mingled with the false in such a way that the resulting concoction forms a whole that appears to be sound at all points. The picture of the British Empire linked to America by common interests so that all the elements of the Anglo-Saxon world would be amalgamated and unified; and the idea that this entity would be strong enough to be self-dependent and under no necessity to take thought for the fate of other peoples—there is in this conception something attractive for superficial minds. Only, the conception will not bear examination. From the fact that England is the heart of the British Empire it does not follow that she

is not at the same time the outpost of Europe. The negative assertions of Lord Beaverbrook in this matter come to grief against the hard facts of geography. Yes, England has numerous common interests with the Dominions, and that is a fact no one disputes (and with America too? that is extremely doubtful, and the question is one deserving of the closest examination). But it is precisely because she has to safeguard these interests—her own and those of the Dominions—that she cannot afford to ignore what goes on in 'the troubled lands beyond the English Channel.' That is a truth which Lord Baldwin (who has not always spoken with such directness) has expressed forcibly: 'Our frontier is on the Rhine.' It follows as a corollary—or else words have no meaning—that England must be closely allied with the country which actually guards the Frontier of the Rhine; and that country, of course, is France. What, in any case, would be the result in hard fact if England really did cease to concern herself with disputes on the Continent? The field would be left open to the ambitions and appetites of the 'nations of prey,' to use a somewhat inept expression current during the Great War; the small European States, too weak to defend themselves unaided, would be destroyed; France would be left to her fate, and therewith would be repudiated all the professions of friendship and loyalty repeatedly made by English spokesmen, if not actually given expression in formal diplomatic documents; and, finally, England herself, deprived of her natural ally and forced to depend on her own resources, could not avoid being involved in disaster.

We have no 'isolationists' in France, and that for the best of reasons. We need an ally: that is a point on which there is practically unanimous agreement. But certain sections of French opinion are disposed to seek this ally elsewhere than on the other side of the Channel. In the years of illusion and far-reaching hope immediately following the Great War, a whole school of political thinkers found the best guarantee of French security in a close association with the newly created States of Central Europe. There is no doubt something to be said for this policy, provided—and the condition is essential—it is resolutely conceived and steadfastly adhered to in action; but this quality of

resoluteness, of steadfastness, has been completely lacking in all the Governments we have had since the War. Poland, tired of our shilly-shallying, tired of the way we have more than once neglected her, has begun to put her own interests first, to act independently of us, and we cannot blame her for doing so; she has come to an understanding, at least provisionally, with National-Socialist Germany, and it is no easy matter to define with accuracy her relations with France at the present moment. As for the Little Entente, of which the chorus of semi-official spokesmen religiously proclaims the unshakable stability, each of its members, faced by the new situation created by the recovery of Germany and the Rome-Berlin 'axis,' is engaged in putting into practice the proverb that charity begins at home. Roumania has still not decided which way to turn; Yugoslavia, in spite of all affirmations to the contrary, has definitely been attracted into the orbit of Germany and Italy; Czecho-Slovakia has lost its head, is altogether at sixes and sevens, and has finally thrown in its lot with Soviet Russia.

The French Communists, whose influence on the *Front Populaire* Government is well known, are doing their utmost to bring us also to take our orders from Moscow, and certain Radicals [9] are lending them a helping hand in this task. I shall not pause to consider the moral and sentimental objections to this monstrous partnership; I will merely observe that it is in the highest degree probable—certain I would say myself—that the conclusion of a strict and formal Franco-Soviet alliance would have as its inevitable consequence the break-up of the understanding between England and France. England has a horror of Bolshevism, and the best English friends of France, that is, the purely Conservative elements of English society, already anxious enough at the prospect of the threatened bolshevisation of France, would have no other course open to them than to turn away from us, should we have the misfortune to allow ourselves in very reality to be bolshevised. In that unhappy event, what grist would accrue to the mill of the advocates of 'splendid isolation'! And what a magnificent opportunity it would be for those who hold that England should, in the fashionable phrase,

[9] The equivalent, roughly, of English Liberals of not very extreme views—TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.

'reconsider' her foreign policy and return to the 'natural' friendship with her German cousin! It can never be too much emphasised—because this is a truth to which certain misguided Frenchmen are perhaps not alive—not only that the idea of a union between France, England and Russia is purely chimerical, but also that the Franco-Soviet alliance is incompatible with the Franco-English alliance: a choice must be made between the two.

I have said—and it is a fact upon which I would insist—that the English Conservatives are the best friends of France, and, conversely, that it is not in the ranks of the parties on the French Left that the best friends of England are to be found. Let me make myself quite clear: I do not deny that there are to be found, in the English Liberal and Labour Parties, men who are sincerely sympathetic towards France, nor that on the French Left there are men who entertain very friendly feelings for England. But one or even several swallows do not make a summer. In such matters we must take account not of individuals but of wholes. Moreover, men on the Left (and, it must be admitted, certain men on the Right) tend to allow their attitude towards a country to depend on the form of government established in that country. Such a way of looking at things is entirely wrong and is extremely dangerous. It leads to that conflict between ideologies which is one of the gravest menaces threatening Europe to-day. Politicians on all occasions keep on repeating, parrot-wise, that England and France must advance together hand in hand, because they are two democracies, in face of the totalitarian States of the world. That is not at all the right point of view: whether they are democracies or not (and what a lot could be said on that point, especially where Great Britain is concerned!), England and France should stand united just because they are England and France, independently of any question of form of government or constitution, and in virtue of altogether higher considerations. (I take no account of the frightful supposition of a bolshevised France: for in that case France would no longer be France.)

It is this union, that between England and France *tout court*, which furnishes the best and the ultimate guarantee of peace. The other—the union of the French and English

democracies, *simply because they are democracies*—is on the other hand just the one that is most likely to lead straight to war. Who are those who advocate this latter union? The rabid bellicose pacifists of all sorts and conditions and of every political shade, who, joining in this matter their efforts to those of the salaried agents of Moscow, untiringly play upon popular feeling and conduct a campaign in favour of intervention on behalf of the 'regular' Government of Spain, and strive, not unsuccessfully, to convert the League of Nations, now become a sort of 'Rump Parliament,' into a military machine for use against one or other or all manifestations of Fascism (already the League of Nations, with its unseasonable intransigence, its fondness for juridical eidola, and its obstinacy in pursuing paths of error, has done as much to bring Italy and Germany together as the deliberate efforts of the two leaders of these countries). The truth that this setting off of one ideology against another is a dangerous business is, it seems, slowly beginning to dawn upon responsible statesmen. Both Mr. Eden and M. Delbos have by implication condemned it by declaring in effect that two groups of nations are not necessarily ranged one against the other in irreconcilable antagonism merely because of differences in their constitutions, however far-reaching or fundamental those differences may be. But their acts do not always square with their words, and M. Delbos in particular, in the unhealthy atmosphere of the *Front Populaire*, is hard put to it to shake off the pernicious influences which, wittingly or unwittingly, operate to lead the Anglo-French *entente* astray into sidetracks and thus divert it from the high-road which conducts to what should be its true goal.

Hitler and Mussolini are engaged in preaching a crusade. England and France are not called upon to do likewise, whether in support of or in opposition to the cause championed by these rulers. If the two great hostile ideologies must come into collision, let London and Paris stand aside, and refuse to be mixed up in these family squabbles. 'There is only one thing for us to do, and that is to remain on Mount Pagnotte,[10] said Louis XV. when he heard of the death of

[10] That is to say, we must refrain from taking any part in the struggle which is now preparing Mount Pagnotte is an eminence in the forest of Hallate, whence it was possible to watch the chase without being under any obligation to follow it

Charles VI., Emperor of Germany, and realised all that would follow from that event. If and when the two rival systems clash, wisdom enjoins on England and France to keep their place on Mount Pagnotte, to remain there vigilant, armed and bound together in close fellowship. What is needed is an attitude of calm resoluteness, without too much speechifying, without idle declarations of principle, and of course without provocative gestures (no brandishing of clenched fists, but a reaching forth of the hand to whoever wishes to take it without ulterior motives or mental reservations)—an attitude conciliatory towards all parties, but at the same time making it quite clear that there are certain limits that may not be overpassed with impunity; such an attitude would quickly range on the side of an Anglo-French combination those wavering States of Europe which, dreading the Bolshevist pestilence, have no liking for the remedies proposed by the anti-Bolshevist dictators. To maintain this attitude, to act thus, would be to occupy a great position among the nations, and to play a magnificent part in the shaping of history. The policy indicated is at once practical and high-minded: it serves the primary and essential interests of the two countries, and at the same time it satisfies the aspirations of the most elevated idealism. *Noblesse oblige.* England and France, adversaries for so long, and now reconciled in amity, have not fulfilled their mission. What they have to do is to act in common to preserve, and, if need be, to defend, all that is most precious in the slowly elaborated achievement of Western civilisation: freedom of thought, toleration and respect of the rights of the individual, a respect not at all irreconcilable, whatever recent political theory has to say to the contrary, with the demands of the State and the exigencies of public welfare. Rudely shaken by the forces of unreason that are sweeping over the world to-day, these achievements are worthy of being saved by the concerted efforts of the two oldest nations of Europe, and the two whose past is richer in glory than that of any other. All the more so, as in saving these values France and England would be saving nothing less than their own existence at the same time. Yes, that is the hard and bitter truth, so unwelcome to certain folk who shut their eyes tight that they may not see it. England and France have got to choose between two,

and only two, alternatives: between preserving their existence by depending one upon the other, and perishing one after the other! Whether they like it or not, there is no getting away from the fact that they are in the same boat. The fate of the one is bound up with the fate of the other. Union between them is more than ever necessary, it is absolutely indispensable, it is the inescapable condition of their continued survival and salvation. For the Iron Age has returned, and its end is far from being in sight.

The views here set forth are not those of an easy-going and slack optimism. Where does help lie? We no longer live in a time in which we can take our ease and dream by the waters of Lethe. Even to philosophise leisurely in academic groves is scarcely an occupation in which we can now afford to indulge. Illusion: that is the enemy we have to thrust forth from our midst. Those in whose keeping lies the fate of nations should ever bear in mind the words of Bossuet: 'The most serious of mental aberrations is to believe in things simply because we would have them exist, and not because we have evidence that in very fact they do exist.'[11]

JACQUES DELEBECQUE.

[11] 'Le plus grand dérèglement de l'esprit, c'est de croire les choses parce qu'on veut qu'elles soient, et non parce qu'on a vu qu'elles sont en effet'—*De la connaissance de Dieu et de soi-même*, I, 16

ENGLAND AND GERMANY

An Open Answer to Lord Lothian

By Herr C. V. Krogmann, Burgomaster of Hamburg

Dear Lord Lothian,

While spending a few days with friends on Heligoland, I have read your article on England and Germany in the May number of the *Nineteenth Century and After* in which you suggest that someone should present a frank statement of the German point of view. Perhaps it is my surroundings which impel me to write a reply. From the red rock island in the North Sea on which the Union Jack still floated only a few decades ago, our eyes wander over the sea and our thoughts are carried over the horizon, across time and space. As a former merchant and the present Burgomaster of Hamburg, the old Hanseatic city, which is bound to your country by so many ties of friendship, I feel called upon to answer you. I shall do so in the frank and open style in which you have written your article and in which you expect to be answered.

You were Mr. Lloyd George's private secretary at a time when fatal decisions were made which inevitably led to the serious crisis of world politics at which we now find ourselves and which you discuss at the beginning of your article. As an influential member of the House of Lords you have recently had an opportunity of convincing yourself, in a conversation with the Fuhrer, of the sincerity of Germany's wish for peace. For these reasons I am very glad that it is you, Lord Lothian, who have taken the initiative of discussing Anglo-German relations.

'What is to happen now?' That is the question you put after having outlined the present political situation and the failure of the League of Nations. You try to discern the difficulties in the way of an Anglo-German agreement and you look round for a way out of the present state of things

which you regard as dangerous. But I fear that you overlook the principal difficulty—the differences of thought and feeling which characterise our two nations. This is not to say that such difficulties cannot be overcome and that they exclude any possibility of an understanding. On the contrary, it is my conviction that friendships are longest lived, not where friends are similar, but where their qualities are complementary, always assuming that the contrasts are clearly perceived and acknowledged by both partners.

Both our nations must try to understand each other's ways of thinking and feeling and to find out each other's point of view. Just as the appearance and the character of a landscape differ according to the spectator's point of view, so it is in viewing the life of an individual or a nation. England has built up her Empire after centuries of struggle. Her point of view therefore cannot but be imperialistic. For my country a longing which is just as many centuries old, and for which likewise much precious blood has been shed, has, at last, come true under the leadership of Adolf Hitler—*das Volk*.[1] Our point of view is therefore bound to be *volkisch*.[1] One of the best-known songs of your country, Lord Lothian, is 'Rule! Britannia, Britannia, rule the waves!' Britannia rules the waves and therefore the world. Even if in your article you place the idea of the British Commonwealth of Nations in the foreground, you will certainly grant that, after all, the British Navy and the Crown of England are the decisive factors. Germany has no intention whatever to rule the waves, nor to contest England's supremacy at sea. The conclusion of the Naval Pact is sufficient proof of this. Germany wishes all that is German to remain German, not because of any material advantages, but as the guardian of the highest values of a civilisation.

If you, Lord Lothian, doubt my words, I should ask you to compare the national anthems of our countries. We do not ask for victory or glory as you do—love for the country and the nation only are expressed in our songs. Our national points of view are different, and therefore Germany's field of vision differs from that of England. All the world is England's parish, whereas the eyes of Germany are primarily concentrated

[1] 'Nation' and 'national' do not sufficiently convey the meaning which *Volk* and *völkisch* have for a German

on Europe. England is interested in Europe only from the point of view of the balance of power, which to her seems the only possible way to protect her sea routes. Germany is interested in Europe from the point of view of the maintenance of European civilisation. Germany does not aim at political power, or rule over other countries; she wishes to live at peace with her neighbours, as the only hope for a resurgence of German and European civilisation.

England, for the sake of the balance of power, looks towards a revivification of the League of Nations as the only means of peacefully balancing the interests of the nations—a wish which can never be fulfilled, for such a League would only too easily be the instrument of any transient majority. In this country we believe pacts concluded on the basis of an absolute equality of rights to be a better means of safeguarding peace and freedom.

I have pointed the contrasts between the two attitudes, believing that the real difficulties are not to be found where you look for them, but are rather the consequence of the historical development of your country and mine. History has shaped the Englishman and the German into moulds which cannot be changed at will over-night. The German is full of ideals and not accustomed to hiding his thoughts. The Englishman is phlegmatic and free from illusions and he likes to write and read between the lines. Therefore I am only all the more thankful that you, Lord Lothian, so openly stress the difficulties in the way of an understanding. But you see the difficulties through the spectacles of an Englishman. Your conception of liberty and ours, for instance, are different. I have personally had the experience of an open expression of my opinions, in the interest of a better understanding of our two nations, being suppressed through the influence of authoritative circles in your country. Moreover, I know that reports favourable to Germany have been rejected by a newspaper closely connected with your Government, as they did not suit the Government's policy at the time. In England, on the other hand, people believe that the German citizen is not allowed to express his opinions freely. I believe that even to-day no country in the world admits as much criticism as Germany does; only it is necessary to make a distinction between criticism which promotes the

welfare of the country and criticism fed by forces abroad and tending to undermine the constructive work of the Government. But as you yourself do not intend to go into the details of this question, which you do not regard as fundamental, I shall pass to other questions the solution of which is in your opinion necessary as a basis for a mutual understanding. The economic question may take precedence.

In Germany we still believe that before the war Germany's *rôle* as a competitor in the markets of the world was a fundamental reason for the tension between our two countries. It was only in 1933 that an influential public personality in England told me that ever since the Great War this has been an obstacle to Anglo-German understanding. But to-day Germany is blamed for holding aloof from the international markets! Is Germany to blame if the measures of other countries and our instinct of self-preservation compel us to live on a basis of limited self-sufficiency? Do you not think that the Ottawa Agreement and the departure of some countries from the gold standard may have accelerated this development?

Germany certainly does not regard the present state of affairs as ideal. Germany wishes to import and export goods, for the simple reason that she wishes to give her own and other nations a higher standard of living. But I cannot regard the economic groups proposed by you as a suitable basis for peace, for such groups are bound to cause discontent in the countries not belonging to them. Mutual concessions as to duties, quotas and import restrictions are neither decisive nor easy to attain, for such measures have in the past almost always been taken in order to help the economically weaker countries against the stronger ones. A strong will to carry on foreign trade is far more important, and will overcome all obstacles. Germany is ready to build up trade relations with any country willing to take German goods; world trade cannot exist without the regular and mutual exchange of goods, and the trade agreements concluded by Germany are the best proof of the fact that Germany does not intend to exclude either herself or other countries from international commerce.

The second question you raise is the colonial question. Permit me to discuss this question just as frankly as the first.

Here also tariffs and currency systems are not the decisive factors; the decisive question is whether the fertility of the earth and the abundance of its treasures ought to be utilised for the benefit of mankind. It is not the gold heaped up in some national bank nor any figures in a ledger which constitute the wealth of nations. In the long run nothing but diligence and industry will guarantee a nation's welfare. The British Empire owns a great part of the earth, and is most certainly not in a position to make full use of its territory. Why then is the rightful return to Germany of her colonies refused though they are of little value to the British Empire, as many Englishmen have conceded, and though for Germany they would provide work and help to cover her vital needs?

As a reason you adduce the suspicious attitude of many Englishmen towards Germany. But is not there much more reason for Germany to be suspicious of England? Has not Germany again and again given proof of her good will, and has not England very frequently shown a lack of good will? If Germany brings her armaments up to the standard of her neighbours, and moreover time upon time declares herself ready to armaments limitations, if Germany again and again offers pacts of non-aggression to her neighbours, do you not think that it must come as an offence to the German nation when she finds herself credited with aggressive intentions? The outlook of National-Socialist Germany is nationalistic; she loves her own nation and is therefore bound to respect other nations as well, as long as they do not interfere with her home affairs and do not try to undermine the German *Volkstum* at home or abroad. The mainspring of anarchy is not to be found in Germany, but in those countries where national rights and the rights of national minorities are trodden upon!

You, Lord Lothian, look round for a way out. Is there any possibility of finding a way out if we do not first try to understand each other? Is there any hope of finding in England an understanding of Germany's point of view? There is a possibility that the affairs of this world may be looked upon not only through English spectacles but with a little more idealism. Why only threats and demands? You say that friendly co-operation would be possible provided that . . . Why let friendship depend on such bargaining?

Would it not be much finer to gain it through an act of friendship? England has built up her world policy on the basis of the balance of power in Europe. Would it not be better to seek a more solid foundation? What is the use of the finest structure if it is built on sand? Firm frienship has been established between the Italian and German nations; there are no serious reasons for strife between Germany and France. When will people in England come to understand that their country is not only part of a gigantic Empire, but also part of that Europe which is the home of the highest values of civilisation and the highest ideals? When will they come to understand that countries held together by the bonds of friendship are of a higher value than a Europe in hourly danger of losing its equilibrium?

You, Lord Lothian, have asked for a frank statement of the German point of view. Here you have it, and I hope that my words will be neither lost nor misunderstood. The question of an Anglo-German agreement is a question, not of politics, balances and concerts, but merely of good will and mutual understanding. You say that an agreement between England and Germany would mean the peace of the world. I should like to add that it would mean more; it would mean the salvation and perhaps even the renaissance of Western civilisation.

C. V. KROGMANN.

Hamburg, October 20, 1937.

NUREMBERG, 1937

By WILLIAM TEELING

As I crossed the border from Belgium into Germany the customs official handed me back my '*laissez-passer*' with the remark, 'You had better keep this, else you will never get into Nuremberg.' Up to that moment I had not realised that for the whole of the coming week Nuremberg would be a forbidden city to all those not taking part in the annual Nazi Congress. The nearer my car approached the city, the more festive seemed the atmosphere in the near-by towns and villages. We spent the last night before arriving in Wurzberg, 50 miles away. Even there nearly all rooms in the hotel seemed booked: two rooms were left; my friend and I asked for both; we were told that was impossible—we must share a room. No matter what we offered to pay, nothing else could be done; it was the spirit of the Congress that everybody possible should be given a bed, and wealth could not buy greater comfort for any one Congressman over another.

Next morning we approached the city of Nuremberg, through flag-bedecked villages. Five miles outside the town we were stopped by the police; my '*laissez-passer*' did the trick, but as we approached the outskirts of the town nothing would induce the police to let me through. The orders were quite definite: no cars must be allowed, without authorisation, inside the city limit. The more I attempted to approach the town from different angles, the more I was struck by the fact that all the police and the S S. men in charge were, like myself, 'strangers in these parts.' The defenders of the city had been drafted in from all over the country; they had never heard of the Grand Hotel, nor of the Deutscher Hof, where Hitler himself was staying. One lot of police came from Düsseldorf and another lot from Hamburg. But every-

body was friendly, and my predicament was recognised; I had luggage, I had an invitation, but I had no car permit. The reason was that the invitations to foreign guests were issued so late that most of us were unable to receive the detailed instructions of how to approach Nuremberg in time. Eventually they let me through, and my car proceeded at a snail's pace, sandwiched in between two processions of singing S.S. men, to the railway station.

From there I walked across to the Würtemburger Hof, the hotel which had been set aside for the journalists. They were at lunch in the garden—a vast mob of international writers. I found the English and lunched with them. The waiters already looked confused, and someone suggested, 'Why do they not bring down more waiters from Berlin to cater for this rush?' One of the journalists who had been longest in Germany replied, 'Can you see a Prussian waiter working with a Bavarian cook?' I realised, in spite of everything that has been done and said, that there is still the old feeling of jealousy of one part of Germany for the other. Another journalist prophesied—what by the end of the week I found to be only too true—that I would see that all the waiters everywhere would be almost asleep on their feet, for during this week everybody had to work like a madman.

I have certainly hardly ever seen such vast numbers of people elsewhere before. It was already the second day of the Congress, and there was suppressed excitement and questions on everybody's lips as to what would be the sensation of this Congress. The famous writer for the *New York Times* who wanders in search of one European incident after another came over to us with an apology. 'I remember the sensation of 1936, and the bombshell of 1935,' said he; 'but can anybody tell me what sensational remark Hitler made in 1934?' Nobody could, and somebody suggested that perhaps in 1937 there would be no sensation either.

The evening before, Monday, September 6, the Congress had opened, and there had been a performance at the Opera House which had lasted for five hours. On the Tuesday morning, shortly before I arrived, the opening session of the Congress had been held in Luitpoldhalle. The Fuhrer's opening message to the Congress had been read, as usual, by Herr Wagner, the Prime Minister of Bavaria. In his message

the Führer had said that this must be a Congress dedicated to work; he had made an appeal for the return of colonies and had stated that Germany could not carry on satisfactorily without access to fresh raw materials. He had also hinted at the Church problems, when he had said that conditions in Europe were far too serious for people to consider that it was sufficient for this life to belong to one religious confession. That afternoon there seemed nothing much to do, and it was most interesting before going through the week of the Congress to study something of its organisation.

I gathered that the Fuhrer had stated some years ago that in future the National-Socialist Party Congress should take place each year in Nuremberg, because it had been held there in the days before the Nazis came into power. He had also decided that this Congress should be the excuse for the coming together once a year of all the old fighters of the party and all its keenest followers; further, that they should meet there picked men from the younger bodies he had recently called into being in Germany, and also from the army, the navy, and the air force. He intended that every year, at this Congress, the work of the party in every field of activity during each year should be reviewed and a statement made of the programme for the coming year. Picked men and women from all over the country would listen to the detailed explanations of failure or success in the past year, and of plans for the next one. They would take these back into their own districts and countrysides and explain them to those others not lucky enough to reach Nuremberg. In addition to such drier events as long meetings with speeches, he planned for every day a series of parades, which have annually become more colossal, and in which he would review the massed members of each different organisation. He calculated, and calculated rightly, that such displays on an ever-increasing scale would satisfy and impress his followers, and might also give foreigners cause to pause and think. For that purpose he decided to set aside buildings and money for the entertainment of some hundreds of foreign guests.

It is not surprising that, as the success and the power of that party has grown from 1933, the magnitude of this Congress week, called in Germany the *Reichsparteitag*, should have necessitated an organisation that, I think, is unequalled any-

where else in the world. To begin with, the town of Nuremberg has a population of 450,000 in normal times. Added to this, come annually now over 500,000 visitors for this one week. The first problem is to get the people to the town and away from it; the second, to house and to feed them while they are there; the third, to make sure of the sanitary arrangements; and the fourth, to keep the people interested, occupied and stimulated. One thing that is strictly forbidden in Germany to-day is for young boys and girls, enthusiastic followers of the party, to 'hike' to Nuremberg from other parts of Germany. In spite of that, all along the roads leading to this romantic old city you will find young men asking for a lift. Nine-tenths of the people, however, arrive by train. The members of the German Labour Camps Corps came at the beginning of the week and left after three days. They were succeeded by 79,000 S.A. men and 30,000 S.S. men; none of these people was paid anything for coming to Nuremberg, and, in fact, they all lost their week's wages, from whatever might be their trade. I came across several instances where older members of the party had come there who really could not afford it. The local party members in their village had clubbed together to pay what expenses there might be, and had promised to provide for their wives and families while they were away. All these people came by train, which necessitated the presence in and around Nuremberg, during the week of the Congress, of no less than 600 railway engines. These engines had to be shunted somewhere to keep the lines clear, and the sidings were filled with them as far away as Stuttgart and Wiesbaden.

The majority of Nuremberg visitors slept in camps and in tents. Where the biggest camps were placed, just outside the city, special railway stations and side-lines had been built; this made it possible in the town of Nuremberg, in one day alone, for no less than 100,000 people to be drafted into the city and 50,000 to leave without causing confusion. The biggest of these camps was the S.A. camp, where the Labour Corps stopped before the S.A. came in. Here the party members slept as many as 120 in one tent; they lay on straw and had a canvas covering. They had washstands near their tents and special places to hang the Nazi banners of their districts, which made a very pretty and colourful

picture from the top of the look-out tower where sentries were on duty day and night. These party men, small leaders in their own towns and villages, were on parade during that week from early morning till late at night, for which they earned not one penny; 79,000 of them were in that one camp. Only on the last day of the Congress were they allowed to spend the day free in the town. They had sing-songs in the evenings, and old friends from East Prussia would wander across the line to talk to companions now coming, perhaps, from the Rhineland or from the Saar. One of their leaders told me that these men came with one object in view—to see their leader as often as they could, and to march past him on the last Sunday of the week. They would see him, and the fact that they were all there, they felt certain, would give him the necessary encouragement to carry on another year of effort. It seemed to me that if there was any truth in the statement, so often made, that there is grave discontent behind the scenes in Germany, surely Hitler would not be so mad as to allow 80,000 people, all in key positions in their districts, to come together from all over Germany and gossip and hear from each other of the discontent in other parts of the country. It seemed to me a clear proof that he and his supporters at least feel they have nothing to hide from their men.

Across the road from the S.A. camp was the camp for the Hitler Youth. Here 40,000 boys were to be found throughout the whole week. In many ways I have seen no more inspiring sight, and these boys had decorated their tents and their camp with delightful ingenuity. They seemed healthy and physically fit, and there could be no doubt in the evenings that they thought themselves happy and that their minds were being greatly influenced by this display all around them of strength and of patriotism. It is in them and in the youth of the Labour Corps that I am most interested, for they are a new Germany, and it would seem that they are completely under the spell of the régime. In reading this article I would ask my readers to remember as I describe the speeches and the processions and displays what impression they think it would be likely to have on 40,000 picked youth leaders, on 38,000 eighteen-year-old workers in the Labour Corps, and on 1500 Labour Corps women as they listen and

take part. One thing struck me particularly on the fourth morning of the week when I was motoring near the Hitler Youth camp. I met these boys of from fourteen to eighteen marching back from a route march; I have never seen people look so completely dead-beat (they were literally worn out), and as they saw our car waiting by the roadside a few section leaders tried to start up a marching-song: the response was nearly pathetic. I could not help but remember that the German always tries to overdo things, nor could I forget the recent criticism a German schoolteacher made to me when he said, 'These boys in the Hitler Youth are marched and paraded to death; they come back so dead tired, it is quite impossible for them to study anything. And as a result, education is suffering terribly.' And I remembered figures given to me in Japan by a German not so long ago, where he had shown me how the young Japanese have grown in stature, on an average, by over 2 inches, due to physical training and outdoor sports; but at the same time, the mortality figures for tuberculosis and other such complaints amongst the youth have risen alarmingly. That, however, is not, so far, the case in Germany, where the tuberculosis mortality is lower than and falling faster than in England and Wales; but the German training is as yet too recent to have a serious effect.

Near the Youth camp were the catering quarters. A huge staff is kept for this purpose by the Fuhrer and moves about from one Nazi celebration to another all over Germany, fully equipped with kitchen utensils, knives, foodstuffs and the like; all ready to feed at least 100,000 mouths. Still further on were the 30,000 S.S. men, who form the guard of Hitler and also do much the same work as would the Special Constabulary in this country. Over 15 miles away were quartered contingents from the army, the air force, and the navy. None of these troops was seen in the city during the week, and it is an interesting point to remember that for seven whole days of marching, parading, and speechifying there was not one sign of arms or warlike material. Nor in any one of the parades was there ever seen a single horse. The only sort of weapons I noticed were the 40,000 spades carried by the young men of the Labour Corps.

It is interesting to note, in this connexion, that the peaceful

feelings of the German population, which to my mind are unquestionable, could be reflected in the lack of enthusiasm one found in private conversation for the coming visit of Signor Mussolini. It was felt that the Italian alliance had one very grave drawback—it might drag Germany nearer a war in the Mediterranean. There were a number of Italian guests at the Congress, just as there were also British, Japanese, French, Latvians, Chinese, Portuguese, and General Franco's brother from Spain. Last, but not least, was a contingent from Austria, which on the first day on the Zeppelinfeld gave Herr Hitler an ovation which was sufficiently embarrassing for steps to be taken that it should not be repeated on any other day in the week.

On Wednesday morning we all attended the inspection of the Labour Corps on the Zeppelinfeld. There were over 100,000 spectators, most of them paying from 2 marks to 10 marks for a seat. Thirty-eight thousand young men, aged from eighteen to twenty, goose-stepped past the Fuhrer to the loud cheers of the onlookers, and then doubled round the backs of the stands, to march up in a most imposing parade, through the centre of the field, carrying their shining spades at the slope. In the centre of their group marched about 1000 young men stripped to the waist and bronzed. They were met by a procession of 720 girls from the Girls' Labour camps, who formed semi-circles round two large flags. Twenty-two men then approached from the left and the right and, forming up in open formation, waved around their heads and into different patterns forty-four *swastika* flags, with a background of over 200 more flying from flagpoles around the stadium. The men and the girls sang in unison and paid homage to the dead. Loyal anthems were sung and many verses were recited of a new hymn, a typical verse of which follows :

All together :

> We are ready.

The young men :

> We thank our leader
> That he calls us.
> We treasure his voice
> As Germany sleeps.

We wish to be companions
With our life to watch over work and Germany;
We are the standard-bearers
Of the new times.

In other verses, spoken later on, they laid stress on the work they intend to do to help the peasants on the land. They spent a good deal of time in moving their spades from the shoulder to the ground, and it was an amazing thing to see the wonderful precision with which they acted, when one realises that they cannot have been, any of them, more than six months in training, and that they came from all over Germany and were meeting for the first time, without a dress-parade, on the Zeppelinfeld that morning. Next day the Fuhrer laid the foundation-stone of a new German stadium. When this is completed by the middle of next year, it will be able to hold 250,000 people. From it will proceed a long processional way, for military and other parades, up to a new Congress hall, which will be larger than the Coliseum in Rome. It is to be ready for the tenth anniversary of the party's coming into power in 1943. Near-by is the Luitpoldfeld, where the annual parade of the S.A. men and the S.S. men will still always take place, and across a stretch of water can be seen the Zeppelinfeld, which will then be given over entirely to processions of the Labour Camp Corps and the Labour Front. The vast magnitude of these buildings, which are only to be used for one week in the year, have naturally caused much criticism, it is rumoured, from Dr. Schacht and other leading German business-men. It has also brought adverse comments from Germany's Japanese allies, who consider simplicity and smallness the perfection of good taste. Several Britons, however, and other foreigners who were there, felt that the Fuhrer's interest in these buildings and in the further laying out of Berlin and other cities was a very good guarantee of peace, since it must occupy him for years to come.

The whole of Friday was spent by most of us either in attending the Congress meetings that were going on or in examining the organisation methods of the party. We saw something of the precautions taken against any outbreak of disease with special inventions for sanitation, and we visited the huge camp of the German workers, members of the

Strength through Joy movement. In the evening there was a colossal display on the Zeppelinfeld of all the party leaders throughout Germany. This was illuminated by hundreds of searchlights going straight up into the air, and going so high that they seemed to meet in a point. It is said that they could be seen as far south as Prague, and that before us were as many men as are in the whole British Territorial Army. Before this meeting took place, and indeed before all the meetings, the audience had to wait and be in their seats for nearly an hour. It could not, therefore, be said that the spontaneous ovation they gave on each occasion to the Fuhrer as he arrived, unheralded and without marshal music, was in any way a form of worked-up mass hysteria. It seemed to me a calculated and genuine welcome, all the more remarkable when one noticed that there were only certain points in his speeches which were unanimously cheered to the echo by everyone. This cheering occurred whenever Hitler spoke of people making personal sacrifice for the good of their fellow-men, and especially for Germany. It occurred whenever he reminded his audience that the Germans were now a free people able to take care of themselves and to develop their own lives; and it occurred whenever he wished to warn other countries, especially Russia, that he and his followers will stand no interference from outside nations.

On Saturday—which was, unfortunately, a wet day—everything was concentrated for the Youth. In the morning was a parade for 40,000 youths, and in the afternoon sports were held. The Fuhrer impressed on the youths that they were there to prepare themselves to enter the party, that they must suffer a little for Germany and that they must be prepared to follow blindly his leadership. This was made specially noticeable when Herr Hess gave the older ones who were about to enter the party an oath which swore solemn allegiance to Hitler direct, and to Hitler alone—only bringing in Germany as a secondary part of that allegiance.

I felt as I attended the party meetings held every day in the Luitpoldhalle that the main theme of this Congress was not being stressed in any one particular speech but was being gradually rubbed in in a series of lesser statements. This theme was the attack on the different forms of

Christianity in Germany, and the insistence that Protestants and Catholics must sink their differences; furthermore, the suggestion was being made, more in conversation than in direct public statements, that a new form of Christianity would be suitable for Germany, and that the Prophet of that religion should be the Fuhrer. As an example one found in a prominent place in the anti-Bolshevist exhibition a picture of the Führer with the caption above it 'In the beginning was the Word.' To the minds of many of the foreign guests present the attack on recognised religion is the most serious thing in Germany to-day. It is certainly alienating many of the older people, as well as many in the army and the navy. But it is not so certain whether it is alienating youth. I myself would be inclined to think that, since parents are not always anxious to teach their children anything contrary to what is taught them in the German official schools for fear of persecution, the boys and girls are likely to be left to believe the new teaching. The Sunday was given over to a parade of all the S.A. and S.S. men, and on the final Monday the army gave a brilliant display.

I think I can safely sum up that foreign guests went away with the impression that they had been lavishly entertained, and entertained with a genuine friendliness. They felt they could agree with the complaints of their hosts that it is a thousand pities the foreign Press pinprick so frequently the German Government. It will never be possible for the British Government to interfere actively in German internal affairs, nor is it its business, therefore, if the British want to keep the peace, they should cease to criticise what is internal in Germany.

But the final lesson of Nuremberg to us all must be that, whatever army or other leaders desire, the people of Germany do not want war and are anxious for peace with Great Britain. Many more efforts should be made in this country to bring about an understanding of Germany which would insure that peace. And there is no reason to believe that the responsible authorities in Germany would not also reconsider their attitude to religion if they felt certain they were to be treated as European equals, and not as naughty schoolboys, always to be lectured.

WILLIAM TELING.

THE NEW AFRICA

I. The Need for New Forms of Government for Africans

By Tracy Philipps

The curious survivals of a dying past, the African Valley of the Dry Bones and the vestiges of mumbo-jumbo which still cling about the skeletons, have often been described, in patches, by anthropologists and travellers.

Since the end of the Great War, when European conceptions of life began to penetrate everywhere in Africa, such an abyss has opened between the old and the new Africa that Africans and Africanisms of the pre-war period have ceased to afford a constructive criterion for the future of that continent. They have become merely biographical relics or museum specimens.

The example of the old life of Africans and of their indigenous institutions is now merely misleading. Their safeguards, and their very functioning, rested on pillars which are already disintegrated, tottering and irreparable.

Similarly, the mentality, as recently as the end of the Great War, of some 160,000,000 of superstitious illiterate Tsarist peasants, who were beasts of burden cultivating communally, was (and is) not only not helpful but a wholly misleading indication of the reactions—and therefore for the future—of the literate and self-conscious workman or peasant youth of Russia, rightly or wrongly proud of their nation and régime. The first contact of Central Africa with Europe was in the reign of Queen Victoria. But the British of Queen Boadicea would then have understood and legislated better for those Africans.

If, as Sir Flinders Petrie asserts, 'Africa was better known in 1600 than in 1800,' it is equally true to submit that the African was better known a quarter of a century ago than he

is to-day. Among other things, and ironically enough, two excellent and unavoidable things are proving an obstacle. *First*, there is the encouragement given to young officials to bring wives to Africa before they have 'learned' the village and the Bush, the consequent growth of a stay-at-home 'social' life, confined to Europeans, and of its European amusements and suburban engagements—of which Kitchener in the Sudan foresaw the grave handicap to Anglo-African understanding. *Secondly*, the almost slothful ease and rapidity of mechanical transport over the earth's surface has everywhere decreased the duration and depth (and increased the superficiality and mutual misunderstanding) of human relations, especially the relations between Governments and governed. *Thirdly*, the blighting increase of bureaucracy (over and above a very necessary routine) and the dangerous reliance of the rulers (white and black) on pens and paper among illiterate populations.

Apart from the extreme west, where European contact has been ancient and gradual, once the young African has passed through the school where fresh air and light flood in by unsuspected windows into his mind, his whole outlook on life, and mentality itself, begin to change. He is as cut off from his past as is a Europeanised Turkish boy whose Ottoman traditions have been torn from him and who cannot even read the inscription on his father's tomb. But such compact nations of the temperate zone have found, in the superiority-complex of an exalting national socialism, a new spirit to sustain their staggering steps. To foresee and to reconstruct the future of Africa, it is already more deceptive and less useful to look to the mentality of any past generation of Africans than to the evolution of other (already emerging) races. For other races have also been dazed by the fierce light suddenly flashed into their darkness and by the disruptive impact of several simultaneous revolutions operated by alien conquerors of different colour and religion, and out of another age. Some of these races have been squeezed and jostled up through the door into our intenser level of life. Others, of the hotter zones, of the South Seas and Peru, have either preferred to die out or have never recovered their old equilibrium.

The probable trend of European empires in Africa is still

obscure. It is not yet even foreseeable with certainty whether many of them may eventually become more of a liability than an asset. However that may be, there exists meanwhile no bold planning, no clear co-ordination even of colonies of the same empire, except perhaps the Italian. The present political position of Africans is thoroughly unstable, and the sense of instability is contagious. In many colonies territorial administration functions and fumbles in a harmful half-light of hush-up and of obscurantism. The colonial continent, divided conflictingly within itself, is a vast property without a plan. Africa is aimless; there exists no agreement even on first principles of policy. Still less is it likely that in an Africa of colonial rivalry—where subject peoples watch and wait—political co-operation can be reached and peace constructed while putting other European (and other African) nations at a disadvantage by economic discrimination. As civilised and reading races, we have the advantage, if we will use it, of learning lessons from our own experiences elsewhere. The case-files of recorded history of the evolution of mankind, and of colonial empires, and a study of the conditions accompanying the rise and fall of their graphs, can materially assist us to recognise and diagnose the causal factors and to arrest premature decay.

The Japanese, with feet firmly set on the ground of a national religion, which includes the cult of public service and of ancestral spirits, have survived the impact of Europe by developing a discrimination of what to reject and what to utilise of the mechanical by-products of Europeanism. But for necessarily still undiscriminating Africans our civilisation reveals, but withholds, material satisfactions which it has taught them to desire. Just as some European *bourgeoisies* feel themselves to be living on the brink of a volcano of the materially dissatisfied and spiritually unsatisfied workers, so will the increasingly unsatisfied restlessness of the people militate politically against European guidance of Africa unless the confused voice of the African masses can be clarified, heard and heeded, in order to meet their peculiar aspirations as well as our own.

Experience in British India or in Japan is apt to mislead rather than guide us in Africa. The population of India, unlike that of the 120,000,000 of Black Africa, has not the

disadvantage of being partitioned between many European nations, many nationalisms, with varying conceptions of life and of the future of the inhabitants. In Turkey and Russia, even up to the last decade, the masses were illiterate and only chiefs and officials could read. Thus, in our own time, the results are visible there of a simultaneous mechanical and state-socialist revolution. It was accompanied by the disestablishment and disruption of religion, and of the royalty of hereditary chieftainship, both spiritual and temporal.

In Russia the *mir*, the collective and communal ('tribal' or village) tenure of land, was abolished only in 1911. After only seven years collective tenure was re-established by the totalitarian revolution—industrial, social and religious. Dissolution and disestablishment of religion are, however, not its destruction—which is what is occurring in Africa.

Africa presents more difficulties than all the examples of history Even among the most diverse races, there often exists a striking similarity of mankind at similar stages of his economic development. The traveller who has experience of the villages of Africa, as well as of colonial Russia and of central Turkey, will not fail to note the value to us of the failures and successes of the *technical* methods in use in the two latter for the development and education of the millions evolved within a decade from imitative beasts of burden to literate self-conscious human beings.

The next African transition, after the present stage, will lend itself to African nationalisms, especially in British areas, to replace the contradictory nationalisms of Europe which are being inflicted upon these peoples. Unless we can create another spirit than that of one-sided and commercialised democratic imperialism, natural native nationalisms will spring up and provide the inspiration and the spirit necessary to all young nations. For man cannot live by bread alone. In our generation we have seen Asians and Africans brought to fight Europeans in Eastern, Western, and Southern Europe, as well as in the heart of Africa itself, in a quarrel which was not their own. In India and Japan the sudden evolution to material Europeanism has remained superficial. It has been limited and stabilised by a conservative moral background, and held firm by the sheet-anchor of an ancient civilisation and religion.

But the non-Moslem African, launched on the sea of transition, finds himself drifting without a moral chart or compass, and without a material rudder or anchor of his own; his ship is threatened with breaking up on an unknown sea. It is being patched up by alien artificers with worn-out materials. In Africa the main body of the crew have not yet reached the haven of the religions of The Book. Those religions recognise the standardising and binding power of the written word. They encourage literacy, upon which they must ultimately rely. African Christians have, almost necessarily, been made to skip the relatively simple communal religion of Christ and of the Gospels for the individualistic and complicated Greek-philosophic mystery-teaching of the epistles. Transubstantiation and the Trinity, monogamy and the Virgin Birth, the physical Resurrection and the rigours of the Athanasian Creed, are not easily the immediate successors of the spontaneous propitiatory spirit-cults which satisfied the spiritual hunger of tropical Africans. The resulting morality is necessarily superficial, and Christianity risks retrogression.

In these conditions, moreover, the voice of the people, as opposed to that of black Government officials, is seldom spontaneously heard—unless or until misunderstanding or exasperation smoulder into the flame of an 'outbreak' necessitating another of the many 'Commissions of Inquiry' into the government of colonies. The position of Inspector-general, which in British colonies exists only for police or military services, exists in some non-British colonies for political and administrative purposes also. In some cases the holders of the post are, so to speak, envoys-at-large of the incoming governor whom their sometimes wider or more specialised political experience of Africa enables them to forewarn or advise. It is essential that the mass of Africans in Africa should feel, and be convinced and *conscious* of, justice, happiness and contentment. In their contentment lies their and our security.

In Africa European government has not taken the trouble to explain itself, or to demonstrate justice to the rank and file of the people where their exasperated voice and 'unexpected' feelings have lacked means to gain hearing and consideration. Where exploitation exists in tropical Africa it is no longer the

European who directly exploits the African, but the black who exploits his fellow-black.

Another gulf which to-day still divides Africans is that between the class of readers and the non-reading masses. The former are the principal interpreters of Europe to Africans. In this interpretation (which is not susceptible of supervision), and therefore in illiteracy, lies a deep danger. Moreover, the division is no longer between black and white, but unavoidably between the mass of blacks and the whites with their black assistants, who seldom form a liaison or bridge between the two groups. In this respect the story of the French revolution in negroid San Domingo (then the world's most flourishing colony) and of its negro nationalist dictators afforded a salutary warning as to what to expect in similar conditions in Africa. The warning was lost upon both the reactionary residents and the furtive anti-patriotic schoolteachers (sent overseas by the democratic and colonial Great Power which is France) in their respective exasperation and incitement of the nationalist intellectuals of Africa.

The crude recrudescence of anti-Judaism (partly due to the British Palestine policy), the new feature of bloody political strikes among Africans in and out of Africa, the recent large-scale native outbreaks from Tunisia to Morocco, are the inexorable harvest of such Governments which, with the best intentions, scatter indiscriminately overseas such decayed dragon-teeth seed. In the end, it is always the credulous masses, in whose name the nationalist intellectuals pretend to act, who are the real sufferers. It is also disappointing to observe how seldom in Africa, as was the case among Africans of San Domingo, those moral and mental half-castes, the Europeanised 'black assistants,' form a liaison or a bridge of understanding between Africa and Europe. On the contrary, at this stage the religious revolution and the metallurgical and mechanical revolution have struck Africa with simultaneous and blinding concussion. In Europe these revolutions were separated by centuries of stabilising development. The African has been goaded by us to leap across the gulf of centuries, from the neolithic to the steel age, in a moment of time. Simultaneously, veiled contempt or benevolent ridicule —or mere contact and example—of Europeans has sapped

the magical but deep-set walls and foundations of the ancient religions of Africa.

Upon these religions were based the ancient sanctions of society, the limitations on tyranny and the same and severe safeguards against prophets, priests and kings. To-day the dykes are down: the flood is in.

Chiefs, facing both ways, find themselves set dizzily between earth and sky, between their people and the European, suspended like Muhammad's coffin in mid-air, without visible means of moral support. They are awakening to find themselves, so to speak, at a masquerade. Conveniently and cheaply we have dressed them in our cast-off period costumes. Their spiritual genius and attitude to authority are rooted in the idea of propitiation. The new, the unknown, gods, spiritual and temporal, of Christianity and Europeanism, must be propitiated. They must be satisfied superficially. It is the physical offences of the façade, and of the tongue and of the pen, rather than the unforgivable living and spiritual sins against sincerity and trusteeship, against which the chief is now warned. One of the developed characteristics of the African consists of a clever imitativeness and sense of adaptation. The clay of the African is still moist and malleable in the potter's hand. Upon this nascent humanity, of then uncertain destiny, we could have imprinted whatever mould we willed. Neither Greece nor Rome with the 'barbarians,' nor the men of the Renaissance in the New World, had such god-like opportunities as these. Among Africans, Europeans have enjoyed previously unheard-of privilege. It is doubtful whether we have felt proportionate responsibilities. Europeans have flocked into Africa as gods with feet of clay.

And so it has not been difficult for us optimistically and superficially to recreate these Africans in our own image, in the presumed character of British civil servants. It has been a mere act of export and imitation. It has called for no originality or thought. But the essence and spirit of the British Civil Service is not an exportable article from our peculiar northern island. The quality and spirit which alone can give the system value are precisely those which cannot be grafted suddenly or enduringly upon a tropical people with roots in quite other soil. The banana tree does not flourish in English air, nor the mountain pine on the banks of the

Congo or the Nile. Both can doubtless be imported and kept alive under glass, so long as English gardeners control all the doors and windows and the temperature. And no conscientious trustee can as yet afford to permit himself the immoral luxury (however cheap, convenient and apparently liberal) of decreasing, and still less of withdrawing, his 'gardeners,' whose numbers and efficacy are already inadequate. It will for long be tantamount to an act of cowardice or treachery disingenuously to abandon without effective safeguards the inarticulate mass of Africans whose confidence in heaven and whose checks on chiefs we have utterly destroyed.

Having recreated African chiefs in our own image as civil servants, we have put them on to a strange stage. On a stage of which the imported scenery is Anglo-Saxon, unfamiliar and uncongenial—at a time of religious transition and moral flux (which is a long and painful period of gestation)—the negro civil servants are placed upon the stage and presented to the public, to their people, as chiefs.

The new-style chief, if conscientious, feels himself in a dilemma, in a new ambiance of unreality and make-believe. That is why a play and a stage provide a proper parable and simile.

Despite himself, he is an orator and an actor *par excellence*. He must walk more delicately than Agag. Through the mask he declaims without conviction the slogans of an alien ideology. If, in the circumstances, he cannot yet command his people's confidence, he at least deserves our sympathy. His stage is set between the Great White Devil and the Deep Black Sea.

The African, indeed, has opted for Europeanism; and it is for Europeanism, and not for the outworn parts of Africanism, for which we now have to legislate. The 'chief' is expected to combine the European *rôle* of a civil servant with that of an African mumbo-jumbo. His difficulty and the contradiction will scarcely be denied.

The principals, who in all good faith present the play, are seated in European capitals of the colonial Powers. Their agents have their box-offices in the colonies. Directly or indirectly, it is the European who assures or withholds the pay and privileges of the caste of chiefs. The chiefs are not in ignorance as to the side on which their bread is buttered.

The stage-manager, the European official, 'indirectly' ruling, whispers forcefully and audibly in the wings. The audience are the black masses. But the governed are not always imbeciles; as an agriculturist, or as a father of a family, he is just as much a full-grown man as an Englishman. The catch-word that 'the African is only a child' is an insidious and dangerous half-truth.

It is only when first faced with the individualistic materialism, the moral complexity, or alien mechanical devices of the European that the African may sometimes appear a child. Hunting pygmies taking an average European to hunt in their mountain forests are apt to complain of his astonishing 'lack of natural knowledge,' knowledge of what, as a matter of course, they have acquired through the centuries, and which they regard as the elementary essentials of life. In their own country they express a slightly contemptuous surprise at the apparent childishness and irritability, helplessness, and ignorance of Europeans.

The average African is a mimic and an actor born. His shrewd and unclouded instinct both appreciates and penetrates mummery. He is deceived neither by the public captions of a ceremonial governor in gold lace and a feathered hat, nor by the lords of the cinema playing at love or banditry, nor by his own mimes or medicine-men masquerading to invoke laughter or fruitful fields.

But his own mimes and priests (where they survive) he can still control—by taboos, by tradition, or by public opinion of what is or what 'is not done.' Thus too, in the past, he controlled his chiefs who personified and *represented* him.

But, for the average African, the new chief on the European's stage is the puppet of the play, controlled from the wings. The black masses have begun to feel that their chiefs have passed out beyond their selection and their sanctions. The chief no longer represents them. In Africa the common colloquial reproach, in many tongues, is that 'our chiefs have become the European's scullions.'

The bench of magistrates over which this official presides consists of his own subordinate officials, who depend on his veto or his recommendation for the failure or success of their advancement and administrative careers. If the peasant's ewe-lamb or only cow is seized for tax at a quarter the market

price and finds its way to the chief's herd, if the African's young wife is detained overnight at the chief's house as a gage till the husband-householder returns, it is these administrator-tax collector-judges who constitute the native court to whom the aggrieved person must apply. Since the European official, himself an involuntary bureaucrat, has now to judge chiefs' work principally by a paper standard (by cultivation returns, by tax registers, by court records, and by daily correspondence), the chiefs themselves are tending to become clerks, but must therefore (runs the plausible argument), logically and in decency, be loyally supported. They concentrate their efforts on the impeccability and appearance of this often misleading façade by which they now realise that they are mostly judged.

There is a growing fear of responsibility, imitated from above, and the feeling that, however urgent or unexpected is the emergency, one must above all 'always be covered by a letter.'

The chief has now to play simultaneously to two totally different sets of spectators—to the modern European and to the tropical African of a still pre-Christian era. 'Government is through the chiefs,' who must therefore, on grounds set forth above, be loyally 'supported.' The more the chief can assure himself of the support (which alone counts) of the European officials whose agent he is, the less he need represent or nurse the people. In a register of chiefs' records, one of the most conscientious and intelligent chiefs of East Central Africa is noted by the administrator as unfitted for promotion on the ground that he 'makes himself a nuisance by always being full of "complaints" from his peasantry.' The reproach, in effect, is that he foresaw the meaning of the changes going on around him, and the dangers to governance of any open conspiracy of silence. He was one of the few chiefs who explained to the people the civic duty (and the uses) to them of taxation. As a consequence taxes were always paid in his area with promptness and without abuses.

President Roosevelt, broadcasting this year, appealed to the youth of America of all parties to examine the *bases* of their institutions. He assured them that 'rules are not sacred, but that principles are.'

In the British Colonies, the foundations and pillars of these

institutions, we have, by conservatism and indolence, whitewashed or camouflaged with an eyewash of (deceptive or inexportable) European political catchwords. But, despite the wise appeal of the President of the United States, those who have the courage thus to probe beneath the surface and to speak out fearlessly must be fully and previously prepared to be an object of suspicion to their superior officials, and to sacrifice their career to their principles and their affection for the people.

In parts of West Central Africa, where all the chiefs, of a confederation of over a million Africans, are of a proud and hereditary ruling caste with a sense of responsibility to their people, the introduction of the commercialised rule of European democracy, of which the chiefs are naturally made the instruments, has been the occasion among them of a significant number of suicides.

In general the interests of the chiefs, and of the people who can no longer exert any control on them to temper the wind, tend to become opposed and the chiefs to represent the people less and less. But the vast majority of native courts and councils are composed of chiefs (that is, civil servants) alone. Where, as is increasingly the case, the people feel it necessary in self-defence to conceal facts from chiefs, the latter are no longer able to keep the European officials (that is, the Government) informed of the people's aspirations and grievances. Such chiefs become the trees which prevent Governments from seeing or appreciating the wood. There is, in such cases, no warning. Little or nothing is seen or known of the smouldering exasperation which ends in one of the 'unexpected' outbreaks. And the number of these outbreaks and political 'strikes' is increasing ominously.

During the first century of the machine age (1830–1930) the machine upset human society from top to bottom. Its second era will see man firmly set in the saddle of his machines —and dominating them. The machine can replace slavery in the service of mankind. Already man is relieved of an immense weight of preliminary drudgeries which stood between him and his essential task. To replace 'cheap labour' the machine has provided us with cheap power. It has conquered distance and has vanquished night. The aeroplane and the radio enable us to listen to the palpitation

of the world. The colonies are at our door. It is not a matter of lamentation, but of relief. Indeed, so far from the machine providing any excuse for the failures of administration in Africa, for failure of personal contact with colonial peoples, and for the notorious lack of knowledge of their daily life, it is, on the contrary, a confession of our failure to scrap all obsolete and obstructive material and to see that, in European and African alike, it is the *spirit* which must dominate the man who commands the new machines. White administrators are neither taught nor encouraged to think in terms of a political sense. Thoughts on policy are reserved for governors. In most cases their sheltered and privileged official lives have been lived far from Europe as civil servants and masters among subject peoples in tropical countries. It is scarcely reasonable to expect that, when nominated governors, that school should normally be able suddenly to confer on them the gift of statesmanship. Hence, in Africa, history is presented with the dismal spectacle of a great empire and its nascent nations often governed and directed without co-ordination by a number of second-rate men in first-class positions. It is improbable that even 1 per cent. of cases of atrocious abuses are reported to Governments. Let us consider a few recent examples of colonial outbreaks which could not be hushed up and have therefore been the subject of public report, and are thus easily verifiable. (Our list is by no means exhaustive.)

1. The Nigerian riots of 1929 found the officials uninformed and unprepared. To quell the outbreak it was necessary to fire on the crowd. It was what the people believed of its methods and purposes more than any innate iniquity of the new taxation which was at the bottom of the sense of grievance which led to the demonstrations against the Government. The European officials were badly served by the chiefs. The Government had not taken the trouble adequately to explain itself or to invite the people's opinion and co-operation. The old ' proper channels ' of popular self-expression were shown to be choked, simply non-existent, and in any case totally inadequate for safety. In these cases the 'chief,' the negro civil servant, fails to represent the people. He ' represents ' the tares which we are sowing among the human wheat, the thorns which are springing up and choking it.

2. The two post-war revolts in the south-west of the Congo basin had to be put down by armed forces. They were not due to abuses by Europeans, but to conditions unwittingly permitted by them. They were uninformed of the political realities of the people's spirit beneath an impeccable administrative surface, until smouldering resentment blazed into flame. The injustices, violences or exactions of office messengers, black police or 'chiefs' were to the mass of the people the first-hand manifestation of European rule.

3. In Uganda (1927 and 1934) the situation in two of the richest districts, happily discovered before the outbreak (and therefore unknown in Europe), showed habitual private auction (by members of chiefs' councils) of recommendations to Government for appointments to chieftainships, wholesale corruption of justice and mediæval tortures, amounting to atrocities, inflicted on a large scale on their people by chiefs in the course of their collection of taxes for the Government or in execution of their other duties—that is, in the name of the Government and as judges of the (chiefs') courts of justice.

During all this period these same chiefs (then in receipt of salaries up to £1000 a year), whenever a European official was present in their court or council, never failed imitatively to declaim high idealistic catchwords regarding 'the good of the people.' Practice was believed to correspond with these pleasing declarations which were periodically reported to headquarters, who were subsequently incredulous and embarrassed when faced some years later with the inconvenient facts, and indignant—with the reporting official.

In this case the existence under a system of alleged trusteeship of such misuse and abuse of power, committed in the name of European government by the strong on the helpless, amounts physically to atrocities and morally to the 'sin against the holy ghost.' The incredible unawareness, or the indolent impotence, of non-supervision and non-responsibility (emphasised also in the Nyasa Report) in tropical Africa runs the risk of causing even well-meaning European administration to stink in men's nostrils.

In these cases a local missionary of long educational experience asserted without contradiction that, so soon as the young men of his schools realised their ambition of entering

the privileged fraternity of chiefs, and thus becoming Government officials, they were 'in practice lost to Christianity.' A devoted doctor volunteered the fact that 50 per cent. of the cases of wounds and 'hurt' coming up for treatment were due to acts of physical violence inflicted by chiefs on their own peasantry, either by clubbed sticks, by their heavy boots, or by the armed police under their direct orders. The abuses were suddenly discovered, in three months, by a new district administrator who did not even know the language, but had a certain 'political' sense and accessibility. There is no valid ground for assurance that the abuses would have been discovered now or until one of the 'unexpected outbreaks' had revealed the patiently pent-up exasperation of the people.

4. In this same decade news of the same thoughtless and uninformed superficiality of European administration and of widespread abuses by chiefs (that is, agents of the Government) upon the peasantry in the vast area of French Equatoria has been made accessible, by Frenchmen, to the people and Parliaments of the colonial Power. Among others, Albert Londres (*Terre d'Ebène*) and André Gide (*Voyage au Congo*) were quite exceptionally widely travelled and intelligent observers. Marcel Homet (*Congo, terre de souffrances*) and Marcel Sauvage (*Secrets de l'Afrique noire*, 1937) made their observations on the spot, and René Maran (*Batouala*) was a French administrator. The parallel, even where the civil-servant chiefs are educated mandarins, is to be seen in *Indo-Chine S.O.S.*, by Andrée Viollis. The situation in an African territory administered, according to Article 22 of the Covenant, 'on behalf of the League of Nations' is indirectly illustrated in *Gulla* (Cameroon, 1937). But any abuses to which they refer do not represent French colonial policy as conceived and approved by France in Paris. They are, however, the policy as often carried out, in practice, on the spot. The abuses, in fact, occur in spite of it.

5. The 1936 outbreak in Rhodesia was due to the methods of new taxation imposed by European government without consultation or representation of (or explanation to) the African taxpayers. The subsequent Commission of Inquiry pointed out the 'insufficient contact' between European officials and the people during this period of industrial revolution. Hence the unawareness of officials and the 'unexpected-

ness' of the outbreak and '. . . firing [on the crowd] became general.'

[The political strikes and recent riots by Africans in the island of Trinidad are reported as due to unremedied or unrealised conditions and '*lack of contact* between the officials and the people.']

6. A Commission of Inquiry (which included no African) had to be set up in Nyasaland in 1936 to ascertain facts of everyday human life which had been taking place openly under the eyes and ears of European residents, of European officials and of their African agents. The inquiry concerned facts which should never have been 'unknown.'

The Commission recorded at the outset with great frankness that '*we must confess that . . . there was not one of us who realised the seriousness of the situation.*' The inquiry emphasised the danger that, unless other methods were introduced, '*Nyasa-born natives will have acquired a complete mistrust in, and a loathing for, administration by white people.*'

7. A Commission of Inquiry had to be set up in 1936 in Zanzibar 'to inquire into the causes' of the Arabo-African outbreak directed against European officials, of whom one, an English administrator, was stabbed to death by the crowd.

The Report points out the '*singular absence of effective supervision* (other than on paper) *over the native staff*'—that is, over the African agents of European governance.

It criticises '*the inaccessibility*' (however involuntary) of English officials and their unawareness of the people's grievances. The European Government, through its agents, English or African, is blamed for '*failure to educate the people*' in the meaning (and usefulness to them) of European legislation. Attention is again drawn to the failure of the Government to take the trouble to explain itself or to consult the people.

In the colonial administrative 'machinery,' too automatised and impersonalised for adequate safeguarding of the still undespiritualised and quite unmechanised masses, there is lack of imagination clearly to conceive (and boldly to plan) machinery of the safety-valve by which the rising and pent-up energy of the African masses may at least rise freely to the surface, to be noticed. Provincial officials are of necessity conformists to the central administrative, municipal type of

bureaucratic *machine*. Judged on the reassuring good 'appearance' of its paper output, its efficient functioning is sometimes judged in overworked central secretariats as equivalent to good government.

It is not an average conscience or ability which is lacking in the 'principal clerks' of colonial offices, but knowledge, imagination, firm planning ahead and, above all, inspiration to inspire others in the government of peoples whose spiritual heritage is still intact. What in reality we are witnessing is *La Trahison des Clercs*. The category cannot wholly exclude many clerks who are in holy orders. The clerks do not await the cock to crow twice, to seek the dawn of the night of doubt, in order to deny it with an oath. What they are unwittingly *denying* is—the truth. What they, conscientiously and unconsciously, *betray* is the subject peoples. Honest doubt provokes original thought, in order to allay it. It is thus capable of breeding constructiveness and bold new action for a brave new world. But doubt has little place in the rarefied atmosphere of colonial offices from whose clerical obscurantism it has been engendered and exported. It is being smothered in London as silently and as surely as were the little princes in the Tower. It is smothered beneath the weight of complacency and Minute-papers, amid days and minutes quickly flying between the decently darkened rooms of principal clerks who have been sedentary for years daily from ten to six. The output of far-seeing and constructive planning of the British Colonial Office has been so infinitesimal in our gen ration that the numbers on the cell doors of this expensive hive could be most suitably inscribed with—a double zero. If the clerks are themselves permanent, safe and sheltered, their policy (if a policy exists) is not. When in recent years a preliminary proposal was placed before them for a non-official foreign-subsidised research into the political problems of Africa, an experienced principal clerk replied, 'But what political problems are there?' The counter-question which presented itself to the inquirer as he emerged from the Colonial Office into the light and air was, 'What further need have we of witness?'

And how are our clerks and secretaries served? What are their possible sources of truth regarding the peoples of whom they are paid to write and render account to Parliament? A

very few years ago a newly appointed governor, of secretarial antecedents and anxious as the Dubarry to *ne pas cesser de plaire*, was called upon to report to the Secretary of State on a matter of fundamental importance for the future of Africa. The terms of his despatch were not merely those of half-truths and inexactitudes. But the despatch also represented only the wishes of a conscientious and squirearchal Administration and its ex-feudal civil-servant chiefs. The views thus officially expressed were precisely the opposite of the proper, more progressive and deep desire of the people. The governor's verbal explanation of this surprising phenomenon to a dissentient administrator was textually, if vulgarly, that 'I had the tip from the C.O. as to what the S. of S. wanted, and I gave it them.' *Et Madame Dubarry n'a pas cessé de plaire.*

Secretariats, principal clerks and Secretaries of State are apt to get what they desire to hear. They thus receive comfortable words, which are dangerously reassuring. Meanwhile, the clerks constitute effective barriers between the people of the non-self-governing colonies and the people of the colonial Power through their accredited representatives. The replies to the questions of the people's representatives in Parliament, edited for the Secretary of State by the principal clerks of the Colonial Office, are models of disingenuous ingenuity. The tone of these 'miniature reports to Parliament' afford, in their turn, models for the reports of administrators and governors' despatches to these same editors.

The governor, to use a governor's elegant phraseology, 'gets the tip from the C.O.' and honourable gentlemen are safely put off till the Greek Calends. The overworked and amiable scribes, good fellows all, show little desire to become acquainted with inconvenient truths. It is on these premisses that principal clerks, secretaries, under-secretaries, politically minded bishops and all the company of heaven continue in good faith to speak and write of Africa, not excluding Abyssinia.

Let us turn for a moment with relief to the honest and outspoken realism of a great colonial administrator, third only perhaps to Lyautey and Lugard. At the end of a long and honourable African career he confesses with candour, like British Arthur, that 'All my mind is clouded with a doubt.' 'My mind,' he declared this year at Oxford, 'is gorged with solid blocks of doubt. The doubt is drawn from my experi-

ence in the rougher field of administration, as compared with secluded study of the subject.' Among the clerks in Europe and among the office administrators in Africa the relative atrophy or decadence of the spirit has failed to keep pace and respond to the soaring grandeur of 'things' which outstrip and dwarf and intimidate the shrivelling 'soul.' There is an administrative feeling in Africa that things can be best 'kept quiet' by being kept as they are; that new or original thoughts are of the devil, prince of lies, therefore to be ignored or suppressed. There is in Africa a tendency to confuse the sensitive and true record of the man who is a political barometer with any dangerous storm which he may foretell. If the forecasting service of aviation were to stamp on or throw out their barometers because their sensitiveness predicted annoying storms, it would be their own interests and their own reputation only which they would be harming. Meanwhile, a new and heady wine is fermenting in the ancient native administrative wine-skins. The sure signs of fermentation are manifested in the similar spasmodic and 'unexpected' outbreaks in widely distant and differing parts of the vast African continent. The majority of them are kept out of the newspapers. In the French and British colonial empires there is a recent disquieting increase of crowd challenge or disregard of law and order in which the agents of European governance have had to make use of firearms to repress.

In Kenya Colony in 1936 an Anglican archdeacon stated in the Legislative Council that, in the course of tax-gathering by chiefs for the European Government, 'things were being done which were so bad that they could not be described in the Legislature; and they would not be tolerated by the Administration, *if they had been* aware of them.'

But it is among, at least, 50 per cent. of the peoples of Africa, and not only in Kenya, and in the realm of the collection of taxes from subject peoples, that injustices which rankle, and violences which breed a spirit of counter-violence, are being perpetrated on Africans. And it is the reputation of European governance which suffers.

In Kenya public opinion of English settlers with a sense both of fair play and of the danger demanded the appointment of a Commission of Inquiry. It appears quite incredible to

Africans, as it is to public opinion in Europe, that white officials in their own areas are unaware of conditions for which they have to bear responsibility. Unfortunately the African, incorrectly but not unreasonably, argues that 'this is European governance' and that . . . *le roy le veult.*

The situation outlined above is worth re-examination. Contrary to the alarming statements of some South African personalities, the native masses of tropical Africa nourish no feelings of hatred towards Europeans. But what Europe does, or allows to be done, to Africans, in the name of European civilisation, is henceforth done with open eyes. The feeling of wrong, whether justified or not, lies deep, but it will not lie dormant for ever, and it is not always based upon our traditional premisses. In about two generations we must expect that the root of bitterness, now already planted, will spring up and bear poisonous fruits.

Until recently in Africa, outside the Moslem areas, movable wealth played little part in economic life. There were no professional merchants. All social existence was founded on the fruits of the field. As in Russia up to 1911, the greater part of the land was redistributable and was held communally, subject to the customary right of usufruct. The history of human evolution affords numerous parallels to the fundamental changes being wrought in Africa also by the recent introduction of coined money, its collection as taxes, and the consequent need to 'buy cash' by export of crops from the village to a 'market.' The resulting cultivation, by the individual instead of communally, of a perennial cash-crop or of 'permanent' plantation (such as cocoa or coffee) leads to a desire to have and to hold the ground itself, individually and for heritage. The introduction of coined money is thus changing both the mentality and the method of land tenure, which, in a predominantly peasant continent, will constitute another vital factor of the political status of Africans.

The sudden breakdown of religion, as yet only superficially replaced by other and alien cults, is the gravest of all the simultaneous revolutions. In Africa it is sapping the very bases of belief (even belief in themselves and in their chiefs) and transforming the spirit and the human mentality itself. It is a false and fickle service to render to the African and to

try to conserve him in his hot-house like a peculiar and sensitive plant. No patched-up African or Genevan 'formula,' which changes nothing with an air of settling everything until it gives way under us at the first strain, will avail us to meet the new political needs of Africa. By a lamentable lack of 'awareness' of the political conditions of our subject peoples we are running the risk, by the line of cheapness and of least resistance, of allowing the erection between European and African of the barriers of black and barbaric tyrannies.

With the disappearance of the restraints of religious taboos and the constraints of their peculiar but effective public opinion, the only incentive (other than pure altruism) for a chief to be a good ruler is fear of insecurity for his paid and privileged position. At the present stage of development, Fear is still the beginning of wisdom. In relation to Europeanism the African is still a schoolboy. The masters cannot teach in an atmosphere of anarchy or indiscipline. With his acquired knowledge of the minimum (of a fair façade and no open scandal) demanded by Europeans, and the knowledge of the timidity or passivity of his compatriots, the African chief has, in the country to which he is appointed, a vast advantage over the European. Once a normally intelligent chief has ingratiated himself with the European official, his position with his people is almost impregnable. The African seldom can afford to get up and tell his grievances and the truth about chiefs in a public meeting. In his weakness, he feels it, on the contrary, necessary to use dissimulation, and above all to propitiate, and it is precisely to public meetings that the contact between European officials (who have to move with motors) and the workers or peasants is increasingly confined.

This is the point at which the administrator, white or black, has generally refused to learn to dominate—that is, properly to utilise—the machine. It can save him much preliminary drudgery, and get him fresher and nearer to (but not *to*) the core of his work. But there is always temptation for the administrator and his wife to remain comfortably on motor roads. He thus limits his contacts with the people to meetings in public in official rest-houses at chiefs' headquarters (that is, the law court, the tax-collector and the prison), which the people have seldom either the leisure or the wish to attend.

It is not yet reasonable to expect that, except in lip-service, the duty to the neighbour and a sense of public service would be found already born. If the narrow alliance of clan brotherhood was a form of collective security, it also enjoined on all brethren the duty of defensive alliance against the remainder of mankind. So soon as the new religions and individualisms, land loyalties, and patriotism break down (and level out) the separate cells of the clans, then the spirit of public service for the nation *and* native nationalisms will appear on the horizon.

In view of the actual standards of public morality of civil services even in, for instance, the greater part of the Christian continents of Europe and South America, it is manifestly unfair to press prematurely into the hands of negro civil servants new and formidable powers of a European type, and thus to hand over to them the mass of the people with what are proving to be ineffective supervision and inadequate safeguards. In the Nilotic Sudan, African native tribunals are much more properly styled *chiefs'* courts.

The breakdown of the State religion (of ' pagan ' animism and ancestor-cult) of the Roman Empire, by the impact of the two religions of the Book born in the colonies, provides us with a curious history-sheet. At this time there was much copying and imitation, from other countries and from the dead past. Labour was cheap; but uneasiness of men's hearts manifested itself in spasmodic outbreaks and in unrest of the spirit.

> The Roman Empire [overseas] was a primitive organization. It did not educate the masses. It did not explain itself to its varied multitudes of citizens. It did not invite their co-operation in decisions. There was no distribution of news to sustain collective security. The spirit of citizenship died of starvation, and *no one observed it die.*

In fact, the officials of the empire were unobservant and ' unaware.' ' The Office,' the bureaucratic administrative *machine*, involuntarily or blindly withdrew them from contact with the masses. At the other extreme, a period of popular liberty or political responsibility are necessary before the catchword that ' good government is no substitute for self-government ' can acquire any real significance.

However attractively cheap or apparently liberal it may

seem, it is calculated to shake the confidence of the 'subject peoples' in the future of European governance and to place on Africans a burden greater than the average modern European can hope to bear. Furthermore, it is manifestly unsafe in Africa to redistribute off the central pillars the weight of a top-heavy top storey, unless new and sound pillars are constructed and thrown out to support the weight of the broadened structure. The whole foundation of political administration needs to be broadened, not by divesting ourselves of our duties and responsibilities by false liberalism, but by explaining ourselves frankly, by consulting the feelings of the people and by inviting their co-operation in our decisions. However liberal or honest the policy, and however well-intentioned in Europe may be the people (and their business managers, the Government) of the colonial Power, it is only by the actual practice of the policy in the colonies, and by the conduct towards them of its lowest representatives (with whom alone there is direct and constant contact), that the subject peoples can judge of the exploitation or benevolence of the Government to which they are 'subjected.'

Before closing the first part of these observations, it is fair to the reader that other experiences should help to illustrate the conflicting conclusions which various authorities derive from the same data. The results appear to vary only with the depth and reality of the observations submitted to them.

The empire of France is the only other Great Power of liberal spirit and democratic structure which is comparable to the British Empire in extent and nature of rule over vast colonies both in Africa and the East. From them we are thus able to draw upon a deep fund of colonial experience, whether as warnings or examples, for the benefit or greater attachment of colonial peoples. It is thus of the highest interest and value to be able to have access to means of comparison of present conditions, and of the causes which have led up to them, in any great tropical colony of France. For this purpose the observers to be quoted should have the quality of wide experience of interpretation of visible political phenomena in many lands. They should preferably be themselves liberal-minded, patriotic and non-official citizens of the colonising Power itself. It is the possession of just these

qualities which render Andrée Viollis a valuable source of information. He has published some dozen books, six of which consist of political observations in exotic or Eastern lands. The observations on the rich colony of Indo-China, of which some 60 per cent. of the public expenditure is stated to be on administration, were published as recently as 1935. They are contained in a compact volume, supported by documents, entitled *Indo-Chine S.O.S.*. Andrée Viollis accompanied the French Minister of the Colonies on his last Far-Eastern visit. Indo-China contains native institutions *in excelsis* which are essentially examples of the main principles of so-called Indirect Rule. The conclusions upon it are here referred to solely for purposes of illustration and comparison, and not for criticism.

But the gravest error in the colony, the one which has caused already an irreparable wrong, is the policy regarding chiefs. The mandarins [the civil-servant chiefs] traffic [in appointments and justice] embezzle and [abuse their position to] commit the worst abuses under the protectorate of Europe. And it is European governance which the people render responsible for this system which is rotten from top to bottom and which, for us, is only harvesting hatreds . . .

Faced with this disturbing evidence from here and elsewhere, we cannot but ask ourselves uneasily: if this is done in the green tree of a great European colony in Asia under a similar system, despite the fact that the mandarin civil-servant chiefs are highly literate and still set in the background of an ancient civilisation—what shall we do in the dry?

Let us glance at the testimony of Dr. Miller. His book (1937) records the essence of thirty years of Christian service in Nigeria. Of so-called indirect rule Dr. Miller's experience is that

there is a growing dislike to the present system. . . . Unless the present native administration can adapt itself to more modern ideas, I foresee a widespread revolt before long against its obscurantism, tending towards more democratic institutions and a more representative administration.

The evidence of such a witness cannot but carry great weight.

The part of the Report of the Royal Commission on Palestine (1937) which deals with the colonial administrative

service has a far wider applicability than to this one Colonial Office area. The members of the Commission were men of exceptional knowledge of overseas history and administration in the best and widest sense of statesmanship and politics. They reproduce the record of a previous Commission that in any time of racial crisis the native officials of the villages bore false witness (to the European Commission) with dignity and deliberation. The members of the Royal Commission were 'much struck by the unanimity of evidence that . . . it is essential that there should be a sufficient number of British Assistant District Commissioners really to see, *know* and guide what is going on.' The Commission did *not* recommend, as a present measure under British trusteeship for the mass of the people, the giving of larger responsibilities to native officials. Indeed, what is needed is precisely the opposite—namely, an immediate *pause* in the process for overhauling and refitting. The very utility of routine machinery is endangered so soon as its first and essential principle is lost sight of—namely, that the machine is made for man, and not man for the machine. The Commission draws attention to this malignant and blinding growth in modern colonial administration.

> Every administrative officer [they observe] is fastened to his desk answering queries. Touring, in the proper sense of getting *to know* the people and their troubles, is discouraged by this continual demand for pace and paper.

And what, finally, is the attitude of the Government?

The gist of British colonial policy was recently restated, by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in a broadcast talk on May 28, 1937. The title of the speech was *Responsibilities of Empire*. The responsibilities are British responsibilities towards the protection of the masses of our colonial subject peoples. The aim of the Colonial Office is now stated to be a 'native Civil Service completely and finally responsible for administration.' 'Quite a few native administrations [it was added] already "run" their own courts of justice.' But the title of the talk was responsibilities of *Empire*.

At this point in my thesis I permit myself a brief topical digression. A letter on Italy in Abyssinia from an occupant of the front Opposition bench in the House of Commons

appeared in *The Times* of September 24. It posed three political questions about Abyssinia which can best be answered non-politically. The answers indicate the substance of the questions. But no reply of any value can be made without first defining and clarifying the vague term 'Abyssinian,' 'man of the land of confusion,' which has long obscured the local issue.

The Ethiopians—that is, the purely Semito-Cushite people of the central plateau—constitute a small privileged upper-class minority, less than a quarter, of the population of Abyssinia. Less than fifty years ago, while Europeans were still pegging out claims on the properties of Africans, the negroid Negus Menelik obtained firearms enough for aggression against the neighbouring peoples who had only spears and bows and arrows to defend their countries, which were thus annexed as colonies.

History does not record that these peoples were inferior in courage, endurance, observance of duty towards their neighbour, generosity, hospitality, regard for women or fulfilment of solemn promises. They were, however, inferior in their non-possession of European death-dealing machinery. The Ethiopians invested nothing in their colonies. They sold and exported their subjects as slaves to Arabia. They exploited their fellow-Africans more pitilessly than any Europeans have done. Pity is essentially a product of Western civilisation, however parsimoniously it may be practised or applied. I have seen Ethiopian governors on their way down to take over a colonial province with anything between 5000 and 11,000 unpaid followers who (in that sinister phrase) lived on the country. British-protected subjects have been carried off and sold by Christian Ethiopian ivory-hunters from villages near my camps over 200 miles within British territory. In Abyssinia the Ethiopians constituted, in French Communist parlance, 'the 200 families.' The last Negus was quite untypical of his class, which alone stood to lose by European occupation. Many of this feudal military caste, of charming courtly manners, have therefore become *émigrés*. The pastoral peoples and the negroid peasantry of Abyssinia are still at that unselfconscious stage of political evolution in which their desires do not extend far beyond a long-unsatisfied yearning for public order and personal security. They are not yet

excited by political pride or prejudice as to the race, creed or even colour of those who may be able and willing to assure to them these elementary desires of mankind.

It is in this setting and these conditions that the answer to the *first* question is probably *Yes*, that it is indeed probable that outlaw brigand bands, which have for centuries been a feature of Abyssinia, will, as suggested, for some time continue to exist 'agin the Government' in the woods and in the Rains. *Secondly*: (*a*) The stampede-shooting during the attempts by un-uniformed infiltrations and concentrations of Ethiopian soldiery in the capital took place, according to non-British and non-Italian witnesses, when the responsible European authority and his chief of staff were lying between life and death in hospital, and not by their orders. This does not render the affair less regrettable.

And (*b*). *Yes*, terrorism, which was practised and understood by Ethiopians, would probably 'succeed against a proud and courageous people like the Abyssinians.' In Europe it has succeeded among not less proud and courageous Germans and Russians. It succeeded in numerous other wars waged by Europeans on Africans, with firearms on one side only. It was successfully applied by Cortes in Mexico and by Pizarro in Peru—which, again, does not render it less regrettable.

In Italian Africa four Europeans (Italians) convicted of robbery with violence of Ethiopian shopkeepers were publicly executed last month on the scene of their crime. '*Parcere subjectis et debellare superbos*.' In view of the favouritism to Europeans or discrimination against Africans by several European races in the administration of Christianity and of justice in Africa and in North America, Africans everywhere are likely to be deeply and favourably impressed by this inexorable non-discrimination.

The third question asks why or if the writer of the letter is wrong in saying that 'Abyssinia is still very far from conquered.' The answer is, *first*, that the Ethiopians did not govern with the consent of the governed, nor did they *ever* consult their interests. They 'exploited' pitilessly until the subject peoples dreamed only of how to *avoid* them like the plague. *Secondly*, Abyssinia was conquered on the day of the last battle before the occupation of Addis Ababa. The con-

quest was finally sealed for his subjects and simplified for the conqueror by the flight from his kingdom on a European warship of the last independent African king.

The Negus was at least spared the last and legendary reproach. When the last sovereign of Granada, who had previously deprived his relative of his heritage, rode sorrowfully away before the entry of the European conqueror, his mother turned upon him with the words 'Thou dost well to weep like a woman for what thou couldst not defend like a man.' And, without 'the man,' revolt is deprived of all head and rallying point. The conquered King of Granada was granted by the European conqueror an estate in Europe. Precedent may repeat itself. For over a year Abyssinia has been an Italian Manchukuo. For several decades England refused to 'recognise' that the French had conquered Algeria. Practically speaking, the non-recognition only caused certain minor inconveniences to all three parties. Certain South African politicians have asserted that the conquest of Abyssinia by Europeans has fanned throughout the continent the hatred of Europeans among the masses of Africa. If it were so, it would indeed perhaps lend added weight and importance to the desires and requests of the Union Government in the counsels of Europe, of the Western colonial Powers and of the Empire. But these statements beg the question of the universal existence of such hatred. They seem to overestimate its extent and location, and to misunderstand its causes. With the exception of the very few but very vocal European-speaking Africans, the result of the conquest has been precisely the opposite. It has increased among Africans the fear and 'respect' for Europeans in general and for Italians in particular. Nothing succeeds like success. The worship of dictatorial dynamism and the cult of precipitate power—which seem to them as dramatic as the thunder, and as inexorable as the lightning, which 'act' and clear up with the almost magical rapidity of an African tornado—are having a curious influence among those African peoples who are beginning to ferment in passionate endeavour to throw off their inferiority-complex by a divinised renaissance of a racialism which we ourselves are busily awakening in them.

It is not the military extension of dictatorial action in Africa which need disturb our dreams, so long as they are not

masters of the air and sea. But one of deep new difficulties which the democratic colonial Powers will have to meet and solve in Africa arises from another and far less suspected source. In proportion as Islam and the indigenous spirits of animism and ancestors begin to appear to the African as 'wraiths outworn,' we shall have to face the possibility that the new régime now being instituted by the two Romes in Africa may more deeply stir *or* make a greater appeal to the African than any other form of Europeanism yet presented to him. However parsimoniously it is applied, the queer quality of pity is essentially a modern product of the West. It has not yet spread thence into Africa. Justice—inexorable, inevitable and immediate—is better understood and appreciated by inarticulate Africans than the intricate and 'pitiful' delays of our law. Its *summum jus* sometimes seems to them, from its methods of administration, a *summa injuria*. Nor to a swift and magical master does he grudge two eyes for an eye or two teeth for a tooth. Unfortunately, the 'works and days' of the British of Boadicea, and of dictators such as the earlier Cæsars and Mussolini, are often more sympathetically intelligible to average Africans than the hum-drum routine prescribd for the bureaucrat administrators of the democracies and the British of the Union for the Society of Some Nations. The dramatic magic and mysticism (which persists even among Africans of America), and the craving for exaltation of the now starving spirit, are not banal or easy needs for commercialised and uninspired bourgeois democracies to provide for the still undespiritualised, unrepresented and voiceless Africans. But if we are unwilling or unable to meet these deep and fundamental needs, we must not be surprised if they are sought or offered from elsewhere.

TRACY PHILIPPS.

(*To be concluded.*)

BRITISH LABOUR IN CONFERENCE

By A. L. Rowse

I.

The Labour Party Conference at Bournemouth this year marks a new and important stage in the recovery of the party to the position which it lost in 1931, and may very possibly mean an advance beyond that to winning power at now no distant date. The Conference was indeed a disappointment to the party's opponents, and no less of a surprise to its friends. Before it met, the air was full of forebodings of disaster; the party was split in two; there would be a secession of Sir Stafford Cripps and his Unity-Campaigners; the constituency parties and the trade unions were at cross-purposes, and so on. On the morning the Conference opened, *The Times* came out with an imposing leader on 'Labour's Differences.'

> The affairs of the Labour Party [it said] have got into some disorder. A constitutional crisis of some kind may be averted, or at least postponed, by the party conference, but only through the making of constitutional changes which may ultimately intensify and not lessen the present differences. The constituency Labour parties are at odds with the trade unions. They have become acutely conscious of their numerical inferiority in the party conference, and therefore of the impossibility of getting their way against the mountainous mass of trade unionism which has arrived year after year with its mind made up on the principal subjects of debate.

So goes on for a column and a half the majestic Cassandra-like voice foretelling disasters—disasters, however, which did not take place. *The Times* was only symptomatic of the attitude of the Press in general—for the Labour Party Conference, unlike that of the Conservatives, is at least always 'news.' But after the Conference was over, and the expected

had not happened, it was comic to observe the slightly disconcerted air of the Tory Press commenting upon the event. *The Times* tried to make out that Labour had taken a turn to the left, when it was obvious to all observers that it had simply held straight on its way. It produced a leader describing the new 'Immediate Programme,' which the Conference adopted on which to appeal to the country at the next election, as a 'headlong,' 'breakneck,' and 'revolutionary' plan. Sir John Simon described it as a 'short-cut to the millennium.' The truth about the Conference was, however, told by that candid and sprightly writer of political comments in the *Sunday Express*, Mr. Peter Howard. He says, in his own inimitable way:

> *Make no mistake. At these conferences the Socialists have the Tories beaten. Bournemouth was alive. Scarborough was dead.* At Bournemouth almost every Labour M P. and every trade union leader turned up. Not 5 per cent. of the 370 Tory M.P.'s went to Scarborough. Bournemouth — first - rate oratory. Scarborough — second-rate speeches. Bournemouth—90 per cent. of the delegates men; Scarborough—more than half the delegates women.
>
> Mr. Attlee, the Socialist chieftain, sat on the platform listening to almost every speech. Mr. Chamberlain was only present while one speech was delivered. That was the speech he made himself. While one Tory delegate was speaking I counted sixteen members of the platform party doing cross-word puzzles. At Bournemouth every speech was heard with interest. At Scarborough, when the less important delegates were talking, their words were lost in the tramp of feet moving out of the conference-hall to the bar.
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> At Bournemouth, plenty of controversy. Differences of opinion were discussed. When the votes were taken sometimes the Socialist Executive itself did not know which way it would go. At Scarborough, no controversy. While I was there not a single dissentient vote was cast against any of the resolutions.
>
> Does this mean that every Tory delegate thought alike on every subject? No. It means that no subject about which Tories differ was allowed to be discussed at the Tory Conference. The Tories have a secret committee who turn down controversial resolutions submitted to them.
>
> From Bournemouth the delegates went away enthusiastic. From Scarborough the delegates were enthusiastic to get away. A young friend of mine told me that it was his first Conservative Conference, and that it would be his last. 'It is like a piece of cold fish,' he said to me. You may think it strange that a man of

my political views should praise the Socialist Conference and blame the Tory Conference. I do so not because I think all that was said at Bournemouth was good or because I believe all that was said at Scarborough was bad. *But because I know that if the Conservative Party is to keep its position as the greatest force in the affairs of Britain, something must be done to wake it up, to remove the dead hand which has it by the throat.*

Very interesting, especially coming from a young Tory journalist. But perhaps something may be said by a young Labour candidate, to rectify the balance. The state of affairs he so vividly contrasts at Bournemouth and at Scarborough is not quite so much to the disadvantage of the Conservative Party as he thinks. For one thing, the Conservative Party is so strongly entrenched, so fundamentally at one with itself, that its leaders can very well afford to dispense with a Conference. It is a sign of strength rather than of weakness. Its leaders know very well that they can rely upon that instinctive sense of power which the propertied classes possess, to pull all together on things which really matter to them. Whereas the Labour Party is really democratic—a great deal too democratic. The annual Conference is the ultimate seat of authority in the party—'seat' is the appropriate word in this case; and it is impossible, if you know anything about politics, to have much belief in government by conferences. Perhaps this may console Mr. Howard somewhat for the dismal impressions he brought away from Scarborough compared with Bournemouth.

For all that, on one point, and that a very important one, he is no doubt right—as to the evidence of vitality that Bournemouth gave, compared with a certain deadness in the Conservative Party. But a Labour Conference always gives an impression of vitality, for the Labour movement is very much alive and kicking—again in my view, as a believer in authority, there is much too much of the latter. What was more important at Bournemouth than vitality was a very real sense of responsibility, of the gravity of the situation into which this country has drifted, of moderation and realism in deciding policy, of give and take within the movement, and an evident will on all sides to pull together. It was the whole spirit of the Conference which impressed everybody there, and to which tribute has been paid in the

most unexpected quarters. It was democracy functioning at its best, at a time when there is only too much evidence of democracy functioning at its worst. In this respect a Labour Conference is a microcosm of the English people: it is only when things are becoming really serious that we can bring ourselves to be as serious as they demand.

Much of this was due to the lead of the Executive, and to the business-like way, if slightly hectoring in manner, in which Dr. Dalton, this year's chairman, conducted the proceedings. It is evident how much he has grown in stature within the party by the arduous work he has put in during his year of office. On the personal side it is now quite clear that Dr. Dalton is one of the four or five figures in the party who have to be reckoned with and who will dominate the next Labour Government. But most of all, the tone and temper of the Conference was due to the realisation in everybody's mind that the party could not risk another *débâcle* like the Edinburgh Conference of last year. That was a fiasco, and a dangerous one; much of the disunity and discontent within the movement during the past year has been due to that. A second Edinburgh would have put the clock irremediably back for the Labour Party; whereas now everybody feels that it has been considerably advanced. Even *The Times* admits to the 'high spirits and rejoicings' throughout the movement at the success of the Conference.

During the past year the leadership has been hard at work repairing the damage done at Edinburgh and preparing the ground for a new advance. The Executive appointed a special commission, of which Dr. Dalton was the head, to travel round the distressed areas and gather evidence on the spot as to actual conditions, and to make proposals for tackling the problem. A number of valuable regional reports have been issued, and a final statement dealing with the problem as a whole, upon which policy can be based, is to be published. In addition, the party leadership in association with the Trades Union Congress Executive—that is, the National Council of Labour—has worked out a new contributory pensions scheme, of which the basis is a pension of £1 a week for all workers, and 35*s*. a week for a married couple, over sixty-five who retire from gainful employment. One may hazard the view that these proposals will make more

impression at the next election than some other, more *recherché*, items in Labour's programme. A new statement of international policy, *International Policy and Defence*,[1] was issued just before the Conference met. It is an excellent statement of policy and was widely noticed throughout the Press; quite rightly, for it marks a new development in Labour policy, the acceptance of the inevitability of re-armament in present conditions, with Fascism rampant in Germany, Italy and Japan, and its ineluctable consequences.

In addition, and as a further step preparatory to the next election, the National Council of Labour has brought together the main objectives of policy of the next Labour Government, summing up the various policy reports which have been submitted to successive Conferences since 1931,[2] and presenting them in shortened form as 'Labour's Immediate Programme.' Upon this programme a national campaign under the direction of Mr. Herbert Morrison as chairman was undertaken this summer. It had a success which exceeded all expectations, and many thousands of new members have been added to the party. Then, too, this new impulse has affected the whole publicity of the party organisation, which for some years has been out of date and singularly without inspiration; the new literature that has been going out has been brightened up and made more attractive, and some of the latest publications of the party have achieved very large sales. It will be evident that altogether a very large amount of work had been done towards making the Conference a success before ever it met; and this was reflected not only in the large majorities by which the official statements of policy were adopted, usually by a vote of ten to one, and in some cases without opposition, but by the general feeling of satisfaction with the work of the Executive which the Conference displayed.

Certain other questions offered more ground for dispute, in particular the campaign for a 'united front' with the I.L.P. and the Communists, with which Sir Stafford Cripps and Professor Laski have been prominently associated. This debate was the high light of the Conference, not because of any contribution from the Unity-Campaigners, for both Sir

[1] Published by the Labour Party (Transport House).

[2] Cf. *The Nineteenth Century*, November 1932, 1933, 1934 and 1935

Stafford Cripps and Professor Laski, each of whom is a considerable orator on his day, have never been heard to less advantage. Sir Stafford Cripps spoke, as usual, with clearness and sincerity, but his case was utterly unconvincing to the Conference; Professor Laski followed with a feeble and superfluous plea to be allowed to remain a member of the Labour Party. But the great feature of the debate was a magnificent speech of Mr. Morrison's, which had every quality of oratory and statesmanship; it showed as perhaps never before who is the destined leader of the Labour Party. It has come about in the last few years that when Mr. Morrison speaks it is the unmistakable voice of the party. That is the unchallengeable sign of leadership. His statement of the party's position on the 'United Front' was intellectually unanswerable. He submitted it to a series of tests: Would it damage Fascism? Would it weaken Toryism? Would it strengthen the Labour Party? And on every one of these he showed irrefutably that it would not. His destruction of the case for the United Front was coupled with a plea of the utmost power and sincerity for the campaigners to come within the party and take up their obligations, an appeal without any recriminations and upon such a moral level that the Conference was deeply affected. Its influence could be observed throughout the rest of the proceedings and in all the later discussions.

It was this speech, and the attitude of firmness and toleration which it embodied, which gave the keynote to the Conference. The spirit of unity and yet of give and take which everybody noted as characteristic of the Conference was its response. Though the policy of the United Front was rejected, and the attitude of the Executive approved, by some 2,000,000 votes to 330,000, yet there were no recriminations against those who had been prominent in the campaign. Sir Stafford Cripps and Professor Laski were among those elected by the constituency parties to the new Executive. Nor is there anything surprising in their election, as so many of the Press comments seemed to find. They thought it somehow self-contradictory, or at least paradoxical, that the party, having rejected their policy, should welcome the men. But it is only an example of the fundamental tolerance and generosity of a party in which so many outside observers

fondly suppose that a rigid orthodoxy and toeing the line are demanded. Not so. Sir Stafford Cripps and Professor Laski, the Labour movement feels, are men who have rendered it great services, and are capable of rendering still greater, if they will only come in wholeheartedly and accept the implications of the movement. This there is every hope that they will now do. They have already brought the Unity Campaign, which was causing so much disunity in the party, to an end; and if they pull their full weight upon the new Executive it will mean an accession of vigour and new blood to that body, and an increased integration for the party.

This result was enabled to be brought about owing to the changes in the method of election to the Executive proposed by the leadership and adopted by the Conference. The Executive hitherto consisted of twelve members elected by the trade unions alone—with five men and five women elected by the trade unions and constituency parties voting together. This undoubtedly gave a very marked preponderance on the Executive to the choice of the trade unionists; and in practice it meant the exclusion of any representation of the Left wing at all. After the Edinburgh Conference the constituency parties were very restive at not having adequate representation and the election of their representatives being dominated by the trade union vote. The Executive therefore proposed two reforms to meet their point: that the number of constituency representatives should be raised from five to seven, and that they should be elected by the direct vote of the constituency parties themselves, just as the trade unions elected their section on their own.

These proposals, it is amusing to note, were very much objected to by *The Times*, which feared that they would

> be liable to perpetuate in the executive the sectional constitution of the conference and the differences of the sections, whereas now the executive is unified by its election by the whole conference and its responsibility collectively and individually to the conference. It may be that these proposals, if ratified, may prove the first step towards the dissolution of the organic link between the political party and the unions. . . . They may mark a division, if not a schism.

Timeo Danaos. . . . Anyhow, the Conference chose by large majorities to set aside the solicitous fears of *The Times*

on its behalf, and to take the opposite line. The result in the election was an admirable infusion of fresh blood into the Executive; in addition to Mr. Morrison, easily head of the poll, Mr. Dalton and Mr. Dallas, there now join them Mr. Noel Baker, Professor Laski, Sir Stafford Cripps and Mr. D. N. Pritt.

But what was even more interesting was the attitude of the trade unions, whose vote was necessary to give effect to the reforms. It was on the whole very large-minded and generous. The unions had not come, as they have been so often charged with doing, with their minds made up. Mr. Bevin in a most interesting speech revealed that the Transport Workers' Union were divided on the question, that they were open to persuasion; and persuaded they were. The proposal to give increased representation to the constituency parties was carried by 1,408,000 votes to 1,134,000; and the proposal for direct and separate election by 1,814,000 to 658,000. And a still larger majority directed that the reforms come into operation immediately, without any postponement. There was the greatest enthusiasm at the Conference upon these results being made known, and there can be no doubt that the constituency parties, upon whom the brunt of the organising and political work of the party falls, have been enormously heartened and encouraged by these changes. It may be confidently expected that a good deal of the discontent and sense of frustration that undoubtedly possessed the minds of many constituency workers in the past year will now vanish, and the upward movement of the party be resumed in the country.

On other issues the victory of the Executive was no less complete, or, rather, it should be said that its standpoint commanded the assent and expressed the will of the Conference. Particularly was this the case in regard to the new statement on foreign policy, with its definite position that a Labour Government, 'until the change in the international situation caused by its advent had had its effect, *would be unable to reverse the present programme of Rearmament*.' The Conference accepted this, on the whole, with surprising agreement; the gravity of the situation abroad has at last opened the eyes of the Labour movement to what I, for one, saw to be necessary from the moment that Hitler came into

power in 1933. All the same, the Conference listened with friendly, unconvinced tolerance to two or three pacifist speeches from Mr. Lansbury, Dr. Salter and others, and with less tolerance to one or two hopelessly confused speeches, such as that of Mr. Silverman, and an entirely irresponsible and mischievous speech by Mr. Aneurin Bevan. At times like this, and in listening to such rubbish, one is grateful that the destinies of the Labour movement are in the hands of such men as Herbert Morrison and Ernest Bevin. There can be no doubt who the dominating figures in the Labour movement are; on the political side it is Morrison, and on the industrial side Bevin. Both are great men with all the qualities of leaders; both are first-class organisers and administrators, and yet at the same time have a really wide vision of the needs of our society and the world to-day; both are strong and determined men, yet capable of a surprising degree of magnanimity and tolerance in dealing with opponents, of which the Conference gave evidence. What is needed for the Labour movement to win power is the dual leadership of these two men, working in unison. And it may well be that if this country has to face the crisis of 1914 again, it will do well to place its confidence in these two men rather than in those who in these last six years have brought us well-nigh to the abyss.

In conclusion, one should note what, surprising as it may seem, is the conviction of the Labour Party's leadership: *they are convinced that the party can win the next election.* So much I elicited from long arguments putting the other point of view, as, very literally, a sort of *advocatus diaboli.* There can be no doubt about the conviction, though I confess its extent and the determination with which it is held were rather a surprise to me. (On the other hand, it goes very strongly in favour of the position which I put forward in this Review, as opposed to Mr. Scanlon.[3]) There is no time now to go into the reasons for which the leadership holds the view that the party will win the next election, though the conviction itself is a factor in helping to bring it about. No doubt the complete success that the Bournemouth Conference has been will be another, and even more powerful, factor. Already one may see some evidence of its effect upon the party in the

[3] Cf. *The Nineteenth Century*, July and September 1937.

unexpected gain it has made in the North Islington by-election The fact is that the decks have been cleared for action; the party's policy has now been worked out and is presented in a clear form to the country; an essential unity has been established and the party is pulling well together. Now that its internal affairs have been set in good order, the party is in a position to get to work in the constituencies. And if it will now, having cleared up its internal difficulties, set to work to bring about an understanding with progressive forces outside it, in particular an electoral understanding with the Liberals, it can make victory at the next election sure.

A. L. ROWSE.

BRITISH LABOUR IN CONFERENCE

II.

By John Scanlon

The Trade Union Congress held at Norwich in the first week of September has been generally accepted as one of the dullest on record, probably because for several years the Congress has been diverted from the industrial sphere to that of foreign politics. In the week-end before the Congress opened I found both Press and delegates much more concerned with the text of the speech which was to be delivered by the retiring president, Mr. Ernest Bevin, General Secretary of the Transport Workers. The chief topics for discussion, they knew, were to be Spain and rearmament, and, as the decision on these two questions was certain to be almost unanimous, the one thing still a hopeful mystery was Mr. Bevin's speech. My first and most pleasing impression of the Congress itself was the increasingly large number of earnest young men who are now attending as delegates. Women are still a tiny minority, but the noticeable thing about the new people is their interest in the homes and workshops of Britain. I noticed that the more direct the contact of delegates with the working class, the more they were concerned with the conditions in the home and the workshop. The further the speakers were removed from actual working-class conditions, the more they were concerned with high politics, and international politics at that.

The Congress was officially opened by the address of Mr. Ernest Bevin. In spite of his detractors, Mr. Bevin is the biggest figure in the Labour movement to-day. More than anyone else he typifies the intelligent development of the British working class. He belongs to the working class,

and all his career is evidence that the glamour of what Mr. Rowse has called 'the fascinating game of politics' has little appeal for him. The speech revealed once again that Mr. Bevin is thinking of the place of the workers in a country which depends for its existence on the organised production and sale of goods, and with the unions as the medium for enforcing their claims to be an integral part of the State. Subsequent speeches and others delivered since clearly indicate that Mr. Bevin is thinking along other than the orthodox political lines.

From the close of the speech until the opening of Tuesday's debate on Spain, the ordinary rank-and-file delegates had their innings. Every speech was an appeal to the General Council to give greater aid to the efforts of the local men in building up the unions as a means of improving conditions. When I say that not one of these speeches brought the slightest response from the platform or evoked even a sparkle of interest I do so in no carping spirit. I merely mention it because it strengthens the conviction already expressed in this Review that since the unions were led into these barren and futile discussions on foreign affairs the leaders have lost touch with what the masses are thinking. And so the lesser lights made their speeches, and doubtless next year will require to make them all over again. The platform was cold and the other delegates only mildly interested. For weeks they had been told that the really important things were Spain, and whether or not they should support the Government's rearmament programme.

Both chief topics of discussion were necessary in order to clear up the confusion created by previous decisions on the same questions. On Spain, at the 1936 Congress, the delegates had voted almost unanimously against any form of intervention and in favour of the Government's policy of refusing arms to either side. In 1936 all the leaders, without exception, declared that any other policy would lead to war. All were emphatic, too, that the British working class would not support a war on the Spanish issue. Their speeches are to be found in the annual report of the T.U.C. for 1936. In 1937, however, the Congress was being asked to change the decision of 1936, and to adopt a policy which everyone in 1936 had declared was bound to lead to war. A noticeable

thing in re-reading the speeches of both years is that Sir Walter Citrine, who led the debate on each occasion, made a much stronger speech against the Fascist countries when urging non-intevention than when urging intervention. Moreover, after having told Congress that they would require to 'envisage naval and military action' in opening the debate, he again pointed out, as in 1936, that the British working classes would not even declare a general strike on the Spanish issue.

The debate on rearmament lost all interest for delegates when the Engineering Union withdrew its resolution opposing the 'crime' of voting supplies to the National Government, and as the subject was more fully debated at the Labour Party Conference at Bournemouth, I will deal with it more fully later. The real impressions I got from the two chief debates at Norwich are: (1) If Hitler is only half as bad as our leaders say he is, then Sir John Simon would have been guilty of high treason if he had even discussed disarmament. (2) If the National Government is so bent on war as our leaders say it is, then Hitler would have been guilty of treason if he had failed to arm against us.

If the T.U.C. produced very little in the way of either light or heat the Political Party's Conference which opened on October 4 at least threatened plenty of heat. In the week prior to the Conference newspaper correspondents, in a laudable attempt to create some public interest in the proceedings, had talked of splits between the unions and the political side, and of revolts in the party's attitude to rearmament. Chief controversy, we were told, was to centre on questions which, it seemed to me, would have little effect in altering the conditions of the working class. Delegates and leaders, it appeared, were agitated by the vexed question of whether the Executive should be increased from twenty-three to twenty-five members, or whether it should remain at twenty-three. If that were not enough, there was also to be great controversy on the question of whether the delegates from local parties on the Executive should be elected by working-class delegates representing the unions and the local Labour parties, or only by working-class delegates representing local parties. These, then, were to be the chief issues of a working-class party at a time when three or four millions of

their members were, according to their own leaders, not getting sufficient food for a healthy life.

A word of explanation as to why these 'major' issues should so stir a political party may be necessary here for those who do not know the structure of the Labour Party. Briefly, the party is composed of trade unions, individual Socialist societies, the Co-operative Party, local Labour parties, and women's sections. The Executive, hitherto elected by the votes of all delegates, had been so arranged that all these sections should have representation on a basis roughly corresponding to membership and influence. In recent years, however, the constituency parties felt that the representatives from the constituencies were being chosen by the large votes of the unions, and it was further alleged that the unions chose as Executive members persons who would not have been chosen by the local parties had they alone the right to choose. On these assumptions the constituency parties had banded together in an association, and after some pressure the Executive agreed to alter the method of election. It recommended chiefly that the number of local representatives should be increased from five to seven, and that the unions should not have any vote as to whom the seven should be.

Coming at a time when a member of the General Council of the T.U.C. had closed their Congress with an intimation that, in future, the Labour Party must take its instructions from the Trade Union Congress, this seemed rather like a defiance to the gods. To make matters worse, there had been reports of canvassing to secure a miniature block vote of the local parties in favour of seven candidates five of whom were decidedly of the Left. Small wonder, then, that the Press correspondents, bored with the uniformity of the Norwich Congress in September, should look forward hopefully to something justifying the name of copy at Bournemouth in October. With all other problems settled, here was something which could safely be described in the old familiar headlines: 'Scenes,' or, if the paper sold at a penny, 'Wild scenes,' at the Labour Conference. Actually nothing like that happened. The debate from first to last was conducted on a very serious note. The union leaders, very properly, resented the imputation that a man chosen by union delegates must of necessity be more reactionary than one chosen by a local

Labour party, but whether it is that the party no longer has the enthusiasm or energy to quarrel, or from a desire to preserve outward unity, the debate was conducted with scarcely an interruption. Moreover, by a rather intriguing method of taking the votes, the unions, whilst all disliking some feature of the proposals, did not all dislike the same things. Had a proposal for reference back been put, the proposals would have been referred back. But the point opposed by some unions was supported by others, and in that way all the proposals got through.

The chief argument against the proposals was the perfectly legitimate one that seven representatives were to be elected to the Executive whom the majority of the party—*i.e.*, the unions—had no voice in choosing. The chief argument for the proposals expressed by all the speakers was the profound conviction that the trade union officials were so far removed from the actual working class that they were quite unable to understand or appreciate the conditions in fields, factories and workshops, and consequently would not express the aspirations of the working class. The voting on this question was illuminating. It revealed that, in the minds of the delegates, the only people who could interpret the new movement against poverty were—three professors, Dr. Dalton, Professor Laski, and Professor Noel Baker; two successful barristers, Sir Stafford Cripps and Mr. D. N. Pritt; one political organiser, Mr. Herbert Morrison; and one trade union organiser, Mr. George Dallas. That over, the Conference settled down to its annual discussion as to whether the party should or should not join hands with Mr. Harry Pollitt and his Communist friends. This topic has occupied successive Conferences since 1921, and, try as the Executive may to avoid fruitless discussion, someone always can be found to restore this King Charles head. The speech of the debate was undoubtedly that of Mr. Herbert Morrison. It was brilliantly witty, and as quotation after quotation was piled up showing the many stupid, and indeed comic, inconsistencies of the Communist Party, the case for unity seemed to vanish in a gale of laughter. The delegates have shown year after year that they will not associate with the Communist Party, and this determination is not confined solely to the trade union leaders. The voting, I think, correctly interpreted the

feeling of all sections, even though this vote was recorded by an Executive and delegates who see in Mr. Pollitt and his handful a terrible menace to England, but on the morrow would see in M. Litvinoff and all the might of Russia nothing but an influence for good in Europe.

From that we passed to the party's new old-age pensions proposals, the explanation of which was left in the hands of Mr. Arthur Greenwood, who was Minister of Health in the last Labour Government. Briefly, the proposal is that at the age of sixty-five all who need a pension should receive £1 per week for single persons, and 35*s*. per week for married couples.

By Wednesday morning, Conference got down to a discussion on what Labour will do in its first five years of office. Briefly it proposes :

(1) Nationalise the Bank of England in order to control credit in the interests of trade and employment.
(2) Set up a National Investment Board to mobilise our financial sources and guide them into the right channels. Some right channels indicated are housing, electrification, transport, and the extraction of oil from coal
(3) No return to the gold standard
(4) Companies Act to be amended in order to protect the public from unscrupulous financiers.
(5) A better distribution of wealth to be secured through taxation.
(6) All land to be controlled in the public interest.
(7) All forms of transport to be under one national authority.
(8) Public ownership of coal and all subsidiary industries, including electricity and gas.
(9) Schemes to secure fair prices for farmers, and a living wage for agricultural workers.
(10) No subsidies to private enterprise unless it pays trade union rates of wages.
(11) Forty-hour week and holidays with pay.
(12) Under the heading ' Security ' we are promised · ' Labour will launch a determined attack on insecurity due to fear of unemployment and loss of livelihood.'
(13) Deals with measures for ' distressed areas.'
(14) Foreign policy.

It will be seen that there is something here for everybody. Liberty, Equality and Fraternity are missing, it is true, but

the worker is still to get a living wage and the investor, looking for an income without working for it, is to be protected from those bucket-shop fellows who also expect an income without working for it, but who are obliged to do hard labour when caught. In the case of the worker, however, he is assured of maintenance when he is not allowed to do hard labour. Nobody has anything to lose from this programme. Railway shareholders, and many land and coal owners too, should welcome it. Every undertaking to be acquired is to be paid for at a fair price, and doubtless the purchase price will allow a better return than is now secured on many of these undertakings and without any of the risk. Middlemen generally, and the big distributing firms in particular, who are already paying on the average far higher dividends and far less wages than producers, will have it all their own way, subject only to a little mild competition from the Co-operative movement, which also wants big dividends. The programme does nothing to secure a fairer distribution of wealth, except by taxation for the social services—that is to say, you allow someone to take too much out of the common pool, then when he has made a return to the Commissioners of Inland Revenue you take part of it back in the shape of income tax. By the mere fact of saying the money will be taken back in the shape of income tax the programme implies that the income-tax payer should never have had it at all. The promise to restore it to the wage-earners in the shape of social services seems to me a needless waste of book-keeping, and a much more effective way would be for the trade unions to collect the cash at the time in the shape of higher wages. Mr. Attlee introduced the new programme, and, I must say, showed very little enthusiasm in the doing of it, but this may be merely Mr. Attlee's way. It may also be that, as he has been preaching the same programme item by item since the end of the war, his original enthusiasm for it has now somewhat evaporated. It is only fair to say, however, that whilst nobody seemed to show any great enthusiasm for the new programme, everybody seemed agreed that it was a better programme than that of any other political party, which may be quite true, and all the items passed without challenge.

This ended Wednesday's proceedings, and Thursday

brought us to what was to be the chief debate of the week—the party's attitude to rearmament. This question, of course, was settled at Norwich when the T.U.C. by an overwhelming majority decided that they were in favour of rearmament; nevertheless, delegates were much more interested in this than in the party's plans to abolish poverty, even with the knowledge that nothing that was said could alter the views of the big unions. The debate differed from Norwich in that three distinct points of view were put forward: (1) The Executive view that the party, if in power, would rearm just as the National Government is doing; (2) the purely pacifist view; and (3) the view of the Socialist League (now defunct) that the party should lend no support to capitalist wars.

The speeches, except of the pacifists, were less concerned with the principles than with expediency. Mr. Clynes' chief objection to the case for pacifism which Mr. George Lansbury advocates is summed up in his statement that if the party adopted a purely pacifist attitude they would not win a single seat. Yet until 1934 the only official policy was one of opposition to all wars, and seats were won. Springburn by-election, decided only a few weeks before the Conference, was won by a pacifist, who opposed the arms policy of the party. It would have been won just the same by a Labour candidate giving whole-hearted support to the policy of rearmament, for working-class electors care very little as to whether their candidate stands for rearmament or pacifism. The debate at Bournemouth was based on a completely new statement outlining the party's attitude to foreign affairs when they come to power, but nothing said in the debate gives the public any idea of what their attitude to rearmament is to-day. The important features of the document are that the party no longer recommends armaments for collective security through the League of Nations. It frankly says the League at the moment is too weak for the purpose, which is precisely what the International Socialist movement said in 1920.

It now recommends rearmament for the purpose of defending Britain and the British Commonwealth against all enemies or potential enemies, meaning the totalitarian States (except Russia), whereas the Socialist International made no distinction between one form of capitalism and another. They stated the view that capitalism in all countries required

room for expansion and that the capitalism of France and Britain was as likely to create friction as that of Italy and Germany. Apart from that, the new document closely resembles the document of 1920, and my one real complaint is that, having recognised in 1934 that the need for capitalist expansion was the chief cause of war, they should have spent three fruitless years in chasing after a phantom League which, it is now admitted, is quite incapable of dealing with the real problem. It is a pity that their proposals for discussing the economic difficulties come at the end of a 4000-word document and not at the beginning.

Mr. Lansbury in his speech stressed the need for this discussion of the economic problems, but he wished the discussions to begin now, instead of waiting until Labour is in power. On rising to speak Mr. Lansbury had the greatest ovation of any speaker at the Conference, but this was a tribute to his long and valuable service to the workers, and so long as he argued from the standpoint of Socialist economics he carried the Conference with him. It was when Mr. Lansbury asked them to trust to reason and love that the big gulf between his attitude and that of the majority of the party was clearly revealed. Lord Ponsonby, who followed Mr. Lansbury, took a rather different line. He opposed all armaments and war on the ground that the workers of all countries through all history had been deceived into killing each other on precisely similar pretexts to those now being put forward by the party Executive. This, be it noted, was the policy of the party as declared at Conference after Conference, although many people knew that when the danger of war came near the party as a whole would behave much as it did in 1914, which is merely an illustration of the folly of cluttering the party programme with too many resolutions.

The next distinctive contribution to the debate was that of Mr. Ernest Bevin, and nothing so interests me at the moment as the workings of his mind. Following his declaration that the unions, instead of being a challenge to the existing State, were now becoming an integral part of it, he rather surprised the Conference by a statement that the employing class in Britain were quite different in their attitude to the union problems to what they were twenty or thirty years ago;

which sounds uncommonly like a complete abandonment of the theory of class warfare being inevitable. In his review of the whole field of foreign policy he again departed from the orthodox. His attitude, briefly, was that the problem was an economic one, that he offered his hand to the Fascist Powers in trying to get agreement on the economic issues, but if they preferred bombs he would meet them with bombs. The significant thing, however, was that at no time did he refer to a political solution. Not once was the Socialist International mentioned as offering any hope. Whatever was being done or likely to be done was through the workers' industrial organisations in the International Federation of Trade Unions. I hope that in his next speech he will openly advise disbanding the political section of the League, with its professional politicians and professional diplomats, and advocate referring all matters to the International Labour Office, where the workers and industrialists of all lands, including Germany, Italy and America, can now meet and settle problems which the politicians and diplomats could only settle by war.

By general consent the speech of the debate, and indeed of the whole Conference, was that of the Welsh miner, Mr. Aneurin Bevan. It was the one speech which roused the delegates to a high pitch of enthusiasm, and it was the more remarkable coming from delegates who were about to record card votes of millions of workers against him. From the circle I looked down into the body of the hall where the delegates sat, and there is no doubt at all that the applause was general. Mr. Bevan did not trouble much about the ethics or morality of war or no war. He seized on the document for what it was, as stripped of all its ambiguities and meaningless phrases —an attempt to get votes. The need for it had arisen solely because of the party's folly in adopting the policy of 1934, which said that wars were inherent in the capitalist system, but could be prevented by the League of Nations policy, which did not touch any of the causes. This, in turn, committed the party to collective security by armed force, and as the National Government needed the force the party had the choice between voting the necessary arms or voting against them. By 1935 it had become apparent that a fresh document was needed to clear the muddle of 1934. At the Conference of 1936 the new document was ready, but Mr. Morrison and

Dr. Dalton, who had helped to draft it, managed to interpret it in quite different ways, and so a fresh document was necessary in 1937 to clear the muddle created in 1936 in trying to clear up the muddle of 1934. Above all else it was to be a document which by its simplicity and directness would show to every elector in Britain that the National Government's policy had brought the world to the verge of war, and nothing could avert war but the return of a Labour Government. Coupled with the new short programme, the new foreign policy when adopted was to be made the basis of a nation-wide campaign to destroy the National Government.

Mr. Bevan ignored everything else in the document. His attack on the Executive was based entirely on their conception of political strategy. In a speech of devastating logic he riddled them from stem to stern, until at the end he proved that without extracting one single pledge from the Government they were now committed to doing precisely what the National Government was doing, and, having reached complete agreement with the Government, they hoped that by this means the electors would respond to their appeal to smash the Government.

Mr. James Walker, M.P., who closed the debate for the Executive, quite bluntly stated that they were rearming because they believed Britain and the British Empire were worth defending, and in a world of enemies could only be preserved by force of arms. Mr. Walker's experience of men has led him to the considered judgment that man is the most predatory of all the animals. Mr. Lansbury's motion to refer back the report was defeated by 2,169,000 to 262,000 votes.

Yet I doubt if any Executive ever succeeded in getting its proposals through with so little enthusiasm for the result. When the figures were announced there were not two hands put together to applaud it. It was received in dead silence. As to the Conference as a whole, it was a week of good debating, with the honours, by general consent, going to Mr. Ernest Bevin, Mr. Aneurin Bevan, and Mr. Herbert Morrison, and be it noted that all three come direct from the working class. The Conference, too, achieved a degree of unity which few people believed possible after the deplorable exhibition at the Conference a year ago. Undoubtedly every parliamentarian there was satisfied with himself and even with

each other. They parted with a greater feeling of unity amongst themselves; but that does not win elections, and elaborate programmes, which not one in ten thousand electors read, do not win elections. Labour victories have all been won because of a great wave of moral fervour against the inequalities of the social system. From first to last I could not help feeling that in tone, temper, and outlook there was nothing to distinguish them from the National Government, and now, when on the issue which the party itself has chosen to make the chief issue of the day there is also complete agreement in policy, working-class electors, looking for some clear unmistakable sign that their party is different, have been given—just nothing.

JOHN SCANLON.

THE REFORM OF THE LAW

VIII. A MINISTRY OF JUSTICE

By JOSEPH TURNER, LL.M.

I.

ANY serious consideration of the subject of the reform of our law and legal system must necessarily involve an inquiry into the need for the creation of a Ministry of Justice. This question was considered by the Machinery of Government Committee presided over by Lord Haldane, and Chapter X. of the Report of the Committee (published in 1918) contains an analysis of the existing method of legal administration from the point of view of the apportionment of responsibility. Everyone interested in the organisation of justice in this country ought to read this Report, and to consider its conclusions. At the time when the Report was published there was a great deal of public support for the recommendations of the Committee, and efforts were made to have the matter fully dealt with in Parliament. Unfortunately the time was not convenient; there were then needs which were more obviously urgent, and the reform of legal administration was postponed. The present time offers a good opportunity to reopen the matter. There is now a discernible willingness to reform law and procedure; the legal profession and the general public are alike desirous of seeing the law improved, and there exists the technical ability to review the whole problem. It is to be hoped that there will presently be a reconsideration of the whole matter of responsibility for law and justice in our country.

II.

There is no person directly and exclusively charged with the duty of maintaining our legal system. This is seen by

glancing at the list of Government departments and authorities. Neither the various Secretaries of State holding the ancient offices under the Crown nor the newer Boards and Ministries include the term 'Law' or 'Justice' in their titles. That in itself, of course, is not important, but it is indicative of the rather surprising fact that the principle of responsibility which is the basis of our government does not appear to extend in all its implications to the administration of justice.

If there is no one department subject to this especial duty of maintaining justice, that is not to say that there is no form of supervision and responsibility. Indeed, one of the most unnecessary defects in the present system is the large number of persons and bodies who jointly bear the responsibility. We will state briefly a number of these First, as regards the tribunals which administer the law, there are half a dozen or so authorities directly concerned—*i.e.*, with the appointment of judges and officers. To deal with the Supreme Court: the Lord Chancellor has the nomination of all High Court judges, yet, according to strict constitutional right, he has not the right to suggest appointments to the Court of Appeal. That is the Prime Minister's privilege. The Prime Minister has also, in theory, the right to suggest the appointments of the Lord Chief Justice, the Lords of Appeal, the Master of the Rolls, the President of the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division, and the members of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Again, the Lord Chancellor is responsible for the appointment of county court judges—except in the Duchy of Lancaster, where the right is attached to the office of the Chancellor of the Duchy. But though the Lord Chancellor is theoretically in charge of the county court system, the Treasury exercises considerable influence as well, for amongst other things it fixes the court fees. The general charge of criminal justice is confided to the Home Secretary, yet the appointment of the justices of the peace who are directly responsible for a large part of the administration of criminal law is the Lord Chancellor's business. To offset this, the Home Secretary can appoint stipendiaries and recorders! This by no means exhausts the list of persons responsible for appointments, for there are many other judicial offices each separately provided for. There does not

seem to be any reason whatever why these methods of appointment should be retained. Any systematic attempt to reform administration will have to provide a simpler, and presumably uniform, method. A Ministry of Justice might well be in charge of the whole matter of appointments.

When we turn to consider the governmental departments which are concerned with the administration of the substantive law we find there are still more interested parties. As well as the Lord Chancellor, the Home Secretary and the Attorney-General, who have obvious duties, almost every department is directly affected. A few examples will indicate the extent of this. The Board of Trade is naturally interested in the maintenance of mercantile law; it accordingly takes part in the administration of bankruptcy, company law, the law relating to copyrights, patents, wrecks, merchant shipping, and mines. The Ministry of Health has an obvious interest in the enforcement of the Public Health and Housing and Town Planning Acts. The normal interests of the Ministry of Transport are obvious, but a reference to railway rates and conditions and to ribbon development may be a reminder of the scope of this Ministry's duties. The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries has always had a remarkably varied collection of interests, and these have been further diversified recently by the addition of the administration and enforcement by law of the marketing and supply schemes. The Ministry of Labour has not only a direct interest in the enforcement of the law relating to unemployment benefit, but it has gone a long way towards providing a jurisprudence of its own. The Postmaster-General takes part likewise, as the number of prosecutions with regard to wireless licences indicates. These are examples only, but they show that almost all the departments have some part in the administration of law. This is natural when it is considered that government depends upon law. The modern tendency has been to divide the whole duty of government into specialised offices, each interested in the carrying out of its own policy, and this has led to the method of rule-making known as 'delegated legislation.' In effect, each department devises rules to carry out its policy and is then responsible in whole or part for the enforcement of the rules.

Are there not now too many authorities interested in the

maintenance of the law? One is tempted to answer 'Yes.' Lord Haldane's Committee stated the matter with what appears to be a certain dryness: 'If the principle to be adopted in distributing the business of Government is that of concentrating the various branches of each service as far as possible in the hands of a single authority, considerable changes will be requisite in the case of the administration of justice,' yet the Report is not definitely in favour of that 'concentration.'

In theory it may be desirable to have one person or body responsible for the whole administration of the law, and to arrive at this it would seem necessary to transfer to such person the relevant duties now performed by the separate departments. Is this possible and, if so, desirable? It would certainly simplify the question of responsibility. But it may be that the technical knowledge available to each department best fits it for the carrying out of the law which affects it. This is one of the problems which requires investigation before the functions of the Ministry of Justice can be defined.

III.

In what way has it come about that there is no person specifically responsible for the administration of justice? The causes are purely historical. In this regard it may be advisable first to refer to the term 'legal system.' The normal use of the word 'system' implies the notion of scientific order and arrangement produced, for example, by a logical classifying and planning. That meaning is not implicit in the term 'legal system.' Our substantive law is to a large extent the product of evolution—that is to say, of accident—and there has been an even greater element of chance in the growth of the administration. There has never been an occasion when a full stop has been ordered and an attempt made to overhaul our method of administration and procedure from beginning to end. There have been periods of administrative reform. The last century was conspicuously so. But then, as always, the reforms were piecemeal; one problem was considered whilst the solution of a related difficulty was postponed. Above all, there was the primary consideration that reform should leave the old system untouched as far as possible. In

the result, many changes were only changes of name. The research done and the ability available made possible a complete review of legal procedures, tribunals and methods, and this ought to have led to the creation of a new administration of the law. But, as is our constitutional practice, there was no revolution. There were many important useful reforms, useful because they made possible the continuance of the old system in the new times, but what was required then (and is needed still more now) was a new and scientifically organised system. Our present arrangement of courts is not the best method of dealing with the legal business which arises in England and Wales to-day, but it probably represents the best way in which the legal administration used in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries can be adapted to to-day's needs.

The method of government which in the past appealed to the English mind consisted in the imposing of detailed duties upon particular individuals. This, again, was simply the retention of a method which was necessary in primitive society. Law plays its part in any organised society; but in early society the forms and enforcement of law are simple, and the rights and duties protected and created by the law are then necessarily vested in and imposed on individuals. As the activities of society become more numerous and new legal conceptions arise, the enforcement of the new duties is obtained by imposing them on certain specified persons, and by the conferring of the right to have the rights enforced on others. The initiative, in case of default, is then with the person entitled to the right. In English society, both the central and local government of the country developed along these lines. There have always been persons responsible for the performance of certain special legal duties, and in the mass these persons have been responsible for the legal system. The same general remarks might be made regarding other forms of governmental action—*e.g.*, the maintenance of the Army, of roads, of charities, of the poor. There is, however, a significant difference. In other matters it has been found convenient in the course of time to create new offices and departments and to transfer to them the responsibilities formerly borne by private persons and authorities, and the ancient rights of the subject have been maintained through the

principle of parliamentary responsibility. This has not been the case in legal administration. In the period of history which has seen the rise and development of the system of government by Ministry and Cabinet there has been no creation of a new office to administer the law. To sum up, there are many persons and bodies responsible for separate duties and various phases of legal activity, but there is no one person to whom we may look.

IV.

We have spoken of the responsibility of the Lord Chancellor and of other persons and bodies for various branches of legal administration. We must hasten to qualify the term 'responsibility' in this connexion. The principle of responsibility as it applies to the ordinary departments of our Government includes two relevant propositions. First, the Executive is responsible to the electorate, and as the electorate is represented only in the House of Commons, a responsible Minister must be a member of the Commons. Secondly, the Minister has not merely a function and a right, but also an obligation to see to the administration of his office. On principle, if his department is responsible for some action or proposal to which a majority of the House of Commons objects, the Minister must give way or resign, and this may in certain cases involve the resignation of the Cabinet. From these points of view there is no true responsibility for the conduct of legal business.

As to the first point, there is no person with the charge of the whole of legal business, but the Lord Chancellor, who has most to do with the legal system, sits in the House of Lords. As to the second, there does not seem to be in practice any recognition by our Government of *liability* for the legal system. There is provision for the enforcement of law, of course, and, comparatively speaking, it is a good provision and a body of good law. Still, there seems to be nothing provided for breakdowns and mistakes; there is no person or body whose recognised duty it is to have an injustice righted or a defect removed. If the administration of the Unemployment Assistance Board's policy causes hardship, complaint can immediately be directed at a responsible Minister, who must justify the policy or offer a change.

Should the Chancellor of the Exchequer indicate that he intended to introduce a certain method of taxation, he might find it necessary, under criticism, to amend his proposal. Contrast these circumstances with corresponding events in connexion with legal administration. At the end of a year's sittings of the High Court there are frequently many cases which have not been reached, and the unfortunate parties have then to wait months before they can have a decision given. This has happened often, and without any doubt it constitutes a notorious defect in our legal system. The remedy can easily be suggested—*i.e.*, the appointment of more judges, or the holding of courts without cease throughout the year. Again, it is well known that the existing provision for free legal aid is inadequate. There remains a large class of persons needing from time to time the aid of the law who are not sufficiently poor to qualify for the help given by the existing provisions for poor persons, but still are completely precluded by the expense from taking legal proceedings. By this many rights go by default, and many people are defrauded and injured and left without a practical remedy. Nevertheless, so far as we can judge, no member of the Government or of a department feels a special obligation to remedy these defects, or would be prepared to shoulder responsibility. This is curious and illogical. The provision of justice is admitted to be an end and purpose and a primary obligation of government. There ought logically to be some person responsible for the administration of the law, someone liable in any circumstance in which the law involves unnecessary hardship or proves inefficient or works foolishness.

From this point of view the creation of a Ministry of Justice can only be described as essential. The Minister would be responsible to Parliament for the whole of the administration of law in the ordinary courts of the land. The pattern of government would be more regular, and more than this—an effectual remedy would be provided where at the present there is only doubt.

V.

So far we have dealt almost exlusively with procedure. Let us turn to the substantive law, to the rules which are intended to lead to the doing of justice. What provision

exists under the present system for the reviewing of existing laws, for the comparative study of legal institutions and methods with a view to the evolving of a better body of law, for the reception of criticism and suggestions? There is very little provision indeed. The law is known to be defective, and it is recognised that the country would profit by the making of a complete overhaul of the laws. But we are here once more up against the fundamental difficulty that there is no responsible person. The holder of the office of Lord Chancellor doubtless generally recognises a moral duty to improve the law when possible, but the duties of that office are so responsible and numerous that the subject of law reform cannot receive much considered attention. With the qualification that the Home Office occasionally takes the initiative with regard to the administration of criminal law, it may be said that there is no part of the internal Government which is bound to consider the general law scientifically.

That part of the law which is administered by departments is kept fairly closely under review. The departments are obviously concerned to keep the law up to date so far as they are directly affected. The resulting legislation comprises the bulk of the statutes annually passed. It is spoken of as governmental legislation, it is recognised as part of the Government's business, and time is found for it. But outside the great number of topics for which departments are responsible in this way there still remains a large body of law for which there is no responsibility. We cannot define this, for it is now a residue, but we can indicate how very important it is to the individual when we consider that it includes almost the whole of the common law on the civil side. The nature and incidents of the relationships of husband and wife, of parent and child, of master and servant, of principal and agent; the laws governing the rights and obligations created by agreements; the principles of liability in tort; a great part of mercantile law—these are but a few of the legal topics which are 'nobody's business.' It is not absolutely impossible to get the law relating to these matters reformed, but it is extremely difficult, and it is still difficult though a majority of the electorate, or even a majority in the House of Commons, desires reform. Such reform is generally not considered the concern of the Government and the initiative is left to private

members. The chances that a private member will succeed in obtaining the passing of any Act are very small indeed, and accordingly the reform of private law is slow work. It may be said with fair accuracy that the only public Bills which have a real chance of becoming law are those for which a Minister is responsible. The necessity for the appointment of a Minister whose active duties should include the reform of the law is evident. The reform of private law should not be left to chance. It should be regarded as a normal part of the business of governing the country, and time should be found for all necessary legislation.

In addition to the need for reform of the body of law there is an urgent case for the setting up of an authority for the systematic study of legal method. Legal institutions and tribunals and procedures function with varying success. As the purpose of law is to provide justice, the law is simply the machine, and there is not necessarily only one suitable pattern of machine which will give an approximation to justice. A glance at the systems of other countries shows that similar results may be achieved by different ways. Nevertheless, it is clear that there are good systems of law and bad systems, that there are useful procedures and procedures which produce evil results. What, then, are the fundamentals of a good legal system? Our system is based in part on a theory of precedent and judicial interpretation. Could not the system be improved by a codification of certain branches of law; could not the canons of interpretation and application be amended and made more useful and equitable? These are examples of the many serious problems which have to be investigated as a preliminary to the establishment of a scientific system of law.

At present the study of legal method—*i.e.*, of attaining a desired end by the use of legal forms—is not the concern of the State in a responsible sense. It is left to the curiosity of private individuals. Much splendid work has been done in this connexion, but it is essentially work for a body accustomed to the practical needs of society as well as possessed of data. As government is carried on by legal instruments the study of method ought to be a recognised part of administration. It could well be assigned to the staff of a Ministry of Justice.

We have referred shortly to the lack, at present, of a

person or body to whom complaints regarding the law can be made. Historically, at any rate, the Lord Chancellor is the proper recipient, but actually, for a variety of reasons (some of which have already been referred to), this is not now practicable, and in many cases there is no quarter to which representation can be made. This has become apparent on a number of occasions when the mercantile community has become critical of some legal principle or judicial decision. Mercantile law exists in order to facilitate business transactions; it ought, therefore, to be the expression of the intent generally understood by the community of merchants to be implicit in any particular kind of transaction. That great commercial lawyer Lord Mansfield made this clear by example when he made a practice of conferring with his juries of London merchants as to the precise nature and force of their usages. If this fact is ignored and legislators or judges tend to limit and thwart the plain intentions of merchants, there is, naturally, a good deal of annoyance caused, and the tendency is for merchants to avoid the courts and to scorn the law. It would be an important duty of a Ministry of Justice to see that the law served those for whose benefit it existed. The discharge of this duty would obviate a great deal of what at present is fair criticism.

VI.

Let us now summarise the reasons which lead us to believe that the institution of a Ministry of Justice and the appointment of a responsible Minister are desirable. In the first place, we feel that a great benefit would be conferred by extending the principle of Ministerial responsibility to the conduct of the administration of the law. It may be that in theory there is responsibility even now, but in practice it is at present very difficult to hold any person or body liable for defects in the system. Secondly, the setting up of a Ministry or the appointment of a Minister would render more easy the process of law reform. The defects in the present system could more easily be brought home and exhibited, and it would be understood that the Minister had the duty of making right that which was wrong. The work of the Ministry would be the work of a Government department, and therefore it would be possible to include law reform in the Government's

time, and reform would no longer need to be left to the hazard of the private members' ballot. Thirdly, the appointment of a Ministry would provide a centre of administration. To this centre criticisms and suggestions and statistics could be forwarded in the knowledge that they would be put to use, and consequently the risk that the law might get out of touch with popular needs and sectional requirements would be minimised. Fourthly, the appointment of a Minister with a sufficient and first-class staff would enable the business of law-making to be done scientifically. There is no question that there are grave defects in our present system; for example, a glance at the law reports suggests, even to a tolerant reader, that the draughtsmanship of statutes is an art which has not yet been fully mastered. The data necessary for the carrying out of the law and the experience which would teach the best way of producing a given result would be available more readily to a staff trained in this tradition, and engaged solely in the business of making the law a practical machine for producing desired ends.

There are doubtless other good reasons which will occur to those who consider the subject, but, over and above these isolated advantages, it must be remarked that the creation of a Ministry of Justice is urgently required with a view to the whole reorganisation of justice. We have not here the space to discuss the defects of the present system of courts; but undoubtedly there are grave objections to the present appellate system, to the circuit system, and to the county court system. There are even clearer objections to the rules of procedure. It is questionable whether it is desirable to have distinctive sets of rules relating respectively to High Court procedure and to county court procedure. It is certain that many of the rules are ambiguous, and that there is far too much litigation concerning the meanings to be given to them. The present time gives an opportunity for a reconsideration of the whole of the substantive law, and of the system of judicature and of procedure. If the law is reviewed piecemeal, if, for example, we are to rely simply upon the efforts of the Lord Chancellor's Committee on Law Reform, progress will necessarily be slow, and will suffer from the usual disadvantages which accompany reform effected in small doses. The time is ripe for great and widespread reform, but there is

no person or department which has the leisure to undertake such a work. If a Ministry of Justice were set up, under its authority the law could be reviewed as a whole. It would be a great step forward if the present readiness to reform the law could thus lead to a means which would expedite the process and give us at the same time the foundation of an ordered system.

The nature of the functions to be conferred on the new Ministry cannot be discussed in detail here. The recommendations of Lord Haldane's Committee, so far as they go, indicate the general duties which might be assigned to it. In short, the Minister of Justice would take over certain duties from the Lord Chancellor and a great number from the Home Secretary, and would in addition bear the general responsibility for the legal administration. As regards the duties now performed by the Lord Chancellor, the new Minister would be largely responsible for the appointment of judicial officers, and for the structure of the courts, their jurisdictions and their procedures. He would also have charge of the whole of the legal business now subject to the Home Office. Whether his general responsibility for the administration of law would extend to liability for the administration of that law which particularly concerns other departments would have to receive further consideration. In addition to these defined rights, the Ministry would have the duty of planning justice—that is, not merely of repairing the existing machine to stop it from creaking, but the duty of building continually a better and, if necessary, a new type of machine.

As we have said, it is an admitted and indisputable part of the duty of Government to provide a system of justice. This is not theory, for every legal practitioner finds out in a very short time that his clients have a genuine desire to see justice done and an implicit confidence, at first, that the State will see to it. But the State only regards the legal system when it has time, and injustice and hardship may flourish for long. In reason a Ministry of Justice is just as essential as a Ministry of Health. The main purpose of these should be similar—not simply the eradication of faults by the correction of old habits, but the provision of a better system by the use of foresight and scientific planning.

JOSEPH TURNER.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Mr. Churchill's Contemporaries

Great Contemporaries, by Winston S. Churchill (Thornton Butterworth, 21*s*.).

These are the great men whom Mr. Churchill has known so well or not so well in the course of his life. Only five have survived, and these are the Kaiser, Shaw, Trotsky, King Alfonso and Hitler. It is fairly clear that only one of these is properly alive or has a future. The remainder are lumber upon the historian's shelf. Of the literary or historical value of this volume there can be slight doubt. There are incidents and conversations for which biographers must be grateful. There are summaries of character and event, which for style could be slipped between the essays of Macaulay and Belloc, touching on the splendour of one and the imagination of the other. But for the rising generation, what are the lessons and the inspirations which can be gleaned? For their own generation, and for those who grew up within sound of their conflicts with pen or sword, they read like pealing and sonorous requiems. But the majority of the subjects have proved Sublime Failures, like Rosebery, Wilhelm, French, Asquith, Curzon and even Birkenhead. Disaster or disappointment even darkened the ends of Chamberlain, Lawrence of Arabia, and Clemenceau, who all three had their way tremendously. These figures of the past tackled problems which have passed and engaged in battles which are meaningless to the present. Their sacred shibboleths have become as cat-calls and the political or personal causes which they set so high are dust. What they believed would most ensure their survival and success with posterity seems small beer to-day, small talk and even smallness of vision. The younger generation have enlarged their panorama. Their problems are clamorous and the vista before them demands immediate courage with whatever

clairvoyance they can draw from the past. Could any of these men be leaders to-day?

Who can inspire us out of this collection? Chamberlain, Lawrence of Arabia and Snowden, but few of the others. They rose out of nothing and adapted themselves tremendously to great events. They fought. They were not afraid to reverse their own opinions. Their views of the Empire differed, but the greatness of England abroad always gleamed their horizon.

Youth will not be inspired by deceased Premiers like Rosebery or Asquith or Balfour. The interest in most of the figures lies in Mr. Churchill's personal interest. To him most of them spoke. To him they are alive as yesterday. It is new to hear that Lord Rosebery's chiselled monograph on Lord Randolph was only a rejected chapter from Mr. Churchill's own biography. Ever memorable were Rosebery's words of salutation to the Anglo-French *entente* that 'it was far more likely to lead to War than to Peace.' This Mr. Churchill truly mentions as 'the greatest proof of his insight.' Rosebery seemed to shudder at any form of greatness in full career. He preferred to tantalise his followers with glimpses of what a wonderful leader he might be if he came back. But he refused the struggle and the palm. Even in his historical writings he described a Chatham before he attained his splendour and Napoleon only in his last phase. It was a tragical moment when the Armistice crowds gathered cheering before his door in Edinburgh while he lay stricken, prostrate, paralysed.

Asquith does not shine like one of Plutarch's men in his official biography, resembling in his misfortunes and fall 'a kind of Saint Sebastian standing unresisting with a beatific smile, pierced by the arrows of his persecutors.' But, according to Mr. Churchill, he fought hard and with tremendous resolution and went down like a generous gladiator. He had fought the Lords over Ireland, and Germany over Naval Power. Who really wants to fight the Lords or Germany to-day? When Mr. Churchill suggested to him moving the Fleet to its war-station 'he looked at me with a hard stare and gave a sort of grunt. I did not require anything else.' His character reads nobly, but Liberalism, which fell with him, means no more now than Whiggery. Few can

realise what that great British condition of thought called Liberalism once meant unless they were engaged in the tremendous struggles over the Irish question. Mr. Churchill is one of the few survivors of the strife of thirty years ago and seems a little ungenerous in his choice of words towards the departed and faithful allies of the Liberals, the late Irish Party. We hear of ' a sinister influence now happily for ever withdrawn from the House,' but one which often sustained Mr. Churchill and his measures. So they ' poisoned nearly forty years of our public life.' Is this the last word on Tim Healy, who could fill and delight the House as no one until Mr. Churchill entered into his perihelion? Poison is not to be spoken of John Redmond, William Redmond, Tom Kettle, Joe Devlin, Stephen Gwynn, and scores of others. They may have obstructed the work of the House, but they brought the fresh and fearless winds of humour and satire and ridicule into a company that suffers too often from stuffiness and by their own confession from dullness.

The brief account of Philip Snowden is the worthiest and noblest chapter in the book. The account of his slow progress, his courage and bulldog tenacity reads well to-day: ' He was a preaching Friar with no Superior to obey but his intellect. In this latter-day period when riches count so much and the fear of poverty haunts so many, there are moral lessons of the highest value for all classes in this modest account.' An interesting hint worth keeping for the future is the remark of a friend of Snowden's: ' No one will ever know what a Labour Government will be like till they see one without Snowden at the Exchequer.'

Even more moving is the study of Clemenceau, but its message must be entirely for the next generation of Frenchmen. With the somewhat fœtid mysteries of French politics no foreigner knows how to deal. They lie at the heart both of the rot and the resurrectionary factor in France. But Clemenceau once visited India and gave some shrewd advice to British officials which is worth requoting:

> Your English officers are rough with the Indians; they do not mingle with them at all; but they defer to their political opinions. That is the wrong way round. Frenchmen would be much more intimate, but we should not allow them to dispute our principles of government.

Mr. Churchill turns out one type for choice. His men are all men of action, and if possible of blood and fire. It is disappointing that he has given us no man of letters except Bernard Shaw, and no philosopher, no artist, and no ecclesiastic. In a future volume he might speak almost as an expert himself upon a painter like Sir John Lavery or about a bishop like Dr. Welldon, both of whom shared in his education on the finer sides of life.

The account of Shaw as a dancing bespangled Jack Frost is the only light touch to this sombre but majestic volume, which is three-quarters Plutarch and one-quarter very modern personal journalism. Accurate and chiselled, the sentences follow each other like the rivets on the sides of an ironclad. Only one mistake would we point out, and that is in the paragraph describing Shaw's 'early years in Ireland.' It would have been impossible for him to have been 'dragged to Low Church and Chapel,' for in Ireland Chapel means only the Pope, but this is a local slip. Mr. Churchill gets under the Shavian skin: 'His spiritual home is no doubt Russia; his native land is the Irish Free State; but he lives in comfortable England.' The comical account of Bernard Shaw's visit to Russia accompanied by Lady Astor is the only real laugh permitted in the book, but it yields more laughter than a cycle of Pantomime.

SHANE LESLIE.

WALKS AND TALKS

By Sir Arnold Wilson, M.P.

Writing on December 19, 1666–7, Samuel Pepys tells how he was made by a friend to understand 'how the House of Commons is a beast not to be understood, it being impossible to know beforehand the success almost of any small plain thing, there being so many to think and speak to any business, and they of so uncertain minds and interests and passions.'

His feelings are doubtless shared by many permanent officials and even Ministers at the opening of a new session. The Government is stronger now than in Pepys' day, but its responsibilities are greater by far. The King's Speech foreshadowed legislation affecting many 'interests': foreign affairs to-day, for the first time, perhaps, since the French Revolution, arouse 'passions' in Parliament, if not among the electorate, and upon many controversial matters men are to be found, on both sides, 'of uncertain mind.' Coal, electricity and the cinema industry will all be the subject of legislation, apart from such hardy annuals as agriculture, roads, drainage, third-party insurance, and company law reform. It will certainly be a livelier session than the last, and members will be harder worked 'upstairs' in committee.

The following 'case to advise' deserves consideration by those who hope great things from the 'Keep Fit' movement, which owners of proprietary medicines and patent foods, judging from their advertisements, are already seeking to turn to their profit.

He came to see me on a tandem cycle one Sunday: he was seventeen and a half years of age; he had spent the first three years of his working life as page and waiter in a great club where he had served and knew by name scores of legislators and high permanent officials, and many elderly persons who have made it their business to instruct the public upon

the importance of physical fitness, youth movements, and many other matters of weight. His wages there had risen to £1 a week. Out of this he had paid 10*s.* to his aunt with whom he lived, as he took most of his meals at the club.

At seventeen he had left the club and gone into a factory where he received 23*s.* 6*d.* for a forty-eight-hour week, of which 15*s.* went for food and lodging 'at home.' The fumes of cellulose and other things often made him feel sick —like other boys with whom he worked. He suffered from boils: the panel doctor had told him to find an open-air job— in East London!

He had tried for the Navy soon after he left school, but was not accepted, for, though his mother was English, his father was a Norwegian seaman who had not troubled to get naturalised. He would have joined the Army as second choice, but was too young at the time. His father and mother were both dead before he was twelve. 'It would have been better for me if they had died sooner; I might have gone to an orphanage and been looked after.'

His aunt was getting old: her only two children had married, and she hated the idea of living alone without him, or he would join the Army now. He felt she had been very good to him and he felt bound to stay. 'It is easier for a boy to leave home when there is a large family, but there are not many nowadays.' But there was another difficulty: his teeth, which were sound at fourteen, were no longer good: the dentist had told him it would cost £5 or so to put them right. He could get nothing from the National Health Insurance till he was eighteen: in any case, his friendly society did not give dental benefit. He would have to pay the whole £5 himself—a sum far beyond his means.

I sent him to another doctor, who was satisfied that he was being poisoned by his teeth, which were not beyond skilled repair, though 'in ordinary panel practice it would probably be found simpler and cheaper to remove most of them.' For such cases, whether of boys or girls, the National Health Insurance schemes make practically no provision. Before they become eligible for the grant of even half the cost of dental treatment—generally between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one—the damage has been done. Only one National Dental Aid Fund exists—the Ivory Cross—

and it receives far less public support than it deserves, for dental trouble does not, it seems, appeal to the charitable public, who themselves spend three times as much on dentists as on doctors, and think it money well spent.

The amount of dental trouble among insured persons is beyond computation: no scheme deserves to be called an insurance that does not include full dental benefit from the day of leaving school. It will cost money, but it is a fundamental need which deserves priority over eurhythmics and gymnastics.

* * * * *

Sir Kingsley Wood's protest at the increased consumption of medicines by insured persons—50 per cent. in ten years—is timely. The consumption of other than prescribed medicines has increased even faster. Yet the Postmaster-General, on grounds of policy, accepts advertisements of proprietary remedies for insertion in stamp books, some of which the Minister of Health, on grounds of policy, regards with scant favour and which the British Medical Association regards as unsuitable for propagation through the agency of a State department. In the words of Juvenal, repeated by Saint Augustine, '*Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?*'

* * * * *

The Trades Union Congress passed a resolution in September last urging that 'workmen's compensation be removed by legislation entirely from the sphere of profit-making insurance.' It is unlikely that any fresh legislation on this subject will be considered until the two Departmental Committees now sitting have made their final reports, but it is to be hoped that the National Government will not be deterred by the provenance of the resolution from examining the proposal with sympathy.

Trade papers are already declaring that 'many thousands of insurance men would be seriously affected' and that 'the injured workman would secure no ultimate advantage.' No one with practical experience will deny that the present system of insurance has placed responsibility for settling claims in the hands of men whose main concern is to settle cheaply. Lump sums are preferred to weekly payments,

provided that the case can be written off. There is little interest taken in restoring the man himself to working capacity.

This is a side of the 'Keep Fit' movement affecting, at a low computation, a quarter of a million adults. It merits most careful study.

* * * * *

Another aspect of the 'Fitness' movement deserving of careful consideration is the attitude to be adopted by public bodies towards Sunday games, played not for profit but for recreation. Under old enactments still on the Statute-book—27 Hen. VI. c. 5, 3 Car. I. c. 2, and 29 Car. II. c. 7—such practices, and much else, are illegal on Sundays, and in some ecclesiastical circles this law has come to be invested with the sanctity of Christian doctrine whereas, apart from its practical convenience, it is merely a Jewish observance not binding on Christians, as is shown by the following extracts from recognised authorities :

Thomas Aquinas :

This command, to 'keep the Sabbath holy,' is, literally interpreted, partly moral and partly ceremonial. *Moral*, inasmuch as men are to devote a certain portion of their time to an attention to divine things For men have a natural inclination to fix a certain time for everything that is necessary, such as for bodily refreshment, and other things of a similar kind. But inasmuch as a *special* time is named in the commandment as a sign of the creation, it is in this respect a *ceremonial* command. The observance of Sunday, under the new law, follows the keeping of the Sabbath, not in consequence of a legal precept, but from the decision of the Church and the custom of Christians. For this observance is not typical, as the keeping of the Sabbath was under the old law. And, therefore, the prohibition of work on the Sunday is not so strict as on the Sabbath, but some employments are lawful on the Sunday which are forbidden on the Sabbath, such as the cooking of food and other similar things.

The Venerable Bede :

The day has dawned, the shadows may well depart : let the spiritual meaning shine forth, and the literal observance fall. Since that keeping of the Sabbath which consisted in a day's inactivity is done away, he keeps a perpetual Sabbath who performs his works in

hope of future rest, and boasts not of his good deeds, as though they were his own, and he had not received them, but confesses that He who, at the same time, works and rests, is working in him. The Christian keeps the true Sabbath, when he abstains from servile work—that is, from sin; for he who sins is the servant of sin.

Calvin:

The Sabbath is contained, not in one day, but in the whole course of our life. . . . Christians should have nothing to do with superstitious observance of days. . . Thus vanish all the dreams of false prophets who have infected the people with a Jewish notion, affirming that nothing but the ceremonial part of the commandment had been abrogated, but the normal part of it—that is, the observance of one day in seven—still remains. But this is nothing else than to insult the Jews by changing the day, and yet mentally attributing to it the same sanctity—thus retaining the same typical distinction as had place among the Jews.

Luther:

As regards the Sabbath, or Sunday, there is no necessity for keeping it; but if we do, the reason ought to be, not because Moses commanded it, but because Nature teaches us, from time to time, to take a day of rest. . . .

If anywhere the day is made holy for the mere day's sake—if anywhere anyone sets up its observance on a Jewish foundation—then I order you to work on it, to ride on it, to dance on it, to feast on it, to do anything that shall remove this encroachment on the Christian spirit and liberty. . . .

God set apart the seventh day, and appointed it to be observed, and commanded that it should be considered holy above all others; and this command, as far as the outward service is concerned, was given to the Jews alone . . . ; only, because this would be impossible to the mass of the people, we must at least devote one day to this purpose. And because Sunday has been appointed from the earliest times, we ought to keep this arrangement, that all things may be done in harmony and order, and no confusion be caused by unnecessary novelties.

Tyndale:

We be lords over the Sabbath, and may change it to Monday, or any other day, as we see need; or we may make two every week, if it were expedient. Neither need we any holy day at all, if the people can be taught without it.

Jeremy Taylor:

We Christians are free from the observation of the Sabbath. . . . The Lord's day did not succeed in the place of the Sabbath, but the Sabbath was abrogated. The Lord's day is merely of ecclesiastical institution.

John Milton:

Under the Gospel, no one day is appointed for divine worship in preference to another, except such as the Church may set apart of its own authority.

Dr. Thomas Arnold:

I quite allow of the suspension, so far as it may be, of the common business of life; but then I believe that we should have much greater indulgence for recreation on a Sunday, and if the railways enable the people in the great towns to get out into the country on a Sunday, I think it a very great good.

The whole question was considered in May 1934 by the Church of Scotland in General Assembly and remitted to the Church and Nation Committee for consideration and report. It is a question which should certainly be further considered by the Church Assembly[1] and, eventually, by Parliament. If the widespread prohibition on Sundays is maintained, playing-fields and other facilities will be deprived, for the great majority, of at least half their practical value.

The question may also possibly arise in regard to Territorial training in urban areas. Sir William Jones provided in his *Heads of a Plan for raising Corps in the principal Towns of Great Britain*, towards the end of the eighteenth

[1] The Church Assembly in 1926 resolved:

'That in view of the ill consequences to Church and Nation which must follow the secularisation of the Lord's Day, the Church Assembly would deplore any action being taken which would strengthen the secularising tendencies already too powerful in English Society.'

In 1932 it passed the following resolution:

'That the primary duty of Christian people on the Lord's Day is to worship God, and their second duty is wisely to safeguard it as a day of rest.'

'That the maintenance of Sunday as a weekly day of rest, in agreement with the original Divine ordainment of the Sabbath, is of vital importance to the whole community, as it not only provides for Christian people the most satisfactory opportunity in an age of stress for the public worship of God, but also is the most effective safeguard against the exploitation of the weak.'

Neither the Church Assembly, however, nor any bishops in the House of Lords protested in 1936 against the great extension of Sunday trading which was legalised by statute in that year.

century, for regular training of voluntary bands 'on Sundays, on Holidays, and also after their work is over in the evening.' There will be no desire to invade the weekly day of rest, but, at certain times of the year, week-end camps which include training should not be regarded as contravening a principle.

* * * * *

Travelling to Yorkshire this month I entered into conversation with a young airman who had just entered the Air Force School at Halton, near Wendover, for training as a mechanic. He was just fifteen and had only been a few weeks in his uniform. He told me with enthusiasm of his first two test pieces; of the drill, the instructors, and the life. He would spend three years there before going to a unit, first at home, then perhaps abroad. They kept 5*s.* a week for him, so that he could not spend it all: they 'did him grand' in food and uniform: his parents were delighted. It was 'as good as a secondary school'—and better—because he was learning to use hand and head and not the latter only. There were lots of clubs to join, and no charge. I have had the good fortune to visit Halton, but I learned more from the boy than from a personal visit. It may well be that the ultimate solution of our recruiting problems in the Navy and Army is being worked out here.

ARNOLD WILSON.

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SPANISH SPAIN

By Antonio Pastor

SOME weeks ago I was sitting before a communication trench on the Madrid front in the dusk of a beautiful September evening. The trees of the once royal domain had suffered little from gun-fire. A few hundred yards across the trickling Manzanares, Madrid is enthroned at a height of 2000 feet in semi-Alpine, crystal clear air (it is almost the only capital in Europe not built on the banks of a great river), in the *Ciudad Universitaria*, a salient into the suburbs of the capital, the defence of which, specially of the huge Clinical Hospital, is an epic comparable to that of the defence of the Alcázar of Toledo Only twenty-four hours earlier mine and counter-mine had blown friend and foe to destruction, followed by an intense fusillade and the rattling of hundreds of machine-guns. Now, a little to the right, trench mortars were dealing with a working party and, in answer, explosive bullets passed over our heads intermittently with their slightly comic double pops. A yellow moon was rising over the northern districts of the once opulent city; the deadly

silence, preceding nightly action, which accompanies the transport over the 'Bridge of the French' of provisions and ammunition for the defenders of the university city, was interrupted by that most familiar of Madrid noises, the clanging progress of a tram.

The abyss that divides two Spains could not have appeared with more dramatic, to a Spaniard almost unbearable, intensity. It divides, with fissures of varying depth and width, every country in Europe, for it is inherent in modern democracy. With overwhelming clearness it appeared to me that the situation in Spain was an extreme and prophetic instance of what may happen elsewhere. *The Revolt of the Masses*, by the Spanish philosopher Ortega y Gasset,[1] was here before my eyes in one of its aspects, not some lamentable '*histoire espagnole*,' as some of my English friends have wrongly and perhaps arrogantly pretended, but an anticipation of things to come. Spain has always specialised in anticipation: the oldest democratic institutions, the oldest centralised monarchy, the oldest of modern bureaucracies, the first to organise a national rising against a foreign invader, a new and original movement which inspired Fichte to preach Spain's example to Prussian youth. Now once more Spain was making her own original and terrifying contribution with this insurgence against the great international revolt. In Spain life and death are opposing each other as in the Pascal liturgy: *Mors et vita duello conflixere mirando.*

Mr. Eden has declared that the Spanish problem is one for Spaniards to solve; yet the opinions, beliefs and passions

[1] There is an English translation. Earlier this year a better French version by Louis Parrot has been published with a remarkable preface by the author. The 'Man of the Masses' is described as follows: 'Everywhere this Mass-man has arisen, a human type hastily built, mounted on a few miserable abstractions and therefore identical from one end of Europe to the other. The stifling monotony, the dull aspect of Continental life is the result.' (Ortega contrasts the wisdom and happy historical evolution of England with the increasing degradation of the Continent.) 'This Mass-man is the type which has previously been emptied of his own history; with unfeeling bowels he is insensitive to the past, and for this very reason submissive to all disciplines described as "international." Rather than a man, he is a shell of a man composed of simple *idola fori*. He lacks inner life, an intimacy which is inexorably his, an irrevocable personality. He is for ever at the disposal of this or that pretence; he only has appetites and only arrogates rights to himself; he does not believe himself bound by duties.'

of the protagonists have either been fantastically misrepresented or ignored in the welter of the interests of the non-Spanish Powers. More specially does this incomprehension apply to the cause of General Franco, since the various appeals and present approach to him are due rather to the military successes of the National Government and the inescapable logic of geography than to any desire for intellectual or spiritual understanding England and France need Spain, though National Spain thinks definitely, if mistakenly, that she does not need either of them with the same urgency. In vain does the student of international affairs search the publications of the last year for a statement of the beliefs and feelings underlying the National movement.

The causes of the obscurity in which the political, social, moral and religious issues, as seen and felt by the adherents of General Franco, have remained are many The genuine Spaniard is the worst of propagandists in a world of rabid self-advertisement, and in this respect surpasses even the Englishman in his incompetence. The superficial excellence of the propaganda conducted by the Valencia Government is a proof, infallible as no documentary evidence can be, of the overwhelming foreign influences that are at work there The Spaniard relates inevitably his convictions to some great moral issue. He is a born crusader; not only does compromise appear to him as the twin-sister of treason, but he fails to understand how it is possible that honest people should not feel with the same depths of passion the inescapable logic of his convictions Hence the civil wars of the nineteenth century have not always appeared to him as lamentable incidents in the troubled history of modern Spain but have always aroused his deep interest. The Carlist volunteers serving in Franco's army consider themselves the heirs of the great Carlist General Zumalacárregui. The writers of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have constantly returned to the civil wars with a curiosity which shows how near in feeling they were to them. A very large part of the work of Benito Pérez Galdós (1843-1920), comparable to that of Tolstoi by its heroic proportions, is devoted to these struggles His point of view, which shows some affinity with that of Thomas Hardy, is, though the author is classed as a Liberal, far removed from the naive Liberal partisanship of his

generation. Rather do we find here the lament that so much national energy should go to waste and the longing for the unifying element that will canalise and usefully direct the apparently inexhaustible reserves of Spanish energy. Even in the so-called 'generation of '98' Valle Inclán and Pío Baroja found their themes in the world of the Carlist wars.

The present Nationalist movement has united, to a degree without precedent since the Peninsular War, divergent groups of ideas into a new national feeling. The divergence between the once semi-Socialist *Falange* and Catholic Carlism (without a Don Carlos, be it understood) is obvious—so obvious that again and again interested propaganda has attempted to represent these ideas as leading to open rebellion against the central authority of the Generalissimo, and already voices are once more heard hoping that after his victory the National Government may be hampered by internal dissension. The wish is father to the thought, and it has taken facts of overwhelming authority to make these rumours recede into the background and for news of hostilities amongst the Nationalists to vanish from even the most rabid repertoire of lies. General Franco commands a following such as no military or political leader has had behind him for a century in the Peninsula. In the eyes of Spanish patriots his great, almost miraculous, achievement is to have given unity of purpose to a large proportion of dispersed forces. That in democratic countries and even by some Spaniards, not identified with the Valencia Government, he should be considered one more leader of a military *Pronunciamento*, on the lines of those of the nineteenth century, surpasses the Spaniard's understanding, in view of the facts of the present situation and in view of the circumstances of the immediate past.

But the unyielding nature of the Spaniard—'*inébranlable Espagne, refus et la demi-mesure à jamais inacceptée*,' says Paul Claudel—where his ultimate convictions are concerned and his lack of subordination of abstract right to vital expediency, gave rise from the beginning to a host of misunderstandings. These arose precisely because it was felt in Spain that abstract statements of principle were likely to inspire repulsion, or at least mistrust, and that it was necessary to cling closely to what everyone outside Spain might clearly understand

Hence the insistence on 'Red atrocities.' But these naïve and honest propagandists did not know, or did not remember, that if there is one conviction deep rooted in the Liberally trained Englishman and Frenchman, it is that, while the outrages accompanying revolution are deplorable, 'the more violent these outrages the more evident it is that the revolution was necessary and that the violence of these outrages will always be proportioned to the ferocity and ignorance of the people. And the ferocity and ignorance of the people will be proportioned to the oppression and degradation under which they have been accustomed to live.' This Liberal tradition, which the Englishman absorbs from early youth, is, generally speaking, foreign to the Spaniard, with his dramatic interpretation of life. Spanish history past and present, with its contrasts of saintliness and sin, nobility and vileness, is a constant illustration of such an attitude. The Civil War is for the Spaniard an arena in which good and evil are struggling, and thus a new crusading spirit fills all ranks from Generalissimo to private.

The soldier who has just taken a village (I speak as an eye-witness), and sees the wanton destruction for which even the most conscientious and inhuman strategist could hardly find military justification, is not likely to be open to Liberal arguments which in his own opinion have made Communism possible in Spain, as a result of long-standing tolerance. He sees the women and children of this village, who have lived in the hills around it hunted like wild animals by the Reds, return to the ruins of their homes, too exhausted and miserable even to weep. This soldier might say, as a non-commissioned officer did say to me, that the volunteers of Franco's army, an army of volunteers and therefore essentially a peasant army, had lived under exactly the same conditions as the supporters of those who are guilty of such outrages. The more educated might have added that too often, if not entirely, the Socialist argument had applied, and still applies, to purely material conditions, and that if one thing was certain it was that the 700,000 soldiers of General Franco were not richer than their opponents. The young man, escaped from Madrid after untold hardships, whose last experience was to see a middle-aged man shot in the entrance of his apartment-building and two little girls trying in vain to drag the corpse

of their father up four flights of stairs to their flat, may be pardoned if he thinks the argument that 'war is war' worse than frivolous. The historian and lover of the art of his country is unlikely to be impressed by the current belief that 'one side is as bad as the other' when, to take one instance in a thousand, he sees, as I have, El Greco's portrait of Cardinal Tavera in Toledo wantonly slashed, or the delicious Van der Goes in the same city destroyed beyond the possibility of repair and, generally, works of art of more than sentimental importance, part of the spiritual heritage of Europe, cut across with the initials of the Iberian Anarchist Federation

In regard to the clergy, the argument advanced in England and elsewhere that only those priests who were 'unpopular' were slaughtered and those who fulfilled their religious and social duties were treated with due regard by honest Red militiamen strikes the Spaniard as monstrous in itself and contrary to experience. What, he asks, would be the casualty list in England, if all unpopular clergymen were soaked in petrol and set on fire? A learned canon was talking to me not long ago in Spain about the reasons which make the clergy always the predestined victims of revolutionary fury, even, or perhaps specially, in Spain, where the clergy was recruited from the labouring and lowest middle classes, so that they belonged generally to the same class as the mob attacking them. Why should they suffer even more than the 'Capitalist'? My friend concluded that the rebellion against all moral authority was naturally directed against those who heroically, like most Spanish clerics, had upheld their priestly character It is not necessary to search for official documents, since unchallenged evidence has been published, as, for instance, in the book *La Persécution religieuse en Espagne* (Paris, Librairie Plon), which contains also a magnificent tribute to the glory of the Spanish martyrs by M. Paul Claudel.[2] He might have added, going outside the Catholic world, that in the case of Russia not only were the 'obscurantist' orthodox clergy murdered, but that the most refined horrors were reserved for the Protestant Church of Finland, for clergy, therefore, whose liberal 'enlightenment' was notorious. On the contrary, the more Liberal and the

more 'popular' a priest, the greater the moral influence he wields in his parish, the more dangerous he is from a revolutionary point of view and the more likely to suffer first The Spanish Church has come through the ordeal with a restored moral nobility, heroism and religious fervour which will have important consequences for its future position in national life. Seventeen thousand martyred priests, among them eleven bishops, create a formidable accumulation of spiritual forces.

Though atrocity stories may be bad propaganda, it is impossible to separate the moral issues involved from political considerations which must gravely affect the attitude of the world towards the Valencia *Junta* It may be permissible to quote one instance amongst many. I have before me, as I write, a copy of a Barcelona newspaper of August 13, *La Vanguardia*, the official organ of the Catalan Government. On page 2, column 1, an account is given of the discovery by the police of a gigantic hoard of treasure, valued at 66,000,000 pesetas and buried in a brick factory This treasure had not been hidden by common thieves, who rarely, and never in Spain, work on this scale. It was one of several collected by the F A.I. (Iberian Anarchist Federation) during the first months of the Civil War which are now being discovered by the police of the Valencia Government, at the same time as the clandestine cemeteries are being found where the owners of the treasure are buried The Iberian Anarchist Federation received its reward for its useful terrorist contribution to Madrid–Valencia–Barcelona politics by being asked to form part of the Catalan Government, presided over by Señor Companys, on September 27, 1936, and then in the Government of Red Spain, under the Presidency of Señor Azaña, on November 9. That the political services of the Anarchist Federation were considered important is proved by the fact that they were given for Ministerial portfolios—*i e.*, a larger number than any other single party of the Popular Front It may be argued, and is constantly asserted outside Spain, that the present Government in Valencia has no moral responsibility for the crimes of the Anarchists, and that this is proved by the fact that now

it is persecuting them. No greater error could be made. The most distinguished members of Dr. Negrín's Government, amongst them Negrín himself, and the true leader of this Government, Indalecio Prieto, formed part of the Government in which the four Ministers of the F.A.I. sat, with which they maintained the cordial relations usual amongst colleagues. If after some months this idyll came to an end, it was not because they had become incompatible with thieves and murderers, but because the Communists of Negrín had come to blows with the Anarchists of the Federation.

The Nationalist Spaniard sees his united front, which includes every right-thinking man in the National territory, as a front against the enemies of mankind, a European front of the defenders of Western civilisation; the certainty directly and visually acquired of the contrast between desolation and destruction and constructive order on his own side, inspired by a high moral sense of responsibility, is the common bond between all supporters of General Franco's Government.

From the point of view of the responsible Spaniard, who considers the problems of Spain as a whole and from a Spanish, not a foreign, point of view, there appear to exist, if I may sum up many and long conversations with directing personalities of the National movement, three blank walls of misunderstanding which separate it from the Anglo-Saxon attitude, as it is understood in Spain: the belief in Liberal democracy as a universally applicable and inherently superior system of government; the sacrifice of fundamental European issues to immediate security; the suspicion that it is intended once more to force un-Spanish, and therefore destructive and weakening, solutions on an exhausted Spain by those most likely to benefit by Peninsular impotence.

English opinion at its best has always been inclined to think that certain forms of government held in abhorrence by public opinion in England may yet suit other nations. There is an agreement of well-informed opinion that, on the whole, English Governments since 1918 have loyally striven for such a spirit of mutual toleration. But this tolerant minority seems to Spaniards to depend on a majority of voters

who, at a distance which lends no charm, appear to them repulsively self-righteous. These Spaniards do not appreciate the position of a subtle and elegant Foreign Minister who is forced to appease in Parliament a Labour Party, which is really interventionist to a man, by proving on the one hand that England has never intervened at all and that Non-Intervention, even if a fiction, has succeeded in localising the conflict, and on the other to enumerate the great services which England has rendered to the Valencia Government by depriving the Nationalists of the effective command of the sea in spite of their naval superiority, and to reaffirm the close association with the Spanish policy of successive French Governments, thereby, in the eyes of Spaniards, accepting part responsibility for the help in men and material which France has rendered and is still rendering to Valencia and Barcelona. Spanish opinion, with all its energies concentrated on the war, can hardly be expected to take into account the international connotations and internal divisions which lie behind and justify such statements, however remarkable their wit and skill. The Spaniard's most vivid, normal political experience is the democratic misrule of the Republic and the political disorganisation of France, his closest neighbour, where, as he thinks, the country is gradually revolting against the democratic politicians in Paris. The supporter of the National Government is generally neither Fascist nor National Socialist, however great and natural his gratitude to Italy, Germany and Portugal, who helped him, or at least did not obstruct him, when he struck in self-defence. He is first and foremost a Spaniard, and his conviction that Spain needs an authoritarian Government, as a measure of public safety, and as a means of regaining her national and international identity, is difficult to dispute in view of the calamitous years that have preceded the storm.

Historically speaking, parliamentary democracy in Spain is under the cloud of its disastrous failure, due rather to the excess of opportunities than to lack of them The parliamentary system did not fail because a reactionary and obscurantist minority was for ever depriving the Spanish people of the delicious present of the gods, but, on the con-

trary, because a real opposition to the demagogic element, implicit in every parliamentary system, was never effective. The Crown was throughout the reign of Isabella II. holding the balance between its supporters of the Right and Left on the one hand and the Carlists on the other, unable, from impotence due to circumstances and, to no small extent, personal ineptitude, to act as an arbitrator and a unifying force.

Democracy failed in Spain for reasons that are inherent in it, and for others, more evident, which are peculiar to the Peninsula, though even these are related to similar failures in other countries, which, however, possessed greater resources of wealth and initiative and were able to make good, or at least invisible, the increasing damage. There is nothing new or startling in this view; what is peculiar to our generation is that, with the increasing decomposition of applied democracy, the inevitable consequences should have appeared in a threatening and fearful light. Aristotle—and we have inherited all our political standards from the Greeks—already considered *Demokratia* a degeneration of the Athenian *Politeia* of the fifth century, which meant government by a municipal oligarchy—the rule of the majority of free and equal citizens. Implicit in the *Politeia* of a Pericles are conditions which are entirely contrary to those of modern democracies. The Greeks were city dwellers, and throughout history cities have been hotbeds of mob rule. But the Greek city ruled over a small territory, and the disproportion between town and country dwellers, characteristic of modern democracies, did not arise in Greece. A Paris or a Madrid, dominating the two largest countries in Europe, gives rise to quite different problems. In a sense it may be said that the Civil War in Spain is also a reaction of the provinces against the capital. Democracy works, on the other hand, where a small homogeneous population with common interests and slight class divisions can meet and discuss the communal business and respond to frequent referendums, as is the case in Switzerland. But Spain is less a country than a subcontinent with an enormous variety of peoples and interests.

The Greek idea of democracy was, moreover, conditioned by the greatest of all limitations. Only citizens in the literal sense voted and the vast mass of slaves possessed no civil rights; it was precisely slavery which made democracy

possible, and it is no accident that in the American Civil War the slave-holding planter-aristocrats of the South should one and all have been democrats. The oligarchical principle implicit in democracy is even more marked in Utopian communism In Plato's *Republic* radical measures are only applicable to the two ruling classes, the Philosophers and the Warriors. The Citizens produce but do not rule. Thomas More in his *Utopia* was obliged to build his ideal State, from which 'disagreeable work' was banished, on a foundation of slavery.

In the Roman Republic the Patriciate limited popular participation in government still further. The crisis comes when this balance is disturbed and Cæsar and Pompey can organise the electoral machine on demagogic principles, comparable to those of the modern democracies In the Middle Ages democracy either means corporate organisation for the protection of professional or economic interests, liberty to exercise in the best possible conditions a certain function, the rights depending on the nature of the function, or the gradual acquisition by purchase, force or blackmail of municipal privileges by the burgesses from the feudal and dynastic fountains of power. This double process leads to the formation of a privileged municipal aristocracy, but not to democracy in the modern sense. In Spain the rule of these oligarchies became a tyranny, and one of the objects of the Isabellan Reforms in the last quarter of the fifteenth century was to reduce the proud cities to the acceptance of more equitable royal laws.

The English Revolutions of 1642 and 1688, the War of American Independence in 1776, the French Revolution of 1789, the Revolutions of 1830 and 1848 and their interminable succession from 1906 onwards, each, while widening the circle of democratic practice, accelerated the *reductio ad absurdum* of democracy by increasing the disparity between the peculiar and extremely rare circumstances under which limited democracy is possible and the theory of democracy, elevated by sentimental enthusiasm to the level of a religious belief. The English Revolutions consolidated parliamentary government; the French Revolution destroyed the foundations of the old order rather than brought about immediate practical applications. The American Revolution was at

the beginning at least, a revolt of the Colonial *bourgeoisie*, comparable, though not in its successful outcome, to that of the Castillian Comuneros against the Emperor Charles V. It was only after the arrival from England of Thomas Paine that the masses were stirred and baser instincts came into play. Vergennes, the Foreign Minister of Louis XVI, wrote to the French representative in the United States: 'The essence of government in a democracy is always jealousy in some sort.' The essential falseness of the democratic ideals of the young French aristocrats, represented by Lafayette, was thus recognised by a real statesman.

The growth and temper of democratic ideas and ideals in the nineteenth century, with their progress towards collectivism,[3] is far more French than English. The Revolution of 1830 was the result of a conspiracy of bankers (let us remember the incomparable descriptions of Dumas in his *Mémoires*) with the avowed object of placing political power in the hands of the rich middle class. The Duke of Orleans was raised to the throne, as first King in Europe not by the grace of God, but by the will of the banker Laffitte and others. The English Reform Bill of 1832 is to an important extent the outcome of these developments on the Continent

But what appeared new, though implicit in the rationalistic thought of the Greeks generally, and explicitly stated by Plato, is the close association of science with democratic practice. Human society seemed susceptible of infinite improvement, and the instrument of this amelioration of the individual as well as of society was to be the infinite development of science in its practical applications. We have every reason now to doubt such a naive assumption, even in its literal materialistic meaning; but the full recognition of its

[3] Ortega y Gasset in the above mentioned work tries to establish the following points (1) Individualistic Liberalism belongs to the flora of the eighteenth century, it inspires the legislation of the French Revolution, but dies with it. (2) The characteristic creation of the nineteenth century has been collectivism It is the first political idea of this century, invented at its very beginning (*i e*, long before Marx and Engels), and has grown constantly during the century, until it now fills the whole horizon (3) This idea is French by origin It appears at first with the arch-reactionaries de Bonald and de Maistre It is, in its main points, accepted at once by everybody, with the one exception of Benjamin de Constant, a survivor of the previous century, but it triumphs with Saint Simon, Ballanche and Comte, and pullulates more or less everywhere. For instance, a physician from Lyons, Amard, already in 1821, talks of 'collectivisme,' opposing it to 'personnalisme.'

falseness has been reserved for post-positivist modern science itself, with its clear distinction between the spheres of moral and natural sciences. The mistake was to imagine that the excellence of the organ would increase the mastery of the executant. It is, on the contrary, a common experience that mediocrity goes hand in hand with superb equipment. The most magnificently endowed university libraries and laboratories may be, and very often are, the breeding-grounds of mediocrity or worse, while truly creative discoveries are made by workers labouring under material handicaps which ultimately prove to have been not handicaps but stimuli. The golfer knows that the higher the handicap of his partner, the more dazzling his arsenal of clubs and pig-skin bags is likely to be. But the greatest mistake the Spanish intellectuals made was to imagine that scientific training, or rather the creation of circumstances in which it was possible to acquire scientific training, was destined to produce a race of statesmen and administrators.[4]

In modern Europe the last vestiges of divine right have disappeared with the fall of the German, Austrian, Russian and Spanish monarchies, and all Governments rule, or pretend to rule, by a mandate of the people. This is even more evident in the great dictatorships than in the avowed democracies, the difference between them consisting rather in two characteristics; uniform majorities rather than coalitions of groups, thrown together by their individual weakness, and intolerance of minorities progressing to the abolition of parties and the identification of the State with one majority party. The old Liberal democracy, with its individualistic humanism, has almost entirely disappeared. While the democratic principle is more widely accepted than ever before, its breadth has reduced it to the lowest common denominator of collective opinion, at the mercy of enormously increased propaganda and a commercial Press which invokes ideals of liberty in order to be allowed to sell its wares and looks upon the censored gazettes of the authoritarian countries with self-righteous superiority. This process, a concomitant

[4] Even Professor J Castillejo writes 'On the other side, the trade unions and their socialist party did not realise that scientific research must be the starting-point of any reform and the cradle of the only aristocracy that socialism would both acknowledge and need' (*Education and Revolution in Spain*, University of London, Institute of Education, Studies and Reports, No. XII, 1937, p. 20)

of the greatly increased population of Europe during the last century, led, with the help of pseudo-science, to the final negation and open contradiction of democracy in the name of democracy.

During the revolution of 1848 Marx and Engels had invited the proletariat in a communistic manifesto to override the Liberal constitutional obstacles, erected by the middle classes, and to seize the 'Means of Production' by force, with the result that the extended franchise and the admission of the new masses, who had no part in the spiritual and material heritage of European civilisation, to what originally had been a political aristocracy culminated in class war and class dictatorship, based on a materialistic conception of history quite foreign to the spiritual origins of Liberalism.

The modern Spaniard knows all this far more thoroughly than he is given credit for, and often far better than the uncritical emissaries of democracy with which he is confronted. The last thirty years in Spain have been years of encyclopædic acquisition of modern culture, of a vast consumption of political manuals and popular pamphlets, the majority of which came, doubtless, from the parties of the Left, but which often also stimulated the tendency to react and oppose which is innate in every Spaniard. He sees democracy as working efficiently only in a country like England, where a high standard of collective conduct, due to the maintenance of the feeling for tradition and a predominance of oligarchic tendencies, within wide democratic possibilities, prevents the *reductio ad absurdum* of unlimited democratic practice. A high personage said to me in Salamanca:

> There seem to me two main reasons, apart from others, why talk about the decadence of England is nonsense. As long as the English bureaucracy can render harmless or prevent some of the more blatant mistakes of parliaments, there is no great danger to England; and so long as the primary function of the State, the administration of justice, remains impartial and independent and is not submissive to demagogy, the sinews of a national society are strong and sound. No country can be called decadent that possesses Judges, a Civil Service, and a Police like England.

The majority of the Spanish people have, during the century of its existence, always felt that parliamentary democracy was an imposition of a minority in Madrid and,

to some extent, in the provincial capitals. It is interesting to notice that Galdós, a profound interpreter of Spanish life from a Liberal point of view which we do not share, saw the army as the real agent of Liberal democracy in Spain, and it is certain that the constitutional façade could never have been kept from tumbling without the support of the army. All the great Liberal coups were engineered and executed by a minority of Liberal officers. This is what happened in 1820 when General Riego (whose lamentable personality and death has been graphically described by Galdós) and Quiroga headed the troops that were to embark to fight the American insurgents and fought the absolutist Spanish Government instead. The *Himno de Riego* became the party song of the Spanish Liberals, and under the Republic the national anthem, until General Franco restored the traditional *Marcha Real*, which is based on a theme written for flutes by Frederick the Great. All Liberal risings in the nineteenth century have similar characteristics, as in 1843 when Prim raised the standard of revolt in Reus, and in 1868 when Queen Isabella was dethroned, to mention only the most notable occasions.

The roots of the Spanish Liberal Cortes were therefore as much in a soil manured by force as those of the reactionaries. The system, which by its very nature was dependent on popular opinion, was alien to the collective feeling of the Spanish people, and all that could be achieved was to force a pretence on to a reluctant or indifferent country. This pretence served as a screen for every ignominy; if there had been corruption before, it had been simple, almost patriarchal and, incidentally, on a most modest scale; now corruption grew as Liberal Governments depended for their existence on the generals as much, and sometimes to a far greater extent than the Conservative Cabinets. The doyen of Spanish historians, Altamira, a life-long Liberal, writes:

> Though both parties included many notable civilians, they appealed to the armed forces in order to gain the upper hand and the leadership became consolidated in certain generals who fought for military and political supremacy in the Cabinets of the Queen (Isabella II). The most prominent were Naváez, on the side of the 'Moderados' (Conservatives), and later, with less resistance to constitutional principles, General O'Donnell; on the side of the 'Progresistas' (Liberal Radicals), Espartero and later Prim.

But none of them—and in this they differed from the present National movement—counted on a vast background of unanimous popular support, and none ever became national symbols.

If democracy, in the modern sense, means less a religious devotion to 'Liberty,' as in the nineteenth century, with its often generous and naive ideas inherited from the eighteenth, than a machinery of representative institutions based on a vast consensus of public opinion, it may be claimed that Spain has never possessed a more 'democratic' régime than that of the Salamanca Government. No one can pretend that the ministries in Madrid were representative, since by their very origins they were cut off from popular feeling. The conduct of the elections had become a byword. The case of the present Valencia Government is an extreme instance, but, in this sense, not fundamentally different from other situations in the nineteenth century. Then, as now, Spaniards with more capacity for acquiring ideas than political practice and common-sense, like the embittered *émigrés* of the time of Ferdinand VII. who returned after the death of that lamentable monarch, and a considerable number of foreign agitators (French and Italian) in the 1850's and 1860's, had carried the demagogic ferment into the cities—demagogic because their ideas were quite divorced from a constructive policy, based on a real understanding of Spain.

Then, as now, Governments would proclaim toleration, liberal enlightenment and protection of political minorities, which in practice were rarely applied, and perhaps could not be applied. Then, as now, vast reforms were embodied in legislation which, to a large extent, remained empty verbiage. During the years 1860–68 this propaganda was intensified, and culminated in the revolution which cost Isabella her throne. General Prim, the unchallenged leader of the movement, recognising the necessity of a monarchy as a solvent of the political acid accumulated during fifty years of struggle, offered the Crown (after having supplied Bismarck and Napoleon III. with the occasion or pretext for the war of 1870) to Prince Amadeo of Italy, who was to inject into the imperial traditions of the Castilian monarchy the Liberal and anti-Papal policy of the House of Savoy—a complete instance of the alien character of this Spanish Liberalism.

'Finding a democratic king on earth is like looking for an atheistic one in Heaven,' remarked Prim, who was assassinated on the day of Amadeo's arrival in Spain in 1870. Left without a guiding and superior personality, the weary Amadeo, the 'Gentleman King,' as he was called, abdicated in 1873 with six ministries and three general elections to his credit, unable to instil some sense of responsibility in the different factions of his Liberal supporters. The Republic was proclaimed. The Republicans of 1931, and those who inspired them, have always looked with tenderness on that ill-begotten child, remembering with sentimental pleasure the first attempt of professors and philosophers to govern the country. Yet the origins of the first Republic were entirely unconstitutional [5] and its record of achievement comparable in quality, though not in quantity, with that of the latter-day Republic. Both failed for similar reasons.

The great virtuosos of parliamentary rhetoric—Pi y Margall, Salmerón, Castelar—devoted their olympic energies to mutual attack and destruction, the chief bone of contention being national unity *versus* federal organisation, supported by Pi y Margall since 1854. The army was demoralised, Catalan separatism rampant; finally the 'Cantonalists,' as the Federalists were called, seized the building of the Cortes and the deputies had to run for their lives. When the Republicans had obtained a parliamentary majority in a Constituent Cortes disorders and 'atrocities' everywhere showed to what an extent central authority had been weakened. Málaga proclaimed itself an independent republic, or Canton, under a certain Francisco Solier and Cantonal propaganda swept over the whole of Andalucia, to the surprised horror of Pi y Margall, who wished to impose

[5] Article 47 of the Constitution forbade both Chambers to deliberate together. In spite of this, they united and raised themselves to the rank of a Constituent Assembly, without new elections, proclaiming the Republic by 258 votes to 32. This constituted a violation of the principle of national sovereignty. The Cortes had been elected under the monarchy of the Savoyard and were ordinary Cortes, but the deputies feared the result of elections to a Constituent Cortes and proclaimed in fact, if not in principle a popular dictatorship, possessing affinities with the ideas which had led to the Paris Commune two years before. A comparison to the French Revolution of 1848 makes the unconstitutional character of the first Spanish Republic clear, after the abdication of Louis Philippe and three days of street fighting, the French Republicans appointed only a provisional Government, and Lamartine proclaimed from the balcony of the Hotel de Ville that no one had the right to impose a Republic before consulting the will of the people

Federalism 'from above.' Indescribable horrors took place at Alcoy; Granada was coining its own money and collected State taxes; Seville made a Communist experiment and promulgated the abolition of private property; Valencia and other towns on the coast declared themselves free ports and established their own customs on their land 'frontiers'; little republics sprang up like mushrooms and made treaties with each other like mediæval cities, and it was not until General Pavía dealt with the situation that a check was put on the worst absurdities, although the Canton of Málaga was granted legal status, and this new miniature republic became the paradise of smugglers. In Cartagena, then one of the strongest coastal fortresses in Europe, where practically the whole of the fairly powerful Spanish fleet was stationed, the local *Junta* rose to the rank of a Government and declared the independence of the Canton of Murcia. Finally, the Madrid Government had to declare the Spanish fleet to be piratical, thus inviting and obtaining foreign help in dealing with the situation.

These are facts worth remembering, since provincial particularism, with which, on the whole, English opinion sympathises, is emphatically rejected by National Spain wherever it threatens the unity of the State, though this may not mean necessarily insistence on complete uniformity. The second Republic tried half-heartedly to avoid the mistakes of 1873. The Constitution of 1931 declares that there is one State (Article 1), but leaves the way open to federation, the Republic being 'federable':

> If one or several adjoining Provinces, with common historical, cultural and economic characteristics, should agree to organise themselves as an autonomous Region, they shall present their Statute in accordance with Article 12 (which establishes the Catalan precedent)

Again practice went astray. I was in Spain when the Galician Statute was being voted and, surprised at the majority in favour, asked a local boss how he arrived at such a result. His reply was: 'We assume that all who have *not* voted (and only a tiny minority of votes was recorded) are in favour of regional autonomy.' Is it surprising that Castile should, with the advent of a National Government,

have returned to her historical mission of arbiter and unifier?

In December 1874 Alfonso XII., son of Isabella II. and father of the present ex-King Don Alfonso XIII., was proclaimed after a military '*Pronunciamento*,' and from this date onwards Spain enjoyed over thirty years of internal peace. Disruptive forces were released by the unsuccessful war with the United States of America in 1898 and the consequent destruction of the remains of the Spanish empire across the seas. A slowly growing revolt began to take shape against the shams and false pretences of a long period during which Cánovas del Castillo, the true architect of the 'Restoration,' had organised an elaborate parliamentary system, based, as elsewhere, on alternating Conservative and Liberal Ministries, and which worked only, as Cánovas, the great pessimist in so far as Spain was concerned, knew only too well, for the very reason that the democratic substance was never allowed to intrude into this world of make-believe. Cánovas had convoked a constitutional Cortes and succeeded in getting a Constitution voted in 1876, the seventh important constitutional change which the Cortes or royal prerogative had made in sixty-four years. This Restoration was not absolutist like that of Ferdinand VII., and, indeed, Alfonso XII. was constitutional by instinct and doctrine. But it is safe to say that during the whole of his reign and the seventeen years of the minority of Alfonso XIII., when his mother, the admirable Dona Maria Cristina, an Austrian Archduchess, was Regent, no genuine elections were held. In the France of Guizot and Louis Philippe the machine had been made to work by limiting the right to vote to a small minority; in the Spain of Cánovas, Sagasta, the Liberal leader, and Castelar, ex-President of the Republic, the Home Office in the Puerta del Sol conducted the elections with the help of the local *caciques*, or party bosses. This was the *conditio sine qua non* for attaining the 'atmosphere'—it came to little more—of representative government. The Constitution of 1876 in itself, by its flexibility and the lack of precision of some of its articles, made such a state of things possible, and even left room for the attempts of the ex-Republican Castelar, a remarkable figure, to liberalise the monarchy.

The politicians of the Restoration were bound by the

desperate urgency of avoiding a renewal of the civil war at all costs, and in this they succeeded. But in their fear of the fratricidal ghost they sacrificed much that was valuable. The most active and vital initiatives tended more and more to be divorced from and opposed to the representative organs of government, which, with all their blatant shortcomings, were yet all that stood between anarchy and a semblance of order So it happened that the great figures of the Spanish Renaissance in the twentieth century, rather than being fully included in the national life, were in a sense 'eccentric,' and, while they were making considerable contributions to letters, art and science, to a degree that had not been equalled for two hundred years, remained anomalous beyond the point that talent or genius must always be anomalous everywhere It is not part of my task to examine the human values involved, and still less to describe this fecund creative current which so strangely contrasts with a long record of political failures.

The majority of King Alfonso XIII. (1902) did not change matters substantially, but during his reign the final disruption and liquidation of the pseudo-democratic system took place. Cánovas and Sagasta were dead. Their place was taken by Maura and Dato on the Conservative side, and by Canalejas on the Liberal one. It is significant that constructive solutions of great problems have been attempted almost entirely by Conservatives: Don Antonio Maura offered important concessions to Catalan Regionalism (represented in the Cortes since the elections of 1901) which led to a partial administrative autonomy under the so-called *Mancomunidades* (federations of provincial authorities); Dato was the first Conservative to attempt social reforms on more than ridiculously timid lines; anticipating the twenties of the present century, we should remember in this connexion that Primo de Rivera's most interesting achievements lie in the sphere of social reform, and not in the construction of superb roads, the constant praise of which sounds somewhat tiresome in the ears of the intelligent Spaniard.

But the democratic régime suffered from an instability even greater than in the previous century. The oscillation between two great parties, who alternately shared the spoils of Ministerial prerogative, was becoming a frantic confusion amongst a multiplicity of new parties. One can

organise a friendly match with one opponent, especially if the winner has been decided upon beforehand; but one cannot play the game with five or six, then ten, and finally, under the Republic, with Anarchists, Syndicalists, orthodox Communists and Trotskyists, academic Labourites, Democrats, Liberals, Monarchists and Conservative Republicans, Agrarians of the Right, Agrarians of the Left, Absolutists and National Syndicalists, those who hope for a prompt establishment of the Inquisition, and the most reasonable of Catholics. The break-up of the great traditional parties has, not only in Spain, but in France and England, profoundly altered parliamentary politics and made coalition Governments normal rather than exceptional, as the only means of securing parliamentary majorities. King Alfonso was thus faced with a pseudo-democratic system which showed all the symptoms of rapid decay. The argument that he is responsible for killing the moribund sufferer can only mean, if it means anything, that it was already so weak as to be at the mercy of a young and impatient but singularly active and intelligent king. The fact was that in Spain, ever since the restoration of Alfonso XII., the Crown had taken the place of the non-existing or non-participating public opinion. The sovereign thus became, not the arbiter within a Constitution in the struggle between opposing parties, but a substitute for the essential element in democratic practice—public opinion.

The military dictatorship of General Primo de Rivera (September 1923) suspended the Constitution and achieved, at least in the material sphere, remarkable improvements. We have already alluded to social reforms. The dictator himself personally brought the Moroccan war to an end by a coup (the landing at Alhucemas) in which military and political ability and a superb confidence in his star had their parts; the face of Spain was improved out of all recognition. The dictatorship disappeared in 1930, as suddenly as it had come, after this remarkable record of achievement. Primo de Rivera had been unable to weld together the spiritual forces of the country into a single will, and temperamentally reluctant, since he certainly was not cruel, to suppress minorities which, on the contrary, flourished exceedingly and bombarded him with ironic or humorous witticisms in which the

Spaniard excels, he had no party behind him, the necessary condition for a great popular dictatorship, and lacked a disciplined volume of unanimity, which was quite absent from his happy Sultanate. Various risings, supported by army officers, preceded (Conservative Monarchist movement of Don José Sánchez Guerra in January 1929) and followed it (Republican rising in Jaca, Aragon, and the revolt of the air force officers in Cuatro Vientos, near Madrid).

No one can doubt that the political ability of the Spanish 'intellectuals,' however accomplished they might be in other respects, was small, and when in April 1931 the proclamation of the Republic gave them a chance without parallel, their failure was of an enormity which even in Spain, the home of extremes, has rarely been equalled. The Constituent Parliament of 1931 included, if not the best political brains in the country (it certainly did not), all the 'intellectuals' who aspired to the position of philosopher-kings Almost their first measure was to suspend the constitutional liberties they had just voted, and, when the forces they had unloosed got out of hand, to retire arrogantly into semi-seclusion The Republic was used as a weapon against all traditional and national Spanish forces, especially the Church (the present President of the Valencia Republic, Señor Azaña, declared in the Cortes that Spain had ceased to be Catholic), and not as a unifying element that was to put an end to the secular waste of apparently inexhaustible energy. More serious even than this, the legal system collapsed completely. Señor Castillejo, a modern Liberal and an enemy of all dictatorships, as spiritually destructive, and for this very reason the most crushing witness, says:

> Spain had lived many centuries united under a dominant religious and moral faith. In the nineteenth century that unity was broken, but liberty and strife did not end in anarchy, because at the bottom there was a common ground: the great system of Roman legislation, as a bulwark of individual rights protected by public conscience, by law and by the State. Political innovations altered the surface, but contracts and real property and testaments were considered inviolable; they were the gold standard of social life and had behind them Public Power.
>
> Since the advent of the Republic there appeared more or less definite hints of a change, but no other firm soil was pointed out to

take the place of sinking, private law. To brag that everything in the country belonged to the community and was at its service was not a reassuring announcement for the possessors, nor promising and speedy enough for the starving masses.

The stalwart legal system which had withstood the political tides of twenty centuries was shattered. Nobody knew any longer whether solemn promises would be upheld, acquisitions respected, harvests reaped, homes and lives protected. The Government had not given enough pretexts for such panic; but neither had they offered sufficient pledges to stem it

The laws of contract, property and heredity were accused of being the weapons of capitalism with all its wail of misery and oppression. And so they were But they had, at the same time, made possible gigantic advances of civilisation. If they vanished, a new social basis was essential. The Spanish Republic did not dare openly to accept Communism, and the liberal, democratic framework gave way before another was ready to take its place.[6]

There exists now considerable literature on the subject of the Spanish Republic, and we may therefore shorten our review of the immediate past. I would only insist on a point which closely affects the general attitude outside Spain, and especially the attitude of English opinion in regard to the Civil War The democratic conscience is offended by the sight of an insurgent General against a freely elected legal Government. We have said something about this insurgence and the volume of public opinion behind it, proved, not by going to the polling-booth, but by enlisting in his armies; but it may once more be necessary to remember that the legality, in the strict sense of the word, of the Valencia Government is one of the most gigantic pieces of political and journalistic fiction Apart from general political considerations as to the relative number of supporters on each side and the circumstances in which such support is given, the unconstitutional character of this Government is evident to those who have inside knowledge of the conditions of the February 1936 elections from which the Popular Front Government derives its supposed legality. The organs of Government in Spain were: the Presidency of the Republic, the Cortes, the Government and the municipal authorities. Every one of these was taken over illegally. In my native

[6] *Wars of Ideas in Spain*, pp 156-7

province seventeen deputies were to be elected, and the result was a sweeping victory of the seventeen candidates of the Right and Centre, which, in this case, had combined against the Popular Front. The agents of the Popular Front destroyed the ballot-papers in several cases, but, as they had not time to complete their violent intervention, caused the final scrutiny of the election results to be postponed. During the interval the Government of the province was seized, some of the Conservative candidates were arrested and their houses were allowed to be attacked by the mob. Candidates of the Left were substituted for the ones elected. An examination of the certificates of the election, deposited in the provincial law courts (since in Spain two certificates were prepared, one of which was kept by the provincial authorities, the other being sent to the Cortes), leaves no doubt as to the methods by which these constituencies were represented in Parliament by seventeen Left-wing deputies who had certainly not been elected. Since the organism which decided as to the validity of elections was the Parliament itself, the front-liners of illegality, who occupied their seats in the Cortes immediately, became the arbiters of those cases in which Conservatives or Liberals had been elected.

There remained, however, one obstacle in the path of social revolution. The President of the Republic was still in authority and he could appoint Ministers and dissolve the Cortes. It became, therefore, imperative to capture the Presidency. Constitutionally the only formula possible was to depose the President on the charge of having acted *ultra vires* in dissolving the previous Cortes Although this could only have been done by a Cortes similar in political complexion to the dissolved ones, the absurdity did not deter what had by now become a revolutionary *Junta*. From this moment onwards the Republic ceased to exist legally, and this illegality was carried into the Presidential chair by the election of the Prime Minister, Señor Azaña, as President. I was in Spain at the time when this tragic comedy was enacted, and can bear witness as to the ways and means by which the '*Compromisarios*,' the Presidential electors, were nominated by the Popular Front, excluding all rival candidates, so that, in fact, no candidate was allowed to present himself for election in any province.

The conduct of the Government in the Cortes was in accordance with its revolutionary principles. Those members who represented parties not included in the Popular Front were in the course of a full-dress debate threatened with assassination, being informed that 'they would die with their boots on.' The growing tension expressed itself in the complete destruction of 160 churches, the partial burning of 251, the murder of 269 persons and the wounding of over 1200, according to figures given by Señor Gil Robles on June 16, 1936—a month before the Civil War—which have never been disproved. This campaign of terror culminated in the murder by the police of the Conservative deputy and ex-Minister Señor Calvo Sotelo, who was taken for a nocturnal 'ride' and his body deposited in the *morgue* of the municipal cemetery in Madrid

Everyone prominent in any walk of life who was known as an opponent of the Popular Front went in fear of death, and even so the majority of law-abiding Spaniards waited, saw common criminals leave prison under the pretext of a political amnesty, arms openly distributed by the civil governors of the provinces amongst the Syndicalists, and warned again and again the more responsible but now powerless elements in the Government of the intolerable situation.

These are the conditions which immediately preceded the outbreak of the Civil War.

The supporters of the National Government are not only faced with the objections of democrats and the general feeling that prevails in the great democracies, but with the attempt to degrade Spain to the rank of a pawn in the general jockeying for position with a view to gaining advantages, or at least to avoiding obvious disadvantages, in a potential European war. It is hardly necessary to sum up all the points which are familiar to students of contemporary affairs. The question turns mainly, though not entirely, on two points: free entry into the Mediterranean for England without danger from a potentially hostile Spain, and the maintenance of the great sea route that leads from London to Singapore and Australia; free communications for France between her great reservoir

of man-power in Northern Africa and the motherland. Gibraltar and the Balearics are labels, though significant ones, which have been attached to this double problem of communications.

The Spaniard, perhaps naively, asks in what manner the re-establishment of authority and the defence of the most elementary principles of civilisation against an international conspiracy can affect this problem, except in the sense of strengthening the guarantees, such as they are, for a continuance of the *status quo*. He simply refuses to believe that the cause of apprehension and the widespread Press campaign, with its reports of 16-inch guns ringing round the Rock, is not ultimately an expression of the fear of a well-ordered and therefore strengthened Spain. It is known that Gibraltar will only serve as long as Spain is neutral, as she was during the European War, or friendly, as in the Napoleonic struggles. The right of way from Oran and Algiers to Toulon and Marseilles depends, more than on the Islands, on a Spain which is at least not openly hostile. The strategic problems are bound up with the political ones that overshadow them. The friendship of Spain is worth a thousand obsolete Gibraltars or any base in Mallorca. To quote Vice-Admiral C. V. Usborne:

> In the face of a hostile Spain it would be exceedingly difficult for the Fleet to use Gibraltar, impossible for its repair-yard to function, because of shell-fire. The big guns of the Spanish fortress of Ceuta, installed long ago, threaten it and howitzers or siege-pieces could at any time be mounted on the hills which ring it round to make its harbour a death-trap, despite the effective reply that the Rock could doubtless make.

What has been done to keep traditional friendship in such high value in circumstances that required vision, tact and high integrity? According to responsible Spaniards, less than could have been desired, and, on the other hand, a great deal that is difficult to forgive and forget, even making every allowance for the slow *tempo* of English opinion. I am not thinking of loose talk or empty chatter, but of the deep regret and disappointment with which old friends of England and devotees of France have spoken to me.

The concrete obstacles to a gradual improvement are three: the presence of foreign contingents on Spanish soil;

the possibility of the cession of National territory in payment of services rendered; the safety of British interests in National Spain. General Franco has made declarations of pellucid clarity on all three points, and especially on the first two.

It has always been known by those who should know that the National army of 700,000 men contained less than 42,000 Italians and roughly 10,000 Germans—*i.e.*, about 7 per cent. foreigners. Rarely has a great army been more homogeneous or inspired by a greater unity of feeling and purpose. The French army during the World War contained a large proportion of foreigners, and I am not thinking of Colonial troops. The strongest contingent, that of the Italians, does not form a separate unit, but is included in a Spanish formation, that of the 'Black Arrows', the Germans have their own completely German unit, but no member of this force is a front-line combatant. Is this a force, my friends in Salamanca asked, that could in any conceivable circumstances attempt tactical, strategical or political blackmail? They may count on our gratitude, I was told, certainly, but to imagine that such a gratitude could take the form of ceding National territory to Italy or even to Germany is to show the profoundest ignorance of our Spain. Moreover, General Franco has declared that they may leave the Peninsula to-morrow if the foreigners serving the Valencia Government really were allowed to go. Since then many have left.

The Spaniard has shown that he has maintained his temper as a soldier and a patriot since the Peninsular War. Any attempt at depredation would to-day be resisted with the same capacity for sacrifice. Joseph Bonaparte wrote to his imperial brother, with a penetration that does him honour, only eight days after his arrival in Madrid: 'You are mistaken . . . your glory will end in Spain.' Napoleon had considered the possession of Spain, even as a vassal kingdom under his brother, as a provisional measure, and, according to Bignon, as a step towards annexation. The *Mémoires historiques* contain a conversation in which the Emperor is made to say: 'The Spaniards will do silly things, and this present I have made to my brother will be returned to me. I shall divide it into five vice-royalties. . . .' He continued to speak of the dangers for France which the neighbourhood of such a potentially strong country involved, and was particularly

worried by the Spanish inclination towards an alliance with England. Prospective dividers of Spain have never fared well.

These advocates of division are not only foreign conquerors but also some Spaniards, just as a minority of Spaniards, entirely influenced by ideas applied or applicable to other countries with varying success, tried to introduce doctrinaire constitutionalism in the nineteenth century. There are those who wish to divide the Peninsula into zones, Red and White, and have actually proposed that the watertight compartment which declares its willingness to accept the peaceful solution should, for defensive purposes, be supplied with arms by the European Powers. The refusal to even consider such a hair-raising project is attributed to international short-sighted selfishness.

Some others have adopted a position equidistant from both contending parties, and in the name of humanity and patriotism implore the belligerents to lay down their arms and to prepare for reconciliation and compromise, since the victory of either side would only mean a foreign victory in Spain at the expense of Spain.

They are not *au-dessus de la mêlée*, but well below it, or beside it; historically in a position comparable to that of the *Afrancesados* in the Napoleonic wars, who sided with Joseph Bonaparte against the overwhelming historical destiny of which the Spaniards were the carriers The superior position, then as now, had its temptations. Joseph's statements, censored or even written by Napoleon himself, who, as we have seen, intended to destroy the independence of Spain, sounded unobjectionable and even appealed to enlightened opinion, as some of the international declarations of the Government of Valencia do to-day. Before the so-called Cortes of Bayonne, held on French soil by order of the Emperor and as representative of public opinion in Spain, as the parliamentary fragment meeting nowadays from time to time in Valencia with the avowed object of impressing democratic opinion abroad, Joseph addressed a Spanish deputation: 'Your monarchy is old; my mission is to rejuvenate it. I shall improve your institutions and shall make you enjoy, if you assist me, advantages of reform without revolution, disorder and political convulsion.' Admirable,

and it worked with a few men of considerable, though not supreme, intellectual attainments and with very obvious flaws in their characters : fear in the case of Moratín ; anger, envy and the resentment of the baulked climber in the case of Llorente, the historian of the Inquisition, and, most characteristic of all, versatile frivolity in that of Meléndez Valdés. Those who possessed high moral and intellectual integrity were uncompromising, like the great Jovellanos, writer, jurist, statesman and reformer, who had suffered previously at the hands of reaction, or rather royal stupidity. Sebastiani wrote to him, trying to attract him to the Bonapartist ranks : 'The reputation you possess in Europe, your liberal ideas, your high patriotism, your wish to see your country happy and prosperous should induce you to abandon a faction which only fights for the Inquisition, for ancient prejudices, the interests of some Grandees and those of England.' The reply of Jovellanos was : 'We do not fight, as you pretend, for the privileges of the Grandees ; we fight for the sovereignty of our King, for our Religion, our Constitution and our independence'—in other words, for the dignity and moral personality of Spain. Yet Jovellanos had no illusions as to the weaknesses of the King and was supremely qualified to know the lamentable state into which the Spanish monarchy, Spanish political life and administration had fallen during the reign of Carlos IV. But he understood with the moral instinct of the true Spaniard, who often makes mistakes in secondary matters but rarely in a vital crisis, that logic is not the law of history, and the divine in man may choose strange and incongruous opportunities for its manifestation

The future must very largely depend on the personality and ideas of the Generalissimo himself. No great leader has ever been less of a figurehead.

This is not the place nor the moment to discuss his military achievements. What concerns us directly is the admirable organisation of the National territory. I have driven over many hundreds of miles of roads and found everywhere striking proof, not only of normality, a negative quantity, but of improvement. The market in Avila was teeming with buyers and sellers. The streets were clean, hundreds of

prisoners, hardly guarded, were repairing a road; the manners of the people showed a certain courtesy and dignity which, though it is traditional in Spain, had been rapidly disappearing. In León, then not more than twenty miles from the front, which has now disappeared after the victory of Gijón, building operations were in progress, painters and repairers were busy and cafés crowded.

My last memories of my flat in Madrid, in the spring of 1936, took one back to Berlin and Vienna in 1918 and 1919. Constant strikes were making life a nightmare and miserable poverty stalked the streets. Necessary repairs had to be indefinitely postponed, or undertaken single-handed by a friendly workman who more than once risked his life as a blackleg; not only man but also inanimate objects went on strike, and we had to climb twenty-one flights of stairs six times a day, as the lift had joined the strikers and the porter of the building had been threatened with death if he did not obey orders to stop the leg- and heart-saving machine. Trams were given to intermittent holidays, even if the trade unions knew nothing of an official strike, and at night bombs went off, laid down in the buildings in course of construction that surrounded us. From our balcony we saw the blaze which completely destroyed the charming baroque church of San Luis among others, set on fire by three or four professional specialists in arson, not by the people of Madrid. Franco's Government means the escape from such conditions and, so his followers devoutly hope, from the underlying cause of such symptoms: Class war.

In July the Generalissimo made some declarations in th course of an interview which deserve careful attention:

> The National movement [he said] has never been a rebellio The real rebellion is that of the so-called Government of Valen which has torn to pieces the Constitution which its supporters the selves had helped to bring into being. No army in any circumstan may rise against a Constitution or a political party because they not please it, but every army has the primary duty to defend country when it is in deadly danger. The war is a foreign The National Government refused at first all, absolutely all, of of foreign volunteers—for instance, the 6000 Irish and m thousands of Italian Blackshirts who already then tried to en ... when at the beginning of November 1936, the Reds ha

the small Madrid front alone more than 30,000 foreigners belonging to the International Brigade, which was recruited in France and other countries, with the help even of public advertisements, when French officers were constantly being taken prisoners and it became known that Russian generals were in command, there remained no valid reason why volunteers should not be accepted. Their number has always been strictly limited. If it was decided to repatriate these foreigners (and some have since been sent home), it is certain that the Reds would not allow the foreigners serving with them to leave their zone. It is well known in the Chancelleries that many of them have been deprived of their passports and have been supplied with false Spanish documents.

The General might have added, as a French Senator and ex-Minister said to me not long ago, that their repatriation is fraught with serious difficulties from other than the Spanish point of view, since Red Spain has absorbed all the most dangerous agitators in Europe, few of whom, for obvious reasons, would care to return to their country of origin. The majority would choose to remain in France; but patriotic Frenchmen think that France cannot allow herself to be used indefinitely as the *sentina gentium*.

The General continued to speak of social policy, to which, in the midst of a war which absorbs his immense energy, he yet finds time to give a very large share of his attention. Social legislation in Spain, he said, was not bad. Some of the measures that have passed into law are admirable and not in arrear of the most advanced in Europe. But their application was either non-existent or lamentable, since politicians used them as a weapon in the class struggle. This suicidal struggle must be ended in the new Spain. Strikes and lock-outs will be treasonable offences and arbitration must be made to work with the utmost efficiency.[7] A complete Statute of Work will be promulgated, which will determine the rights and duties (no right without a duty) of both the working and the capitalist classes. The aim must be to give dignity and security to the worker by applying rigorously the existing legislation and by improving it, not in a Utopian and inapplicable manner, but strictly within the possibilities of Spanish

[7] It is worth remembering that Spain was the first country in Europe to establish mixed juries of employers and workers, on July 24, 1873—*i.e.*, under the régime of the first unhappy Republic. Primo de Rivera applied the principle in a modified form with characteristic originality.

economic life. Since then the charter regulating wheat production has already been put into operation.

Political parties:

> The two important organisations which have contributed the largest number of volunteers to the war and can contribute most to the structure of a new Spain had as their aim a totalitarian State, and for this reason did not consider themselves, properly speaking, political parties, although in practice they acted as such as long as in National Spain there existed different ideologies and different organisations This is one of the reasons which made unification absolutely necessary, and this unification now achieved will be of immense value for the organisation of the new State. . . . The young sap of *Falange* will lend to this group a new manner of traditionalism and is a guarantee that we shall pursue a policy of social justice, compatible with the respect which all social classes owe to each other.

The General refers here to the merging of *Falange*, originally the Fascist body of José Antonio Primo de Rivera, son of the Dictator, with the *Comunión Tradicionalista*, the Carlists whose red-bereted volunteers, the *Requetés*, form an important part of the National army, and the *J.O.N.S.* (*Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista*) into one party, the *Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las J.O.N.S.*, which also includes some remnants of *Renovación Española*, Monarchists of Señor Goicoechea and the once important *C.E.D.A.*, the *Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas*, originally led by Señor Gil Robles, who was a Minister of the Republic. Thus by the Decree of April 18 the twenty-six points of *Falange* were incorporated in the traditionalist tendencies of the *Requetés* and the 'sole political entity of national character' was consolidated. Since then a statute has defined its organisation and laid it down that all army officers must be members.

Foreign opinion ·

> It is sad to think that while the foreign Governments know us quite well, the peoples of Europe do not, for the Reds have used their stolen treasure to organise a propaganda of lies and calumnies which stands between us and public opinion abroad.

Relations with the Church:

> They are cordial, as is natural in the case of a profoundly Catholic people After the thousands of priests and religious who

were murdered in the Red zone, the Vatican has been able to verify the destruction of nearly all the churches in the territory where the Valencia Government pretends to rule. The Vatican understands the true significance of this war.

One of General Franco's advisers said to me: 'They [the enemies of National Spain] have the League of Nations; we have the Vatican to the extent that it is right and proper.'

The future?

The first Cabinet of National Spain will be formed very soon. We have lost many highly gifted men who have been killed by the Reds or who are in prison or hiding in territory not yet liberated.

The General has frequently alluded to the Spain of Ferdinand and Isabella and the possibility of restoring 'the secular régime under which Spain's unity and greatness was achieved.' He admits the 'possibility' of a Monarchist restoration, subject to certain circumstances and conditions. He himself and some of his most distinguished advisers with whom I had the privilege of talking are by sentiments, tradition, and reasoned conviction inclined to think that a Monarchy will ultimately suit Spain better than some form of authoritarian Republic. But that day should be the final liquidation of the consequences of the war, not an immediate step to be lightly taken; a King may return as a neutral and neutralising solvent of the last remaining antagonism, not as a belligerent. The people of Britain who have twice in their history found unity in such a solution will be the first to appreciate its significance.

The new Monarchy would obviously differ profoundly from the one that fell on April 14, 1931; it would be different in substance and different in the person who would wear the crown of a pacified Spain. The King would have to act as the link between the new style [*sic*] of Spanish youth and the great tradition. Don Juan de Borbón (younger son and heir of Don Alfonso XIII., recognised by all Spanish Monarchists, including the Carlists, as the rightful candidate to the Throne), of whose talents, discretion and personal charm I have a high opinion, has tried to go to the front and offered his services as a naval officer, pleading that he should be given a commission in view of his professional training, which he received mostly in England. But I have not been able to accede to his wishes. My responsibility is great, and it is my duty not to risk

a life which some day may be precious to us. I have to consider that at present there are two groups of Spaniards engaged in war with each other, and that one of these groups is closely linked up with sinister international influences. When we shall have finished with all that, when the whole of Spain will be Spanish once more, if then some day there should be a King presiding over the State, he would have to come as a bringer of peace and must never be counted amongst the victors. . . . But now we can only think of ending the war; then of reconstructing the State on sound foundations. . . . Meanwhile, I cannot occupy a provisional position.

The Generalissimo has said that foreign Governments know the National Government well and has contrasted the knowing Governments with ignorant public opinion. Since the English Government, for one, is now acting in accordance with its knowledge, and ignorant opinion will disappear with characteristic speed and forgetfulness, every Spaniard may be more hopeful than he has been for months past. Every Spanish lover of England and English life—and there are many—will look forward to the day when Spanish bitterness, which it would be useless to deny, will have abated. This bitterness, if unreasonable, since all bitterness is unreasonable, is understandable. Thousands of Spaniards have died as a consequence of the prolongation of the war, due to the fact that the National fleet has so far not been able to blockade the eastern coast of the Peninsula.

Meanwhile, 'democratic' opinion is taking with alacrity to one more misconception, the last in this war, let us hope, the prospect of a compromise between the opposing parties—another 'Embrace of Vergara' which ended the first Carlist war in 1839. Then there could be a compromise between Espartero and Maroto, and there was room for the good offices of the English Government, approached by Lord John Hay, who was in command of the British ships near the Cantabrian coast. Now no such basis of compromise exists or can exist between the defenders of a Western European Christian Spain true to her great traditions and even the most sincere supporters (far less the professional exploiters) of some future materialistic and mechanistic Kingdom of Man. But those in command devoutly hope that no more

battles like the murderous one of Brunete, or even masterly operations like those which led to the collapse of resistance in the Asturias, will be necessary. A blockade, so long postponed for reasons well known, of the Catalan-Valencian coast may be sufficient. The Generalissimo has again and again expressed his desire to avoid useless bloodshed. But a powerful army, larger and better equipped than any that has so far been concentrated, is held in readiness if the great battle should become a tragic necessity.

To be neutral—I speak of individuals, not countries—in such a conflict is the most cowardly of all participations. Joseph-Renaud, one of the last surviving witnesses of Oscar Wilde's death, has preserved what was probably the unhappy man's last coherent thought: 'There is something worse than Injustice; that is Justice without a sword. When right is not power, it is evil'—in an ocean of frivolity perhaps the only profound thing Wilde ever said. We who have been spared the physical sufferings (though not the moral and economic ones) of civil strife remember the inscription over the entrance of the chapel of an English college which has a claim to the interest and gratitude of Spaniards: '*Tantus labor non sit cassus.*'

ANTONIO PASTOR.

PLATO'S ACADEMY

Confessio Fidei on the Occasion of the Discovery of the Ambulatory

By Pan. Aristophron

In April 1929 Pan. Aristophron, a Greek merchant, applied for leave to seek and, having found, to uncover the ancient Academy of Plato in the hope that from its ruins might spring a centre for the intellectual, as distinct from the political, activities of the whole world His ambition was, as he has told us,[1] that in such a centre representatives of the universities of the world might meet freely and apply themselves to an analysis and synthesis of the origins, nature and ideals of Man which, *idem aliter*, are common to, though differently manifested by, all races in every clime. He and his wife were convinced that the world needed, and indeed longed for, such a centre, but felt that it must be built, literally as well as in spirit, upon ancient foundations, what ground could be so fitting and what rock so sure as that on which Plato walked and talked with the young men he loved and with the older men who loved him? In such a place, as nowhere else, enduring bonds could be forged by men devoted to the pursuit of truth.

Four years later, in June 1933, Pan. Aristophron, after great expense of money and labour, discovered the Academy and the Ambulatory. Excavators, like translators, are seldom held in great honour by the world of letters; yet Pan. Aristophron has assuredly earned, like Jowett,[2] 'a kind of glory' from living for so many years in the companionship of one of the greatest of human intelligences and from having enjoyed, as the great Master of Balliol said of himself, 'in some degree, more perhaps than others,' the privilege not

[1] *Plato's Academy or The Birth of the Idea of its Discovery* (Oxford University Press, 1934, 5s)

[2] [illegible] the third edition of *The Dialogues of Plato*, p xvii.

only of helping the world to understand Plato, but of uncovering after twenty centuries the very stones of a place which is no less a magnet to lovers of truth than Zion to Jews, or Mecca to Muslims.

A prophet is not without honour save in his own country, and after the discovery of the site of the Ambulatory of Plato Pan. Aristophron was long obstructed by the many owners of the site, whose avarice compelled him in November 1934 to suspend his labours. The decision of the Government of General Metaxas, in August last, to expropriate the whole site has aroused fresh hopes that Pan. Aristophron will be allowed to accomplish his two-fold task of excavating the Academy, and of founding, upon a site which will embrace it, the *koinon*, or World Union of Universities and Academies.

Pan. Aristophron's ambition is that such a *koinon*, once incorporated, might be allowed by the Government of Greece to take over the site of Plato's Academy as its permanent centre, with as full rights of property and extra-territoriality therein as the Vatican or an embassy, and no less amply endowed and supported. The *koinon* would choose a permanent *curatorium* of the most notable professors and scientists, representative, not of countries, but of every humanistic science. Here, as nowhere else, in a climate favourable to study, in an environment and a geographical situation which will make close contact with East and West comparatively easy, the chosen ambassadors of the sciences and the arts may one day obey the admonition addressed to his contemporaries by Jer. vi. 16.

> 'State super vias, et videte, et interrogate de viis antiquis, quae sit via bona; *et ambulate in ea*, et invenietis refrigerium animabus vestris.' [3]

With this introduction we have the honour to print, for the first time in English, Pan. Aristophron's *Confessio Fidei*,[4] itself but a preliminary to the full account that will some day be written of the circumstances surrounding the discovery and excavation of the ancient Academy, a place which, so

[3] These words, quoted by Chaucer in *The Parson's Tale*, are thus translated in the Great Bible of 1539: 'Go into the streetes, consider, and make inquisicion for the old way, and if it be the goode and right waye, then goe therein, that ye may finde reste for your soules.'

[4] Printed in Greek by the University Press, Oxford, 1937.

long as men seek the light of reason for guidance, will ever be held, in the words of Festus, ' sacer et religiosus ' by reason of its associations with the greatest philosopher that the world has known.—ED.

Confessio Fidei
addressed to the Academy [5]
by Pan. Aristophron
on the Occasion of the Discovery of the Ambulatory,
June 17, 1933

O belov'd Academy, I have in truth discovered the Ambulatory!

O ye pedestals, relics of the peristyle that once enclosed this sacred Ambulatory, how vividly doth the sight of you awaken in my mind the thought of your Founder!

O pedestals of this venerable Sanctuary, which in days long past rang with the sayings of the divine Plato, with what radiance did ye reflect the dazzling effulgence of that Mission whereon every untrammelled and inquiring soul was sped!

The beating surf of the ignorance that o'erthrew the columns once raised upon you typifies the world of false values wherein Man's life is spent to-day. Yet behold despite their destruction at the hands of unworthy men, at last they reappear, now in the guise of the angel-band of the Archetypal Ideas, columns of purest ray, palisade incorruptible of this heav'n-roofed Sanctuary, wherein are enthroned Intelligence, saviour of the human race, knowledge of Final Causes and recognition of the Good!

During those dark nights of my perplexity, O Academy, I quested o'er the wide level of Truth and Reality, seeking the key to such riddles as these:

' What is this that ever is coming-to-be and suffering change and passing away?

' How does that which comes-to-be spontaneously acquire orderly arrangement into forms numerically proportioned

[5] This Confession of Faith is a fragment of the projected Account of the circumstances surrounding the discovery and excavation of the ancient Academy. The interruption consequent upon the opposition of neighbouring householders, which held up the work of excavation from the unhappy 23rd of November, 1934, onwards, must necessarily cause serious delay in the completion of the work and in the publication of the detailed Account; it has therefore been considered advisable that the Confession which is the subject of this preface should be published as a fragment of the whole for the sake of the faithful few.—The *Academy*, November 15, 1935.

according to the laws of reason and space, into finite species, into groups determined by resemblance and dissimilarity?

'How does it automatically come to manifest heterogeneity and increase, discover self-deficiencies, and equip itself with necessary means for self-preservation of the group, yet suffer corruption and dissolution through innate causes?

'How comes it to thirst for a share of intellectual light and for clear vision, to acquire perspicacious perceptiveness, attain to the expression of scientific truth and imagery, conceive and aim at projects worthy and valueless, make new departures and efforts towards swift progress, strive towards manifold self-expression and the reciprocity of friendship, gather in communities and form combinations for procreation of the species and self-perpetuation?

'How does it culminate, by way of the Universal, in the human form of Man endowed with godlike power and activity, with the hands of the craftsman and creator, with comprehension of and desire for what is noblest and best, with will and memory and articulate speech?

'How is it possessed of finiteness and infinity? Moreover, if it be not a One-in-itself, nevertheless it would seem to be a Something permanent, having potentiality of knowledge, and of progress in a predestined direction, cognate with the Ideal, endowed with attributes, capable of co-ordination and suffering.

'How is it that this which comes-to-be, though it clearly comes-to-be by the power and operation of the Idea and its potentiality—though it clearly comes-to-be by some necessity and with some definite end—yet perishes by extinction?

'How is this that comes-to-be essentially related to what is ranged above it, to what is ranged below it, to what is on the same plane? How are its elements reciprocally related? Of what nature are the entities opposed to it?

'To what end is that which comes-to-be manifested in grades and kingdoms, and moulded by intricate combinations into innumerable varieties and species, which yet suffer dissolution after a brief day? To what end is it that this comes to be such though it passes thus away?

'Can it be that this perpetual flux, in accordance with the invincible necessity of Omniscience, is conditioned by nonentity and spontaneity and chance, for no other purpose

than to serve as a nursery of evolution and of initiation, with a view to the gracious boon and unfolding of the universal comprehension of all things, the germs whereof are manifest in Man?

'That which is suffering change and decay—what relation does it bear in each of its parts towards their intercommunion? That which has perished in its journey back to the upper Realm—what lot or part has it in this communion, and what necessity constrains its elements?

'Again, that which has perished—is it truly reintegrated in freedom for self-regulating and self-purposive life? And what is to be the aim of its intelligence and striving? And how is it borne along the much-hymned way of return to its Source, and of what nature are the things that oppose it by the purposive law of Inevitability?

'How does its Source bear itself in face of that return in omniscience to the upper realm?'

Seeking to find what lies beyond the sphere of Being and Perception, in this ocean of my perplexity I was ever asking: 'What means is there of o'ertaking and capturing and questioning the surviving passenger or driver of that chariot which ever flies, or rather is whirled onward? The passenger is hastening to the same bourne as the Delphic charioteer and is whirled onward much as I myself—can one do nothing to capture and question him?

'What of the touchstone of Truth? And in her presence what is to be the bearing of the coming Man of to-morrow? Is it to be, pray, of no account, or is it to be of paramount importance, this mission of the highest of the self-manifestations of the Absolute given to the world, since in an infinitesimal moment of time it grasps alike the universal and the particular, the *summum bonum*, the inestimable, and the Divine?'

I was abandoned, a figure of ridicule, by the faint-hearts and word-spinners. . . .

I was abandoned, a figure of ridicule, by the faint-hearts and word-spinners, in the midst of a trackless maze! Thee I sought out, O Academy, as my sole refuge. I summoned to my aid the fighting-man of the swan chariot, thy priestly servitor, the divine Aristocleës, interpreter of his own reflections, to the end that as one pursuing *inter ludum seria*, like some just-freed slave who finds speed all too slow as he goes

his way, I might escape from this place of generation and corruption and, passing from tract to tract till I reached the regions of perpetual flux and participation and commingling, might there discover some stronghold whence, as from a watch-tower, I might mark the laws that control and guide thither what comes-into-being, both whole and parts; and that also I might penetrate the realm of the First Causes and of that intelligible entity in whose central depth dwells the idea-generating and irradiating fire of the Absolute.—It is told in an unfinished tale how that, intersecting this place of the intelligible entity, there is seen an axis in the form of a pillar of extended light from one extremity whereof come streaming semicircular lines of force, infinite in number, stretching down to the other extremity—[6] they resemble the pictured lines of force issuing from a magnetic rod, but are of different texture—and that of these the coalescing lines, like the cords of a balloon of immeasurable size, engirdle the spot in the manner of a ball of wool or the threads of a spindle, completing thus the dynamic field of the Whole—herein also move on their courses the celestial systems of the phenomenal world—in the central depth whereof, in like manner as at the centre of the intelligible entity, dwells the aforesaid fire of the Absolute. Furthermore, from this fire the Archetypal Ideas, the thoughts and purposive Causes of the Absolute, are mirrored abroad in the way of grace and lovingkindness, in the nouther-impregnated territory of the intelligible entity (as in the reticular membrane of the eye), and their rays, comprehending the All, stream over the field, dispersing like so many daughters of the Sun, throughout all regions of the eternal participation irradiating particles of the intelligible entity, which itself emanates from the force of the radiations of the mirrored reflection and gathers without stint upon the extremities of the pillar-like axis.

These particles, through their vibratory and other motion and the current and intertrition of their force, transform by infusion of vapour and æther the Universal Substance into

[6] Lines 110–118 are a reference to the aggregation of the Whole as presented in the *Republic* (616 B C), the definitions there given of 'extended light' and 'engirdling cords' may be compared with the familiar representation of the magnetic rod and with its lines of force and their coalescence. The lines of this figure are drawn in a manner curiously resembling that in which the Poet made his attempt in a passage of the Timæus (36 C).

tenuous cloud-like masses, which, whirled about like floating continents, now marshalled together, now ranged apart by the violence of the stresses that are generated in them, are interchanged and intermingled, and together with the masses of the bodies that have perished are, proportionately to the quality and amount of their respective forces, welded together and are metamorphosed to form new separate systems, the several bodies whereof make up the sensible Whole.

The equilibrium of heat and force proper to the material of the individual bodies, and likewise their synchronization with the vibrations of the aforesaid particles of the intelligible entity, promote, by the aid and power of the universally interweaving law of the Creator, their heterogeneity and orderly manifestation, by upward gradations, in species of widest variety whereof it is evident that man, Essential Man, is and shall be in all cosmogonies the consummation.

By the agency of man, the Absolute makes manifest to the sensible universe its own intelligence and knowledge, as also the external Ideas of the Beautiful, the True and the Good the sole purposive causes of the existence of that universe.

I will expound, in the manner of a waking vision rather than a dream, the true essence of Knowledge, concerning which I once received instruction, as thus :

'O Knowledge unblemished, reason, comprehension and pure activity of the intelligence of the complex of Being, never shall poet laud thee commensurably with thy desert !

'Thou dost by thy metaphysical speculations elicit the laws that control the All, and yet in making manifest the truth dost condescend unto particulars of least account !

'From among the infinitely many species of the universe thou hast foreordained Man to be thy perfect and chosen instrument and hast caused his godlike hands to reach forth after achievement and well-doing !

'Thou dost lavishly impart thyself to all irrespective of race, birth and creed, and dost care for the pauper, the naked, the destitute.

'Thou alone, confronted with the empty husks of imperfection and unreason, dost offer thyself as guide to a happier to-morrow.

'Thou dost purify the dark recesses of every soul, and

capturing the Keeper of the yet impregnable mansion of the human subconscious dost penetrate to the central hearth of the True; and mastering by thy way of approach both the principles and laws of the intelligible universe of Ideas dost reveal it as compounded in like manner as its physical counterpart, thus ranging thyself as a ministrant amid the divine retinue of the Demiurge!

'Thou alone through thy servants Search and Trial, through thy classifications and mechanisms, directed towards the perfection of the sensitive equipment of the human tabernacle and the profound investigation of the intelligible universe, art fain to discover its hidden purposes and all other manner of knowledge, and that "golden mean in all" is thy symbol!

'Thou dost thus purpose presently to resolve the secret of that aggregate of particles—noons and mitons—by mirroring the shadow-dance of their reflected images, and by searching into their mode of regulation to acquire the touchstone of truth, wherewith to test the corruptible universe and the incorruptible, and the invincible laws that control them in all things.

'Thou assuming the likeness of the philosopher-scientist dost reveal him as the spiritual counterpart of his complex incarnate entity, and dost show that he, acquiring self-knowledge and knowledge of the causes of what comes-to-be, is borne by way of earth, æther, and nouther as missioner of the Absolute, to the end that he may bring to completion, through new steps and upward gradations, the full revelation of all the dark places of the supersensual universe and every other hidden thing, and by guiding all men towards a single all-embracing and universal synopsis may thus secure the rendering of homage to the True and the Beautiful—this being by a fundamental principle the sole *summum bonum*, that yet almost all may share—to the glory and praise of the Absolute.

'Wherefore right justly hast thou chosen this place which knew Prometheus the Fire-bringer, this place which knew Academus and Plato, where first was heard a voice lamenting the lost Truth and Righteousness of mankind—right justly hast thou chosen this place to be thine impregnable habitation.'

That holy place have I discovered, O Academy, even

thine Ambulatory! Yea, I have discovered thee, O place of initiation into Academic mysteries, treasure-trove of this day of marvel! I have found thee, O venerable Sanctuary of Intelligence and Knowledge, Freehold and Stronghold, Spiritual Hearth and Eternal Fatherland of all inquiring souls! I recognize thee by every token, by every inference, as though I had passed my life without intermission lapped on thy bosom.

Wherefore I come forward in your midst, O luminant columns of this sacred Ambulatory, and in presence of the sacred vases that once adorned thy architrave, whereof these ruined pedestals are the holy symbol, here make confession of my unshaken faith in the Universe of the eternal Ideas which control the All! I come hither in the company of my wife, my sole life-partner. I do not hanker for some cataclystic change, for an Elysian pleasaunce, for divine draughts of universal blessings. No dilettante scientist I, searching for First Causes: no querulous critic of the world of phenomena! But I come forward as a faithful follower of the divine Plato, the celebrant of the supreme ceremony of initiation to the Good, and as a partaker of that spiritual Grace whereby the Absolute, in this venerable place, like the corporeal Sun disseminates 'as an act of grace and sacrifice' its own Intelligence and Force in furtherance of the general perfection of the human race and its participation in the Knowledge of the service of the great Truths and in the Vision of the irresistible beauty of the Good.

And do thou, O sweetest of days, no less preeminent in joyfulness than that wherein first a smile appeared on man's lips, be thou the shining witness of what has come to pass and the recording Muse of the attendant Singer.

PAN. ARISTOPHRON.

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4. *American Journal of Archaeology*, xxxvii. (1933), p 491, Plates LIV. and LVI.
5. *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, liii. (1933), 272 6. *Ib*, liv (1934), 188.[*]
7. *Πρακτικὰ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας Ἀθηνῶν*, viii (1933), 243 ff (by P. ARISTOPHRON).

[*] On p 189 there is mention of the marble block with the names of Charmides, Ariston, Axiochos and Crito.

CONSIDERATIONS ON THE ETHICS OF IMPERIALISM

I.

By J. S. Barnes

The vast majority of British people are exceedingly proud of their Empire. Nevertheless, it is curious to note that the adjective *Imperialist* has earned an evil connotation in the minds of great numbers of English people to-day, especially among that powerful '*intelligentsia*' who 'adorn' the universities, the civil services, the Bar, the literary and artistic coteries, and a large portion of the Press. It is interesting to ask why this is so. The explanation, in my opinion, is three-fold.

In the first place, it is characteristic of English people to avoid thinking things out and to be especially averse from looking unpleasant facts in the face. Yet they have a very shrewd instinct for the realities of a situation, and instinctively adapt themselves to it. The awareness and the adaptation being instinctive rather than intuitive, the mental process is subconscious rather than conscious. The expression in words of the process is consequently indicative of the reality rather than descriptive of it; and the reality of which the British to-day are instinctively aware, but are afraid consciously to name, is their national decadence.

Now, there is no doubt at all that in the not very distant future the British Empire is fated to meet a crisis from which it is not likely to recover without grave loss. The present programme of rearmament is a desperate effort to re-establish lost positions. When the programme is completed there may be a dangerous moment for the peace of Europe, because many influential English people will instinctively feel that the only chance of saving the Empire is by a successful war. The danger, however, is likely to pass, because the country

is not morally prepared for war, and the risks of defeat would be great. The decline will then steadily set in again, and only a revolution would have any chance of stopping it —an event not to be expected, because the decline is not likely to be so rapid at first as to cause grave disorder or grave suffering, and because a true revolution means a moral change of which there are at present no signs of growth whatever. A purely political or economic revolution would probably not suffice to save the situation.

Between twenty and thirty years hence the population of Great Britain will begin to fall at an alarming speed. At present only seven females enter the child-bearing age (sixteen to forty-eight) for every ten who leave it each year. If this rate is maintained and the present birth rate remains constant, it means that within the space of a generation the population will drop by 30 per cent. The tendency, however, is for the birth rate actually to diminish still further. The average age of the population is in any case increasing year by year. A time will therefore soon come when the death rate will begin to rise again; and, since the fundamental causes of the fall in population are being accentuated rather than removed (urbanisation, proletarianisation, the spread of knowledge regarding birth control coupled with the increasing abandonment of universal objective moral standards), there is every probability that, by the census of 1971, the population of Great Britain will have fallen to below 35,000,000—perhaps to nearer 30,000,000. After that date the decline is likely to become disastrous. In any case, it will be very difficult for a people in these conditions to maintain an empire, scattered all over the world like the British Empire, difficult and expensive to defend, and in many parts, as in India, ripe for revolt.

The populations of the self-governing Dominions—Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and Canada—are also showing signs of stagnation. Canada's population is increasing chiefly by American emigration and by the still large excess of births over deaths among the French Catholics, who do not feel the same sentimental ties which the British settlers feel for the metropolis. The destiny of Canada is indeed bound up with the United States, not with the British Empire. Her interest is to take advantage of her sheltered

position in the North American continent and to refrain from burdening herself with the task of assisting the mother country to maintain the rest of the Empire. Great Britain cannot therefore rely on the Dominions to help her out of her difficulties. They are destined to remain either too insignificant, demographically speaking, to be of much help or else, for all intents and purposes, to secede.

As for India, things are boiling up there for a very serious crisis indeed. The Indian masses are awakening very rapidly. Communism is spreading. In fifteen to twenty years' time the situation in India will have become very dangerous. The trade union movement will have become organised, as well as the agrarian. Both will be animated by communistic and nationalist ideals. With a population of 400,000,000, an awakened India, determined to be rid of British rule, will be well-nigh irresistible. Nor will the British be able for long to rely on the loyalty of the Moslem section of the population. Nationalism is gaining ground also among the Moslems. The latter are losing their faith in the privileged friendship of the British since the introduction of democratic forms of government, which in many provinces places them at the mercy of the Hindus. Nationalism is on the rise in neighbouring Moslem countries—in Afghanistan, Persia, Turkey and Arabia; and Nationalism is contagious. Even now the repercussions of the Palestine troubles are being felt in India. Russia is abetting both the national ideals of the Moslems in India and the spread of Communism. Already there is talk of the creation of an independent State in the North-West of India which would comprise all those provinces possessing a Moslem majority—namely, Baluchistan, the Punjab, the North-West Frontier Province, Kashmir and Sind, all merged with Afghanistan and with access to the Sea at Karachi. Afghanistan is in process of modernising herself and of building up a respectable army. She is in alliance with Persia. That she cherishes the ambition to expand in conjunction with the Moslem provinces of India is unquestionable; and if, at an opportune moment—when the rest of India is in revolt (say twenty years hence)—she elects to stake her ambitions on the result of a war, she will have a very fair chance of success. The North-West Frontier tribes would rise to a man on her side and the British would

not be able to rely on the Moslem troops, which are her best troops. Russia, moreover, would be at Afghanistan's elbow, supplying her with arms, technical advisers and volunteers—for Russia, whatever form of government she will have in twenty years' time, is not going to change her aims, which are, as ever, to reach the warm seas ; and her new technique is far more formidable than her old ways. More and more is she regarding herself as a Central Asiatic Power, less concerned with her Far Eastern and Western ambitions than with her southern. But she has given up the idea of conquering Persia and Afghanistan and North-West India. She looks forward rather to embracing these countries in confederation and thus to reach the warm seas, not in contrast with the ambitions of the countries which lie across her path, but in harmony with them.

Great Britain's economic situation is also by no means promising. The present boom is temporary and is sure to be followed by a slump soon after the rearmament programme is completed. Unemployment, which even in the present boom is greater than 1,400,000 without counting 1,000,000 others, unemployable, in receipt of poor relief, will rise again. The fall in the population will not mean the absorption of the unemployed, for it will mean a shrinking in consumption and smaller production for the home market. Costs will rise and greater resort be had to machine production. The burden of maintaining the unemployed will have to be spread on fewer shoulders. Overseas trade is also destined to shrink, because for technical reasons, as well as for reasons of defence, foreign countries are becoming more industrialised and self-sufficient. The spread of self-sufficiency will also have its repercussions on Indian economy. India has now to export some £35,000,000 to £40,000,000 worth of merchandise or treasure annually in excess of her imports in order to be able to find the foreign currency required to pay the interest on loans and dividends on British capital sunk in the country. But she can only hope to continue to do this by expanding her British market through reciprocal preferential tariffs. When, however, the fall in the population of Great Britain becomes accentuated, Great Britain will not be able to absorb the same quantity of Indian goods. This will produce a monetary crisis in India and the freezing of British assets.

To sum up: things look very black for Great Britain in the long view. Nor is the picture brightened by the steadily increasing figures of suicides, broken marriages, lunacy and mental defectives. There is also the growing power of Japan to be reckoned with—hungry for land and with an empty continent (Australia) within reach—and probably also of a regenerate China, swiftly modernising herself with Japanese technical assistance. Nearer home both Italy and Germany will within twenty-five years reach the zenith of their demographic increase with populations of over 50,000,000 and 75,000,000 respectively. The economic and financial situation of both these countries, who are already Powers of the first magnitude, enjoying a magnificent morale and sense of unity, will be greatly improved. Great Britain's decline will therefore be not only absolute but relative to the situation in which other great Powers give promise to finding themselves.

Many people in England are instinctively aware of the plight into which their Empire is drifting and are instinctively adapting their minds, by decrying Imperialism, to the forthcoming inevitable retreat—from glory. It is an example of the fable of the Fox and Sour Grapes.

Another reason for the widespread decrying of Imperialism in England to-day is a matter of policy, coupled with the well-known English national defect of self-righteous hypocrisy. The spread of pacifism and the pursuit of collective security is due to the same cause: an awareness that the defence of the Empire is becoming an increasingly difficult problem and the hope that others may be induced in the name of Peace to help Great Britain to maintain indefinitely the *statu quo* from fear of a general war. To pose as a tamed lion ready to lie down with the lamb, to pretend that the Empire is an unfortunate reality due to a past age which has now been succeeded by a more enlightened one, and to excuse her refusal to give it up on the grounds that this would mean handing it over to less worthy imperialist Powers and so betraying her trust—all this is quite sound policy for a Power which is feeling the effects of old age and is no longer sure of itself. It is also quite good propaganda. It appeals to all the soft sentimentality of people all the world over corrupted by the 'immortal principles' of humanitarian

and parliamentary democracy; and it is especially effective when backed behind the scenes by financial pressure. Defeatist and lying propaganda, backed by big finance, is an art which has been notably developed of recent years in London as well as in Moscow.

Finally, the English of the twentieth century are rightly ashamed of much that was done in the nineteenth century, the century of utilitarianism, of unregulated individualism, of competitive capitalism—the century in which the Empire reached its apotheosis. They realise that their Imperialism has been largely a matter of commercial and financial exploitation of the weak by the strong. Their consciences genuinely prick them on this account. Moreover, English people have very little historical sense, logical sense, or imagination. They understand very little of anything except what they can touch or see. They are essentially empiricists. The only Imperialism they know anything about is their own, and therefore, in the face of a guilty conscience about much of their own Imperial achievements, they pass from the particular to the general and are inclined nowadays to propound the theory that all Imperialism is a wicked thing.

This is not hypocrisy, but muddled thinking. Imperialism is a law of life. Imperial expansion in one way or another is the fatal necessity of every people who are full of a great vitality and creative energies. The will to power, to grow wealthy, to influence and guide events, to set the tone of culture, to be the object of honour and respect, is the natural prerogative of every individual and of every people. Because it is a law of life—in fact, a manifestation of life and a measure of its exuberance—it is as admirable as life itself. The spectacle of a man of humble origin who succeeds in rising to a great position is not one to deplore but to encourage. The same is true of peoples and nations. If there is anything to deplore, it is only the abuse or misuse of means and of power once attained. Imperialism is therefore not to be condemned as such, but to be judged by its achievements. If the achievements are, on balance, good (for nothing is perfect), a given Imperialism is justified. If not, it deserves to be destroyed.

It is a reflection on the British achievement that so many English people have come to the conclusion that Imperialism

is inherently wicked. They have forgotten the example of Rome, to which the modern world owes almost everything, directly or indirectly. They do not realise—partly because they are still themselves the victims of doctrinaire Liberalism and of its economic counterpart, Capitalism—that the empires of the twentieth century will be very different from the empires of the nineteenth century. They have not yet faced the fact that the twentieth century is going to be the century of Fascism and that Fascism is the revival under modern conditions of the beneficent spirit of Rome. Those few who do realise this fact are apt to react against it. For the predominant culture of Great Britain is Protestant and therefore traditionally anti-Rome. This, indeed, is the main trouble at the back of Anglo-Italian relations. Englishmen are instinctively aghast that the Rome which they thought dead has risen again.

The key to understanding British Imperialism lies in the biggest fact of British history—namely, that for 1000 years Great Britain was Catholic and that for not yet 400 years has she been Protestant. Her culture is accordingly only Protestant above ground. Its roots are Catholic. Her Imperialism is therefore a blend of two traditions: the Carthaginian, as I like to call it, or Protestant tradition—the Roman or Catholic.

There is no reason for the English people to be ashamed of their Empire. If only they possessed the vitality for a moral revolution, meaning a return to their Roman origins, they could reform their Empire and make it the glorious thing it promised to be. Unfortunately, this vitality, as I have attempted to show, appears to be lacking; and the great majority of the British people, who are proud of their Empire, are really only proud of their power. That is not enough, for the British Empire needs reforming—not in the way it is being reformed at present, by a succession of surrenders to agitation, but by strong and sympathetic rule, directed to improve the lot of the masses and to nourish them with something besides bread alone.

The record of British administration all the world over is an admirable one—a truly Roman one, honest and efficient.

The rule of law has been introduced everywhere, and equality before the law. The people have been rescued from the arbitrary rule of self-indulgent or bloodthirsty tyrants. Justice and fair play have been made open to all. Opportunity to rise from the lowest rung on the social ladder to the highest has been secured for all in a measure previously unknown. The example of character, devotion to duty, fearlessness and hard, conscientious work, has been magnificently displayed for the edification of millions. This is something to be proud of indeed; and young imperialist nations like Italy have plenty to learn, not only from British experience, but also from British example.

There is, however, another side to the picture—the Carthaginian side, which is due to the unregulated individualism which was introduced by the Protestant culture and reached its climax during the past century when the British Empire was systematised. Even in the self-governing Dominions colonisation has been mainly capitalistic—that is to say, the aim of the agricultural settler has been not so much to settle permanently on the land but to make his fortune, sell his land, and retire. This is the exact opposite of the Roman tradition, which sets use above profit. The Carthaginian is a Semite and worships mammon. Protestantism is like unto it and in many ways can be shown to be a kind of neo-Judæism, founded on the Old Testament rather than on the New.

During the nineteenth century it was considered economic heresy to interfere with the interplay of individual interests pursuing wealth. It was considered political heresy for Governments to engage in economic and social activities unless invited to do so by a strong demand from some quarter. The result of these theories was to circumscribe and severely limit the excellent intentions of the civil servants of the British Empire who, recruited for the most part from among the younger sons of an aristocracy descended from the Normans and educated on the classics, were imbued with genuine Roman traditions. Their work was done well. Their sins were sins of omission rather than of commission. While they freed the peoples of the Empire from the tyranny of corrupt and arbitrary rule, they allowed them to be delivered over to the tyranny of the capitalist or the rapacious

landlord. In India, for example, the village industries came to be destroyed by industrialism, with the result that the peasant's lot is now economically worse than before the advent of British rule. He has lost part of his traditional means of livelihood, prices for him have risen, and he has become the prey of the moneylender. Debt pursues him and his heirs to the grave. Little has been done for him because he was unorganised and inarticulate. His voice was unable to formulate any compelling demand on the Government for action, which accordingly left him to his fate. Famine relief and medical assistance in times of epidemic were accorded to him, but very little else.

Organised capital was articulate enough. It demanded railways and arterial roads, the right to finance irrigation and other great public works (but always on a strictly commercial, profit-making basis), ports, telephones, and modern equipment of every description. The Government accepted these demands and India has consequently been equipped with all kinds of magnificent and up-to-date plant. This has made the country's resources accessible and brought about numberless indirect benefits. It has helped the great majority of the people to increase in numbers without the previous periodical scourges of famine which kept numbers down to within the margin of subsistence. But the effect has been less to improve the lot of the masses than to improve the opportunity of the capitalists, British first and later Indian. Terrible slums have consequently been allowed to grow up in the great industrialised cities, and the vast majority of Indians remain under-paid and under-fed, ignorant, badly housed, filthy, diseased and subservient.

Similarly, education was afforded with a view to creating a middle class of clerks with a knowledge of English to staff the offices of the bureaucracy and the great English commercial and industrial houses. Little was done, however, for genuine culture. Indian craftsmanship has waned, India's artistic life has withered. Little has been done either to revive the great traditions of Indian art and philosophy or to introduce European culture as distinct from European mechanical technique. Lord Curzon was one of the few Viceroys who cared sufficiently for culture to leave his mark in this field. He rescued the decaying monuments of India's past civilisa-

tion, restored them and saw to it that they would be preserved. But there is little else to show in this respect within British India to-day. There are no great collections of art, there is no live theatre, no music. There is not an orchestra in all India capable of playing a Beethoven symphony passably well. There is, indeed, no artistic life whatever beyond that in the Indian tradition which is fostered by a handful of enlightened maharajahs. India has become a cultural desert despite 150 years of British rule.

The Protestant tradition is also responsible for the segregation of the conquered from the conquerors, and consequently for the growth of racial hatred. The English have not sought to make friends with educated Indians, many of whom are as good as any European. There has been no attempt to assimilate Indian culture, no attempt to understand the Indian soul. The bureaucracy has become more and more complicated, aloof and inhuman. The great Indian poet Tagore has aptly likened it 'to those American patent foods which the human hand has never touched'—pure and uncorrupt, but soulless. Nothing has therefore been done to create an Imperial patriotism. There are plenty of Indians who feel loyalty towards individual Englishmen, whom they have learnt to respect for their clean lives, integrity and fair-mindedness; but there is no sign of any growth of Imperial loyalty or sense of a common destiny with Britain. On the contrary, the sentiment of the country is centrifugal. It aspires to complete separation from Britain at the earliest opportunity. Yet if Britain leaves India, the lot of the Indian will be worse than ever. Internecine strife, the sacking of cities, rape and murder, economic disaster and disunity will follow inevitably.

The same desire to be rid of British rule is universal among the peoples of other countries conquered by Britain—Ireland, Malta, Cyprus, Palestine, Egypt, Ceylon, Burma. They all tell the same tale. Only in some parts of Polynesia and negro Africa are the benefits of British rule positively appreciated—probably owing to the fact that these peoples are so primitive that the white man is still something of a god for them.

Italy is still an imperial Power in infancy. But the difference between the Roman and Carthaginian, the Catholic

and the Protestant ideas of empire can be seen in comparin
Rhodes with Cyprus. The Roman spirit is limited in Cypru
to the efficient and just administration bestowed for the pa
sixty years by the British officials. But the Carthaginia
spirit is exemplified there by the continued primitive stat
of the agriculture, the destruction of the forests, the poc
facilities for education, the decay of the ancient monument
the absence of governmental initiative to develop the islan
the lack of all intercourse (beyond the bare formalitie
between the Greeks and the British. As *The Times* has state
in a recent leading article, 'It is no credit to fifty years c
British rule that in 1933 the Cypriot peasantry were eatin
weeds and owed something like £2,000,000 to the mone
lender.'

In Rhodes, on the other hand, the Italians have alread
(a matter of fifteen years' work only) created a terrestri
paradise. Agriculture has been improved, model farms an
travelling agricultural chairs created; forests have bee
protected and reafforestation pushed forward; school
including facilities for higher and technical education, hav
been multiplied; the ancient monuments have been restored
local industries have been fostered; magnificent roads an
hotels have been built; pure water supply, irrigation an
hygiene have been introduced. At the same time Greek
and Italians of the same class meet socially on an equ
footing and interchange ideas. Already there is a movemer
among the Greeks towards a sense of imperial loyalty; an
even those Greeks who are still passionately desirous c
eventual union with Greece are appreciative of the benefi
of Italian rule. One prominent Greek irredentist confesse
to me that 'when the Dodecanese comes to be united wit
Greece, ours will be—thanks to the Italians—the most prc
gressive area in the whole kingdom.'

Roman rule insists on respect for authority. Carthaginia
rule is more tolerant of disloyalties and the outward expre
sion of political opinion. It prides itself on this liberal spiri
But it is doubtful to what extent the subject races benef
from it. It merely invites rebellion, and then there is onl
the alternative of surrender or ruthless repression. Th
introduction of democratic and parliamentary reforms i
India are entirely unsuited to the country. They will lea

to much corruption and a costlier administration, when precious money is needed for social reform. All that can be said in favour of these changes is that they have made the demand for social reform articulate and brought British and Indian into closer contact with each other. But under Roman rule it is not necessary to create the cumbrous and corrupt institutions of parliamentary democracy in order to bring about these beneficial results; for Roman rule aims spontaneously at assimilation and social uplift; and in its Catholic tradition it makes for that human intercourse which is indispensable for a permanent association between the conquerors and the conquered. The essence of Roman Imperialism is architectural—the dream of building something both permanent and beautiful.

It is perfectly true that there would be few, if any, architects, if the profession of architect was not also a means of livelihood. But it would be wholly false to assert on this account that the main motive of an architect is gain. Architects look forward to securing their fees, but their work is inspired by an artistic aim. Similarly, an expanding country is undoubtedly spurred on to expand by her needs and her desires for wealth and place. But there is no reason why her main ambitions should not be inspired, similar to the true architect's, by a desire to build up a civilisation which will be good in the sight of both God and man, and on that account endure in its influence for ever afterwards.

This is the spirit animating Fascist Italy. Rhodes and Libya already afford examples of the new type of twentieth-century empire, which is destined to take the place of the nineteenth-century type. For the latter there is no future. It must either reform or disappear without leaving behind it a trace. I dare prophesy that in twenty-five years' time the results achieved in Ethiopia under that great Roman, Marshal Graziani, will have restored the good name of Imperialism. *Imperialist*, thanks to Italy, will no longer be an adjective of opprobrium even among the British '*intelligentsia*.'

J. S. BARNES.

CONSIDERATIONS ON THE ETHICS OF IMPERIALISM

II.

AN ANSWER TO MR. J. S. BARNES

By RICHARD ACLAND, M.P.

I FIND it difficult to reply to Mr. J. S. Barnes' article, for the words chosen are designed to obscure, rather than to reveal, the true concepts which the author has in mind; and over and over again when one extracts the true concepts from the well-sounding phrases they seem to me to be remote from the realities of the situation, and to ignore other parallel or alternative conceptions. May I give a few examples of what I mean?

I propose to put the fourth paragraph into clear and accurate language. It sounds quite good as it stands, but this is what I understand Mr. Barnes to mean: 'As our rearmament programme advances, there will come a moment when we shall be strong enough to pick a quarrel and declare war (on somebody or other), but we will not have the courage to do it; so the decline will set in again, unless some "moral" revolution occurs in the meantime which turns us into the sort of people who will declare war whenever we think the moment has arrived when we could kill foreigners quicker than foreigners could kill us.' I can only say, 'May God save us from Mr. Barnes and his like!'

In the next paragraph we are told that the population is going to fall. No reference is made to the fact that this will happen, at or at about the same time, in every Western European nation, and that German and Italian population boosting have been ineffective.

In the next paragraph we are told that Canada will 'refrain from burdening herself with the task of assisting . . . to maintain the rest of the Empire,' and that the other Dominions

are destined, 'for all intents and purposes, to secede.' But is Canada burdening herself to-day? Great Britain burdens herself; witness the annual expenditure, for example, on capital construction works in the Colonies. But where is the burden of Empire in the Canadian budget? I understand 'seceding'; but what does 'for all intents and purposes' mean? Does it mean that the Dominions will secede except for the purposes of receiving Governors-General chosen (sometimes) by His Majesty's Government, and of appealing (when they chose) to the Privy Council? If so, the Dominions have 'for all intents and purposes' seceded already.

We are told that in fifteen or twenty years' time Indian trade unionism will be organised and India determined to throw off British rule. Mr. Barnes apparently demands that we shall exterminate or permanently imprison every Indian engaged on the work of organisation. I can think of no more certain means of guaranteeing a revolution that would drive India to despair, and us out of India.

If the reader cannot continue the cross-examination of Mr. J. S. Barnes in detail, I beg him to believe that I only refrain because I have something more important to say.

His article is not an argument in favour of Fascism; it is not an argument at all. It is a piece of mental wandering up and down over the whole face of the British Empire in a manner nicely calculated to leave the reader with a strong pro-Fascist bias in his mind. As such, it is typical of contemporary propaganda of British Fascists from Sir Oswald Mosley downwards. In order that the reader may be inoculated against this form of attack, it is essential to isolate the two fundamental ideas underlying the whole of Mr. Barnes' case and to examine them on the broadest possible lines before considering their application to the Empire. The fundamental ideas are these:

(1) Fascism, or Roman rule, is necessary, in order to establish 'Authority' against 'Disloyalty.'

(2) Fascist Authority is necessary in order to safeguard the community against the disasters of 'Liberal' Capitalism.

'Roman rule,' says Mr. Barnes, 'insists on respect for Authority. Carthaginian rule is more tolerant of Disloyalty.' But surely the point is, whose authority and whose disloyalty? Would Mr. Barnes have been prepared to support Lord Snowden if he had decided that in 1930 he would not tolerate the disloyalty of those who dared to advocate Protection while a Free Trade Chancellor was in authority? I doubt it; and I fear that Mr. Barnes really means that we ought to respect the authority of those who agree with him, and put down the disloyalty of those who do not.

'Little has been done [for the Indian peasant] because he is unorganised and inarticulate.' Shall we, then, adopt Roman or Fascist rule and give the Indian peasant those rights of free organisation and unfettered articulation which are now enjoyed by Italian or German workers? 'No,' says Mr. Barnes, that is unnecessary, because 'Roman rule aims spontaneously at assimilation and social uplift.'

There, I think, we have the core of the Fascist case. If, in relation to the business of government, the ordinary people are allowed to know, to think, to discuss, to organise and to vote, then, according to the Fascist claim, they make the most hideous mistakes and government becomes a slow, inefficient and ineffective process. Therefore, let us cut out all knowledge and thought, all democratic machinery, and let us have a dictator who can do what he likes, with us and for us. Only in that way can you have a government free from the trammels of democratic folly, free to pursue that policy which will promote the material well-being of the people, and to feed them 'with something besides bread alone.'[1]

This, then, is the case I have to meet, and I see at once why it is that Mr. J. S. Barnes has to take his case to the Colonies for its contemporary application. There are two reasons:

1. When dealing with the natives of the Colonies, the right to think can be made to seem wholly unimportant—material well-being can be presented more easily as the sum total of human needs.

2. In relation to the Colonies, and to them only, it cannot

[1] I quote this from Mr J. S Barnes, but I think he has got it wrong. The correct quotation is 'something besides *butter* alone.'

yet be *proved* that Fascist rule has *failed* to produce even material well-being.

Mr. Barnes may praise the results in Rhodes if he likes. He will not persuade me willingly to adopt a system of government which has reduced the standard of life all over Germany and Italy.

I shall not go further into the question of standard of life, because had Fascism maintained, or even improved, the standard of living in Germany or Italy, my case would not be affected. I insist that there are other things in human life besides material well-being. Oddly enough, Mr. Barnes agrees with me. 'Something other than bread,' he says, and 'aims at social uplift.' I would prefer to say that the ultimate aim of humanity is the ennoblement of man, to which participation in government, based on free knowledge, free discussion and free thought, is vital. If we are to be treated like sheep—fed by a benevolent shepherd whose decisions we may never challenge—we shall one day fall to their mental level.[2] I cannot believe that Mr. Barnes would really feel that he was living a full or a dignified human life if he had to live under a dictator of whose whole policy he disapproved, and who forbade him ever to express his opinions, even if that dictator did supply him with an adequate standard of living.

If Fascism kills all political thought and knowledge, what does it put in their place? Where and what is this 'social uplift' which Roman rule spontaneously provides?

> 'I get only mediocre effects because I was expecting enormous explosions whereas the little Abyssinian homes give no satisfaction to anyone bombing them. The incendiary bombs give satisfaction, at any rate one sees the fire. We set fire to the wooded hills and the little villages; it was all most diverting. I began throwing bombs by hand. It was most amusing. A big "zariba" was not easy to hit. I had to aim carefully. The wretches inside, seeing their roof burning, jumped out and ran like mad.'

This is Bruno Mussolini on his Abyssinian exploits in *Volli Sulle Ambe*, now *recommended to all Italian schools.*[3]

[2] My argument holds good even if the 'shepherd' is benevolent and wise. When, as is more often the case, he is not, my argument is doubly effective.

[3] Quoted from a letter in the *New Statesman and Nation*, October 23, 1937. In the book the passages I have quoted are not consecutive.

Let us look at one or two other aspects of Fascism. Is it or is it not an accident that the three Powers inspired by the Roman spirit are also the three Powers which cannot be trusted to observe any treaty to which they have put their name? Incidentally, if Britain, France, Czecho-Slovakia and Russia all took Mr. Barnes' advice and went Fascist to-morrow, is it suggested that German and Italian '*Macht Politik*' would come to an end? Of course not. We would then have seven nations instead of three playing at this 'glorious' game of international lawlessness.

Does Mr. J. S. Barnes agree with Dr. Goebbels, who says, 'Important is, not who is right, but who wins'? Is any system of justice possible when the courts are instructed to mete out punishment 'according to "healthy" public sentiment'—in other words, according to the whim of the magistrate? What happens to history when Fascists rewrite it so that the man who 'volunteered and died for his country is no longer a hero if his mother, or his wife, who mourn him is a Jew.' What happens to the science of medicine when it can be seriously published that 'hereditary cancer is the conflict of races in the human body'?[4] Are a people being accorded the dignity of men, or are they being treated as cattle, when their Government dare not let them know that a Russian aeroplane has flown over the North Pole?

It may be that Mr. J. S. Barnes is right when he says that the twentieth century will be the century of Fascism. If so, it will not be through the decadence of the British people, but through the decadence of the present Conservative Government. And in such an event, the twentieth century will witness a return to human barbarism, human ignorance, human brutality and injustice, human lying and human treachery. From such a degradation we may be certain that humanity will rescue itself some day through the most bloody revolution in all history. This is poor comfort for those of us who have to live in the world to-day.

I now come to Mr. J. S. Barnes' second argument—that Fascism is necessary in order to oppose 'Liberal Capitalism.' How has it become possible for Fascist propagandists to put

[4] The points in this and the last paragraph are taken from a splendid pamphlet, *We or They*, by Hamilton Armstrong, published by Macmillans of New York, and now I believe, in this country also.

across this superb piece of political distortion? The story works itself out in seven stages:

(1) Capitalists want to make bigger profits.
(2) Simultaneously all over the world they demand protection.
(3) To their surprise—but not to the surprise of a Liberal—this produces lower and not higher profits.
(4) This 'proves' that the Communists were right in saying that Capitalism could not exist without beating down the standards of the workers, and the bosses thereupon decide that they must be beaten down.
(5) They therefore finance the propaganda of some Fascist party.
(6) To justify its failures, as the standard of living falls, Fascism must conduct propaganda campaigns against (*a*) the Jews, and/or (*b*) the foreigners. Huge rearmament (reviving a temporary and bogus business prosperity), followed by military adventures against weaker Powers, becomes necessary.
(7) Finally, money is required, and there is now no remaining source, except the pockets of the industrialists, who find, to their surprise, that their own creature has grown too strong for them. Hence the Italian capital levy.

It is this last stage of the Fascist journey which is enabling British Fascists to pretend that Fascism is the friend of working men.

And now, at last, I can turn to the British Empire, to which Mr. Barnes devoted the greater part of his article. It will be found that my conceptions are very different from his. He desires that Imperial policy shall be directed to the 'glorification of Britannia.' He would apparently be ready to sacrifice great numbers of British people to this 'glorification of Britannia'[5]; and if a lot of foreigners were killed in the process as well, he would be even happier. I hold other views. I am not concerned with 'glory.' I hope that we shall pursue that Imperial policy which will contribute most to the creation of those conditions in which the individual

[5] In fairness to Mr. Barnes, I put on record my confidence that he would be perfectly willing to sacrifice his own life too.

citizen, whether of this country or of any other, will have the best chance of living in peace and liberty without the gnawing fear that he may be called upon to have his insides shot out for Mr. J. S. Barnes and Glory. I therefore say that it is first of all essential to preserve the Empire (not as such, but the Empire as a part of the civilised world) from the threat of highway robbery. This threat will be made by the Fascist Powers at no distant date, and, if things go on as they are now, they will be able to back this threat with overwhelming military and strategic force.

Let it be quite clearly realised that we cannot defeat the Fascist menace out of our own resources. It is quite enough to remember that we nearly lost the last war with Italy and Japan on our side, with Spain friendly and neutral, with America on our side at the last, and an economic ally from the start, with no submarine base west of Zeebrugge, and with the air menace in its infancy. No efforts we may make in the realm of rearmament will save us if we have to meet in isolation the combined strength of Germany, Italy, and Japan—particularly if the whole of the colonial possessions of Spain are open to them as air and submarine bases. And it is quite certain that we shall not be able to persuade any nation in the world to fight for the British Empire, unless we are prepared to make some corresponding offer to them. Therefore, contemporary Liberalism still insists that we must put ourselves at the head of a group of nations pledged to defend international justice as such. Any nation may belong to the group, whatever its past record, so long as it will keep the rules.

What are the rules? The nations of the group must make concerted plans in advance by which they pledge themselves to render to each other every possible form of assistance if any is attacked. Each nation makes to some others, but not to all others, a pledge of immediate military support. Britain and France make mutual pledges of this kind to each other, and they take steps in advance to decide in detail precisely how these pledges are to be brought into operation in practice. Russia gives a similar pledge to Czecho-Slovakia. But all pledge to each other unlimited economic and financial support, and all pledge themselves to break off every sort of economic and financial relation with the aggressor. Lastly—

and this is the most essential pledge of all—each lets it be known beyond any doubt that if the aggressor threatens to shoot his way out of this economic boycott all will stand firm and will resist force with force.

Liberals do not advance these proposals because they think it would be an easy matter to obtain such a group of nations so pledged, nor do they think that the creation of such a group would give the world an absolutely certain guarantee of permanent peace. They make these proposals because in the present state of the world they see no other proposals which do not quite inevitably lead to the complete destruction of civilisation (including the British Empire) at a not distant date. It comes to this—either the nations of the world will pool their resources in a collective determination to resist international lawlessness now, or, in the course of the next few years, they will be swallowed up by international lawlessness separately.

I suspect that even if an archangel should give Mr. Barnes an absolute guarantee that this policy would permanently preserve the peace of the world and the safety of the Empire, he would none the less reject it; because to co-operate with foreigners is not sufficiently glorious.

But while we co-operate with others to show the world that both our territory and theirs shall be permanently closed to highway robbery, we are bound, at the same time, to make it clear that our territory is not permanently closed to reason. Does this obligation not fall equally upon the other colonial Powers? Yes, it does, of course, but it rests more heavily on Great Britain because we happen to rule a far greater Colonial Empire than does any other nation. The Dominions, of course, settle their own policy, and the most we can do is to advise. But we can and we must make it clear forthwith that it is not our intention to develop the Colonial Empire as our own private garden. We can throw it open economically, by reverting to the policy of the 'open door' to all nations. In practice, the policy of good sense and of justice would be to revert to that policy only in favour of those nations which were co-operating sincerely in the development of the mutually defensive group. I am aware that economically the effect of this step would not be considerable. Morally it would be vitally important, and it would become

more so if we made it clear that it was not only the trade of other nations that we would welcome, but also that we would give every possible assistance to foreign nationals, in proper circumstances, to settle in our Colonies. These things would demonstrate the initiation of a Colonial policy deliberately designed to make the existence of the human race on this planet tolerable in the future.

My only point of agreement with Mr. J. S. Barnes is where he says that in some cases we have not done enough to promote the well-being of subject races. But I deny him his right to suggest that this is due to the triumph of Liberal Capitalism over Roman administration. The ideal of developing the Empire for the benefit of the native races has been essentially the Liberal ideal. This ideal has not in all cases triumphed because it has too often succumbed to another ideal—namely, the ideal of developing the Empire for the profits either of the home country or of the white population which chooses to settle in the Empire. This ideal has been the ideal of Lord Beaverbrook and of some of the 'diehard' Tories. I am glad to think that it is not the ideal of most of the Conservative Party

There is to me only one hope for the native races in our Empire, or in any other empire, and that is that the Liberal ideal shall triumph. May I take a concrete example? If Fascism is to be introduced into Kenya to 'save' the native from Capitalism, by whom will this Fascism be administered? By a political committee of the white settlers and planters, I rather suspect. Surely the one hope of the Kenya natives is that through the triumph of the Liberal idealism of the best of the whites, in Kenya and at home, the Kenya natives may be gradually led towards an effective share in self-government. It will be difficult; there will be mistakes, it will be a long process. But it is the only hope of the coloured peoples.

Does Mr. J. S. Barnes seriously suggest that the opposite policy should be pursued? Has he thought out what this means? 'Insist on respect for authority' sounds so big and warm. Does Mr. Barnes realise what it means in practice? Does he mean that we shall now announce to the world that never shall we allow the native peoples of the Empire a share in their self-government? Does he mean that for

that purpose, from now onwards, all over the Empire, we shall systematically shoot or imprison anyone who dares to say, or to write, that our administration is misguided, unfair, or inefficient? If he does, can anyone think of any policy which would more certainly entail the loss of our Empire, through rivers of blood, long before the end of Mr. J. S. Barnes' Fascist twentieth century?

When equal economic and trading opportunities in colonial empires have been given to nationals of all States co-operating in the mutually defensive group; when the group has established its authority, and, through its authority, has brought about a general reduction in, and an international control over, armaments; when it has been firmly established that the well-being of native populations, to be achieved through their gradual education towards self-government, is the aim of all Colonial policy, then there would seem to be no reason why we should not transfer to others, or co-operate with others in, the task of administering part at any rate of our Colonial Empire. One might also hope that other colonial Powers would be prepared to pursue a similar policy.

This, however, raises very large issues, none of which arises immediately, and I doubt if I would be competent to deal with them quite apart from all questions of space. I have answered Mr. J. S. Barnes.

RICHARD ACLAND.

A SPECIAL AREA—AND SARDINE TINS

By William Nunn

There is a part of England which, although familiar to almost every Englishman, is yet unknown. The Londoner, pack on back, his pale knees, or hers, exposed for a brief fortnight to the strange sun, and the forthright Mancunian, bent on being 'the life of the party,' with his boisterous bonhomie and his jettisoned beer bottles, know nothing of the real life of the people who live in West Cumberland, that area which lies between the sea and the wonderful hills, fells, and lakes of Lakeland. Most of the visitors to Cumberland come in holiday spirit to enjoy the natural beauty of the county, to seek health and change of scene. There are comparatively few who realise that sea, hill, and fell frame an area in which the struggle for existence is desperately hard.

Early in 1933 two members of the Department of Economics and Commerce of Manchester University published a Report upon the area. It was a depressing document, its effect heightened by the incontestability of many of its statements. Its authors started by putting their fingers on the main fact--that

> The region has shown no tendency at all towards that diversification of industry which is the only method by which an area with declining staple industries can maintain its importance It continues to lean largely upon those industries which, it will generally be agreed, must continue to employ decreasing numbers of workpeople in this country.

Diversification of industry is not a feature of the area. Coal mining, iron and steel manufacture, and iron-ore mining are the activities upon which the prosperity of the area mainly depends. Its remaining important industry, agriculture, is materially affected by the condition of the others.

The general impression conveyed by the Report was that

the 'native' industries of the area either had declined or were declining owing to causes arising out of economic conditions, and that there was little hope of substantial improvement. It was emphasised that geographically the area is unfortunately situated, that it is more or less isolated from the great industrial consuming districts, and that its sea and land transport facilities are poor. Expansion of the coal trade, it was pointed out, had been adversely affected by the restriction of the export market; the pig-iron industry had been hit by the economic slump and hampered by expensive transport; and the steel industry, using the Bessemer process, had been beaten by the competition of the open-hearth method used elsewhere. But the most depressing section of the Report dealt with the prospects of the iron-ore mining industry, which had, according to the authors, practically no hope of revival, the mines being exhausted and there being, apparently, little chance of the development of new fields. The conclusions of the Report were substantially confirmed by Mr. J. C. C. Davidson (now Lord Davidson), who made an investigation into the state of the area later in the year, at the instance of the Government.

Both Reports tended to convey the impression that West Cumberland's hopes for the future lay in the development of new industries, although neither explained how the transport difficulties which had affected the old industries would not affect the new. Stress was laid upon the desirability of encouraging land-settlement schemes, although, again, no attempt was made to show where the markets would be found. Probably none of the reporters had the thought, or, if they had, had dismissed it as wildly impractical, of suggesting that the only hope of success for their proposals lay in the drastic levelling out of transport charges, as the Post Office levels out the cost of letter-carrying. There were, however, people who had some knowledge of the area who believed that the iron-ore industry was one of the basic facts of the situation, and that activity in that industry would assist the coal, pig-iron, and steel industries. It was true that, unless the iron and steel concerns could sell their products, the iron-ore miners must work short time or close down. But in 1933 it was evident to anyone with ordinary political [illegible] that iron and steel were likely to be heavy require-

ments in the not far distant future. Through the smoke-screen of politics could be seen the inevitable rearmament of the country.

The Government was urged to take steps which would make it possible for the iron-ore industry to meet the call. Suggestions were made that the industry should be encouraged to keep its hold by being helped by central pumping schemes (one mine was actually meeting a charge of *2s. 6d.* a ton for pumping alone), by being assisted to secure better freight charges, by being relieved of the expense of surveying and testing new fields, by having established a compulsory quota of usage of British ore in British steel, and, finally, by being given financial assistance for the continuance of production and the banking of the ore upon the surface. The iron and steel industries received very substantial aid from tariffs; the iron-ore industry was left unaided to fight the competition of cheap foreign ore, carried mainly in foreign ships.

To-day, owing largely to rearmament, the pig-iron and steel concerns are flourishing and in such dire need of raw material that the Government is asking the general community to bring out its scrap—its old bedsteads, kettles, bicycles, and even sardine tins. In the little township of Cleator Moor, which is entirely a mining community, 62 per cent. of the men were workless in 1933. Had they been assisted to keep their employment there might have been on the surface an available supply, not of sardine tins, but of the highest quality iron-ore.

In 1933 the Reports suggested that fresh deposits of ore were unlikely to be found; to-day a company is seeking powers to let down half the township of Cleator Moor so that they may work the ore which lies close beneath the surface. They may get their powers; but five valuable years have been lost since the Government was informed on sound authority of the existence of this deposit—years which the men of Cleator Moor have spent in impoverishment, living upon the 'dole' at the public expense.

According to the financial columns of *The Times*, six million tons of iron-ore were imported into the country in 1936. Probably nearly half of that amount was hæmatite iron-ore. An out-turn of two million tons would keep every employable hæmatite miner in West Cumberland fully

employed, and there would be no unemployment problem left in the mining area.

In the meantime, a hard-working Special Commissioner and an energetic body of men forming a Development Committee are scratching about trying to attract new industries to an area which is 'off the map,' groups of men have been set on small holdings, and the Forestry Commissioners have been instructed to blanket the scenery of Lakeland with conifers so that unemployment may be relieved. Some success appears to be likely to attend the efforts to establish new industries, but if and when they come they can do little to affect the main problem. Small holdings at the public expense must necessarily have but a problematical chance of success when hard-working and life-experienced men find that it is barely possible to wrest more than a mean existence out of a holding, and are doomed to certain failure if no action is taken to maintain markets in the area. If the main industries are not flourishing there can be no markets. And the efforts of the Forestry Commissioners have, so far, resulted in the displacement of sheep, farmers and shepherds, and the employment of a smaller number of men, not from the industrial unemployed, at low rates of wages, and in many instances for only about half the year. The afforestation areas are inaccessible to the industrial unemployed. All this is merely toying with the problem. The plain fact is that the rehabilitation of the iron-ore mining industry would clear the lower half of West Cumberland of its unemployment. The country is in desperate need of raw material for the production of iron and steel. But, so far, in spite of the repeated statements of the case made since the year 1932, the Government has rendered no assistance except by receiving deputations, listening politely, and making vague and futile gestures.

Perhaps it was too much to expect that two or three years before rearmament became publicly a Government policy the political leaders should have had the leisure or inclination to consider a matter so comparatively trifling as the plight of a small community of miners in remote Cumberland. It may have been that some of those leaders foresaw that steel would be required in enormous quantities and have remembered that steel is not a raw product; if they had that vision, they

probably thought that the great steel concerns were quite capable of finding their own supplies in the future as they had done in the past. It would not occur to them to connect the political situation in Spain, and the war-cloud gathering darkly over that country, with the question of the supply of raw material for the manufacture of steel. But the Department of Mines was aware of the facts, or should have been if it had given heed to the representations made. A great deal of time had been occupied in forcing those facts upon its attention. The War Department, and the Admiralty too, had been invited to consider the question. Every member of the Government, and, indeed, every member of Parliament in the Government ranks, had received the 'case.' The subject had been raised in the House on several occasion. It was aired at the Conservative Conference in 1935.

In all this time, had there been no intercommunication between department and department? Is it possible that in a matter so vital as the supply of an essential raw material it was no one's business to plan ahead? If it is true that the leaders have no time to think, were there no advisers more leisured to whom the question could have been delegated? Or, as seems likely, have the Government been wrongly advised? Whatever may be the answers to these questions, one fact is indisputable: nothing has been done officially to make it possible for West Cumberland to produce more ore from its known mines or to seek out new deposits. But an appeal has been made for sardine tins.

WILLIAM NUNN.

THE PLACE OF 'PLANNING' IN A DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT

By Sir Daniel Hall

Since the world war was fought 'to make the world safe for democracy' we have become familiar with the negation of that principle, actual as well as theoretical. We perhaps dismiss the denunciations of Mussolini and Hitler and their apologists as attempts to provide a facade for the autocracies they respectively have created, while the Communists excuse the tyranny they exercise as a temporary necessity until their own 'one class' interpretation of democracy has consolidated its power. But even in England we find a vigorous trend of public opinion decrying the democratic basis of government, attributing to it all the maladjustments of the administration and professing a longing, however platonic, for the advent of the 'strong man.' Such a point of view is too general to be treated as negligible: it may easily lead to a false step in our history; it will be wise to examine its sources and consider how to meet whatever is valid in the criticism.

It is not enough to reaffirm our faith in democracy or to say that the British people are essentially democratic; of late years we have seen too many examples of how a nation may be stampeded into an autocracy that is cloaked by intensive propaganda and protected by force from all expression of dissentient opinion. 'Democracy' is a word that has become almost meaningless; no modern State is democratic in the original sense of the word; the mere weight of numbers and size makes it impossible that every citizen can participate in the government. Regarded *en masse*, the citizens are becoming passive recipients of government that is in the hands of a relatively small administrative class; the real question is how and by whom those officials shall be controlled. Even in [illegible] anyone whose experience runs back into the

last century must be conscious how weakened has become the expression of public opinion and how little the public is told under a managed Press and a B.B.C. constrained to put a smooth, comfortable face on things. We shall get closer to the problem if we forgo the discussion of first principles and concentrate our attention, not so much on an undefined democracy, as upon the system of parliamentary government that we have practised for the last 300 years.

Without doubt that system is creaking in its joints and requires readjustment to the changed conditions of the world. Substantially Parliament as a machine of government is the same as it emerged from the revolution of 1688. The franchise has been enlarged to add to the difficulties, the seat of power has shifted from a landed aristocracy to a widely diffused commercial plutocracy, but the House of Commons still remains a reasonably representative body of men who in most cases have experience of administration and are in that sense experts in government. But in what follows the word 'expert' will be restricted to men who possess technical familiarity with some branch of industry or science, as distinct from administrative capacity. A man may control a great steel firm with success and yet possess no fundamental knowledge of steel-making.

In its turn, the Cabinet does not consist of experts, but of men who have been picked out by their judgment in affairs and for the influence they can command. Their essential justification is that they have been chosen among their fellows for those indefinable qualities that command confidence. The machinery of administration was systematised, purified and given a notable degree of efficiency in the mid-nineteenth century, but, like Parliament and the Cabinet, it is non-technical, marked by judgment and common-sense and, happily, free from a desire to engross power. The members of our Civil Service and of its extensions in the municipal services are still citizens rather than bureaucrats.

This machinery of government was efficient under the conditions that prevailed during the nineteenth century, when the guiding principle was to avoid interference with industry and the functions of the departments of State were regulatory and not constructive—confined to such matters as police, public health, education and social services. But conditions

have changed through the increasing pace of industrial discovery and the growth of organisations possessed of resources that almost enable them to speak on equal terms to Governments. High finance, the great industrial combinations with international linkages, the concentration of the popular Press in a few hands, with its control of national propaganda, are all creations of the last half-century that can shake Governments and modify their action. Willingly or not, Governments are now forced to take a hand in industry, and their departments have to administer constructive instead of merely regulatory policies. It is in this respect that our machinery is becoming inadequate. What is the substance in the complaints of the younger and more active-minded people of to-day that is rendering them impatient of our representative government and is turning them on the one hand towards Fascism and on the other towards Communism? They are exasperated by the slowness of governmental action and look for the strong man who will get things done. For nine years Waterloo Bridge hung broken-winged across the Thames, a staring reproach in the very heart of the Empire to our inability to take a decision. Perhaps, again, the solution eventually adopted was determined as much by pique and political jealousy as by the considered needs of the situation. This is a trivial example, but it illustrates what forces of opposition can be organised against any action. The critics urge that Parliament is only responsive to popular pressure, that the only measures to be introduced are those which can command an emotional appeal, and that matters of vital importance to the nation are ignored because they are without a slogan. Men feel that vested interests receive undue consideration because of the skill with which they can work up an outcry; short views and inefficient compromises alone prevail.

Whatever may be the feelings of the man in the street towards the Duce's Government, he recognises that it has made the city of Rome worthy of its ancient glory, that it has in a short time carried through great schemes of amelioration of the land and of public health, and that it has introduced a new standard of efficiency into Italian life. This, indeed, is the crux—efficiency. One may have every sympathy with the view that the best-governed State is the one in which the

Government least interferes and that the mark of a civilised people is its capacity of conducting its life with the least amount of law and direction, but the world has become bitterly competitive, and there is a necessity upon Governments to become efficient. So the problem before democracy, and particularly before our form of parliamentary government, is how to ensure the necessary degree of efficiency—how, in fact, to introduce 'planning' into its administrative machinery.

'Planning,' however, is not to be understood as that drive of the whole machinery of government to set the nation on a new track, such as the 'Five-Years Plan' of the Soviet or the 'Four-Years Plan' of Germany. Few Englishmen believe that an autocratic Government can organise a nation to meet the manifold complexity of human life, though it might degrade it into an ant or bee community. The word is here used for that degree of foresight in the conduct of public affairs that will take long views, that will anticipate the effect of material progress on the social organism and will concern itself with matters affecting the welfare of the people but which exercise little popular appeal and pass unheeded in the political struggle. The world is changing too rapidly in certain directions to allow the whole of wisdom to be summed up in 'Wait and see' or to justify us in trusting to improvisation when the occasion arrives.

The conception of planning is by no means ignored in our system; the Electricity Board is an example, and the legislation of the last six years affecting agriculture is potentially far-reaching in its effect, though it has by no means been developed to its logical conclusion. These are, however, but partial schemes, and are open to the criticism that their bearing upon other schemes of development may not have been considered. It has been urged, for example, that the Electricity Board should have had a wider reference and should have been a Power Board, which would have embraced the production and distribution of gas and coal as well as of electricity. Our planning is defective in that our schemes are usually piecemeal, without provision for the consideration of their place in the national economy as a whole.

It is necessary to trace in some detail the procedure by which a measure is prepared for submission to Parliament. The initiative rests with the Minister and his department:

he need for legislation may have been put to the Minister by he Cabinet; it may be his own idea or it may be submitted o the Minister by his department, perhaps in response to ›ressure from outside interests. But, on the Minister giving nstructions, his department will provide him with a critical liscussion of the subject, proposals upon which legislation nay be based, and estimates of their cost. The Minister lecides upon the line of action to be taken and requests the Treasury to instruct the parliamentary draftsmen to confer with the legal advisers of the department and prepare a draft Bill. This may involve prolonged and confidential discussion vith the representatives of the interests affected, and with the Treasury on the financial aspects, before a final draft is reached. This then goes before a Committee of the Cabinet, and finally, vith a brief memorandum from the Minister, before the Cabinet itself, by whom it may be referred back to the Cabinet Committee and to the department. When approved, the lepartment has still to put it before the whips in order to scertain when parliamentary time can be found for it. Nor s this reference a mere matter of form, for the whips have a vely appreciation of the tactical value of a Bill. All conentious legislation will be judged as a party asset or otherwise, and the sort of measure which may be of great public tility but will attract little support to balance some determined sectional opposition will receive a very cold reception. t will be evident that at no stage does the measure receive an ndependent technical review, nor may it obtain any conideration of its impact upon elements in the community that re not ostensibly affected. Such criticism can only come from nembers of the Cabinet, all of whom are busy men, rarely ossessed of any special knowledge of the subject, and on eneral principles indisposed to interfere with another Minister's affairs, except from the political point of view.

On the technical side the department's view goes pretty vell without question, though it may easily occur that the pinion of such technical men as are within the department ave been overruled and ignored by the chief administrative fficers who have the preparation of the measure. It is not nknown that a technical officer may be instructed to state a ase and give evidence in direct opposition to his own opinion; called on, his business is to support the office policy. Since

all questions turn upon finance, the Treasury officials may have put forward alternative proposals of their own; to what extent they do so is largely a matter of the nature of the measure and the accidental familiarity of the particular official with it, and he can easily be overridden by a determined Minister. Nor when the Bill reaches the House is there any security that it will receive technical examination. In committee all elements of opposition will find expression, for more than one member is certain to be briefed by someone among his constituents. It is the social and political aspects of the Bill that will be discussed, even if Mr. Birrell's remark be true that the chief change he had noticed in his time in the House of Commons had been the substitution of second-reading speeches for real committee work.

These considerations apply not only to new legislation but to many activities of a department or public board, which may possess a general sanction for the purpose, though the concrete proposal may have to come before the House, perhaps to lie on the table for a stated number of days. The most notable illustrations are supplied by proposals for the compulsory acquisition of land. The department makes its plans—naturally enough, from its own point of view; the actual choice may be the work of an officer whose opinion, without further inquiry, is successively endorsed as it passes up the office. When the proposal is made known there may be considerable public opposition; but, however vocal, it is rarely very pertinent, because the protesters have not access to all the material facts, and rarely can organise an inquiry to state an alternative case. The department's *amour propre* is aroused, as it is in the nature of services and departments to resent outside criticism; it has committed itself to a scheme, and, rather than reconsider it from the starting-point, it digs in to support its own officer. If the opposition is active enough, questions may be asked in Parliament and the matter may be raised in the Cabinet. Then the Minister is briefed in support of his case; few of the other Ministers have any technical views of the question, and in any case are not disposed to question the responsibility of a Minister for his own job. If the outcry is loud enough, if it can touch some sympathetic chord in public opinion, the Minister may be advised to find an alternative. Of recent years we have

seen popular protest cause the abandonment of proposals to make bombing-grounds of some of the open country still left in England and to erect a munitions factory near Maidenhead; but these decisions reflect only the volume of opposition aroused, and not informed criticism of the proposal in all its aspects. The Air Ministry continues to select the best agricultural land in the district; the Metropolitan Water Board, in order to construct a reservoir, is evicting the leading market gardener in Britain—a centre of illumination for a vital industry—without a protest from the Ministry of Agriculture. Nor does any blame attach to the Ministry; it may have regretted the loss of land, but it had no title to interfere with plans for the national defence, nor had it an answer should the Water Board state that it could not take the responsibility for the supply of London water unless it obtained the particular piece of land it had selected. The Ministry was not in a position to suggest alternative sites, still less to raise the wider question of whether the Thames basin water, above and below ground, is not being drawn upon to excess. Similarly, it would seem to have been no one's business to consider the new munition factories in relation to the distressed areas.

Instances of this kind might be multiplied; they are merely examples which serve to reveal three weaknesses in our departmental system of administration, if planning is to become a function of government. These are the lack of technical advice from the best expert opinion available in the country, the lack of co-ordination and combined action among departments, and the absence of any organised thinking body which can take an initiative in submitting to the Government schemes of far-reaching importance to the future of the nation, though to the ordinary man they may seem to have little immediate urgency.

The members of the Cabinet are not experts, but are busy men, preoccupied with many cares; their function is to supply the broad-man-of-the-world judgment, to take decisions and to ensure action on them. Where the path is clear they can act with effect, as may be seen from the way the rearmament scheme has been pushed along. But in the main they are not initiators; as politicians they are impelled to deal with matters as they arise, to satisfy rather than create

public opinion. It may be objected that this does not do justice to the large volume of valuable legislation that has been put on the Statute-book ever since the war; but analysis will show that this has been almost wholly of a political and social nature, and has little to do with the planning that is required by the increasing pace of scientific and industrial change. The initiative of the departments is in practice restricted by other motives; even within the ambit of a department its head may be conscious of desirable reforms that he rules out of consideration. As one of them said, 'My first business is to keep my Minister out of trouble'; and it may be objected that some of them try to anticipate the political opportunism that is the Minister's prerogative. Moreover, the technical officers the departments include can rarely be men of such authority as to have opportunity of putting forward plans for long-term development; as a rule they are fully engaged in specific services.

It is indeed on this question of expertism that our administration is weak, partly because our Civil Service took its shape when there was little need for technical advice, since the State took no constructive part in industry, partly because of the traditional distrust of experts among our men of affairs. But times have changed; experts have become necessary in all walks of life; it is for the man of affairs to learn how to use them. The usual procedure by which the Government has obtained information prior to legislation has been the appointment of a Royal Commission or Departmental Committee. Without decrying the valuable work that has often been done in this way, the method is undoubtedly cumbrous, and, while well adapted to sound public opinion and to thresh out the details of departmental regulations, it is perhaps best applicable to questions of social reform, and it is lacking in the element of initiative which is essential to planning. Too often a Royal Commission is regarded as a convenient way of shelving a troublesome question.

To some extent, however, of recent years successive Governments have begun to recognise the need for technical advice, and to this end have set up such bodies as the Development Commission, the Medical Research Council, the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, and the Agricultural Research Council. The three Research Councils

are responsible to the Lord President of the Council; each possesses an administrative staff and controls considerable funds for the promotion of research, which in some cases is carried out by officers of the Council. It is in dispute to what extent the Councils are executive; constitutionally they only recommend: it is the Lord President who takes action through the officers attached to each Council. But in practice, subject to normal Treasury review and the concurrence of departments who may be affected, they possess executive autonomy.

The Councils are composed of men of distinction in the cognate sciences, together with a minority of men more directly engaged in the profession or industry. The members of the Council are nominated by the Lord President, in certain cases in consultation with the President of the Royal Society; they serve for a short term of years and receive an honorarium. The Research Councils are available for consultation by the Government, but, as the reference to them is restricted to research, a department is under no obligation to consult them when contemplating legislation, however technical, and therefore liable to be affected by research, the subject may be.

These are specialist organisations dealing only with research; but there is one other body with a wider reference, the Economic Advisory Council, which replaces a former Committee of Civil Research. The Economic Advisory Council possesses a dubious status in the administration: in the books of reference it finds a place under the Privy Council; but its members were in the first instance nominated by the Prime Minister, by whom it may be consulted on any matters of public interest, and to whom, of its own initiative, it may submit recommendations.

In these bodies may be seen the nucleus of an organisation that could exercise the function of planning within our normal machinery of government. The Economic Advisory Council, with its wide reference but undefined function, should be replaced by a Planning Council, which, strengthened in personnel and provided with a technical staff, would be linked with the three Research Councils and organised to meet regularly. It must remain an advisory body to the Cabinet, officered only for purposes of inquiry, in no wise impairing the final authority of the Cabinet or the responsi-

bility of Ministers for executive action. Its members should be men eminent in the industrial, commercial and financial world, together with men of science and economists, all essentially technical men nominated for a period, say, of five years. As considerable time will be required from them, they should be paid a reasonable honorarium, and the provision should, when required, include salaries for deputies so as to allow professional members to have half their time free for the service of the Council. It is well known that men in academic positions have of late years been unduly indented upon by Government, to the detriment of their official duties; and as the work of this Council is to be of prime importance to the State, men should not be called upon to do it in a way that over-taxes their strength and impairs the efficiency of the university and other bodies to which they are attached. On the other hand, such experts should not become whole-time officers, withdrawn from active participation in their industry or subject of research. Appointments should be for five-year periods, with a limited power of reappointment, perhaps after one year's retirement from the Council. It is essential that the Council should obtain the services of some of the younger men without withdrawing them permanently from their profession. Since the Council itself could not embrace experts in all the subjects with which it will be called upon to deal, it would have the power to nominate special committees, as the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research now does; indeed, the three Research Councils would, in effect, be standing committees co-operating with the new Council.

The immediate function of the Council would be to advise the Cabinet or the departments on any question submitted to it. But departments of their own motion would not welcome the interference of any third party, and the Cabinet itself, which consists of non-technical men and is always working under pressure, would often be unconscious that the scheme before it may require review on the technical side and may have reactions on some other branch of the national economy. To this end every department and public authority, before submitting a proposal to Parliament that has any technical aspect or involves the acquisition of land (thus affecting the industry of agriculture), should lay its measure before the Council, which will prepare a report

thereon for the Cabinet. This should not be taken as in any way impairing the authority and the responsibility of any Minister; it is strictly on all fours with the financial consideration by the Treasury which every measure has to undergo. The object is to secure a technical as well as a financial review of all measures, a review that will often be more informed than can be supplied by the experts attached to the department, and in particular will be seized of other interests than the purely departmental.

Further, the most important function of the Council will be the exercise of its own powers of initiative in planning, irrespective of matters specifically remitted to it. No one can meet with the great industrialists and men of science of the day without becoming aware that they have at the back of their minds many far-reaching conceptions whereby the material wealth, the health, and the spiritual life of the community could be enriched. There may be crude and formless ideas about which their originators waste little time in order to check up the relevant facts, since in the present state of our society and our administration they see little chance of putting them into practice. But they know that these ideas are imminent and can only be ignored at the risk of their irrupting dangerously through the crust of our civilisation. The thinkers deplore, not so much the inertia of our system, knowing, as engineers, the value of inertia in smoothing out fluctuations in the application of power, but its preoccupation with the catch-words and trivialities of the day. Such men are in no sense revolutionaries, but they are very conscious that material change is going on so rapidly that society must be prepared with adjustments to meet it, and they are afraid of the desire, so manifest in English life to-day, to look backwards to some golden age—pre-war, Victorian, or even Augustan.

The purpose of the Council is to give such men the opportunity of putting forward their ideas, of obtaining the criticism of men of their own sort in all walks of life, and of securing the collection of the relevant data, prior to the formulation of a plan of action. This, if approved, would go forward to the Cabinet and to the consideration of the departments involved, who would normally become the agencies to carry it into effect. It will be seen that the Council

proposed will be almost wholly concerned with matters upon which the modern developments of science have a bearing—with industry and commerce and their reactions upon the general welfare of the community, with agriculture, public health, housing and population, to some extent with finance and education. But its power of initiative would not mean freedom to make incursions into the wide fields of politics, foreign affairs, national finance, and local administration. The plain man may apprehend busibodiness; the safeguard is that the Council would be composed of men of exceptional quality and experience, fully conscious of the responsibility resting upon them.

The proposed Council would be in no sense a technocracy; it will possess no power of action nor publicity: its function is to advise and plan, and it is for the Government of the day to use its advice and schemes in so far as it judges them to be fit and practicable. The Council thus would not conflict with the essentially English belief in the judgment of the plain man, but it does provide a means of supplying the plain men charged with government with the services of the experts who are playing such an increasing part in the shaping of the modern world.

The aim is to furnish our representative Government—democracy, if you will—with the arms enjoyed by current Fascist and Communist Governments. In the British system there is no place for an organisation on the scale of 'Gosplan'; but the stage is smaller, and the human material has already advanced far along the road up which 'Gosplan' is leading. None the less, if our system of government is to survive in competition, it must not deny the intellectual preparations for action that 'Gosplan' provides.

The question remains of whereabouts in the structure of administration the Council shall be placed. It must be given some departmental status and be represented by a Minister; as an advisory body attached only to the Cabinet it would be ignored and eventually cease to function. One method would be to give it a place in the Treasury, since the body has to exercise a financial review of every measure, and does in practice extend its powers to make criticisms of a technical nature, however much the department in question may deny its competence to do so. But it is

probably wise to keep separate the financial and the technical review, since the Treasury must endeavour to subordinate all considerations to the financial. Indeed, financial review is only effective when it stands upon its own ground and is not confused with other issues. Again, the Treasury possesses no initiative other than in finance, and its representatives in the Cabinet have other concerns: the Prime Minister does not burden himself with departmental affairs, and the Chancellor is fully occupied with the Budget and national finance.

The proper place for the proposed Council would be with the Privy Council, where it would be associated with the three Research Councils through whom it would often have to work. It would be represented in the Cabinet by the Lord President—a Minister of sufficient status and detachment from routine departmental business to secure due consideration for the work the Council could do. Indeed, as 'planning' grew into part of the normal policy of Government, the Lord President would become one of the most important Ministers in the hierarchy. A Minister is essential, otherwise the best planned schemes may fade out for want of a backer, as so many recommendations of Royal Commissions have done.

This is of necessity a brief and inconclusive outline of a great matter. The argument could be reinforced by many instances of hitches and mistakes due to lack of co-ordination, of which those who are familiar with government during the last generation are aware. But the case goes much further; our administrative machinery is falling behind the needs of the modern world, and Parliament has little time and inclination to inquire into its repair. Yet if it is not made efficient there is real danger that the principle itself of representative government will be threatened; democracy must become as efficient as its competitors. We deplore the tyranny of the efficiency test; but this is a competitive world for nations as well as individuals, and we have to think how we can secure our position without sacrificing our liberty.

A. D. HALL.

PALESTINE IN NOVEMBER

By ARTHUR MERTON

THE 'firm hand,' for which all who understand local psychology have long been clamouring, is at last being applied in Palestine. As in Egypt thirteen years previously, it has required the brutal assassination of a prominent and universally respected British official to bring home the need for action which, taken eighteen months earlier, would have avoided the loss of many valuable lives.

The swift, resolute and shrewd measures adopted by Mr. Battershill, the Officer Administering Government, after the murder of Mr. Andrews, undoubtedly prevented organised reaction on any scale to the deportation of the henchmen of the Mufti and to the latter's deposition from the presidency of the Supreme Moslem Council and of the Higher Wakfs Committee. The acts of violence, which synchronised with the Mufti's escape from the Haram Esh-Sherif, where he had sought sanctuary, were intended as a signal for sympathetic action in neighbouring Arab lands. No such action has followed, however, and Hag Amin El Husseini, whom the French have segregated as a political refugee to prevent his stirring up trouble at Damascus, has given bitter expression to his deception.

The resignation of the High Commissioner, Sir Arthur Wauchope, had been generally expected, though the cause is much regretted. To his courtesy, his sincere desire to do the right thing, his generosity, all pay tribute, while the courage and devotion which he displayed in the face of extraordinary difficulties are readily acknowledged. But it cannot be disguised that he misjudged the situation in April 1936, and to that extent he must accept responsibility for what has followed.

One might have thought that the Mufti would have lost

caste by running away. But in many quarters his prestige has risen on the ground that he has outwitted the British. The continuation of his influence must, however, depend on whether he is able to further the cause while in exile. Of his ability to do anything practical in this direction there is much doubt.

That acts of terrorism should continue is not to be wondered at in the light of past history. But with the maintenance of a firm hand they should gradually become more rare. Money is necessary, and funds must be running dry. The Government has taken over the Wakfs, while close supervision is being exercised over the frontiers and the banks to prevent financial assistance from abroad. The terrorists are no longer welcomed by the villagers. But until they feel that there is a strong Government to protect them against reprisals they will naturally continue to 'cover' the terrorists. Meanwhile, the Commission which the British Government proposed to send out to negotiate with the Arabs and the Jews with regard to the partition and advise on the division of the country has been held up. The Colonial Secretary has announced that it will not leave until the reign of law is restored. In itself this threat is not likely to be very effective, since neither side in Palestine favours partition. It would seem better to despatch the Commission without delay.

The Report of the Permanent Mandates Commission, on which the Council's decision authorising this new Commission was based, is an admirable document. But to understand something of the real mind of the Permanent Mandates Commission it is necessary to read the minutes of its twenty-nine meetings. Clearly it had no wish to hamper the efforts to find a solution made by the Mandatory Power, whose concern for nearly twenty years 'to appease the antagonistic feelings prevailing in Palestine must awaken in any man of goodwill a degree of admiration all the higher in that it was exercised in a world in which ruthless violence often stills the voice of humanity.' But equally clearly it has little enthusiasm for the solution proposed.

In spite of the eloquence of the Colonial Secretary, to which the vice-chairman, Mr. Rappard, paid the tribute that it 'went far to explain the electoral fidelity of Mr. Ormsby

Gore's constituency,' the Commission obviously did not share his optimism that 'a solution could be found which would receive sufficient assent from both Arabs and Jews to enable a solution on the lines of partition to become practical politics.'

In the course of his explanations the Colonial Secretary made the interesting statement that when Sir Arthur Wauchope came home just after the return of the Royal Commission, he reported to him: 'Nobody recognises more clearly than I do that my efforts at conciliation have failed and that we must have a new policy.' One would hazard a guess that no one was more surprised than Sir Arthur when he learned that the Royal Commission favoured 'partition.' In the sense in which he spoke, he clearly envisaged, not a radical change like partition, but a change in treatment as opposed to 'conciliation'—something of the nature of that 'determined purpose and resolute government' which Professor Temperley[1] considers the British Government should show in its execution of the scheme proposed by the Royal Commission, but which might equally well, and possibly with greater success, be applied in continuing the mandatory form of government. I agree with Colonel Wedgwood[2] that 'the Mandate can still be carried through to peace and not to war; and our good name can yet be saved.' But it would have to be an amended Mandate.

When the Colonial Secretary was asked whether the proposed States would fulfil the conditions laid down by the Council for the termination of a Mandate, he replied that 'he was quite confident that the Jews would be able to establish a settled Government and an Administration capable of maintaining the regular operation of essential Government services.' The question, he said, was debatable in connexion with the Arab State, though Arabs who had served in the Administration had shown themselves quite good administrators. It is instructive to note, however, that in its recommendation to the Council, the Mandates Commission stated it was 'opposed to the idea of the immediate creation of two new independent States,' and considered 'that a prolongation of the period of political apprenticeship constituted by the Mandate would be absolutely essential both to the new Arab and to the new Jewish States,' in the form either of provisional

[1] *Vide The Nineteenth Century*, August 1937 [2] *Ib.*, September 1937

cantonisation or of two separate mandates. Incidentally, thoughtful members of the Jewish community in Palestine doubt whether the governors of a Jewish State would be able to control the Labour element which at present dominates local Jewry. They fear that it might assume a socialistic, even a communistic, character, which is the last thing that we want at this point.

That Jews and Arabs hate one another is, as Colonel Wedgwood says, a 'misconception.' In any case, one should distinguish between Jews and Zionists, between Jews who were in Palestine before the British occupation and those who have come in since. As the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Wacyf Ghali Pasha, reminded the Council, in an address the brilliance of which surprised no one who knows this erudite son of a distinguished Prime Minister, Arabs and Jews have lived side by side in perfect harmony for centuries. All of us who knew Palestine before and during the war were aware of the remarkably friendly terms existing between the Arabs and the then Jewish colonists. The boisterous, arrogant, domineering ways of the Central European immigrants, and the 'land garb' of their women-folk—to none of which have the Arabs been accustomed—have greatly contributed to the antagonism that has arisen. But the main provocation has been immigration, which the Zionists want to intensify so as to assure themselves against a feared Arab onslaught and in which the Arabs see a menace to their numerical predominance. As Professor Temperley says, nothing could have had a more provocative effect on the Arabs (or, he might have added, have played more into the hands of the interested politicians) than the steady increase in authorised immigration and the official condonation of illicit immigration which have marked the past five years.

It is an illuminating fact that the old colonists look with disfavour upon the Zionist settlers. Certain elements among the latter actually resent the increase in the flow of immigration and they apprehend the formation of a Jewish State. They foresee that immigration is bound to expand beyond 'economic absorptive capacity,' because a Jewish State will be unable to withstand the pressure from without in this respect, as has been possible under the Mandate.

The Permanent Mandates Commission terminates its

Report with the words: 'Without British efforts certainly there would have been no National Home; but also there would have been on the threshold of the twentieth century no Independent Arab States.' The 'change in policy' which Sir Arthur Wauchope contemplated might well have taken the form of an amended Mandate, and it might yet do so. Executed with firmness and with the sole consideration of what is in the interest of Palestine as a whole, irrespective of promises given or rights accrued, such a Mandate would envisage the creation of a 'Palestinian State,' towards which both Arab and Jew would co-operate, each preserving his religious and racial individuality.

The Arabs would have to abandon their demand for the complete cessation of Jewish immigration, the Jews their claim to continue bringing in their co-religionists on the basis of economic absorptive capacity. A ratio would be established between the Arab and Jewish communities which, in view of the lower Jewish birth rate and the higher Arab infant mortality, would leave a margin for annual immigration. Thus the Arabs would get a measure of satisfaction by the limitation of Jewish immigration and the maintenance of their numerical preponderance, while the Jews would find that they could secure at least as great an immigration as would be possible under any partition scheme which was at all fair to the Arabs.

In this connexion it has latterly seemed that the implementation of the Balfour Declaration was being based on a misconception. The Jewish problem is in reality a dual one—the pre-war urge for a National Home, which produced the Balfour Declaration; the post-war call for a refuge for the Jews oppressed in Central Europe, for which that Declaration neither provided nor was intended, simply because this particular aspect of the Jewish problem did not then present itself in its actual acute form. The pressure for an intenser immigration came only with the oppression of the Central European Jews. It has been because an attempt has been made to stretch the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate to cover them that the trouble with the Arabs has really arisen.

The obligation in respect of a National Home should be amply satisfied by immigration on the ratio between the Arab and Jewish population. For the rest of the Central European

Jews, as a humanitarian gesture, the Nejeb might be reserved with unlimited immigration under a charter. The Nejeb, by which the Beersheba sub-district is meant, is an area almost one-half that of Palestine. A considerable portion would have to be excluded from any development scheme owing to its unsuitability for any sort of cultivation. In the other portion, some 3,000,000 donums in extent, where the Jews have already acquired holdings, the drilling operations now being undertaken should reveal great possibilities, seeing that the remains of Roman works indicate the existence 2000 years ago of a water supply adequate for a large European population. The area is sparsely populated, mainly by semi-nomadic Bedawin, some 70,000 in all. Jewish settlement would thus not cause any displacement of local population. The Arabs have never made anything of the Nejeb and do not possess the means for doing so. On the other hand, the Jews, not limited by considerations of finance, would find there ample scope for the exercise of the genius which has enabled them so successfully to develop other almost equally unproductive, apparently waterless, regions.

It might, of course, require the display and exercise of force to continue administering the country under Mandate. But, as Colonel Wedgwood asks, 'Does anyone suppose that partition will reduce the trouble and expense to the British Empire?' The Colonial Secretary himself admits that 'special safeguards must be devised to maintain peace between the proposed Jewish and Arab States,' and that 'in the early years, quite apart from British responsibility for the Holy Places and for her continual responsibilities as a Mandatory Power in Palestine, the United Kingdom would have to have sufficient force in Palestine to make the treaties with the new States effective.' Incidentally, he suggests 'League observers' in each State to safeguard minorities.

A continuation of the Mandatory system, if worked with firmness, would require no more military provision than would undoubtedly be necessary under partition. One is inclined to question Mr. Ormsby Gore's view that 'if it came ultimately to imposition it would be far better and more likely to avoid successive periods of bloodshed to have a scheme based upon partition than the continuance of the existing Mandate with small or large modifications,' and to

agree with Sir Ronald Storrs when, in his brilliant *Orientations*, he asks the very pertinent question whether the sum total of guards and safeguards, of cash and goodwill, required to control three States would not have sufficed to maintain the Mandate.

The Royal Commission's own scheme is now clearly impracticable. The pity is that the details were ever made public. Here the Commission committed a psychological error. It should have contented itself with merely recommending 'partition' and have communicated confidentially to H.M. Government any particular scheme it had in mind. The publication of the map, even though entitled 'provisional,' has undoubtedly made more difficult an agreed settlement based on 'partition.'

The Permanent Mandates Commission considers that 'any solution to prove acceptable should deprive the Arabs of as small a number as possible of places to which they attach particular value, either because they are their present homes or for reasons of religion. And further, the area allotted to the Jews should be sufficiently extensive, fertile and well-situated from the point of view of communications by sea and land, to be capable of extensive development and consequently of dense and rapid settlement'—two conditions which the Royal Commission's scheme scarcely fulfils.

That scheme gives also, in the words of Professor Bentwich, 'the richest lands to the Jews, the holiest to the English and the most barren to the Arabs.' But its great practical drawback is that within the Jewish State there will be no less than 225,000 Arabs, if you leave out the 'mandated' towns, which have 75,000 Arabs. Clearly, so long as they remain, Jewish settlement in the Jewish State will be restricted. At the outside there are 400,000 Jews in Palestine. Since 75,000 are in Jerusalem and 58,000 in the 'mandated' cities, that leaves only 267,000 in the Jewish State. This would scarcely give it the majority in population, which, the Colonial Secretary said in his evidence, was essential to the success of the scheme.

In suggesting a transfer of land and an exchange of population the Royal Commission quoted the precedent of the exchange effected between the Greek and Turkish populations in Turkey and Greece after the Greco-Turkish War of 1922.

But surely that is no parallel? In Turkey there were Greeks, and in Greece Turks, each wanting to return to their homeland. In Palestine there are on the one side 225,000 Arabs living on what they regard as their family homesteads and having no desire to be transplanted elsewhere. On the other side some 1250 Jews.

Conscious of the delicate problem which transfer presents, the Mandates Commission warns the Council that 'in order to guarantee that the advantages of such a transfer should outweigh the disadvantages particular care would have to be given to ensure that it was carried out with the greatest fairness.' It is of opinion that 'if the partition scheme should be applied its success would depend more on its effect on the relations between Arabs and Jews than on the territorial solution adopted.' As Professor Bentwich says, 'partition can give a prospect of peace only if the Arabs and the Jews make separation a starting-point for co-operation.' But, undoubtedly, its success must also depend on the possibility of getting Arabs within the Jewish enclave to transfer to the Arab area and so make room for Jewish settlers, three of whom, it is claimed, can, owing to superior scientific methods, live where one Arab has existed before. There is, however, no land available in the Arab State for these Northern Arabs. Steps, it is true, are being taken to find suitable areas both in Palestine proper and in Transjordan, where, the Colonial Secretary told the Commission, there is room for considerable numbers of settlers on land capable of providing a better livelihood than that which they could at present scratch from the hills of Palestine. But it will take considerable time to prepare this land.

The Colonial Secretary considered that there would be 'a good deal of voluntary transfer as a result of the operation of political factors, provided always there was a genuine Arab State and a genuine Jewish State.' And if—as seems more likely—the Northern Arabs refused to be tempted by generous offers, the British Government would not adopt the Royal Commission's proposal for compulsory transfer. In the circumstances one would like to know what benefit in the matter of intensive immigration the Jews are going to derive from this partition scheme. Moreover, how is the Jewish [illegible] to administer these Arab areas? Surely not with

Jewish district officers and police, as Colonel Wedgwood seems to think. As it is, under the Mandate the Palestine police have found it impossible to use Jewish policemen in Arab areas, and *vice versâ.* How is it likely that a Jewish Administration will be able to run a population so pronouncedly Arab with a purely Jewish personnel ? Take Acre sub-district as an example. Here you have 55,000 Arabs and only 700 Jews. No Jewish district officer or Jewish police will ever enjoy any authority there.

Then again the Royal Commission proposes that Nazareth, Haifa, Acre, Tiberias and Safed, with their mixed populations, should be provisionally administered by the Mandatory. But the Commission has overlooked that these are the administrative centres of the sub-districts bearing their names, and that in some cases the population in the sub-district is just as mixed as it is in its chief town. These towns have always been the administrative centres of these sub-districts. There are no other centres from which those sub-districts can be administered. What is, therefore, to become of these areas when these towns are separately administered under Mandate ? Putting these towns under Mandate should logically mean putting the sub-districts under Mandate unless in the towns in question the Jewish State is to have its own administrative offices cheek by jowl with those of the Mandatory authority, which in a country like Palestine would make confusion worse confounded.

Professor Temperley complains that the partition provides neither a natural border nor a defensible frontier between the two States. But nowhere in Palestine is there any natural or defensible frontier which would do to separate equitably constituted Jewish and Arab States. As the difference in economic standard and requirements of the two States will entail different fiscal policies, the impossibility of defending the joint frontier will offer constant opportunities for smuggling and raids, which the Arab, a raider by tradition, will not be able to resist.

There is also the question of financial stability. Unless immigration into the Jewish State can be intensive, funds will not be forthcoming as they have been heretofore. It follows, particularly if it has to pay the Arabs a subsidy and maintain any modern equipped force—which, it is estimated,

it will cost £200 per annum per man to do—that the Jewish State may find difficulty in balancing its budget. Certainly the Arab State will, and it will be Britain who will have to keep both States solvent as well as finance the Jerusalem enclave and 'Corridor' Administration. Partition means for Britain greater commitments and responsibilities, if not greater trouble, than under the Mandate. Partition would, it is true, give the Palestinian Arabs an independent State, which would place them on a footing of equality with their brethren in Syria and Iraq, whose position has been a reproach to them. But the only chance of any 'sufficient assent' being secured from them reposes in the eradication of the terrorism now abroad, so as to give moderate Arab opinion a chance to make itself heard, and certain vital adjustments in the Royal Commission's proposal.

In the first place, the area south of Jaffa must be excluded from the Jewish State. The question of an outlet to the sea for Arabistan is involved in this. Slowly the peoples in the hinterland have seen their access to the Mediterranean restricted. First Alexandretta, then Tripoli and Beyrouth, failed to meet the Arab demand for a nationally controlled access to the sea. Now comes the proposal to convert Haifa, long regarded by hinterland Arabs as their natural outlet, into first a mixed, and later a Jewish, port. Even their access to Jaffa, which is an Arab port *par excellence*, can only be through the Jewish State or the 'Corridor.' True that the Arab State is to have free transit to and from Haifa. But that, in Arab eyes, is only a palliative. A 'partition' scheme, to be acceptable to Arabistan and the Palestinian Arabs, must provide free and direct access to Jaffa.

The reason the area south of Jaffa was placed in the Jewish State was that it includes the two oldest Jewish colonies, Richon le Zion and Rehovoth. Moderate Arabs have expressed to me sympathy with Jewish sentiment in this respect. But they ask, why must direct access to Jaffa be denied them in order to preserve these two colonies for the Jews? Could not some such arrangement be made to guarantee these two colonies in an Arab State, as is proposed for certain mixed centres in the Jewish State? Further, the partition scheme leaves a large number of Arab-owned [illegible] within the Jewish State, with the result that

the Arab State will have but a small portion on which t draw for its income. Some Arabs go so far as to claim tha as so much Arab land is included in the ' Corridor ' it shoul be under Arab control, with special safeguards for access t Jerusalem. Next, Acre and part of Safed must be exclude from the Jewish State. The population is predominantl Arab. They see no reason why they should be placed unde Jewish domination, nor why they should abandon what i their homeland. The difficulty is that, if these areas are take away from the Jewish State, they will be isolated from th Arab State. The solution would be to transfer them t Syria, of which Palestine under the Turks was the souther section. This the inhabitants would accept.

On the other hand, there would be agreement to the Jew having the colonies south of the Sea of Galilee. Indee their inclusion in the Arab State caused much surpris There would also not be objection to the Jews having th Jewish portion of New Jerusalem. True, the ' Corridor passes through the middle of the Jewish area. But I foun from personal investigation that it would be possible t divert the Jerusalem–Jaffa road south and bring it int Jerusalem through the Katamun quarter. Far more seriou however, is the question of sewerage and water for the Ol City, which at present run through the Jewish area. It woul cost a lot to remedy this. But no doubt the Jews would b ready to pay in order to get part of New Jerusalem. Finall the Arabs would agree to the Jews having the Nejeb, bu under charter with a charter fee, which would, they fee more fittingly replace the proposed subsidy from the Jewis State.

These adjustments would remove some 150,000 Ara from the Jewish enclave and bring many Arab-owned orang groves within the Arab State. The latter would thus b enabled to start with that prospect of solvency, denied under the Commission's scheme, which should be the *si qua non* of partition. It would also ease the administrati and settlement problem for the Jewish State, since the possi bility of applying partition by agreement would remove Ara antagonism in the north and enable the acquisition of lan for settlement of far more colonists than could be possib under the Royal Commission's scheme.

But it is by no means certain that 'partition' will be the final solution. Only the Arabs have taken up any definite position towards it—opposition. Neither the British Parliament or Cabinet nor the League Council or the Mandates Commission have declared themselves for or against the solution. The Jews merely authorised the Zionist Agency to see under what conditions a Jewish State could be obtained. Obviously they want more, which could only be at the expense of the Arabs. But we may yet find the Jews will have nothing of 'partition.'

The new Commission which is coming to Palestine—like the Milner Mission which, delegated to find a solution for the Egyptian problem within the Protectorate, recommended its abolition, and the Royal Commission which, sent to devise a solution within the Mandate, advised Partition—may quite possibly find it imperative also to go outside its terms of reference, particularly as it is understood that it will not be debarred from exploring other lines of settlement. It may quite conceivably find that 'partition' with any prospect of 'sufficient assent' of both parties is impossible. It may not improbably advise that the only satisfactory issue from the present *impasse* is a continuation of the Mandate on new lines. It may even be led to suggest that the best solution would be for Great Britain to be asked to take over Palestine and Transjordan lock, stock, and barrel. For there is no doubt that annexation in some form or another would definitely cut the Gordian knot by removing for all time the fears of the Arabs that Palestine may become a Jewish State with them as a minority—which is really the *fons et origo* of all the Arab agitation. And I firmly believe, from my conversations with both Arabs and Jews, that they would accept such a solution as an alternative to what is now proposed.

With a strong Central Government, a reorganisation of the administrative services, an efficient political department in close touch with Arabs as well as Jews, a definite policy accepted by all political parties in England and executed regardless of remonstrances or obstructions from either Arabs or Jews, with evident determination to deal severely with any who challenge the authority of Government, I believe that we would find within a relatively short time Jew and Arab living amicably side by side and co-operating for the benefit

of the country as they all did up to twenty years ago, as, indeed, they are doing to-day in so many directions. And some fifteen or twenty years hence a great advance would be noticeable towards that national consciousness as joint subjects of a 'Palestinian State,' to create which is the one outstanding duty of the Mandatory and of paramount interest to the Empire.

But whatever the final decision, it must be reached with minimum delay and be carried out with that firmness, intelligence and consistency, which, Professor Temperley rightly remarks, our past policy has lacked. As the Permanent Mandates Commission sagely reflects, 'The capacity of a Government to establish peace and concord amongst those whom it governs is proportionate to its confidence in itself and its policy; and the likelihood of its being obliged to resort to force in order to impose its will is proportionate to the uncertainty of its intentions.'

ARTHUR MERTON.

THE REFORM OF THE LAW

IX. Commercial Arbitration

By B. A. Wortley, LL.M.

I.

It is a trite saying in the law that, in mercantile matters time is of the essence of the contract: the rapid deterioration of many mercantile commodities and the constant fluctuation of prices may account for this saw. Men of business must settle their transactions with dispatch, and they must dispose of their differences without delay, if they are to conduct their enterprises with success. For this reason any arrangements for the speedy determination of disputes by persons familiar with the conditions reigning in any trade or industry have a strong appeal to commercial men. Three types of such arrangements have been in use from time immemorial.

There is *conciliation*, whereby a mutual friend of the disputants attempts to bring the parties together to settle their dispute themselves; there is *valuation*, whereby a third party is called in to make, from his own knowledge and without hearing evidence or argument, some assessment or valuation which is at issue between the parties; lastly, there is *arbitration*, a quasi-judicial procedure whereby some person or persons who have been nominated by the parties to a difference listen to evidence and argument, and then pronounce upon the issue in the same way as a judge would do. It is with this last form of procedure that we shall be mainly concerned in this article.

II.

In the early stage of its development, arbitration is a private procedure which lacks the official sanction attendant [illegible] procedure and the judgment of a court of law.

Nevertheless, arbitration has always been a possible rival and competitor of litigation. The old maxim runs, '*Bonus judex est ampliare justitiam*,' and any encroachment of arbitration upon the jurisdiction of the courts of law has usually been viewed with considerable disfavour by the judges. In England, for instance, during a long period, the common lawyers managed to stultify the effect of a submission to arbitration by treating the arbitrator merely as the agent of the party appointing him. In *Vynior's Case* in 1609 it was said:

> A man cannot by his act make such authority, power or warrant not countermandable, which is by law and of its own nature countermandable

This meant that the authority of any arbitrator could be taken away from him at any time before he had fulfilled his function, and therefore that no one could be held bound by a promise to arbitrate if he decided that he preferred to litigate. Because of this, the custom grew up of attaching a penalty bond to a submission to arbitrate in the hope that the fear of forfeiting the bond would induce a party to arbitrate. This was a makeshift device, but when an attempt was made to improve upon it by asking the Court of Chancery to compel a party specifically to perform an agreement to arbitrate, by appointing an arbitrator, no satisfaction was obtained.

A cynic might observe that the reluctance of the judges to encourage resort to arbitration might not have been unconnected with the fact that the law was developed at a time when the judges depended for their remuneration upon the fees of litigants; but a more charitable view would be that the Bench could not believe that informal arbitral tribunals could operate as effectively as could the formal courts with their elaborate rules to govern the conduct of the proceedings before them. In short, a sense of duty and a regard for professional interests contributed to form this conservative attitude to arbitration. This attitude has had its counterpart in the courts of most foreign countries. In England, however, Parliament has been less hesitant than the Bench and the Bar in recognising the value of arbitration.

The first Arbitration Act was passed in 1698, other Acts

followed, and in 1889 the existing statutes were consolidated. The Act of 1889 clearly lays down the principle that a submission to arbitration shall be irrevocable, and a bar to litigation by the parties to it. Arbitrators are given power to take evidence upon oath, and the successful party is enabled to enforce the award through the machinery of the courts in the same way as he would have been able to enforce a judgment of a court of law. The only formal requirement of the Act is that the submission should be contained in a written agreement. This agreement usually takes one of two forms. Either it consists of a formal document specially prepared by the parties for the purpose of having a defined dispute settled, or, what is more usual, the submission merely consists of a common form clause in a contract of sale, or lease or similar document, to the effect that the parties will submit any future differences to arbitration. The fact that a few words inserted somewhere in a long document are sufficient to compel a man to submit to arbitration willy-nilly very often comes as a great shock to him. Certainly the careless and indiscriminate signature of contracts containing arbitration clauses is not to be recommended, since it leads so often to a person being compelled to arbitrate against his will, and when he does not possess the dispositions that are required if arbitration is to operate smoothly and efficiently: but, properly used, the arbitration clause can undoubtedly save much time and trouble.

When a submission has come into existence the Act of 1889, as amended, implies the grant of all powers needed by the arbitrators and, where no provision has been expressly made, it provides a full set of rules to regulate the appointment of the arbitrators and the conduct of the procedure. Not only has Parliament provided all this machinery for private persons who desire to settle their differences without recourse to litigation, but provision has been made for arbitration by many statutes, especially by those which give rise to questions of compensation for the use or expropriation of property, or which are concerned with capital and labour. Since 1845 there have been more than fifty statutes or groups of statutes providing in some measure for arbitration: among them are such well-known pieces of legislation [illegible] Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, the Public

Health Act, 1875, and the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1925.

III.

The advantages usually claimed for arbitration are that it is cheap, speedy and private. Where the proceedings are conducted by competent persons these advantages are usually forthcoming. Moreover, when the arbitration is conducted under the auspices of a recognised trade organisation or a chamber of commerce, the awards are accepted as a matter of course, since there is very often sufficient economic and social pressure at the disposal of a trade organ to induce the most recalcitrant member honourably to abide by a fair decision. But when a disputant has no confidence in the arbitral tribunal, or in its conduct of the arbitration, he may be prepared to go any lengths to upset the arbitrator's award. In such cases English law will very often allow an appeal to the courts on a point of law by way of case stated, and this may result in protracted litigation ending only with a direction by the House of Lords that the matter be remitted to the arbitrators. When this occurs, more time and money will be lost than if the parties had proceeded at once to litigate the issue. This is a risk of English arbitration. Where, however, a question can be finally disposed of by arbitrators, the flexibility of their procedure can certainly save some of the costs that would have been spent if litigation had taken place in the ordinary way. This was specially so under the old unreformed system of English legal procedure which gave a party many opportunities of raising purely technical and non-meritorious points of law for the sake of delaying the determination of the real issue. Since the reforms which began last century, and since the introduction of the New Procedure Rules of the last few years, the greater speed of arbitration, as contrasted with litigation, is not always as marked as it used to be.

It is especially in matters involving the determination by experts of a short point of commercial law or practice that arbitration is still the speediest method of procedure if the services of the right men can be obtained. In disputes requiring a protracted hearing and much sifting of evidence, the services of a professional judge may be found preferable

to those of an arbitrator, who may not be free to sit day in and day out until the dispute is settled. On the financial side it should be recalled that, subject to the payment of court fees, judges are paid by the State, whilst most arbitrators have to be paid out of the pockets of the parties.

No doubt secrecy is an attribute peculiar to arbitration, and from a private point of view this may be very satisfactory, but there are undoubtedly certain types of cases when, in the public interest, it might be desirable to have dirty linen washed in public. In a brilliant recent article on arbitration, Mr. P. G. Phillip rather drily observes that there are many contracts in which the utmost privacy is desired :

> For example, an actress, pressagented as salaried at $2500 a week, is completely satisfied with and has contracted for $250 a week. Even though a dispute should arise on the contract, neither party would care to disclose how John Q Public was misled.[1]

Such cases are, however, rather exceptional.

IV.

From the earliest times arbitration has been resorted to by parties to international business transactions and, with the growth of world trade, the number of arbitrations involving some foreign element has increased enormously. Such arbitrations give rise to special problems, and these problems are probably more difficult to settle now than they were in the Middle Ages when the law merchant seems to have been more of a universally accepted code than it is to-day. The growth of statute law, coupled with the encroachments of the King's courts on the jurisdiction of the old mercantile courts, has given rise to an English type of mercantile law, and this, together with the birth of a number of national commercial codes on the Continent, has helped to destroy the old sense of unity. At any rate, recent efforts have had to be directed towards the elaboration of international conventions to restore in some measure the unity and uniformity of mercantile law, the lack of which is such a constant cause of misunderstanding and a hindrance to commerce. The legally erected obstacles to the growth of arbitration have been as noticeable abroad as they have been in England

[1] . Yale L J p 19.

During the nineteenth century the courts of France and Belgium held that clauses in contracts whereby the parties agreed to submit all future disputes to arbitration were void as contrary to public policy. In the United States some States adopted the restrictive common law view of arbitration, whilst others passed legislation on the lines of the English Act of 1889.

The fact that the laws of many countries did not recognise the validity of arbitration clauses habitually used by men of business led to many difficulties when attempts were made to enforce such clauses in those places. So long as England remained a creditor country, it was often possible to use economic pressure to induce foreigners to agree to arbitration in London according to English law and by English institutions. But since the war there has been a great increase in foreign arbitrations, and at least one foreign country that has a monopoly in certain markets has copied the English practice and is applying economic pressure to compel the acceptance of arbitration clauses providing for arbitration abroad by foreign arbitrators. When a country is able to do this it may well be that the problem of enforcing awards against foreigners is not a pressing one, since that same pressure which compels submission to arbitration will no doubt also be able to compel the observance of the award. But in the more general run of cases the conflicting attitude of different jurisdictions towards arbitration has often been a real source of irritation.

The first step to ensure that as many countries as possible should at least admit the validity of arbitration clauses in contracts of a commercial nature was taken in 1923, when the League of Nations prepared a protocol on arbitration clauses now embodied in the Arbitration Clauses (Protocol) Act, 1924. Great Britain ratified this convention on September 24, 1924, having been preceded by Albania, Austria, and Belgium. Germany followed in November of that year, and Southern Rhodesia in December. Up to August 1934 twenty-eight other ratifications followed, and the convention has been applied to most British Colonies. The French ratification did not take place until June 7, 1928, but in the meantime a French law of December 31, 1925, had recognised the validity of the arbitration clause

in commercial matters. After 1930 the French courts tended to recognise the validity of arbitration clauses in contracts deemed to be subject to foreign law, even in non-commercial matters.

The 1923 Protocol did not, however, go far enough: it merely provided that parties should not resort to litigation when they had agreed to arbitrate.

In 1927 the League of Nations produced a second convention now embodied in the Arbitration (Foreign Awards) Act, 1930. The object of this was to enable foreign awards to be enforced on a reciprocal basis by the courts of the signatory States. Up to August 1934 some twenty-two ratifications had been obtained. The convention is in force in most British Colonies. Thus, through the action of the League, the international value of arbitration has been strengthened—first, by the wide agreement recognising the validity of arbitration clauses, and, secondly, by the greatly increased possibility of enforcing awards in foreign countries. Nevertheless, there still remain grave deficiencies in the various national laws relating to arbitration, and, therefore, in the value of the international conventions we have referred to.

V.

In England a serious attempt was made to improve arbitration law when the Committee presided over by Mr. Justice MacKinnon, as he then was, was set up to review the law. The Committee's Report was issued on January 10, 1927, but it was not until 1934 that a new Arbitration Act was passed to make amendments in the law which the Committee found to be desirable. The new Act increases the efficiency of arbitration agreements without altering the general scheme of the law. It abolishes the rule that the death of a party automatically revokes the appointment of an arbitrator; provisions are made for the replacement of an arbitrator who has been removed or who fails to act; and when only two arbitrators have been appointed an umpire must now be appointed at the commencement of the proceedings, so that the parties need not wait until the two arbitrators, who often quite improperly regard themselves as advocates for the parties they represent, have come

to a deadlock; arbitrators who fail to use reasonable dispatch can be removed; interim awards may be made and the arbitrators have been given power to order specific performance of all contracts that do not relate to land.

On the other hand, the effect of the new Act is to increase the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court of Justice over arbitrators. Parties cannot contract out of the power of the court to order the arbitrators to state a special case on a question of law for the decision of the court, and the power of the arbitrators themselves to 'state a case' for the court is continued, as is the right of a party to the arbitration to apply to the court for relief when he alleges that a mistake of law appears on the face of an award, or when he is dissatisfied with the conduct of the arbitration.

Thus arbitration may still lead to litigation because the English system attempts to secure the best of both worlds—lay arbitration according to law but subject to judicial supervision. In sharp contrast to this are those foreign systems which do not admit the system of stating a case for the court. In his recent article Mr. P. G. Phillips says:

> The common law rule codified into most of our American statutes allows no court review of rulings of law by the arbitrators, and their rulings thereon are final regardless of their departure from accepted legal principles

Somewhat similar to this is the Swedish system of arbitration. In other words, 'arbitration' does not mean the same thing in every country.

Moreover, neither of the two international conventions on arbitration altered the widely differing requirements of the various national laws with regard to the form required for a valid arbitral agreement, so that, there being no uniform set of requirements, it was, and still is, quite possible to imagine that one has a valid arbitration agreement with a foreigner when, owing to some technical deficiency under the foreign law governing the contract, such as the lack of a stamp, or a seal, or the absence of notarial verification, the arbitration clause was not worth the paper it was written on. Further, different legal systems hold very varying views upon the matters which might be submitted to arbitration. The International Chamber of Commerce and other similar

bodies, and such institutions as the United States Department of Commerce, have done, and are doing, useful work to ensure that the foreign law of arbitration shall be made known to traders; but this knowledge, however up to date, is not enough to prevent disputes arising as to the system of law which governs a contract; the need to be constantly looking out for points of foreign law is a tiresome complication of commercial life.

It is not surprising, therefore, that, impatient of all these obstacles, many business-men have expressed their desire for something which would at once safeguard them from technical pitfalls and at the same time provide a uniform standard of arbitral conduct throughout the world. In what follows we shall attempt to explain the steps that have been taken by the League of Nations Rome Institute for the Unification of Private Law.

VI.

The Rome Institute was founded in 1928 by the Italian Government, as an international body under the League of Nations, directed by a committee of leading lawyers from different countries of the world. The Institute has now continued its disinterested work in the sphere of private law for nine years without interruption, in spite of the many upheavals that have been taking place in the sphere of public law. The problem of arbitration was placed upon the agenda of the Institute in 1929, and thereupon Professor René David was assigned the task of making a complete survey of the law of arbitration throughout the world.

This task took three years, and every available source of information was tapped. The results appear in a Report of 157 printed foolscap pages. Annexed to the Report are a further 120 pages containing the texts of the two Geneva Conventions together with the original texts and French translations of the arbitration laws of Germany, England, Spain, Italy, Poland, Sweden, and the American Arbitration Act of 1925, and with the text of the French law. Realising that theory and practice go hand in hand, the Report also sets out the complete rules and the arbitration clauses of the great arbitral bodies to whom a very large proportion of the arbitrations of the world are referred; they are the Inter-

national Chamber of Commerce, the London Court of Arbitration, the *Deutscher Ausschuss für schiedsgerichtswesen*, and the American Arbitration Association.

After considering Professor David's Report, the Council of the Rome Institute decided, in 1933, to set up a small committee of jurists representing the legal thought of France, England, Italy, Sweden, Poland, Switzerland, and Germany under the chairmanship of His Excellency Mario d'Amelio, first president of the Italian Court of Cassation. When Germany left the League the German delegate could no longer officially attend. The fact that the United States is not a member of the League accounts for the fact that it was not represented. It is hoped, however, that at some later stage both Germany and the United States may see their way to collaborate officially.

The drafting committee met five times and, by dint of hard preliminary work and very full discussions, sometimes lasting for more than a week, a text of a draft uniform law of arbitration of forty articles was produced in 1936, together with an explanatory Report of fifty-four pages and English translations of both documents. In preparing the law the draftsmen did not attempt merely to make a synthesis of existing material, but they sought rather to thresh out the whole problem of arbitration from the first principles implicit in the vast amount of material at their disposal, and from their personal experience and knowledge of affairs Their aim was to prepare a simple statement of a uniform law that would, if widely adopted, reduce the confusion now caused in the legal world by the problem of conflicting laws. It was not desired to produce a group of arbitration rules that would merely compete with the private procedural rules of existing institutions such as chambers of commerce: existing sets of rules were to be left to operate freely as matters for private contracts, but the draft law was to contain the legal principles governing the conduct of arbitration and the enforcement of awards, together with certain rules of procedure that would apply when the parties had not themselves specified their own rules or those of any institution.

The draft law is designed to apply whenever parties expressly desire it; it will not apply when parties expressly say that it is not to apply, but, in the absence of a contrary

agreement, parties will be deemed to intend the law to apply when, at the date of their contract of arbitration, they have their habitual residence in different countries where the law is in force. Any documents suffice to move an intention to submit to arbitration, and any rights arising out of a contract or out of an established legal relationship may be submitted. Eight articles deal with the constitution of the arbitral tribunal and the right to challenge arbitrators. Those dealing with the setting up of the arbitral tribunal apply where the parties have not made other arrangements, for example, as we have said, by referring to the rules of a chamber of commerce. Similarly the six articles which set out the procedure to be followed by the arbitrators are capable of modification.

Normally the award is to be given by the vote of an absolute majority of the arbitrators, but the draft provides for a president of the arbitral tribunal who is given certain powers to prevent a deadlock. Perhaps the most important feature of the draft is the provision made for the automatic recognition, by the courts of all countries adopting the draft law, of leave to enforce awards, once leave has been granted by the court of any such country. This is in striking contrast to the present Continental procedure even under the existing conventions. The draft sets out the cases when courts are entitled to intervene to annul an award and, as we shall see, as a result of representations recently made, the scheme embodied in the 1936 draft has been considerably modified on this head.

Through the medium of the International Chamber of Commerce and its national committees valuable advice has been obtained on the possible reception that the draft law might have. The draft was brought before the Berlin meeting of the International Chamber of Commerce in June last, when, after a thorough investigation, the following resolution was passed:

> Having persistently recommended the arbitration of disputes between business-men of different countries and, by its Conciliation Commissions and Court of Arbitration, secured without legal proceedings the settlement of hundreds of international disputes, the International Chamber of Commerce reiterates its recommendations in favour of the earliest possible ratification, by those States that have not yet done so, of the Geneva Protocol of September 24,

1923, on the international validity of arbitration clauses and of the Convention of September 26, 1927, for the execution of foreign arbitral awards. It also requests its National Committees to urge their Governments to take the necessary steps for the removal of the difficulties still arising out of the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards and the variety of conditions governing the form of submission to arbitration.

Furthermore, the International Chamber of Commerce expresses its satisfaction at the elaboration of the draft of an international law on arbitration by the International Institute at Rome for the Unification of Private Law. This draft, once adopted by the principal States, will facilitate recourse to arbitration for foreign contracts, in particular by recognition of the universal validity of leave to execute issued in a country having brought the uniform law into force.

The International Chamber of Commerce therefore approves the draft uniform law, subject to . . . amendments the main object of which is to give precedence, on certain points, to the agreement of the parties, in particular in the event of the latter having referred to special rules, such as the Rules of the Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce.

The second and third paragraphs of the resolution were not backed by the American, Australian, and British national committees, and reservations were made by the Japanese national committee of the chamber. It will be noticed, however, that these committees are not opposed in principle to some changes in the law directed to facilitate international arbitration: their attitude is one of cautious reserve

The Berlin resolution led to the following question in Parliament on July 28, 1937:

SIR PATRICK HANNON asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he had considered the resolution passed at the recent congress of the International Chamber of Commerce in Berlin on the subject of commercial arbitration, approving the scheme submitted in the name of the International Institute at Rome for the unification of private law as a preliminary to such scheme being submitted at the approaching congress of the League of Nations at Geneva; whether such scheme differs materially from the Anglo-American system of arbitration operating in English-speaking countries; and whether he will cause a committee to be constituted to examine and report on such scheme before authorising or instructing the British delegates at Geneva

to approve the scheme itself as supplementing the Geneva Convention of 1927 for the enforcement of foreign awards?

MR. EDEN. The resolution on the subject of commercial arbitration which was adopted at the Berlin Congress of the International Chamber of Commerce has only recently been brought to the notice of my Department, and I have not yet had an opportunity of examining the International Institute's scheme in detail. It would obviously be impossible at present to indicate the precise method which will be adopted with a view to the full examination of the scheme, but His Majesty's Government will certainly not commit themselves to the support of it without taking into full account the views of the United Kingdom trade interests.

SIR P. HANNON. Having examined the *pros* and *cons* of the case, will my right hon. friend give the suggestion sympathetic consideration?

MR. EDEN. Yes, sir. I must confess that I have not had time to examine this at all.

The English attitude to the draft therefore still remains open.

In September of this year, however, the Rome Institute's drafting committee met to consider the reception of the draft law by the International Chamber of Commerce and by other important bodies, such as the United States Department of Commerce. The result of this meeting has been that most of the points raised by way of drafting amendments by the International Chamber of Commerce have been met, and certain changes in the draft have been made which should render it more acceptable to legal opinion in England and the United States. In particular the vexed question of the degree of control to be exercised by the court over arbitrators has been more fully explored, and a number of optional clauses, to be adopted by persons who wish the law to apply to their submissions to arbitration, have been drafted. There are now three possible courses open to parties who wish to adopt the uniform law.

First, if the parties adopt the uniform law expressly or impliedly, without further elaboration, the arbitrators will be bound to apply the provisions of the uniform law and any relevant rules of private international law; but, as under the present Swedish law and many American laws, the courts will have no right to review the award for an error of law, though, of course, under the draft law full provision exists for annulling

the award for misconduct on the part of the arbitrators and in certain other cases.

Secondly, if the parties wish to preserve the right of the court to set aside the award for a mistake of law, whether concerning the uniform law or some matter of private international law governing the submission, they must insert a clause to this effect in the submission.

Thirdly, if it is desired to give the arbitrators a completely free hand, so that they can act as conciliators not bound by private international law, or by any rules of law, except, of course, the terms of the uniform law itself (*i.e.*, where the arbitrators are intended to act as '*amiables compositeurs*'), then a clause to this effect should be inserted in the submission.

Thus the draft law does not restrict the freedom of choice of parties to an arbitration, but it makes clear and unimpeachable many arrangements the legal effects of which cannot be predicted with certainty in many countries. The next step will be for the general secretary of the Rome Institute to deposit a copy of the draft law with the Secretariat of the League of Nations, and then it will be for the Secretariat to decide whether or not to call a full-dress diplomatic conference of experts in order to submit the draft to the closest scrutiny. If the draft should emerge from this ordeal, then it may form the basis of an International Convention on Arbitration with a much wider scope than anything that has been attempted hitherto. The final word, however, rests with the various Governments concerned, who have it in their power to advance or retard the progress of international private arbitration. It is to be hoped that the British Government will give the draft its careful scrutiny and sympathetic attention, since any step in the direction of friendly international collaboration in commercial matters is surely a step in the right direction. It must be admitted, however, that in the many attempts that have been made in recent years to obtain uniformity in legal matters this country has not led the way: too often our pride in our own indigenous legal arrangements seems to have prevented us from giving more than a perfunctory glance at any proposed change. Perhaps with arbitration it will be different.

B. A. WORTLEY.

THE ACCESSION SERVICE

By The Reverend Canon Swanzy

Michael Fane, the hero of Mr. Compton Mackenzie's *Sinister Street*, before the religious side of his nature woke to activity, disliked church-going.

> He had hated the throaty voices of smooth-faced clergymen He had despised the sleek choirboys smelling of yellow soap. Religion had been compounded of Collects, Greek Testament, Offertory Bags, varnish, qualms for the safety of one's top-hat, the pleasure of an extra large hassock, ambition to be grown-up and bend over instead of kneeling down, the podgy feel of a Prayer Book, and a profound disapproval that only Eton and Winchester among public schools were mentioned in its diaphanous fumbling pages

The modern boy is relieved from at least the last of these troubles. The two Colleges of the Blessed Virgin Mary have disappeared from those pages, diaphanous and fumbling though they still may be. Yet many of us in our schooldays, perhaps during a lengthy and imperfectly understood sermon or the linked sweetness too long drawn out of an anthem, may have read the less familiar parts of the book with the interest of an explorer: the Epact, the Golden Number, the Table of Feast Days and Fast Days, and at last, like Michael, the Accession Service and the Royal Warrant that gave it such validity as it possessed. If our book was a very old one we may even have read the Forms of Prayer for the Fifth of November, the Thirtieth of January and the Twenty-Ninth of May, and wondered at their prolixity. But our immediate concern is with (I speak as a Victorian) 'A Form of Prayer with Thanksgiving to Almighty God; to be used in all Churches and Chapels within this Realm, every year, upon the Twentieth Day of June, being the Day on which Her Majesty began her happy reign.'

In the April number of this Review the article on 'Parliament at Prayer' tells us that November 17, Queen Elizabeth's accession day, was first celebrated as a religious service at Oxford about the twelfth year of her reign by Dr. Cooper, then Vice-Chancellor, 'from whence this institution flowed by a voluntary current all over this realme.' It does not appear that the service for this day was ever printed in the Prayer Book itself, and the same may be said about those for the Twenty-Fourth of March (James I.) and the Twenty-Seventh of March (Charles I.), though both were published and the latter is referred to in the Canons of 1640. The *de jure* (January 30) and *de facto* (May 29) accession days of Charles II. were already provided for, and in William III.'s time the Fifth of November service served for the accession, as he had landed at Torbay on that day James II.'s service for the Sixth of February was the first to be printed at the end of the Prayer Book, and closely resembled that of his younger daughter Anne, now to be described.

Queen Anne's Prayer Book of 1712, with Dr. Nicholls's Commentary, lies before me as I write. It contains the three services for November 5, January 30 and May 29, with the Royal Warrant of 'Marie R.' dated October 6, 1692. This is followed by 'A form of Prayer with Thanksgiving to Almighty God; to be used in all Churches and Chapels within this Realm upon the Eighth Day of March, being the day on which Her Majesty began her happy Reign.' If the day should fall on a Sunday, the accession was to take precedence, but notice was to be given on the previous Sunday. At Morning Prayer the opening sentences were to be 1 Tim. ii. 1, 2, 3, and 1 John i. 8, 9. A cento from the Psalter replaces Venite, the psalms are xx., xxi. and ci., and the lessons Prov. viii. 13, etc., and Rom. xiii. After the Creed came special versicles and responses. Instead of the Collect for the Day the third prayer of our present service was used. The Litany was always to be said, and in it were inserted two special prayers, one of which is the second of our present office, and the other is as follows:

Most gracious God, who hast set thy servant ANNE our Queen upon the Throne of her Ancestors, we most humbly beseech thee to protect her on the same from all the dangers to which she may be exposed; Do thou weaken the hands, blast the designs, and

defeat the enterprises of all her enemies, that no secret conspiracies, nor open violences, may disquiet her reign; but that, being safely kept under the shadow of thy wing, and supported by thy power, she may triumph over all opposition; that so the world may acknowledge thee to be her Defender, and mighty Deliverer in all her difficulties and adversities; through Jesus Christ our Lord. Amen.

This was to be followed by the Prayer in Time of War and Tumults, and by that for the High Court of Parliament, if sitting.

In the Communion Service, immediately before the reading of the Epistle, instead of the Collect for the Queen and that of the Day, shall be used this prayer for the Queen, as supreme Governor of the Church:

Blessed Lord, who hast called Christian Princes to the defence of thy Faith, and hast made it their duty to promote the spiritual welfare, together with the temporal interest, of their people; We acknowledge with humble and thankful hearts thy great goodness to us, in setting thy Servant our most gracious Queen over this Church and Nation; Give her, we beseech thee, all those heavenly graces that are requisite for so high a trust, Let the work of thee her God prosper in her hands; Let her eyes behold the success of her designs for the service of thy true Religion established amongst us; and make her a blessed Instrument of protecting and advancing thy Truth, wherever it is persecuted and oppressed; Let Hypocrisy and Profaneness, Superstition and Idolatry, fly before her face, Let not Heresies and False Doctrines disturb the peace of the Church, nor Schisms and causeless Divisions weaken it; But grant us to be of one heart and one mind in serving thee our God, and obeying her according to thy Will, And that these blessings may be continued to after-ages, make the Queen, we pray Thee, an happy Mother of children, who being Educated in thy Faith and Fear, may happily succeed her in the Government of these Kingdoms. So we that are thy people, and sheep of thy pasture, shall give thee thanks for ever and will always be shewing forth thy praise from generation to generation. Amen.

The Epistle (1 Pet. ii. 11) and the Gospel (Matt. xxii. 16) were as in the present office. The Sermon was to follow the Nicene Creed, and the Offertory Sentence was to be 'Godliness is great riches, etc.' (1 Tim. vi. 6, 7). Three collects were to follow the Church Militant Prayer: (1) Trinity V.; (2) the third; (3) the fifth of the six collects which are printed

at the end of the Communion Service in the Prayer Book of 1662. The whole was to end with the Peace and Blessing.

The beautiful Prayer for Unity, of unknown authorship, was added in George I.'s service. George II.'s was disgraced by the following Rubric: 'This Day (June 11th) being the Festival of the Apostle Saint Barnabas, the proper Office for that day shall be wholly omitted, and this used instead of it; and there shall be notice thereof given publickly in the Church the Sunday before' The reader will be glad to know that the change of the calendar in 1752 restored St. Barnabas to his honours by transferring the accession to June 22. It is noteworthy that this service, which continued practically unaltered till November 1901, though it ordered that the Ante-Communion should always be said and a sermon should always be preached, did not appear to contemplate an actual celebration of Holy Communion, nor did it make any provision for Evening Prayer. At this point it is well to say a word about the Royal Warrant. Reference has already been made to that of Mary II. ordering the use of the Gunpowder Plot, King Charles I., and Restoration Services. This seems to have retained its force after Mary's death, not only for the rest of the reign of her husband, but during that of her sister also. The Accession Service was authorised by Anne in the following Warrant:

ANNE R.

> Our Will and Pleasure is, that this Form of Prayer and Thanksgiving for the Eighth Day of March, be forthwith Printed and Published, and be used yearly on the said Day, in all Cathedral and Collegiate Churches and Chapels, within both our Universities, and of our Colleges of Eton and Winchester, and in all Parish-Churches and Chapels within our Kingdom of England, Dominion of Wales, and Town of Berwick-on-Tweed.
>
> Given at our Court at St. James's, the Seventh Day of February 1703. In the second year of our Reign.
> By Her Majesty's Command,
> NOTTINGHAM.

The earlier Hanoverians followed the same use. Queen Victoria in 1837 issued one Warrant covering the four Special Days; and on January 17, 1859, supplemented it

by a further Warrant abolishing the three earlier commemorations.

But all through the period, up to the year 1910, the rule was followed that the Order in Council changing the names in the Royal Family prayers during a reign should apply to the Accession Service as well as to the rest of the book. In Victoria's reign six such changes were necessitated: by her marriage in 1840, the birth of her heir in 1841, the Queen Dowager's death in 1849, Prince Albert's elevation to the dignity of Prince Consort in 1857, his death in 1861, and the marriage of her eldest son in 1863.

The Queen died on January 22, 1901. The new Prayer Book was issued immediately. We may call it the 'Cornwall and York' book, for in it the new King's heir was described as Duke of Cornwall and York. It contained the old Accession Service, headed as in his mother's book, but for 'The Twenty-Second Day of January, being the day on which His Majesty began his happy Reign.' So, in accordance with precedent, was the service described in the Table of Contents of the volume, and in the Table of Feasts it appears as 'A Solemn Day, for which a particular Service is appointed,' and is described as above.

The Royal Warrant of this book marks a new departure. I am not lawyer enough to say whether, between 1837 and 1901, any Act of Parliament was passed extending the validity of a Warrant beyond the lifetime of the sovereign who granted it (but see reference to that of Mary II. above). If such an Act is on the Statute-book, this Warrant and those of succeeding reigns are, in this respect at least, in order. But if there is no such Act, the suspicion arises that the Warrant was drafted after a glance at that of January 17, 1859, and in forgetfulness of the difference of circumstances. In that case, all succeeding Warrants issued at the beginning of reigns have been incorrect, except perhaps that of the present book, as it may be that a Warrant which expires at a sovereign's death can survive an abdication.

But the 'Cornwall and York' book had only a lifetime of less than ten months, and its Accession Service was never used. On November 9 the Duke was created Prince of Wales, and new Prayer Books were required.

Now it is necessary to retrace our steps. It had long

been felt that there was something unsatisfactory about the Accession Service. It had no authority either from Convocation or Parliament; it rested solely on the Warrant; and many Churchpeople felt scruples about letting it oust the normal Prayer Book services for the day. This feeling was particularly strong in that section of the Church which attached importance to festival and weekday services. Others, who felt less keenly on the question of authority, had little use for other than Sunday services The result was that no party in the Church felt it a point of honour to use the service, and it fell largely into desuetude. In 1898 Convocation appointed a Joint Committee to revise the forms, and the result of its deliberations took, in the book of November 1901, the place of the James II. service, which had held its ground since the days of Queen Anne. The Warrant this time was perfectly in order. It directed that the Warrant of January 1901 should be revoked and the service no longer used, but that the new service should be printed and annexed to the Book of Common Prayer and used instead.

Before describing the new service it will be convenient to relate the subsequent history of the Warrant. George V. in 1910, Edward VIII. in 1936, and George VI. in 1937 issued their Warrants, each withdrawing the service previously in use, and each professing to set up a new service in lieu of its predecessor. Nor is this all. On June 23, 1910, the present Duke of Windsor was created Prince of Wales; on November 20, 1925, Queen Alexandra died. On each of these occasions it was thought necessary to issue a new Warrant, withdrawing the service previously in use and substituting precisely the same service, with the one omission already covered by the Order in Council affecting the rest of the Prayer Book. This was evidently done under a misapprehension of the circumstances of the Warrant of November 1901. The strange thing is that the Home Office, after its attention had been invited to these mistakes, declined to remedy them.

The service itself is in all our Prayer Books. It is a great improvement on the old one. Provision is made for Morning and Evening Prayer, Litany, and Holy Communion. The Proper Psalms are xx., ci., cxxi. The Proper Lessons are Joshua i., the first ten verses, or Prov. viii., the first seventeen

verses, and Rom. xiii., the first eleven verses, or Rev. xxi. 22 to xxii. 4 inclusive. The suffrages after the Creed are shorter and simpler, and vary less from the usual; and after, not instead of, the Collect for the day comes a new Collect from the Coronation Service. Two prayers, one for the King and Royal Family, the other for the King alone, and the beautiful Prayer for Unity are to be said in the Litany in the place formerly appointed, if it is a Litany day, otherwise instead of the usual State prayers. At the Holy Communion the Collect, which is to be instead of that of the day, is to be the same as at Morning Prayer, and the Epistle and Gospel are to be as in the old Order.

But there is one great innovation, the result of a petition signed by leading theologians of Oxford and Cambridge. A form is provided, dissociated from all the existing services, and intended to be used by itself. It begins with the Te Deum, divided into three sections: the second begins with the verse 'Thou art the King of Glory, O Christ'; and the third with the verse 'O Lord, save thy people; and bless thine heritage.' Then follow the special suffrages and collects, and the blessing brings the service to a close.

There are some adverse criticisms which must be made at once. The title is inferior to that of the old Office. Neither in the Table of Contents, nor in the List of Festivals, nor in the heading of the service itself, is the day mentioned; search has to be made in the comparatively small print of the Royal Warrant itself before we can learn that it is the Eleventh Day of December, nor is there any allusion to His Majesty's 'happy Reign.' The suffrages after the Creed provide a trap for the unwary: the first, with its response, and the second, are as usual, but the response to the second is different. After several special suffrages have been said there is a return to the normal forms, but the last is, rather unaccountably, different. But in every other respect we note a great improvement. There is real Church authority for the forms; they displace nothing of importance; and in the Holy Communion Service a rubric provides that if the day fall on a Sunday or holiday the Sunday or holiday shall have precedence, and the accession only 'commemorated.' The psalms and lessons are admirably chosen, and the prayers, though shorn of some of the redundant eloquence of Caroline

times, have a majestic harmony of their own, and are far better than much of what was suggested in 1927 and 1928.

It may be well to add a note with regard to the mention in the Prayer Book of members of the Royal House other than the sovereign. The general rule is to name the consort, the living consort of a deceased sovereign, and the heir apparent with his consort. The wives of George I. and George IV were never mentioned as Queen, though Caroline of Brunswick had been prayed for as Princess of Wales. James II., Mary II., Anne, 'the Princess Sophia,' Electress of Hanover, and His present Majesty were, like Princess Elizabeth, prayed for while heirs presumptive. William III., George I, William IV. and Victoria did not appear till their accession 'Frederick, the Prince Elector Palatine, and the Lady Elizabeth his wife' in James I.'s time, and in George II.'s 'the Duke, the Princesses,' are instances of persons not in the line of succession being mentioned.

I would plead for a more general use of these forms when December 11 comes round. The monarchy of this country is the surest bulwark of freedom now existing in the world. Its destruction would be a calamity, not only to our own country and the Empire of which it is the heart, but to the civilisation of mankind. We believe that we can trace the hand of Divine providence in the reverence and love that gathered round the Throne during the last 100 years, and not least in the staying power which enabled it to stand fast amid the tempests that threatened it on December 11, 1936. When the first anniversary of that momentous day comes round, let these prayers, praises and thanksgivings rise from every cathedral and collegiate church, from the chapel of every college and school, and from every parish church in the land. We might even add the hope that, as there is nothing in any of these forms inconsistent with the beliefs of many Christian people outside the Church of England, they too may be able to use them with heart and voice. 'The Lord hath done great things for us already, whereof we rejoice.'

T. Erskine Swanzy.

THE CHILDHOOD OF AN IRISHMAN

By Patrick Kavanagh

II.

On summer evenings when school was over, with the two Gorman lads who were about my age (six or seven, perhaps), I played: dark, cryptic games sometimes.

One of our principal pastimes consisted in catching bees as they sipped the honey from the tiny blue forget-me-nots and dandelions which grew on the slope of the railway. We were cruel. We held the bees by the wings and stuck pins through the eyes of the poor creatures till they died. Then we held a wake, had pipes and tobacco and whisky. We held a funeral and buried the deceased bees, match-box coffined, in pyramids of dust on the laneway.

We gave them a Pharaoh glory. But there was one notorious iconoclast in the district who, driving each evening in his cart, made it his business to draw the cartwheel through our pyramidic grandeur. We had no answer; he knew it and laughed. He reckoned without the strategic genius of John Gorman, who was a little older than me.

'Leave Charlie to me,' he said knowingly.

My strategic genius rolled a huge boulder of stone on to the middle of the road and over it raised a pyramid of dust. It was by far the finest memorial we had ever seen.

We saw Charlie coming in his cart singing; he could only sing to the accompaniment of a rattling cart. We hid behind the fence and waited.

Charlie leaned over the sideboard, one eye shut, taking aim with the wheel: he wanted to cut the heap of dust exactly in the centre.

'Oh, damn to their skins,' he roared as the cart jolted and turned, horse and all, over on its side.

He fell into a heap of nettles, but it was our laughter that stung him most.

John Gorman was a naturalist in his fashion. One evening in April or May he climbed a beech tree where there was a woodpigeon's nest with eggs in it. As he climbed down very gingerly I noticed that one of his pockets was full.

'What are you up to?' I asked.

'Never you mind,' he said, 'but I'll tell you what you're to do. You don't let the woodpigeons near the nest or tree till I come back.'

He ran off towards his home while I sat under the tree keeping my eye skinned for the homing woodpigeons. They did come, but I shooed them off every time till my companion arrived.

He had pigeon's eggs in his cap.

'I'm after boiling them' he said, 'and now we'll put the eggs back in the nest and see what'll happen.' He did so.

The hen pigeon came and sat on the eggs and the cock looked on, now and then tooting a tune that made the cuckoos envious. He nor his wife did not suspect the impending tragedy. We kept the nest under close observation—or at least, my companion did; every evening after school he watched it, and if I wasn't there kept me in touch with events.

'She's sitting on them still,' he informed me four weeks later. John never tired of watching the pigeon on the boiled eggs. At the end of the month he again told me the pigeon was still hatching in hope.

For three or four months the pigeon sat on the eggs; we could only see her beak over the brim of the nest. Then one day came and we saw no beak.

'I'll go up and investigate,' John said. He went up. As he propped himself between the forked branches near the nest he shouted down.

'Be cripes, do you know what?'

'What happened?' I shouted up.

'There's what happened,' he said as he pitched the woodpigeon's nest right at my feet.

The pigeon was dead and rotten; there were no eyes in her sockets; she must have been dead a long time. The boiled eggs fell on the soft tufted grass and were unbroken.

'She hatched till she died,' John said. 'Did you ever hear of better?'

'I never did,' I agreed.

* * * * *

When I was six years old, or thereabouts, I went to Confession. Nobody told me to go. The children didn't go in a body as they do now. The initiation rite wasn't organised. I can't say why I wanted to confess my sins, and I don't think they weighed heavily on my soul.

Father MacElroy, an old white-haired and deaf priest, was in the Confessional.

'What sins do you remember?' he said.

'I committed adultery.'

'You committed what?'

'Adultery,' I said out loud.

After a pause he continued:

'Any other sins?'

'I stole.'

'What did you steal?'

'Sixpence.'

'Who did you steal the sixpence from?'

'From the press,' I explained.

'Well now you mustn't steal from the press any more,' he advised me tenderly. 'And for your penance,' he hurriedly summed up, 'for your penance you'll say . . . no you'll come in and serve my Mass on Sunday.' My father taught me the Latin and the next Sunday I began to serve Mass. I was very poor at the business, and tripped and stumbled against all sorts of projections.

'That's the fellow was breaking stones on the altar,' some fellow sneered as I was going home.

Father MacElroy was an old-time priest. The people looked upon him as a saint, though they'd have been better pleased with him if he'd use 'his powers.' He would have then come in very useful in times of sickness among both cattle and Christians.

Father Pat, the curate, did go in for the cures. He was an old priest too. From the altar he was in the habit of using strong language, such as 'A pack of whore's bastards.' This was what he called the designers of the low-necked blouse

which the women were beginning to wear. The whole congregation laughed.

'Yes,' he said on another occasion, 'when you have a child sick you'll come for the penny doctor.'

The penny doctor was himself.

Sometimes he lectured on theology. His lectures consisted in repeating that 'The people that are going now are as ignorant as box-barrows.'

Father Pat was a hard man on Mass-servers, so hard that in the end none of the lads would serve for his Mass. If we talked while he was vesting he knew punishments that would have taken the light out of Torquemada's eyes. He would make us lie on the floor with our noses on the tiles without moving for five minutes. We were like faithful Moslems at sunset, except that we didn't face Mecca. He addressed me as 'Cobbler' and had me face the congregation one Sunday and demonstrate how to draw a waxed-end.

A priest can't say Mass without a clerk; and then came a morning which found Father Pat in this dilemma. Up and down through the aisles he marched peering in and out between the legs of big men, where he knew he might find a truant clerk; and he spotted me.

'Ha, Cobbler,' he grinned, 'come out here!' And he put over his hand and caught me by the ear. He led me up to the altar by the ear as a man would lead an unhaltered colt.

Father MacElroy made long, long sermons on all sorts of subjects. If he had lived he might have given a tight race to Huey Long for the speech-marathon championship of the world. The patient hearts of his hearers were broken; but what could they do? Going home on his side-car he would shout: 'Did I do that well, Biddy?'

'Oh, it was grand, Father. God bless you; it was grand!'

On Candlemas Day, 1916, I was serving Mass for Father MacElroy. I think I had helped him to bless the candles, though I'm not sure, but at any rate I helped to sell them. There was a brisk demand. At the end he gave me a blessed candle for myself and sixpence. I bought the morning newspaper, which cost a halfpenny, and turned for home. On the road near the chapel I met a little boy. I knew him, but, just to let him know, I asked him who he was. He was a Protestant, the son of a Church sexton, who every Sunday

rang the Protestant church bell, which had a sound like a cracked pot, we used to say. The lad didn't give me a suitable reply, so I began to use third-degree methods. He ran into his father crying: 'Daddy, daddy, I'm choked.' I didn't try to choke him. I was frightened and ran for it. I had got a start of a few hundred yards when, looking round, I saw the church sexton taking, as it were, the range. He hitched up his pants and came hot-foot after me. I ran. All the people I met stared at me, wondering what mischief I had done. I wasn't thinking; I was merely running. Behind me my pursuer was gaining ground; he was within fifty yards now. I met a man going with his horses to plough, and Mr. Sexton shouted: 'Stop him, stop him; he choked my son!'

The ploughman looked upon this act of mine as a recommendation. 'I'll not stop him,' he roared, 'but I'll stop you, you Orange dog!'

And he did hold him up sufficiently long to let me get a fresh start. He came again like a bear robbed of her whelps —fifty yards behind.

> Anigh draws the chase,
> With unperturbed pace.

I met a half-wit. Willie shouted, not 'Stop him'—he was wiser now. 'Who is he?' he asked.

'That's young Kavanagh,' the half-wit replied. I was vexed, yet had I but known it I was saved.

My pursuer ceased running now that he knew who I was. He walked towards my home. I crossed the hills and hid away among the whins for a while. When, as I thought, the storm had blown over, I went down the warm green face of the hills and home. I was shocked. The church sexton was standing on our kitchen floor quoting bits out of the Bible. My parents were showing great deference to him. Tom Hales, a journeyman shoemaker who hailed from Belfast, was hopping with religious rage on his seat and hammering away at his last like a madman.

'Will you come here at once, you blackguard?' my mother whined affectedly. 'Will you come here and tell us what you've done?'

The sexton cross-examined me!

'Did you meet my Bob at our gate?'

'I didn't pass your gate,' I said. 'I came across the hills.'

'Eight—thou shalt tell no lie,' he texted. 'In our religion the first thing we're taught is to tell the truth.'

He got no satisfaction out of his race and I got no beating. There were some—and the journeyman was one—who said I should get a medal for my deed.

'I never took you to be the man you are,' Tom Hales said. 'You stood up for religion as good as any Belfast Catholic ever did.'

* * * * *

We were sitting around the fire one winter's evening when the latch of the door was lifted and a head all wrapped up in bandages appeared in the lamplight.

'Come inside,' we called, and he came in.

'I was looking for Harry MacElroy's,' he explained.

'I was just thinking as much,' my mother said. 'On yer head ye have it, God bless it!'

'On me head it is,' he agreed.

The man had erysipelas, popularly known as 'the rose.' Harry MacElroy was believed to have the cure for the disease in his touch, and he had a practice large enough to fill any doctor with envy. As our house lay along the road leading to Harry's we had many callers inquiring the way. They came from as far distant as twenty miles because there was no other MacElroy willing to make the cure; it was unlucky, they said. Our present visitor had come a long way on foot and, being tired, we bade him sit down. There were a few other visitors in the house and the arrival of this other naturally turned the conversation on cures and charms and such like.

'No matter what they tell ye, no doctor can cure "the rose",' one said.

'Indeed, they cannot,' they all acquiesced.

'I remember a fella once tryin' his hand out with a doctor,' one of the journeyman shoemakers said, dropping his boot; he could never work and talk at the same time.

'And he got cured?' somebody else asked with contempt.

'Oh, he got cured in the right-out style,' said the shoemaker. 'He wore the suit of dale-boards when the doctor was finished with him!'

'Of course,' my mother said, 'the doctors know righ well they can't cure "the rose".'

'To be sure they know it,' a customer said, 'but the wouldn't give in.'

'Some of them agree to the cure,' my father said. 'Ther was oul' Doctor McKenna and he always sent for Harr whenever he got a case like that.'

'The divil thank him,' the journeyman shoemaker said picking up the boot which he had been stitching. 'The divi himself thank him,' he repeated, spitting out.

'Does Harry take anything?' the man with the bandage head inquired cautiously.

'He's not too hard to deal with,' my mother told him.

'About how much would he be expecting?'

'Anything from half a crown up,' he was told.

'I'd better be goin',' he said, rising from his chair.

My mother accompanied him to the door and directe him to Harry's house.

'The second house on yer right with the gable facin' th road—ye can't miss it; God send ye good luck!'

'Thank ye, thank ye,' he said, moving off. When he ha gone we fell to discussing all the diseases doctors couldn' cure and all the complaints of cattle which baffled th veterinary surgeons.

'See the harmless stye on the eye, and, if ye hadn't th cure made, it would stick to you for ever.'

'Aye, and if the cure wasn't made in the moon that th stye came in the bleddy little nuisance would keep comin' bac till that moon came again.'

'There's the water-beetle, and nobody but the Cassidy has the cure of it.'

'I remember,' my father began, 'how our cow took sic and swelled up like a barrel. I knew the Cassidys wouldn' give in to makin' the cure, so one early mornin' I stole roun Cassidy's house and found a piece of rag which I burne under the cow's nose.'

'That was as good a way as any,' someone interjected 'She got all right, I warrant.'

'She did,' my father agreed, 'but the funny part of th story was that the bit of rag I burned wasn't belongin' to a Cassidy at all; it was a leg of the servant-boy's trousers.'

All heads bowed humiliated: nobody liked the end of the story; it was heretical.

'Well, what d'ye think of Father Pat?' my father was asked.

'I believe he has power,' he said.

'Ye believe it! Are ye not sure of it?' the journeyman shoemaker said, dropping his boot once again.

'I've only hearsay to go on,' my father said.

'Hearsay?' the journeyman said, reaching away from his bench as though striving to reach the land of certain certainty. 'What about Biddy Moran's Katie, eh? What about her?'

'What about her yourself?' my father asked.

The journeyman was disgusted and withdrew from the land into which he was trying to project his body. He lifted his boot and commenced hammering away like mad.

'Keep yer hair on,' he was advised.

'There's some people,' he growled, 'and they believe nothin'; no more religion in them than a dog.'

PATRICK KAVANAGH.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Oxford Limited, by Keith Briant (Michael Joseph Ltd., 10*s*. 6*d*.).

When a book is written on an institution, the direct influence of which the author believes himself to have escaped, one may be pardoned for regarding it as to some extent a personal document. Mr. Briant reiterates that *Oxford Limited* is not in the nature of an autobiography. It is strange that he should, in view of his obvious capacity and the nonsense upon cognate topics so consistently produced by disgruntled public-school boys, be so shy of admitting the limitations imposed by his own circle.

The early part of the book, which is unfortunately likely to be of first interest to the general public, may be true of some of Oxford after six o'clock. But there is another and more satisfying aspect which will never find its place in the Press—that of the fields, woods and lanes which embrace the city, to which, save in Chapter III., the author hardly refers.

Oxford Limited delighted the gutter Press. Here was a new book about Oxford, with descriptions of alcoholic and other orgies, supported by impressive statistics. It was eagerly 'splashed.' It is to be hoped that Mr. Briant felt some remorse, for the outcome can scarcely have been a surprise to him or his publishers. The world of broken sherry glasses and contraceptives does exist, but it would be far from the truth to suggest that a majority of boys who go up sow their wild oats so extravagantly.

The average undergraduate, we are told, does not exist; he is then discussed. The author rightly assures us that Oxford has lost none of her power to mould the outlook of youth. He defines sharply the exhilarated curiosity of the

First Year—the cynicism of the Second, and the Possibilities of the Third. What he terms, perhaps despite some half-forgotten awe, the 'Checked Windbag' is surely no real danger to the University as a whole. A noisy group of idiots, to quote Lady Astor, is to be found in each college, but these simple Bacchanalians perhaps serve as a useful example to those who would otherwise sit on the fence between self-indulgence and scholarship

The author's attack on the proctors is largely merited The University officials have shown signs in recent years of being perturbed by the changed interests of undergraduates and have often concentrated on quite trivial details of conduct, rendering less good-natured the healthy differences between freedom and authority The author, who has a code though he might be ashamed to confess it, expresses fears with regard to undergraduates' interest in sex which seem, to the present reviewer, exaggerated and unjustified. Although we shall refuse to consider as either reliable or important the elaborate network of percentages which he gives us in this connexion, we may be grateful for a timely exposure of the materialism which typifies our universities. Before the war, poetry was the predominant interest of intelligent young men; to-day, dogmatic politics have supplanted the Muse, and University journalism is often marked by a gawky sententiousness. With regard to the statement that snobbery is less prevalent to-day at Oxford, Mr. Briant might be reminded that the *Isis*, of which he was, for some time, the successful editor, only recently found that, by cramming in the maximum quantity of undergraduates' names into each number, it could command a considerable increase in circulation

Oxford women, the author suggests, are on the whole to be admired. They are still subject to restrictions which would arouse derision, and even anger, in any other country than our own. If, as seems proven, the girls who fight their way to Oxford utilise their time more conscientiously than young men of the same age, it is a pity that the authorities behave so frequently as though they were fighting off the horrors of promiscuity.

It is doubtful whether the Oxford Group exercises in the University even the little influence which Mr. Briant ascribes

to it. Modern Oxford has principles, but they are not, for the most part, those of Organised Religion. That everything is preposterous, excluding himself, and that 'there is no new thing under the sun,' are, for the average undergraduate (for there *is* such a person), among the accepted postulates of his existence. The result is a well-ordered profligacy which should be reassuring to the older generation if immediately distressing to the Minister for War. How satisfying would it be to see this energy diverted into less self-conscious channels! Facilities for physical education in Oxford are still disgracefully inadequate. Swimmers are forced into old-fashioned council baths, and boxers into the gloom of a hired gymnasium. This is hardly an encouragement to boys, fresh on the rebound from school discipline, to approach that reasonable standard of physical fitness which would without doubt affect the whole tone of University thought.

What should alone commend this book as a critique of modern university life is Mr. Briant's onslaught on that school of thought which regards three years at a university as an invariably good investment. Oxford can be little more than a teashop to some who demand no more of her, and she can also brand many others with an indelible mark. How often have we not met the nonentity in the wrinkled blazer with the sole excuse to himself and to the world that he is, after all, an Oxford man! We can feel less pity for him than we can for the moneyed fool who once disgraced a college to satisfy a family tradition.

Oxford has benefited signally in the last few years by native generosity, and her Governors, whether mediævally organised or not, seem aware of a peril lest the function of the University degenerate into that of a mere technical institute. It is to be hoped that probable reaction against an 'efficiency' education will not mean further delay in the reform of more than one course of studies. Though it is pleasant to hear of Cambridge dons rejoicing that higher mathematics can be put to no useful purpose, it should be possible for undergraduates to feel a real conviction that their studies are more than mental gymnastics.

WILLIAM DROWER.

The Immortal Heritage. An account of the work and policy of the Imperial War Graves Commission during twenty years, by Sir Fabian Ware, with an Introduction by Edmund Blunden. (Cambridge University Press, 1937, 2*s*. 6*d*.)

This little book arouses poignant memories which cannot fail to reawaken in the reader pride in his country, love of his fellow-men and hope that the living will be worthy of the million dead whose bodies have found fitting sepulture at the hands of Sir Fabian Ware and his staff. As a record of twenty years of close co-operation between all parts of His Majesty's Dominions and Possessions in the pious duty of ensuring reverent burial for those who died during the World War it merits the most careful attention, for in no previous war has such care been taken to preserve the individual memory of the dead.

Sir Fabian Ware, who has been at the head of the organisation from its first beginnings, aimed high, and has enabled us to set a standard for all other combatant Powers. He has succeeded in doing the best of things in the worst of times—namely, in maintaining intact, upon a strictly international basis, an Imperial organisation whose duties required it to be in closest touch alike with former foes and with old friends, and to achieve beauty and fitness in every place of burial with strict regard for economy in first cost and in maintenance.

Two points of general interest arise directly from this beautifully written and finely illustrated Report. The first is that the whole system of individual memorials is, as Sir Fabian Ware indeed emphasises, of comparatively modern growth. Until the middle of the eighteenth century only one grave in a hundred or more in this country was permanently marked. Bodies were usually buried uncoffined in shrouds and mingled quickly with the soil, so that the necessity for extending churchyards never arose. The professional soldier inherited this tradition and, left to himself, wisely said with Mæcenas, 'Non tumulum curo, sepelit natura relictos,' for there is no sadder sight than neglected military cemeteries which abound, especially in India.

The second is that the system excludes the modern (and

ancient) practice of cremation which is becoming increasingly general in all urbanised communities. (It is adopted in 50 per cent. of all deaths in Berlin.) So long as this practice is deprecated by Roman Catholics, abhorred by Moslems, and regarded with aversion by the masses of the people (it has not been widely adopted even in the cities of Soviet Russia), it is clearly necessary for Governments to dispose of those who die elsewhere than at sea by the single system which is satisfactory to all confessions (except Parsees and Hindus)—namely, earth burial.

A further point which arises is of even more general application. It is well known, though the necessary data are not to be found within the covers of the present volume, that the cost per grave of burials in the beautiful cemeteries established by the Imperial War Graves Commission, including architectural adornments and individual headstones, is smaller by far than the average cost of interment plus memorial stones in any civil cemetery or churchyard in this country After full allowance is made for the cost of the land acquired for the purpose of civilian graves, it is clear that unity of administration and uniformity of design have very great advantages which, if applied to our own cemeteries, might make them as inspiring and beautiful as they now are for the most part depressing and drab. And the costs of maintenance are, in proportion, but a small fraction of the charges made by our municipal cemeteries.

This book, then, is not only a historical record and a milestone, but also a sign-post, pointing the way to a similar achievement in other spheres. 'Man,' said Sir Thomas Browne, 'is a noble animal, splendid in ashes, and pompous in the grave.' Sir Fabian Ware and his colleagues have endowed the old saint's eloquence with reality.

ARNOLD WILSON.

Erasmus and Holbein, by A. K. Bruce (Frederick Muller, Ltd., 1936 5*s*. net).

This delightful little book, by a student and a lover of both the great men with which it deals, deserves to be on the table at every prize-giving: it would too often be, alas, in such a position, an oasis in an arid wilderness of unreadable and obsolete

books. It is the quintessence of Desiderius Erasmus, explained and displayed by the briefest quotations His industry was immense. He desired to change many things, but his ideal was reanimation rather than reformation: he would have agreed with the old pagan adage, '*Religentem esse oportet, religiosum nefas*' ('A man should be religious, not superstitious'), but, in his abhorrence of superstition, hid from his eyes what Gibbon calls 'The exquisite rancour of theological hatred.'

His work as a pioneer of textual Biblical criticism by his edition of the New Testament is overshadowed by the popularity of his *Colloquies* and *In Praise of Folly*. The last named, known as *Moriae Encomium*, was written in Thomas More's house in Bucklersbury, in the City of London, in 1510: over a century later, in 1628, Milton found it in everyone's hands at Cambridge. It certainly owed something of its fame to the inexhaustible humour of the author's host, one of the most exquisite scholars ever produced by a Teutonic people. It owed yet more to the fifty or more 'curious cuts' with which it was embellished by Hans Holbein, of which Mr. Bruce here gives an affectionate and withal penetrating account.

An English translator of 1709 commended the work to his readers in terms which ring true after a lapse of over two hundred years:

> De Wit, Trump, Ruyter, easily were beat,
> Their ships from ours so naturally retreat
> Erasmus only does remain unconquer'd yet
> That name alone (worthy the Noblest Muse)
> Does from Disgrace and Utmost Scorn excuse
> His Youthful, Neatest, Stile atones for all
> Their clumsiness, a Sin that's National
> In Comick Dress he gravely preaches Sense,
> Directs, and jeers, and chides his Audience
> O'er Thoughts profound Mirth dances all the Way,
> Like the Sun-beams that on deep waters play

ARNOLD WILSON.

WALKS AND TALKS

By Sir Arnold Wilson, M.P.

I have seldom had greater opportunities for seeing something of my countrymen in different parts of England than during the past month, for duties of one sort or another took me to Wigan, Liverpool, Buxton, Ilkley and Hull in the north, to Coventry, Birmingham and Cambridge, and to half a dozen villages and towns in Hertfordshire. The contrast between the speech and outlook of the respective communities was as marked as between different parts of the American continent: local rather than national institutions were the objects of pride and interest. The panic cries of the popular London Press in relation to foreign affairs were not echoed in the North of England: the studied moderation, coupled with firmness, of the Prime Minister at the Mansion House, accurately reflects the outlook, at least of the Midlands and the North. It was an inspiring experience to address 900 men of a Men's Fellowship at Hull upon 'Britain and Germany.' Community singing came first—culminating with 'Ilkley Moor' and (all standing, to the tune of 'Eternal Father, strong to save') Kipling's *Recessional*; there were few in the audience, it seemed, who did not know it by heart It was an encouragement, after an address lasting almost an hour, to have a series of questions put from the body of the hall, every one of which was pithy, pointed, and courteous, from men, mostly young, who had clearly not allowed their minds to be warped by headlines in the papers or news-bills in the streets.

We English have acquired in the last hundred years or so the habit of regarding food for anything but the stomach as a luxury. In the Press and in Parliament attention is directed to every social service for adults except that of the mind

THE

NINETEENTH CENTURY

AND AFTER

XIX- -XX

A MONTHLY REVIEW

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Milton believed that the universe was made to the sound of music. When he wrote

> ' The sons of morning sung
> When the Creator great
> His constellations set
> And the well-balanced world on hinges hung,'

he was but repeating the words of Job (xxxviii. 7) and of the Psalmist. When during the war concert parties were first sent out we were astonished at the joy of those before whom they played and at the deep appeal of music, vocal and instrumental.

The B.B.C. have brought many things into the homes of nearly everyone, but men and women care as much as ever for things they can enjoy together: they wish to see and hear flesh and blood before them, not to listen to disembodied spirits. Hence the growing appeal of Men's Fellowships, of which that of West Hull is a recent and creditable example.

* * * * *

The Technical College at Wigan, offering facilities for instruction in a great variety of subjects, revealed another aspect of vigorous local life, drawing strength from every stratum of society and evoking much unsuspected talent, particularly in drawing and painting. I never miss a chance of going down a pit and, at Wigan, was able to add a little to my meagre knowledge of the technique of England's basic industry. Close to the mine, which employs 1500 men, was a good example of a modern pit-head bath installation, a triumph of careful planning which has done much, and will in time do more, to lower the barrier which separates mining from other occupations.

At prize-givings at a secondary school for boys at Coventry and for girls at Smethwick the veil which separates the public from the academies was for a time drawn aside, to display teachers convinced that the examination system is one of their principal handicaps, and that it requires drastic change. Youths, full of individualistic *joie de vivre*, are inclined to leave school the moment they have got their certificate in the not wholly unjustified belief that they can learn more in the world than at a school which is fettered by examinations.

Many parents and employers deplored, in conversation

with me, the decay of the apprenticeship system. Masters and men alike wished to see a concerted effort made to restore it, but found it difficult to suggest how a beginning should be made.

* * * * *

In the North of England, and in Hertfordshire, I was brought into touch during the month with one of the most widespread of English hobbies—the keeping of carrier-pigeons. As an organised sport it is a recent development, for the first regular races in this country date from 1881, though it was in practical use in the East from the earliest times. It is a popular and plebeian hobby indulged in, like bell-ringing, only by wage-earners, but there are probably as many pigeon-fanciers now as at any time in our history. I hope later on to find out, and perhaps record in these pages, more about it

* * * * *

'Two seventeen-year-old boys summoned under the Vagrancy Act, 1824 (as rogues and vagabonds for betting by way of wagering or gaming on the highway), said they were guilty, one of them adding: "We were only playing for half-pennies, and we had only 1½*d.* between us." A police-constable said he was on motor patrol duty when he saw defendants playing pitch and toss on the side of the road. From one boy he took two half-pennies and the pitching stick, and from the other boy one half-penny. The Chairman said that the Bench wished to point out that it was very wrong to gamble, particularly on the highway. He did not believe in gambling, and they certainly must not gamble on the highway "I know the amount of money was very small, but that is nothing to do with it. It is the principle at the bottom of the business you have to consider, and if you take my advice you will give up gambling and go in for some clean, healthy sport." If they were unfortunate enough to find themselves in such a position again, they would not, he added, receive such lenient treatment.'

These particular youths were dismissed with a caution, having been pilloried in the Press and lost at least half a day's work. What would their judges have said if they had been warned, let us say by the local vicar, of the evils of playing cards for money, or of backing dogs or horses? Boys see

pin-tables and the like at every corner, but, as they are for private profit, they are presumably sacred, and we are assured that but for betting the race-horse would disappear.

Football pools are growing apace, penetrating every borough and country parish, children being encouraged to hawk tickets, ostensibly 'in aid of Saint Mary's Football Club.' But to play for halfpence in a country lane is an offence so serious that all the stupid flummery of the law is invoked to enable superintendents of police to strain at a gnat. Perhaps, as Samuel Butler says, 'it makes it easier to swallow a camel now and then'

* * * * *

Not long ago I attended, in a great northern city, a service in Commemoration of the Centenary of Local Government, attended by the lord mayor and sheriff, members of the city council, and 'representative bodies.' The absence of the rank and file of salaried servants and weekly wage-earners was conspicuous, for the church was half empty. The sermon was uninspiring; the service not very appropriate. What most struck me was the great age of the city fathers—all must have been grandfathers at least. Here perhaps is one of the reasons why not more than one municipal elector in four is willing to record his vote. I fancy that there are far more members of Parliament under forty than county, borough, urban or rural district councillors. 'Youth movements' might well begin here: civic debt is accumulating rapidly—repayable, not by the generation that incurs it, but by their children and grandchildren.

* * * * *

Nearly a year has passed since it was announced that a National House Builders' Registration Council was to be formed, under the auspices of the Central Housing Committee of the Ministry of Health, to discourage 'jerry-building.' There was to be a sort of 'National Mark' scheme for good builders, on the lines of the existing National Mark for honest shopkeepers. The scheme seems to have had the effect of encouraging responsible authorities to evade some of their statutory responsibilities by sharing them with an advisory body without executive power.

'Jerry-building' is no new development, though the word itself dates only from 1869 and its origin is unknown. The Royal Commission of 1875 on Trade Depression received evidence from the Operative Bricklayers Society 'as to the scandalous system of jerry-building under which vast estates in South-east London are being covered with hovels the product of the leasehold system and the jerry-builder.'

The evidence tendered showed that there was lack of confidence and lack of enterprise; many houses, badly built, made by unskilled men at the lowest rates, stood empty. There was no doubt whatever that the quality of the work turned out by the building trade was lower than twenty years previously. Its fall was due to the permeation of the trade by unscrupulous and grasping men, who employed the cheapest labour and the worst material. In the building trade alone, bad contractors drove out good. Local authorities had powers of inspection, but they abused them shamelessly, putting in men who had neither knowledge of the trade nor, in some cases, honesty. Efficient inspection was strongly urged.

The Hammersmith secretary of the Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners gave a vivid example of the effect of bad workmanship which deserves quotation in full:

> A gentleman bought an estate calling it Bedford Park and laid it out for building in the Elizabethan style on plans by Norman Shaw. There was a great demand for these houses. Street after street was let or sold. The proprietor thought the work cost too much He discharged his journeymen and invited tenders from sub-contractors. Nigger-driving and scamping commenced; quantity, not quality, was demanded. The tenants found the ceilings fell, the doors would not shut, the windows did not keep the weather out. They ran away and operations stopped with the estate half covered. [December 1, 1885.]

There are degrees of jerry-building as of other forms of fraud, but the primary responsibility lies, as everyone in the building industry knows, on the local authorities. If they exercised their statutory powers, the jerry-built house would scarcely exist. But in many districts they do not do so, for reasons which do no credit to anybody, and Sir Harold Bellman [1] has seen houses built by a local authority 'in which

[1] Broadcast Talk, February 11, 1937.

weeds were growing through the boards on the ground floor and the joists were green and sodden with damp.' Building societies have done little to insist on proper standards: the prospective borrower has generally made his contract with the vendor before applying to a building society to lend him the money, and 'the object of a building society inspection is, not to make a catalogue of any defects in the property, but merely to ascertain whether the house is a reasonable security for the money to be loaned on it.'[2]

Complaints on this subject constantly reach me. The only way to get a house is to buy it by instalments, for in many areas there are none 'to let.' Here are some specimen letters which reached me after I had made a public reference to the subject:

> I am one of the unfortunates Every time it rains my bedroom walls are saturated inside, completely ruining the wallpaper; and although the house has been built only about two years, and has been occupied by me since August 1935, mildew is attacking the contents of the rooms and the next thing I am expecting is that wet rot will set in in the woodwork.
>
> Let those who are thinking of buying a house take warning from one who has 'been had'

Another letter was from a carpenter:

> The underlying cause is not so much cheap materials as cheap labour. Having regard to the slavery methods and undue stint used in practically all house-building of to-day, it is easy to see that even the best materials cannot be used to their proper advantage—let alone the cheap stuff.
>
> Craftsmen are not given sufficient time to do their work conscientiously
>
> I know of a firm which boasts of 'slapping' a roof on a pair of houses in a few hours. I have seen a house 'floored' from top to bottom by a semi-skilled man and boy in one and a half days. Needless to say, the amount of nails used could be held in the palm of the hand I have myself been 'sacked' for refusing to 'hang' fourteen doors in eight hours. I have seen doors 'hung' without the aid of screw-driver. I have seen picture-rails fixed without plugs, and last, but not least, I have been called upon to prop up a roof that had 'spread' 4½ inches.
>
> I had recently the experience of four months' 'maintenance' on a batch of eighty new houses. During that time I corrected an

[2] *Ibid.*

average of seven doors to a house, refixed forty-six mantelpieces, corrected thirty-seven gates, made up forty-nine deficient window-fittings, refixed twenty-seven pieces of picture-rail or 'skirting,' and attended to twenty-three airing cupboards!

At the time of my 'receiving my cards' for being too slow the occupiers were complaining bitterly of windows falling out, walls soaking wet, fencing collapsing, and defective electric or water systems.

A youth about to be married told me of his experiences. The contract included the words 'not responsible for shrinkage.' He had seen houses two years old where window-frames had shrunk leaving a gap of half an inch on either side The wainscoting had shrunk and was loose: the fireplace surrounds were falling down.

There were hundreds of houses just as bad, with a bit of tarred canvas for a damp-course, but such was the demand for new houses, thanks to new factories transferred from the North, that he had to take such a house, or not get married He envied his elder brother, who had a pre-war house, one in a long row in a mean street, but solid and cosy and well built with a 'proper back-yard' instead of a sodden waste of clay and builder's waste, miscalled a back-garden.

I asked the head of a Technical College in the provinces whether he could arrange a course of lectures, if necessary under the auspices of the W.E.A., on how to choose and buy a house, on hire-purchase, on industrial insurance and workmen's compensation. He laughed gently: 'You don't know our borough council,' he observed.

This is the other side of local government, of private enterprise, and other gods to whom, in the name of freedom, we pay lip-service.

ARNOLD WILSON.

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